On Angels

Question 2

On angels

Then there were two questions about angels:

first, concerning their action, namely, whether, whatever they do, they do through the command of the will;

second, concerning their place, namely, whether they can be in the dome of the empyrean heaven, which was asked also about glorious bodies.

Article 1

On the action of angels

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that whatever an angel does, he does not do through the command of the will.

Obj. 1: For the will relates equally to things near and remote. If, therefore, an angel were to act only through the command of the will, it would follow that for an angel to do something it would make no difference whether the thing on which it acts is near or far. And thus, it would never be necessary for an angel to descend from heaven to earth to do something here, which is contrary to the tradition of Sacred Scripture.

Obj. 2: Inasmuch as they pertain to the will, unity and multitude do not differ: for just as someone can will to move one thing, so he can will to move many things, or even the whole universe. If, therefore, an angel acts only through the command of the will, it would follow that he could move the whole universe, which is impossible since he is part of the universe. Therefore, an angel does not act only by the command of the will.

On the contrary: Every act is from some power. But in an angel there is no other power than intellect and will. Yet the intellect does not act except through the will. Therefore, every action of an angel is through the command of the will.

I answer that every action of every thing is through the form of that thing’s nature. For although some accidental forms are the principles of the actions of some things, it is necessary for actions of this sort to be reduced, as to a first principle, to the specific form of that acting thing, just as the action of the heat of fire is reduced, as to a first principle, to its substantial form, which is also the principle of all proper accidents of fire. And thus, it is necessary that it relate differently to actions of things having a simple nature and to actions of those having a composite nature: for if there is something having a simple nature, its every act will be according to the property and mode of its nature, which does not happen if it has a composite nature. For every action of fire is according to the property of the nature of fire, yet in a fire-heated knife there is a certain action not pertaining to the property of fire, namely, incision.

And this must be considered also in spiritual substances. For the human soul is not totally intellectual, but it participates in intellect. Hence there is in it some power and action which does not pertain to intellectual nature, as is especially clear in these things which pertain to the vegetative soul. But an angel is totally of an intellectual nature, and for this reason, it is necessary that its every action be according to intellect. Hence blessed Dionysius says in chapter four of On the Divine Names that angels have intellectual substances and powers and activities. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4.1 (PG 3:694).) Yet intellect does not act unless with the will mediating, because the motion of the will is the inclination following the intellectual form. Hence it is necessary that whatever an angel does, it does through the command of the will.

But nevertheless, it must be considered that, since power is a middle between essence and activity, it is necessary that the power and activity of every thing are proportioned to its essence. Hence a superior angel, whose essence is nobler, has also a more efficacious power, just as to understand, so also to act in exterior things. And according to this the action of an angel is limited to some effect because it has neither infinite power nor infinite essence.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the action of the angelic will is rooted in its essence, from which its power and activity proceed. Yet it is necessary that the mover be simultaneous with the mobile thing which is moved by it, as is contained in book seven of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 7.2, 243a22–23.) And for this reason, it is necessary that the substance of an angel somehow be conjoined to the things which it moves.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, because an action of the will is limited according to the mode of the essence, it is not necessary for an angel to be able to do everything which it can will.

Article 2

On the place of angels

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that an angel cannot be in the dome (Averroes, On the Heavens 1, comm. 100.) of the empyrean heaven.

Obj. 1: For Anselm says that nothing can be in nothing. (Anselm of Canterbury, Monologue 6–20 (PL 158:150–70); On the Fall of the Devil 10–11 (PL 158:337–41); On the Virginal Conception 5 (PL 158:438–39).) But nothing is outside the empyrean heaven. Therefore, an angel cannot be in the dome of the empyrean heaven: for thus he would be outside the empyrean heaven.

Obj. 2: It seems that neither can a glorious body be there. For it is necessary that every body be in a place; but outside the empyrean heaven there is no place. Therefore, a glorious body cannot be outside the empyrean heaven.

On the contrary: If either an angel or a glorious body cannot be there, either this is because one cannot ascend there, or because it cannot penetrate the profundity of the empyrean heaven, or because it lacks a containing place, or because it lacks a conserving place. (Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 37, a. 14, 26:247; Aquinas, In I Sent. 36.1.3, ad 5.) But all these are removed from the perfection of a glorious body, and much more from the condition of angels. Therefore, a glorious body and an angel can be in the dome of the empyrean heaven.

I answer that, to address this question, amongst the ancients there were two most probable opinions concerning place. One (Platonism.) was that place is a certain space or dimensions existing through themselves. And indeed, if this opinion were true, place would be due to body from the very fact that a body is a thing having dimensions, since it is necessary that these occupy some dimensions. But this opinion concerning place was reproved by the Philosopher in book four of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 4.1–2, 209a2–210a13.) Hence the other opinion is his, that place is the surface of a containing body. This is not, indeed, inasmuch as it is of the body which immediately contains it; otherwise, it would follow that a resting body would not always be in the same place: for example, if a man were standing in a river through whose flow the diverse surfaces of the water around him were renewed continuously. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 4.4, 212a16–20.) Rather, the surface of the body immediately containing it is a place in relation to the first container. Hence the same place is understood according to the same site to the first container, (Aristotle, Physics 4.4, 211b28–29, 212a21–27.) and on account of this, place is immobile, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 4.4, 212a18–21.)

Therefore, according to this opinion, which is true, the necessity of existing in a place befits a body because it depends upon the first container (and on account of this, the first container is not in a place except incidentally and according to its parts, as is said in the fourth book of the Physics). (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 4.5, 212a31–b22; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4, comm. 43.) Yet an angel does not depend upon the first container, nor even does a glorious body, which is perfected through the soul beatified from divine enjoyment. And for this reason, there is no necessity for a glorified body or an angel to be surrounded by some local body. Thus, nothing prohibits a glorified body or even an angel from being in the dome of the empyrean heaven.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that word of Anselm must be understood on the strength of the affirmation: for it is not possible for something to be in nothing as in a container. But that understanding does not apply to the present case.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that objection comes from a body which depends upon the first container.