On Man

On Spiritual Things

On Sacraments

Question 3

On baptism

Then must be considered what pertains to man:

and first, concerning spiritual things; (Qq. 3–9.)

second, concerning bodily things. (Q. 10.)

About spiritual things there was a question:

first, concerning sacraments; (Q. 3.)

second, concerning virtues; (Qq. 4–8.)

third, concerning sins. (Q. 9.)

About the sacraments there were two questions concerning baptism:

first, concerning the necessity of baptism, namely, whether a boy who is born in the desert where no water can be had, dying without baptism, can be saved in the faith of his faithful mother;

second, concerning an impediment to matrimony which arises out of baptism, namely, whether a Christian man, who baptizes a Jewish woman, to whom he had first given a promise in regard to contracting matrimony, if she were baptized, if he in knowing her carnally afterwards would consummate matrimony.

Article 1

On the necessity of baptism

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a boy who is born in the desert can, without baptism, be saved in the faith of his parents.

Obj. 1: For faith is not of lesser efficacy in the time of grace than in the time of the law of nature. But in the time of the law of nature boys were saved in the faith of their parents, as Gregory says. (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 2, resp.) Therefore, the same is true now in the time of grace.

Obj. 2: Through Christ the way of salvation has not been constricted for men, since he says: I have come in order that they might have life and might have it more abundantly (John 10:10). But before the advent of Christ some boys were saved in the faith of their parents. Therefore, much more now are they saved after the advent of Christ.

On the contrary: The Lord says: unless anyone should be reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven (John 3:5).

I answer that from that damnation which the human race has incurred on account of the sin of the first parent, no one can be freed unless through Christ, who alone is found immune from that damnation, namely, such that he should be incorporated to him as a member to its head.

Yet this can be done in a threefold way. The first, indeed, is through the reception of baptism, according to Galatians 3:27: all who have been baptized in Christ, have been clothed with Christ. The second is through the shedding of blood on account of Christ because through this also someone is conformed to the Passion of Christ, from which baptism obtains its efficacy; (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, tract. 5, ch. 6, 4:127.) hence it is said of martyrs that they washed their stoles in the blood of the lamb (Rev 7:14). The third way is through faith and love, according to the Proverb: through mercy and faith sins are purged (Prov 15:27); and in Acts 15:9 it is said: purifying their hearts by faith; and through faith Christ dwells in our hearts (Eph 3:17). Hence also baptism itself is called the sacrament of faith. (Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit 1.3.42 (CSEL 79:32; PL 16:714); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 3, ch. 4, p. 246 (PL 192:844); Augustine, Epistle 98, paras. 9–10 (CSEL 34:531–32; PL 33:364).) And according to this there is said to be a triple baptism, namely, of water, of spirit, and of blood, because the other two substitute for the baptism of water, provided, nevertheless, there is present the intention of receiving such baptism, namely, such that a crisis of necessity, and not contempt of religion, excludes the sacrament.

Yet it is clear that in boys not yet having the use of reason there cannot be a movement of faith and love or the intention of receiving baptism, and for this reason, they cannot be saved except through the baptism of water or through the baptism of blood: if they are killed on account of Christ, from which they are made not only Christians, but martyrs, as Augustine says of the Innocents. (Augustine, On Free Will 3.23, para. 68 (CCSL 29:315; PL 32:1304); Sermones dubii, sermon 373 and 375 (PL 39:1664, 1668).)

And thus, it is clear that a boy dying in the desert without baptism does not obtain salvation.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, according to certain men, in the time of the law of nature a motion of faith in the parents alone did not suffice for the salvation of their sons, but some exterior protestation of faith was required through some sensible sign. And according to this, what was required for salvation then differed nothing from what is required now, except that now that sensible sign is determinate, yet then it was indeterminate and presented as a pledge. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 1.2.6, qa. 2, ad 1; Commentary on Hebrews, on Hebrews 7:1, ch. 7, lect. 1, response.) The opinion of some is that only an interior motion of faith related to the salvation of the boy sufficed for the salvation of the boy. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 1.2.6, qa. 2; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 1, P. 2, a. 1, q. 2, 4:33–35.) Nevertheless, neither is the power of faith diminished now, but the grade of salvation is augmented because now those who are saved through Christ are introduced immediately into the kingdom of heaven, which then was not the case. Hence it is not unfitting if something more is required for this, namely, baptism, as is said in John 3:5.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that through Christ the way of salvation was widened for men in that through him the gates of eternal life were opened for them, which before had been closed through the sin of the first man.

Article 2

On the impediment to matrimony which arises out of baptism

To the second we proceed thus. It seems there cannot be matrimony between a Christian man and a Jewish woman baptized by him, whom he knew carnally after having given promise that he would contract.

Obj. 1: For it is said in the Decretum that the son of a priest cannot take as a wife a girl whom his father has baptized (C. 30, q. 1). (Rather: Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 30, q. 3, cc. 1–3, 1:1100–1101; cf. Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de matrimonio, cur. X. Ochoa et A. Diez (Rome: Commentarium pro religiosis, 1975), tit. 7, col. 943–44.) Therefore, much less, if he himself had baptized her, could he have her as his wife. If, therefore, that Christian man baptized the Jewish woman, he cannot receive her as his wife.

On the contrary: According to the laws, (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 1, c. 30, 2:672; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 28.1.2.) when carnal union follows after faith concerning contracting has been given through words of the future, matrimony is presumed by the presumption of law, (Henry of Segusio (Hostiensis), Summa aurea, bk. 2, “De presumptionibus,” 662.) against which proof is not admitted. And thus it is in the present case. Therefore, there is true matrimony.

I answer that spiritual kinship impedes contracting matrimony and dissolves that already contracted. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 42, a. 1, q. 2, 4:870b.) Yet it is clear that, because the Christian man baptized the Jewish woman, spiritual kinship is contracted between them because she is made his spiritual daughter. Hence subsequent matrimony is null, even if he contracts it expressly through words of the present, and even if carnal union should follow.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear. For what has been said concerning the presumption of law must be understood when some impediment to matrimony does not intervene.

On virtues

Regarding faith

Question 4

Regarding faith

Then there were questions concerning virtues.

And first, regarding faith, namely, whether the certainty of a heretic’s or bad Catholic’s adherence is an act of the virtue of faith itself; (Q. 4.)

second, concerning what pertains to religion or latria; (Q. 5.)

third, concerning what pertains to charity. (Qq. 6–8.)

Article 1

Whether the certainty of the adherence of a heretic or of a bad Catholic is an act of the virtue of faith itself

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the certainty of the adherence of a heretic or og a bad Catholic is an act of the virtue of faith.

Obj. 1: Because, according to the Philosopher in book two of the Ethics, there are three things in the soul: potency, passion, and habit. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 2.5, 1105b20.) But that certainty of adherence cannot be attributed to potency, since it merits either rewards or punishments, yet we do not merit rewards or punishments by potencies. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 2.5, 1106a6–10, 1105b31–1106a2.) Similarly, it cannot pertain to passions, because the passions pertain to the sensitive appetite, which cannot be extended to adhere to the truth divinely. Therefore, it remains that it pertains to some habit. But the habit to which the certainty of adherence pertains is the virtue of faith. Therefore, the certainty of adherence in a heretic or a bad Catholic is an act of faith itself.

Obj. 2: Everything which acts according to a likeness of something seems to act in virtue of it. But a heretic, adhering with certainty to what he believes, acts according to a likeness of faith because he adheres with certainty only inasmuch as he reckons that he has right faith. Therefore, he acts in virtue of faith, and thus it seems that that his certainty of adherence is an act of the virtue of faith.

Obj. 3: The whole firmness of the spiritual edifice is from faith, according to Matthew 7:25: the rivers came, the winds blew, and they could not move it, for it was founded upon a firm rock, namely, through faith. (John Chrysostom, On Matthew, homily 20, on Matthew 7:24–26 (PG 56:744); cf. Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 7:25, ch. 7, lect. 10; Catena Aurea on John, on John 1:42, ch. 1, lect. 25.) But certainty of adherence pertains to spiritual firmness. Therefore, it is an act of the virtue of faith.

On the contrary: What is not, cannot act. But in a heretic or a bad Catholic there is not the virtue of faith. Therefore, the certainty of adherence in them cannot be an act of the virtue of faith.

I answer that if someone treats what is common to many as proper to one, he is necessarily deceived. Yet certainty of adherence is not proper to the virtue of faith. The first reason, indeed, is because it accords with the intellectual virtues, for example wisdom, science, and understanding. The second reason is because it accords not only with true faith, but even with false faith: for just as there is true and false opinion, so also faith; nor does someone adhere less firmly to falsity than to truth, as the Philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 7.3, 1146b29–30.) The third reason is because certainty of adherence does not always arise from some habit. Rather, from his own choice someone can strengthen his assent to something true or false before he has a habit. The fourth reason is because certainty of adherence not only applies to formed faith, which is a virtue, but even to unformed faith, which is not a virtue.

It must be said, therefore, that in a heretic certainty of adherence is an act of false faith, yet in a bad Catholic it is an act of unformed faith. And thus, in neither is it an act of the virtue of faith.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that division of things in the soul is about the principle of action: for every activity of the soul is either from some passion, habit, or pure potency. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 2, lect. 5.) But certainty of adherence of this sort cannot be from passion. In a bad Catholic it is from the habit of unformed faith, while in a heretic it is either from the habit of perverse faith or from pure potency, which is the case at the beginning before he has acquired the habit: for it cannot be said that perverse faith is an infused habit. Yet if what is said, that we merit neither rewards nor punishments by potencies, is understood such that we merit neither rewards nor punishments by the very fact that we have potencies, then this is true. Yet if it is understood that pure potency cannot be the principle of meriting rewards or punishments, then it is true as regards meriting rewards, which cannot happen without grace. Yet it is not true as regards punishments, otherwise he who sins from the beginning, before he acquires a vicious habit, would not merit punishments.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that something can act according to a likeness of something in two ways: one way is according to a true likeness, and thus truly he acts somehow in virtue of it; the other way is according to an apparent likeness, and thus he acts in the appearance of that virtue, and so it is in the present case. Hence in a heretic certainty of adherence is an act of apparent faith, and not of true faith.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, just as the firmness of the spiritual edifice depends upon true faith, so also the firmness of the diabolical edifice proceeds from false faith.

On what pertains to religion or latria

Question 5

On what pertains to religion or latria

Then there were four questions regarding the act of latria or religion:

first, concerning the celebration of feasts, namely, whether it is licit to celebrate the feast of the conception of Our Lady;

second, concerning the discharging of offices, namely, whether a cleric who lives in the schools and has a benefice, with or without a curacy, is held to say the office of the dead;

third, concerning the giving of benefices, namely, whether a bishop is held to give a benefice to the better man;

fourth, concerning the paying of tithes, namely, whether some pauper is held to give tithes to a rich priest.

Article 1

On the celebration of feasts

To the first we proceed thus. It seems it is licit to celebrate the conception of Our Lady.

Obj. 1: For if it is not licit, this is only because she was conceived in original sin. But she was not conceived in original sin, as it seems, because the Blessed Virgin was made in order that in a special way she would be the dwelling of God. (Cf. Ephesians 2:22.) Therefore, she ought to have been prepared for this specially. Yet she was not prepared specially according to the body, which was conceived out of the mingling of the sexes, nor even as regards the soul, because others also are read to have been sanctified in the womb. And thus, it remains that she was prepared specially through immunity from original sin. And thus, it is licit to celebrate her conception.

On the contrary: It is a privilege said to belong to Christ alone to be conceived without original sin. Therefore, it does not apply to the Blessed Virgin, and thus her conception is not to be celebrated.

I answer that here two questions are introduced, one principal and another related one which it is necessary to determine first, namely, whether the Blessed Virgin was conceived with original sin.

It must be considered, therefore, that everyone contracts original sin from this: that they were in Adam according to the seed-like principle, as Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 10.20, para. 35 (CSEL 28:323–24; PL 34:424).) Yet all those were in Adam according to the seed-like principle who not only received their flesh from him, but also were propagated from him according to the natural mode of origin. The Blessed Virgin proceeded thus from Adam because she was born through the mingling of the sexes, just as all others. And thus, she was conceived with original sin and included in their totality, concerning which the Apostle says: in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12). From this totality only Christ is excepted, who was not in Adam according to the seed-like principle. Otherwise, if this were to be the case with someone other than Christ, that person would not need the redemption of Christ. And for this reason, we should not give so much to the mother that something is subtracted from the honor of the Son, who is the savior of all men, as the Apostle says (1 Tim 4:10).

Yet although the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin, nevertheless it is believed she was sanctified in the womb before being born, and for this reason, the diverse custom of the churches has grown up about the celebration of her conception. For the Roman Church and most others, considering that the conception of this same Virgin was in original sin, do not celebrate the feast of her conception. Whereas some, considering her sanctification in the womb, the time of which is unknown, do celebrate the conception: for it is believed she was sanctified immediately after conception and the infusion of the soul. Hence that celebration does not refer to the conception by reason of conception, but rather by reason of sanctification.

Thus, therefore, it is not because she was conceived without original sin that the abovementioned conception is to be celebrated. And this does not mean she was now prepared more specially than the rest. For in the sanctification itself she received the gift of grace more copiously than the rest: not only so that she would be purged from original sin, but so that her whole life would be rendered immune from every sin, mortal as well as venial, as Anselm says. (Anselm of Canterbury, On the Virginal Conception 18 (PL 158:451).)

Article 2

On the discharging of offices

About the second we proceed thus. It seems that a beneficed cleric who lives in the schools is held to say the office of the dead.

Obj. 1: For he who receives someone’s temporal goods is held to recompense him in spiritual goods. But that cleric received goods which belonged to the dead. Therefore, he is held to say the office of the dead for them.

On the contrary: He who receives less is held less. But the cleric who dwells in the schools receives less than those others who make their residence in a church, who receive daily distributions. (Cf. Hostiensis, Summa aurea, bk. 5, “De magistris,” para. 9, 1516.) Therefore, he is not held to say the office of the dead as they are.

I answer that (Cf. Hostiensis, Summa aurea, bk. 3, “De consecratione ecclesiae vel altaris,” d. 5, para. 22, 1186.) a cleric, from the very fact that he is a cleric, and especially one constituted in sacred orders, is held to say the canonical hours: for such men seem specially charged unto divine praise, according to that saying of Isaiah: everyone who invokes my name, I have created him unto my praise (Isa 43:7). But inasmuch as he is a cleric beneficed in this church, he is held to say the office according to the manner of that church. It must be considered, therefore, that sometimes the office of the dead is said in a church as something that ordinarily pertains to the office of that church. An example is when on the day of souls the office for the dead is said in the whole Church, and such as when in any church there is some special custom about this office: for example, that the office of the dead is said ordinarily once a week or however else according to a certain time. A cleric, even one living in the schools, is held to the offices of the dead of this sort if he is beneficed in such a church, and through this he makes satisfaction for the dead whose goods he receives. Whereas sometimes the office of the dead is said in a church extraordinarily, on account of some cause specially emerging, for example, for the prayers of some person or on account of something of this sort. A cleric living in the schools is not held to an office of the dead of this sort.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 3

On the giving of benefices

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that a bishop sins in giving a benefice to a good man if he passes over a better man.

Obj. 1: Because he who goes against conscience, paves the way to Gehenna. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 28, q. 1, c. 14, 1:1088.) But a bishop passing over a better man seems to go against conscience. Therefore, he sins mortally, paving the way to Gehenna.

On the contrary: Even according to the laws (Cf. Liber extravagantium dentalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 1, tit. 6, c. 32, 2:77–79; below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 4, a. 1, s.c., resp.) it suffices to give to a good man, if he be suitable, to serve in the Church.

I answer that someone can be called better in two ways. One way is absolutely, namely, because he is holier, having more charity. In another way, someone is called better in regard to something. Yet sometimes it happens that someone is better absolutely who, nevertheless, is not better in regard to what the benefice gains. For someone else, perhaps, can help the Church more either through counsel of wisdom, or through assistance of power, or because he has served in the Church. Therefore, a bishop is not held always to give to the better man absolutely, but he is held to give to the better man in regard to this. For it cannot be that he prefers one to another unless for some cause. If this cause pertains to the honor of God and the utility of the Church, then in regard to this he is better. Yet if that cause does not pertain to this, there will be the receiving of persons, which is so much the more grave as it is committed in divine matters. Hence the gloss of Augustine on the text: you sit here well (Jas 2:3), says: if we refer this difference of sitting and standing to ecclesiastical honors, it must not be thought to be a light sin in the receiving of persons to have the faith of the Lord of glory. For who would bear that a rich man be elected to a see of honor of the Church, while a holier and more learned pauper is scorned? (Glossa ordinaria, at James 2:3, 6.1275–76 (PL 114:673); Augustine, Letter 167, para. 18 (CSEL 44:605; PL 33:740); Bede, In epistolas septem catholicas (CCSL 121:193; PL 93:18).)

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 4

On the paying of tithes

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that a pauper is not held to pay tithes to a rich priest.

Obj. 1: That tithes should be paid was instituted for the sustenance of the ministers of the Church. But a rich priest has other sources whereby he is sustained. Therefore, tithes do not have to be paid to him, and especially from a pauper.

Obj. 2: In many lands, tithes are not paid, and prelates would correct this if men were held to pay tithes by necessity of divine law. Therefore, it does not seem that paupers especially are held to pay tithes to rich priests.

On the contrary (1) is that which the Lord says: it was necessary to do these, namely, judgment and truth, and not to omit those, namely, those which pertain to the paying of tithes (Matt 23:23).

Furthermore (2): The Pharisee says: I give tithes of all that I possess (Luke 18:12).

I answer that, as the Philosopher teaches in the fifth book of the Ethics, (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 5.4, 1131b32–1132a6.) the mean of justice is understood not only in reference to us, as in the other virtues, but also according to the thing, namely, because in other virtues the diverse conditions of persons are attended to, according to which the mean is diversified, such as about food which is much for one and little or moderate for another. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 2.6, 1106a36–b4.) But in justice the mean is not varied according to the diverse conditions of the person, but it is attended to only as to the quantity of the thing: for he who buys something ought to pay as much as he is able, whether he buys from a pauper or from a rich man. Yet to render what is due is an act of justice, and thus in this case rendering what is due to someone does not depend on whether he be rich or poor.

Yet tithes are due to priests in common according to natural law: for natural reason says that those who labor for the people in spiritual matters should receive stipends of their sustenance from the people. And thus, even in the New Testament this is sanctified by divine law: for, as it is said: the Lord has ordained those who announce the Gospel, that they should live from the Gospel (1 Cor 9:14). But in the Old Law by judicial precept there was taxed the quantity of what was paid by the people to the ministers of God, namely, a tithe, and also the Church has established this paying amongst the Christian people. Hence, since tithes are due to the priests both from natural law and from divine law and even from a statute of the Church, a pauper is still held to pay tithes to him even if the priest is rich.

Reply Obj. 1: It is necessary to respond in two ways.

In one way, it is said that the payment of tithes was instituted not only for the sustenance of the ministers of the Church, but also for the sustenance of the poor, to whom it is due to be provided for from the house of God. Hence it is said: bring in a tenth, so that there may be food in my house (Mal 3:10). And thus, for the priest who ought to provide not only for himself, but for the poor, however rich he be, tithes are necessary.

In another way, it can be said that the necessity of the sustenance of ministers was the reason for the ecclesiastical institution concerning the paying of tithes, but when something is due to a man through a statute of the Church, it does not matter whether he is rich.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, as Paul laudably did not exact the costs which were due to him on account of the preaching of the Gospel lest that would be made an impediment to the Gospel or a scandal to the faithful of Christ, (1 Corinthians 9:12.) nor, nevertheless, did they sin in not giving the costs which the Apostle remitted as due to himself, so also prelates of the Church act laudably by not exacting tithes in those lands in which on account of being unaccustomed they fear that scandal would be generated. Nor do they sin who do not pay tithes in those lands in which there is no custom. Yet they would sin if obstinately they refused to give to those exacting, and for this reason, so that priests might obviate this sin, in those lands they do not demand tithes. (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 3, resp.)

On certain things pertaining to charity

On obedience

Question 6

On obedience

Then there were questions concerning acts of charity:

and first, concerning obedience, namely, whether it is more meritorious to obey a prelate or to do something at the word of a brother; (Q. 6.)

second, concerning alms. (Qq. 7–8.)

Article 1

Whether it is more meritorious to obey a prelate or to do something at the word of a brother

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is more meritorious to obey a prelate than to do something at the word of a brother.

Obj. 1: For to greater merit is opposed greater demerit. But he who is disobedient to a prelate demerits more than he who does not assent to the word of a brother. Therefore, someone also merits more by obeying a prelate than assenting to the word of a brother.

On the contrary (2): Where there is greater humility, there seems to be greater merit because God *gives grace to the humble (*Jas 4:6). But it seems to belong to greater humility for someone to subject himself to an equal, doing something at his word, than for someone to subject himself to a superior, obeying a prelate. Therefore, it seems to be more meritorious for someone to act at the word of a brother than to obey a prelate.

I answer that an act can be called more meritorious in two ways.

One way is from the genus of the work, and thus that act is more meritorious which is of more excellent virtue. Yet it is clear that latria, through which someone serves God, is a more excellent virtue than beneficence, by which someone makes satisfaction to his neighbor, just as to love God is also more meritorious than to love a neighbor. Yet for something to be done at the word of a brother pertains to friendship or beneficence, by which someone loves his neighbor, while for him to obey a prelate, inasmuch as he is a minister of God, pertains to religion, by which someone worships and loves God. And for this reason, it is more meritorious for someone to do something obeying a prelate or observing a vow than to do something at the word of a brother.

In another way, some act can be called more meritorious because it proceeds from greater charity, although it be lesser by its genus. And thus, nothing prohibits him from meriting more who does something at the word of a brother.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, we concede the first.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that he who does something at the word of a brother acts of his own impulse. Hence it seems to be of lesser humility than obeying a prelate as a superior.

On alms

Question 7

On the alms of clerics

Then there was a question concerning alms:

and first, concerning the alms of clerics;

second, concerning alms which are made for the dead.

Article 1

Whether clerics sin mortally if they do not give away in alms what is superfluous for them

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that clerics sin mortally if they do not lavish in alms what is superfluous for them.

Obj. 1: Because, on the text: he who has two tunics, let him give to him who does not have any (Luke 3:11), the Gloss says: concerning the two tunics to be divided a precept is given, because if one should be divided, no one is clothed in half a tunic, and he who receives and he who gave remain naked. (Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 3:11, 5.734 (PL 114:252); Bede, On Luke, bk. 1, ch. 3 (CCSL 120:79; PL 92:354); Gregory the Great, On the Gospels, bk. 1, homily 20, para. 11 (PL 76:1165).) But the lavishing of one tunic is understood as the lavishing of what is superfluous to the necessity of life, as is clear through what is mentioned before in the same gloss. (Glossa interlinearis, at Luke 3:11, in Glossa ordinaria 5.734.) Therefore, to give superfluities is in a precept. But he who transgresses a precept sins mortally. Therefore, the one who does not give his superfluities to the poor sins mortally.

Obj. 2: A precept obliges more than a counsel. But to give all that one possesses is a counsel, and, nevertheless, a man is obliged to this in case of extreme necessity. Therefore, even outside a case of extreme necessity, someone is held to give his superfluities to the poor since this is in a precept. And thus, he who does not lavish, sins mortally.

Obj. 3: Whoever consumes what belongs to another is held to restitution. But the goods of clerics belong to the poor, as is clear through the gloss of Jerome on the text: robbery of the poor in your home (Isa 3:14). (Glossa ordinaria, at Isaiah 3:14, 4.56 (PL 113:1239); Jerome, On Isaiah 2.15 [2.3] (CCSL 73:54; PL 24:68).) Therefore, if clerics consume ecclesiastical goods uselessly, they are held to restore to the poor from another source, if they have one.

Obj. 4: Whoever makes himself impotent unto that which he is held to do sins mortally. But clerics, by making superfluous expenses, make themselves impotent unto assisting the poor, to which they are held. Therefore, it seems that they sin mortally.

On the contrary: There seems to be a custom which has prevailed amongst many.

I answer that it seems to be different regarding patrimonial goods and ecclesiastical goods. (Cf. Peter Abalard, Sermo de eleemosyna, sermon 30 (PL 178:564, 567); Gregory the Great, Book of Pastoral Rule 3.21 (CCSL 141; PL 77:87).)

For a man truly is lord of patrimonial goods or goods licitly acquired. Hence, as regards what pertains to the condition of the thing itself, he can use his own property as he wishes, and in this respect sin does not befall him. Nevertheless, sin can befall him from an inordinate way of using, either through superabundance, namely, when he consumes his own goods uselessly for that for which there is no need, or according to a defect, namely, inasmuch as he does not pay out for those things for which there is need. For virtue is corrupted in either way, as is said in the second book of the Ethics. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 2.7, 1107b8–14; 4.1, 1121a10–15.)

Yet clerics are not truly lords of ecclesiastical goods, but dispensers: dispensation has been credited to me (1 Cor 9:17). Yet it pertains to a dispenser to distribute faithfully those things committed to his dispensation: here now it is sought amongst the dispensers, that each be found faithful (1 Cor 4:2). In these things, therefore, sin can happen in two ways. One way is from the condition of the thing itself, namely, while he usurps a thing as though his own and converts unto his own uses what must be paid out to others. Another way is from the inordinate use of those things which fall in his part, just as also was said about other goods.

Truly, because the dispensation of these things is committed to the faith of the dispenser, as was said, if someone in good faith dispenses ecclesiastical goods, thence receiving what befits him according to the condition of state and person, and lavishes to others according to what seems to him expedient in good faith, he does not sin mortally even if perhaps he converts something more unto his uses than is necessary: for such things, because the judgment of them is in singulars, cannot be defined through every sort of certainty. (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Questiones antequam esset Frater, ed. V. Doucet, in Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi 19–21, 3 (Quaracchi [Florence]: The College of St. Bonaventure, 1960), q. 17, d. 2, membr. 2, “De superfluo,” 1:277; Aristotle, Ethics 2.6, 1106b3–4; 2.9, 1109b14.) Hence, if there is not much excess, one can presume the good faith of the dispenser. Whereas if there is much excess, it cannot be hidden, and thus this cannot be done with the good faith of the dispenser. And if he does not observe good faith in dispensing, he sins mortally.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, just as Augustine says in the book On the Lord’s Sermon on the Mount, those precepts which the Lord hands on in Matthew 5:39: he who should strike you on one cheek, grant to him also the other, and others which follow there, must be understood according to the preparation of the mind, namely, that man should be prepared to do this when necessity requires it. (Augustine, The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.19–20 (CCSL 35:67–76; PL 34:1257–63); Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 9:17, para. 33 (CCSL 38:73; PL 36:129).) Hence there is not always mortal sin when man does not do this. But when he sees that necessity is imminent, if he does not do it, then he sins mortally. And the same reason applies concerning this precept: he who has two tunics, let him give to him who does not have any (Luke 3:11), and concerning all like precepts. Hence he does not always sin mortally as often as he who has a surplus does not give to a pauper, but when necessity is imminent. Yet when there is such necessity which obliges unto mortal sin, it cannot be determined by reason, but is committed to prudence and the faith of the dispenser. Hence, if in good faith he gives when it seems expedient to him, he is immune from sin; otherwise, he sins mortally.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that those same things which are counsels fall under a precept according to the preparation of the mind. For no counsel is more perfect than for a man to hand over his soul for his brothers, and nevertheless this falls under precept according to the preparation of the mind: and we ought to lay down our souls for our brothers (1 John 3:16). And similarly, to give all his things to the poor falls under a precept according to the preparation of the mind, namely, for a man to be prepared to do this if necessity is imminent. Nevertheless, less necessity is required to pay out superfluities than to offer everything. Nevertheless, the whole of this cannot be determined by universal reason, but is committed to prudence, as was said. (Above: reply obj. 1.)

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that ecclesiastical goods must be dispensed not only to the poor, but also to the ministers of the Church. Hence according to the canons they ought to be divided such that some part falls to the uses of the poor and some to the uses of the ministers and to the cult of the Church. (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 12, q. 2, c. 23, 1:694–98.) Therefore, it must be said one way for ecclesiastical goods which are attributed principally to the necessities of the poor, and consequently to the necessities of the ministers, such as the goods of hospitals and of other things of this sort. It must be said otherwise for goods which are attributed principally to the uses of the ministers, such as the provisions of clerics and other things of this sort. For in the first goods, sin is committed not only from abuse, but also from the very condition of the things, when someone takes for his own uses what belongs to another; and for this reason, he is held to restitution as a defrauder of another’s property. Whereas in the second goods, sin is not committed except through abuse, as also was said concerning patrimonial goods. (Above: resp.) Hence someone is not held to restitution, but only to performing penance.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that neither the moderate use of riches nor the good faith of the dispenser seems to be saved in him who knowingly makes superfluous expenses on pleasurable feasts and other superfluities of this sort, and thus there is no doubt that in such things he sins mortally. Hence it is said: if that bad servant should say in his heart: my lord makes a delay to come, and should begin to beat his fellow servants, which pertains to proud (Augustine, Epistle 199, ch. 1 (CSEL 57:244; PL 33:905).) and cruel dominion, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, on Matthew 24:49, ch. 24, lect. 4, n. 2006.) yet let him eat and drink with drunkards, which pertains to superfluous and pleasurable feasts, the lord shall come to his servant on a day when he does not hope and at an hour when he does not know, and shall divide him, namely, from the society of the saints, (Cf. Jerome, On Matthew 4, on Matthew 24:50–51 (CCSL 77:235; PL 26:183); Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 24:51, ch. 24, lect. 13.) and shall place his part with the hypocrites, namely, in hell; hence it is added: there, there shall be weeping and grinding of teeth (Matt 24:48–51). Yet if someone exceeds not much in such things, this can be done in good faith by someone who wishes according to the decency of his state to follow the custom of those with whom he lives.

Question 8

On alms which are made for the dead

Then there were questions concerning alms made for the dead. And about this there were two questions:

first, whether a dead man suffers some detriment if his executor defers giving alms which in his will he commanded to be given;

second, whether an executor can defer licitly the distribution of alms for this reason: that the possessions of the deceased would be better sold for his descendants.

Article 1

Whether a dead man suffers some detriment if his executor defers giving alms which in his will he commanded to be given

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a dead man experiences no detriment from this: that the alms which he commanded to be given are delayed.

Obj. 1: For a delay of this sort arises from the negligence of the executor. But the negligence of one is not imputed to another. Therefore, the dead man suffers no detriment from a delay of this sort.

On the contrary: On account of a delay of this sort there are delayed the prayers and sacrifices which would be made for the soul of the deceased, from which he would be helped most greatly. Therefore, from a delay of this sort he suffers detriment.

I answer that this requires a double distinction.

First, indeed, a distinction must be made on the part of the detriment itself. For there are two kinds of detriment. One detriment is what pertains to the enduring of punishment: if anyone’s work should burn, he shall suffer detriment (1 Cor 3:15). Yet another is what pertains to the subtraction of remedy. Second also, a distinction must be made on the part of the alms, about which we can consider the merit of the alms themselves as well as their effect.

As regards the merit of the alms, therefore, the deceased suffers no detriment from the aforementioned delay, especially if, as much as he could, he took care that alms of this sort would be given immediately because merit principally depends upon the will and intention. But as regards the effect of the alms, he suffers detriment, not indeed that he is punished for a delay of this sort, but because remedy is not offered for him while the suffrages are deferred, by which he would be aided most greatly.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the negligence of one is not imputed to another unto punishment. Nevertheless, it can affect someone as a defect of remedy, since one man can be aided by another.

Article 2

Whether an executor can defer licitly the distribution of alms for this reason: that the possessions of the deceased would be better sold for his descendants

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that an executor ought to delay the distribution of alms for this reason: that the possessions of the deceased would be better sold.

Obj. 1: Because from this it follows that he could make very many alms for the deceased, from which the deceased will be aided more. Therefore, if he defers, it seems that he does so laudably and faithfully.

On the contrary: From a delay of alms there follows a delay of remedy, which perhaps the deceased needs. Therefore, it seems that the deceased would be burdened rather than aided from a delay of this sort.

I answer that in a delay of a short time there does not seem to be great danger. Hence, if an executor defers alms for a short time so that, with the possessions of the deceased better sold, he can give more alms, he does this laudably. Whereas if, conversely, he defers distributing alms for a long time such that he gives not many more alms, this does not seem to be without fault because perhaps the deceased would have been liberated from purgatory, where the remedy of suffrages was most necessary for him. Yet this requires the examination of a prudent executor, namely, so that, having considered the interval of time and the condition of the person who is believed to be liberated more quickly or slowly, and also the quantity of the increase of alms, he might do what seems expedient for the deceased.

[Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.]

On sins

Question 9

On sins

Then there were questions concerning sins. And about this there were three questions:

first, concerning original sin, namely, whether he who has been baptized transmits original sin to his offspring;

second, concerning actual sin in general, namely, whether aversion from God or conversion to a mutable good is prior;

third, especially concerning lying, namely, whether that which is done by word or that which is done by deed is more grave.

Article 1

On original sin

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that he who has been baptized does not transmit original sin to his offspring.

Obj. 1: For three things can be considered in someone born, namely, body, soul, and the union of both. But he does not contract original sin according to the body, which he contracts from his parents, because his parents had been cleansed totally from original sin. Likewise, he does not contract according to the soul, which he has from the creation of God, whom sin cannot befall. And consequently, neither does he contract according to the union of both. Therefore, he who is born from the baptized in no way contracts original sin.

On the contrary: A remedy is not applied except to a wound. But baptism, which is a medicinal remedy against the wound of original sin, is applied to the little children of the baptized according to the common custom of the Church. Therefore, the little children of the baptized are born with original sin.

I answer that sin which is derived originally from the transgression of the first parents unto all their descendants is not destroyed except through the grace of Christ, who from sin has damned sin in the flesh (Rom 8:3). But this is accomplished in a certain order: for original sin is removed first in the state of the present life through the sacraments of the grace of Christ in regard to the pollution of the soul, namely, so that it is not imputed to man unto fault. Nevertheless, it remains meanwhile in regard to the corruption of the spark of desire in the flesh. Hence the Apostle said: I myself serve the law of God by my mind, yet the law of sin by my flesh (Rom 7:25), namely, inasmuch as flesh desires against spirit (Gal 5:17). Hence a man baptized according to the mind lives in newness of spirit (Rom 7:6), but according to the flesh still retains the oldness of Adam. (Cf. Augustine, Epistle 140, ch. 8, para. 22 (CSEL 44:172; PL 33:547).) And for this reason, just as he produces sons in Christ without sin through spiritual generation, namely, by which he generates others through the Gospel, so also according to carnal generation he produces sons in the oldness of Adam with original sin.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 2

On actual sin in general

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that in actual sin aversion is prior to conversion.

Obj. 1: For aversion implies a withdrawing from an end, yet conversion is an approach to an end. (Cf. Augustine, On Free Will 1.16, para. 35 (CCSL 29:235; PL 32:1240); 2.19, para. 53 (CCSL 29:272; PL 32:1269).) But in bodily motion withdrawing from an end is prior to approaching an end. (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 42, a. 3, q. 2, fund. 4, 2:973b.) Therefore, in the spiritual motion of sin aversion is also prior to conversion.

On the contrary: Dionysius says in chapter four of On the Divine Names: no one acts intending unto evil but intending unto good. (This is an adage often cited by Aquinas (for example: In II Sent., 42.2.1, ad 7: nullus ad malum intendens operatur; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 24, a. 2, ad 6; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 3, a. 12, obj. 1; a. 14, obj. 7; ST I-II.72.1; 79.2, obj. 2), but it is not found as a direct quotation of Dionysius, except in the general sense of the words. See Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4, para. 19 (PG 3:715–18).) Therefore, the mind of the sinner is turned toward a mutable good through the appetite prior to its being averted from God.

I answer that sin principally consists in willing, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On True Religion 14.27 (CCSL 32:204; PL 34:121); On Two Souls 10.12, 10.14 (CSEL 25:68; PL 42:103–5); On Free Will 3.17–18 (CCSL 29:304; PL 32:1294–96).) Yet as regards willing, what is principally intended is prior. And for this reason, in sins where the enjoyment of a mutable good is principally intended, such as lust, avarice, and similar things, turning towards is naturally prior to aversion, which is not intended principally, but it follows from the inordinate turning together with the intention. Yet in sins in which aversion from God is intended directly, such as infidelity, despair, and others of this sort, aversion from the immutable good is prior, and afterwards there is turning towards a mutable good, as is clear in those who, despairing, hand over *themselves to impurity (*Eph 4:19).

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, although in bodily motions withdrawal from an end is prior in execution, nevertheless approach to an end is prior in intention, in which sin principally consists.

Article 3

On lying in particular

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that it is a greater sin when someone lies by deed than when someone lies by word.

Obj. 1: For it seems to be a greater sin when by lying someone abuses that which is more believed. But, as Anselm says in the book On the Truth, deeds are believed more than words. (Anselm of Canterbury, Dialogue on Truth 9 (PL 158:478).) Therefore, he sins more gravely who lies by deeds than by words.

On the contrary: As Augustine says in the book On Christian Doctrine: (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 2.3, para. 4 (CCSL 32:34; PL 34:37); cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 38, a. 1, sol., 28:714.) words hold the principal place amongst all signs. Yet he abuses these, he who lies by word. Therefore, it seems that he sins more gravely who lies by word than he who lies by deed.

I answer that, as Ambrose says in a certain sermon, not only in false words, but also in feigned works there is lying. (Ambrose, Sermon 8.2 (SC 161:198); Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 38, a. 1, q. 2, ad opp. 3, 3:844b.) Yet the sin of lying consists principally in the intention of deceiving. Hence he who speaks a falsehood which he thinks to be true does not lie, yet he is more guilty of lying who speaks a truth which he thinks to be false, as made clear by Augustine in the book On Lying. (Augustine, On Lying 3–4 (PL 40:488–91; CSEL 41:414–19).) Hence, since the same intention of deceiving is in him who lies by word and in him who lies by deed, both equally sin. For word and deed are used as instruments of deceiving. Hence it does not matter to the sin of lying whether someone lies by word or by writing or by nod or by whatever deed, just as it does not matter to the sin of homicide whether someone kills a man by sword or by axe.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

On bodily things

Question 10

On bodily things

Article 1

Whether someone can be naturally or miraculously a virgin and a father simultaneously

Then there was a question about the body of man, namely, whether someone can be naturally or miraculously a virgin and a father simultaneously?

Obj. 1: And it seems that this can happen miraculously because father and mother simultaneously are principles of generation. But a woman miraculously was simultaneously a virgin and a mother. Therefore, for the same reason a man miraculously can be simultaneously a virgin and a father.

Obj. 2: Likewise, it seems that this can be without a miracle because an incubus demon can steal a virgin man’s semen in his sleep when he has been polluted and pour it into a woman’s womb, from which semen, indeed, an offspring can be conceived, whose father, indeed, is not the incubus demon but the one from whose semen he is generated, which it does in virtue of him from whom it was released. (Cf. Augustine, City of God 15.23 (PL 41:468; CCSL 48:489); Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 8, a. 5, 27:174–75.) Therefore, it seems that even without a miracle someone can be simultaneously a virgin and a father.

On the contrary (1): A woman without a miracle cannot be simultaneously a virgin and a mother. Therefore, for the same reason neither can a man without a miracle be simultaneously a virgin and a father.

Likewise (2), it seems that neither can this be through a miracle, because if the Son of God, who was born miraculously from a virgin, had assumed flesh from another part of the virginal body than from that whence a woman naturally conceives, for example from a hand or a foot, he would not be called the son of the virgin, just as neither was Eve called the daughter of Adam even though she was formed from his rib. But it cannot happen, with the man’s virginity intact, that from the same part of the body and in the same place he would generate an offspring as it is generated naturally. Therefore, not even miraculously can it happen that someone is simultaneously a virgin and a father.

I answer that to answer this it is necessary to see what is required for virginity.

Three things are required for its perfection. The first of these is principal and formal, namely, the choice or intention of the will, just as also in all moral matters. Hence it is necessarily required for virginity for there to be present to someone an assiduous will of never experiencing venereal delight. Yet the second is material, namely, the passion of the sensitive appetite, namely, the delight which someone experiences in the venereal act—the privation of which is required for perfect virginity materially: for the sensitive passions are the matter of the moral virtues. If, nevertheless, this is lacking beyond the choice of one’s own will, for example when someone is polluted in his sleep or when a woman through violence is oppressed by an enemy, the virtue of virginity does not perish, as is clear through Augustine in the first book of On the City of God. (Augustine, City of God 1.18 (PL 41:31; CCSL 47:18–19).) Yet the third is as though incidental and concomitant with virginity, namely, bodily integrity. Hence if the cloister of modesty is ruptured otherwise than through the venereal act, for example if a midwife or doctor cuts it open with a knife for the sake of healing, nothing is lost to virginity, as Augustine says in the first book of On the City of God. (Cf. Augustine, City of God 1.18, para. 2 (PL 41:31–32; CCSL 47:19).)

Thus, therefore, if virginity is understood according to its perfect being, just as the three abovementioned things concur with virginity, a woman, indeed, with her virginity intact cannot be a mother, such that she conceives and gives birth, except miraculously, because an offspring cannot come out with the cloister of modesty remaining unless through a miracle, as happened with the mother of God. Nevertheless, a woman can perhaps conceive without a miracle with every sort of virginity intact, just as is said to have happened with a certain pubescent girl whom on account of the custody of modesty her father had in his bed; he was polluted during sleep, his semen descended into her womb, and the girl conceived. Yet a man without any release of semen cannot be a father either naturally or by a miracle, because if an offspring were formed from his body miraculously in another way, he could not be called a father.

Whereas if virginity is understood more broadly, such that it requires only the interior choice of the mind, thus it is clear concerning a woman that she can be a mother naturally, with such virginity remaining, just as if some woman through violence were oppressed by an enemy and thus conceived. And much more can this be done miraculously. Yet a man, with such virginity intact, can be a father naturally on account of nocturnal pollution, which by whatever chance arrived at a woman’s womb. Yet it would not be thus congruous that miraculously a man would become a father just as that a virgin would become a mother, both because a virgin miraculously was made a mother by the Holy Spirit forming the body of an offspring from her most pure blood, as Damascene says, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.2 (PG 94:987); 4.13 (PG 94:1139).) yet the release of semen without which a man cannot be a father is not congruous with the activity of the Holy Spirit. And because a man in generation is as an agent while a woman is as a patient, and it yet befits God to do and not to undergo, it is more congruous for God miraculously to supply what is lacking from the part of the man than what is lacking from the part of the woman.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.