About Spiritual Substances

Question 1

On the knowledge of spiritual substances

There were three questions:

first, concerning what pertains to spiritual substances; (Qq. 1–3.)

second, concerning what pertains to the sacrament of the altar; (Q. 4.)

third, concerning what pertains to the bodies of the damned. (Q. 5. The remaining two questions, q. 6, on the senses of Sacred Scripture, and q. 7, on manual work, are not included in the outline above.)

About spiritual substances there was a question:

first, concerning their knowledge; (Q. 1.)

second, concerning the enjoyment of Christ’s soul at the time of his Passion; (Q. 2.)

third, concerning the plurality found in spiritual substances. (Q. 3.)

About the first, there were four questions:

first, whether any created intellect can see the divine essence immediately;

second, whether a created intellect can understand many things simultaneously;

third, whether an angelic intellect can know singulars;

fourth, whether the knowledge which Augustine calls the mind’s offspring is an accident or not.

Article 1

Whether any created intellect can see the divine essence immediately

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that no created intellect can see the divine essence immediately.

Obj. 1: For a created intellect, since it relates indifferently to all intelligible things, cannot know something determinately unless it be determined through its object. But the divine essence is not an object which can determine the intellect, because it is the greatest amongst beings and of maximal generality in no way determined. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see it.

Obj. 2: In order for the intellect to know something, it is necessary that it actually happen: for nothing acts according to what is in potency, but according to what is actual. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 320b17–19; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What is Sensed, tr. 1, ch. 9, nn. 138–39.) Yet the intellect is not made actual except as it is informed by an intelligible thing. Therefore, since the divine essence cannot inform the intellect through itself such that it might make it to be formally in act, it is necessary for it to be known through the intellect that it inform the intellect through some likeness of itself unto this: that it be known, and thus it cannot be seen except with some likeness mediating.

Obj. 3: In order for a created intellect to see the divine essence, it is necessary that it be perfected by the light of glory. But the light of glory is a medium distant both from the intellect itself and from the divine essence, which is uncreated beatitude, whereas the abovementioned light is called created. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 49, P. 1, a. 1, q. 1, 4:1000–1001.) Therefore, a created intellect cannot see the divine essence immediately.

Obj. 4: According to the Philosopher in the third book of the De Anima, just as sense relates to the sensible, so the intellect relates to the intelligible. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a16–18.) But for the sense of sight to perceive its object, it requires a double medium, namely, light and species, which is a likeness of the thing seen. Therefore, this same thing is necessary for the intellect in the vision of the divine essence, and thus it will not see it immediately.

On the contrary (1): It is said in 1 John 3:2: we shall see him as he is.

Furthermore (2): In order for the intellect to understand, nothing else seems required except that the intelligible be made actual and that it be conjoined to the intellect. But the divine essence through its very self is intelligible in act, since it is immaterial; also, it is present to the intellect because, as Augustine says, God is more intimate to each thing than that very thing is to itself. (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 14 (PL 40:791); Augustine, Confessions 3.6, para. 11 (CCSL 27:33; PL 32:687–88).) Therefore, a created intellect will be able to see the divine essence immediately.

I answer that it must be held without a doubt that the divine essence in the fatherland is seen immediately by the glorified intellect.

In order to understand this, it must be known that in intellective vision there happens to be a triple medium. One is under which the intellect sees, which disposes it for seeing, and in us this is the light of the agent intellect, which is to our potential intellect as the light of the sun to the eye. Another medium is that by which it is seen, and this is the intelligible species, which determines the potential intellect and is to the potential intellect as the species of a stone to the eye. The third medium is that in which something is seen, and this is some thing through which we come to the knowledge of something else, as in an effect we see a cause, and in one of similar or contrary things, the other is seen, and this medium is to the intellect as a mirror to bodily vision, in which the eye sees some thing. The first and second media, therefore, do not make vision mediated: for I am said to see a stone immediately even though I see it through its species received in the eye and through light, because sight is not borne to these media as to visible things, but is borne through these media to the one visible thing which is outside the eye. But the third medium makes vision mediated: for sight is borne first unto a mirror as unto a visible thing by which, with it mediating, it receives the species of the thing seen in the mirror. Similarly, the intellect knowing a cause in the thing caused is borne to the thing caused itself as to a certain intelligible from which it crosses over to the knowledge of the cause.

And because we know while in a state of journeying the divine essence in its effects, we do not see it immediately. Hence in the fatherland, where we will see immediately, such a medium will be utterly taken away. Similarly also, there will not be there the second medium, namely, some species of the divine essence informing the intellect, because when something is seen immediately through its species, it is necessary for that species to represent the thing according to the complete being of its species, otherwise that thing would not be said to be seen immediately, but a certain shadow of it, just as if a likeness of light were made in the eye through the mode of color, which is overshadowed light. (Cf. Aquinas, In III Sent. 14.1, qa. 3, resp.) Yet since everything which is received in something is received in it through the mode of the receiver, it is impossible for there to be received a likeness in a created intellect of the divine essence which represents it perfectly according to its whole character. Hence, if the divine essence were seen by us through some such likeness, we would not see the divine essence immediately, but a certain shadow of it. It remains, therefore, that there will be only the first medium in that vision, namely, the light of glory by which the intellect will be perfected for seeing the divine essence, concerning which it says in the Psalm: in your light we shall see light (36:9 [35:10]).

Yet this light will not be necessary to make what is intelligible in potency be intelligible in act, for which the light of the agent intellect is now necessary for us, because the divine essence itself, since it is separated from matter, is through itself actually intelligible. But it will be necessary only for perfecting the intellect, for which the light of the agent intellect also now prevails. Yet the light of glory will perfect sufficiently the abovementioned intellect for seeing the divine essence, since the divine essence itself is totally intelligible light. Hence the light of glory descending from it to the intellect does this in respect of the divine essence in the intellect, which it does in respect of other intelligible things which are not light only, but simultaneously species of the thing understood and light, just as if sensible light were to exist through itself, and light perfecting the eye would suffice for its vision, without any other likeness.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that something is called determinate in two ways: first by reason of limitation; in another way, by reason of distinction. Yet the divine essence is not something determinate in the first way, but the second, because form is not limited unless it is received in another, to whose mode it is made equal. Yet in the divine essence there is not something received in another, as its being is the subsisting divine nature itself, which happens in no other thing. Hence any other thing has received being and thus is limited. And hence it is that the divine essence is distinguished from all things through this: that it is not received in another. So too, if there were some whiteness not existing in a subject, from this very fact it would be distinguished from any whiteness existing in a subject, even though in the character of whiteness it be not received and thus not limited. It is clear, therefore, that the divine essence is not something general in being since it is distinct from all other things, but only in causing, because it is through itself the cause of those things which are not through themselves, and hence subsisting being through itself is the cause of every being received in another. And thus, the divine essence is an intelligible thing which can determine the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a created intellect is made actual for seeing the divine essence through the light of glory, and this suffices, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that that light of glory, although it differs both from the divine essence and from the intellect through its essence, nevertheless does not make vision mediated, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that visible things are not light only, and for this reason, it is necessary for sight to be determined to them that there be not only light there, but also the species of the thing seen. Yet the divine essence is pure light, and for this reason, it does not require some species other than the light itself to be seen, as is clear from what has been said.

Article 2

Whether a created intellect can understand many things simultaneously

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a created intellect can understand many things simultaneously.

Obj. 1: For sensitive potency, since it is material, is more limited than intellective potency. But sense can sense many things simultaneously, just as the common sense senses white and sweet simultaneously while it recognizes their difference. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.2, 426b12–15.) Therefore, much more so can the intellect understand many things simultaneously.

Obj. 2: Many intelligible things can be known simultaneously inasmuch as they are one. But all intelligible things are one inasmuch as they are intelligible. Therefore, all intelligible things can be understood simultaneously.

Obj. 3: Just as the intellect in habit is to the intelligible in habit, so the intellect in act is to the intelligible in act. But the intellect in habit simultaneously considers many intelligible things in habit. Therefore, the intellect in act simultaneously can understand many things in act.

Obj. 4: The species of the intelligible thing existing in the intellect suffices for knowledge of the intellect. But the intelligible species do not impede one another from being in the intellect simultaneously, since they are not contrary by being separated from matter. Therefore, the intellect is not impeded from being able to understand many things simultaneously.

Obj. 5: The capacity of the intellect is greater than that of any body. But there is some body in which there can become many species simultaneously, even of contraries, as it is clear when in a point of air, in which two straight lines intersect themselves from two visible things unto two viewers, there is the species of each visible thing. (Cf. Averroes, Compendium on the Book on Sense and Sensation; Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 8, a. 14, obj. 8.) Therefore, much more strongly can there be many species in act in the intellect simultaneously, and so the intellect can understand many things simultaneously.

On the contrary: The Philosopher says in the second book of the Topics: (Aristotle, Topics 2.10, 114b34–35.) to know reaches many things, whereas to understand only one.

I answer that the intellect understands something in two ways, namely, primarily and consequently. Consequently, indeed, it can understand many things simultaneously inasmuch as they are related to one primary intelligible thing. And this happens in two ways. One way is from the unity of that which is understood, as when many intelligible things are understood by means of one species. For a divine intellect sees all things simultaneously through its own one essence, and in like manner a created intellect seeing the divine essence can see all things simultaneously which it sees through the divine essence. Another way is from the unity of that which is understood, namely, when many things are understood as one: for then that one is first understood and those many are understood consequently in it, just as when the intellect understands a line, it understands simultaneously the parts of the line, as is said in the third book of On the Soul. (It is actually: Averroes, On the Soul 3, comm. 23.) And similarly, when it understands a proposition, it understands simultaneously the predicate and the subject. And when it understands the likeness and difference of any things, it simultaneously understands those things of which it is the likeness or difference. But it is impossible for the intellect to understand simultaneously many intelligible things first and principally.

The reason for this is that the intellect according to its act is altogether, that is, perfectly, the thing understood, as is said in the third book of On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431b16–17.) This must not be taken to mean that the essence of the intellect becomes the thing understood or its species, but that it is informed completely through the species of the thing understood while it actually understands it. Hence, for the intellect to understand simultaneously many things actually first, is the same as if one thing were simultaneously many things.

Yet in material things we see that one thing numerically cannot be simultaneously many in act. But in potency or according to disposition one and the same thing can be many: for the same air is simultaneously water and fire by potency, and there also can be dispositions simultaneously to each inasmuch as something is in the same thing, as if air from one part were heated and from another were thickened. (Cf. Aristotle, Meteorology 1.3, 340a32–35.) But for air simultaneously to be actually fire and water is impossible, and similarly also for something to be actually stone and iron simultaneously, which do not seem contrary but disparate.

Yet the intellect, from the very account of its potency, is simultaneously all intelligible things in potency, just as also sense is all sensible things. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 431b20–28.) Yet sensitive potency is reduced to act through the likenesses of sensible things in two ways. One way is incompletely, through the mode of disposition, namely, when the sensible species are in it as dispositions, which Avicenna calls being as in a treasure-house. (Avicenna, Book on the Soul 5.6, pp. 144–48.) But another way is perfectly, namely, when the sensible species in act inform the sensitive potency, and this is what Avicenna calls the apprehension of the intellect. (Avicenna, Book on the Soul 5.6, pp. 144–48.) He thus distinguishes the apprehending sensitive potencies from those sensible forms that are in them as in a treasure-house. And similarly, in the intellect in habit there are likenesses of intelligible things as dispositions, but when they are actually understood, they are in it as perfecting forms, and then the intellect becomes altogether the thing understood. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431b16–17.) And this happens through intention, which conjoins the intellect to the intelligible and sense to the sensible, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity 11.4, para. 7 (CCSL 50:342–43; PL 42:990).) Hence it is clear that, just as one material thing cannot simultaneously be many things actually, so one intellect cannot simultaneously understand many things primarily. And this is what Algazel says, that just as one body cannot simultaneously be figured by many figures, so one intellect cannot simultaneously understand many things. (Algazel, Metaphysics, ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute Of Mediaeval Studies, 1933), part 1, tr. 3, sent. 4, p. 68.)

Nor can it be said that the intellect is informed perfectly by many intelligible species simultaneously just as one body is informed simultaneously by figure and color. For figure and color are not forms of the same genus, nor are they received in the same order, because they are not ordained to the perfecting in being of one account. But all intelligible forms, inasmuch as they are of this sort, are of one genus and relate in the same order to the intellect, inasmuch as they perfect it in this: that there is one being actually understood. Hence many intelligible species are like as many figures or many colors, which cannot be in act simultaneously in the same thing according to the same manner.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said similarly concerning sensitive potency, which cannot sense many things simultaneously first. But it can consequently, inasmuch as many things are received as one, as for instance when sensible differences are united in one difference, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.6, 418a14.) and many sensible things which are parts are united in one whole. Hence when the whole is sensed, simultaneously all the parts are sensed consequently, and then the intention of sense is not borne unto any of the parts principally, but unto the whole. For, if it were borne to any of the parts as to a principal sensible, another would not be sensed simultaneously. And again, the common sense, although it be one potency according to essence, nevertheless in some way is multiplied in existence inasmuch as it is conjoined to diverse proper senses, just as one center is conjoined to many lines. (Cf. Averroes, On the Soul 2, comm. 149; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 27, n. 609.) Hence the changes of all the senses are terminated simultaneously at the common sense, just as a motion which is through all the lines can be terminated simultaneously at the center. But the intellect is not multiplied in the aforesaid way in many potencies, and for this reason, it is not altogether similar.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that for knowable things which are simultaneously understood, it is necessary that they be understood as one knowable thing numerically. Yet all intelligible things, inasmuch as they are of this sort, are one generically, not numerically, and for this reason, that objection does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that it is clear already from what has been said above that the intellect in habit does not relate in the same way to intelligible things in habit, which are in it as dispositions, as the intellect in act relates to intelligible things in act, which are in it as ultimate perfections.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that not only is any thing prohibited from actually being many contraries simultaneously, but from being many disparate things, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, although intelligible forms in the intellect are not contraries, still, nevertheless, the intellect is prohibited from thinking about many things simultaneously, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that sensible species which are in a conferring medium are there as dispositions and not as the ultimate perfection, (Cf. Averroes, Compendium on the Book on Sense and Sensation, ed. Aemilia Shields (Cambridge: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1949), 31–32.) because they are there as in a certain flux. (Avicenna, Sufficientia (The Book of Healing) 2.2 (Venice: 1508, ff. 24vb A–B, 25ra C–D).) Hence it is not similar.

Article 3

Whether an angelic intellect can know singulars

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that an angelic intellect cannot know singulars.

Obj. 1: For if it knows, either it knows through an acquired species, or through a con-created species. But it does not know through an acquired species, because that species either would be particular and consequently material, and thus it could not be in an immaterial angelic intellect; or it would be universal and so a singular could not be known through it. Similarly, neither does it know through a con-created species, because a species con-created with an angel was in it from the beginning of its creation, yet in order to know something it suffices that its species be in the intellect. And thus, if through a con-created species some particular could be known while it is present, an angelic intellect would have known it from the beginning of its creation when it was yet future, which cannot be, because to know future things belongs to God alone: announce those things which are to come unto the future and we shall know that you are gods (Isa 41:22–23). Therefore, an angel cannot know singulars.

Obj. 2: If it is said that those con-created species make knowledge of present things but not of future things, to the contrary: some new knowledge cannot be made unless some innovation occurs in the knower. But for a particular which was future to be made present, some innovation is not made in an angelic intellect, since it receives nothing from an outside thing. Therefore, if it did not know it before while it was future, neither could it know it while it is made present.

Obj. 3: If it is said that, although it receives nothing, nevertheless it applies the form which it before had for itself to a particular which is newly made, (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 3, P. 2, a. 2, q. 1, s.c. 4, concl., and ad 4, 2:118–21.) then, to the contrary: the intellect cannot apply something to something else unless it already knows both what it applies and that to which it is applied, since to know two things according to themselves is prior to the comparison of one to the other. Therefore, the abovementioned application would follow the knowledge of singulars, and thus cannot be its cause.

Obj. 4: If an angel knows singulars, this is either by one species or by many. But it is not by many, because thus it would be necessary that it would have infinite species, since there are infinite particulars, at least in potency. Similarly, it is neither by one, because thus an angelic intellect would be equated with the divine intellect, which by one, namely, its own essence, understands many. Therefore, an angelic intellect cannot know singulars.

Obj. 5: If it is said that it does not know all things through one species, but rather through one species it knows all the individuals of that species and not others, then to the contrary: that one species is not closer to one individual thing than to another. But it is necessary for the intellect to be determined to a determinate knowable through an intelligible species. Therefore, it will not be able to know a particular determinate thing through that species.

On the contrary: It is said in Hebrews 1:14: all are administrators of the spirit, which could not be unless they knew singular men.

I answer that an angel without a doubt knows singulars.

Yet so that we might see the way this is possible, it must be known that for some singular to be known, it is necessary for there to be in the knowing power a likeness of it inasmuch as it is particular. Yet every form from itself is common, (Cf. Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 3 A, a. 4, obj. 8, 27:66b.) hence the addition of form to form cannot be the cause of individuation. (Nor can individuation be caused by the “collection” of accidental forms (see Porphyry, Isagogue 7.22–24).) No matter how many forms are gathered together simultaneously, such as white, two cubits long, (Cf. below: q. 4, a. 1, obj. 1.) curly, (Boethius, Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, bk. 2.25 (CSEL 48:124; PL 64:67); cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 7, a. 4, n. 1339.) and things of this sort, a particular thing is still not yet constituted, because it is possible for all of these to be found simultaneously in one as also in many. But individuation of form is from matter, through which form is drawn unto this demonstrated individual; (Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 3, text. 58 (Venice: Apud Junctas, 1562, vol. 4, f. 112ra C); 1, text. 69 (f. 40va I); 4, text. 59 (f. 151va).) hence for a particular to be known, it is necessary that in the knower there be not only a likeness of the form, but somehow also a likeness of the matter.

Yet the likeness of a known thing is in the knower in two ways. One way is when it is caused by the thing, as in these which are known though a species abstracted from things. Another way is as the cause of the thing, as is clear in an artist who knows an artifact though the form through which he makes it. Therefore, the species which is caused in sense by a sensible thing, inasmuch as it is not altogether purified from material conditions, is a likeness of form according as it is in matter, and for this reason, a particular is known through it inasmuch as it is particular. But because, according to how it is received in our intellect, the species of a sensible thing is already altogether purified of material conditions, our intellect cannot know a particular directly through it, but through a certain reflection of the intellect upon the sensitive powers from which intelligible species are abstracted. (Cf. Aristotle On the Soul 3.4, 429b16–17.) Yet through the form which is the cause of the thing, in this way the thing is known according to how that form is its cause. And because the human artist does not produce matter through the form of his art, but with matter presupposed he induces the form of his art, the form of his art which is in the mind of the artist is not a likeness of the artifact except with respect to form only, hence through it he does not know the artifact in particular, unless he receives the form of the artifact through sense. Yet the uncreated artist, namely, God, produces not only form but also matter, hence the ideas existing in his mind are not only efficacious for the knowledge of universals, but also for God to know singulars.

Yet just as those ideas flow out in producing things in their own natural being, in which each subsists particularly in form and matter, so they proceed into angelic minds so that there might be in them the principle of knowing things according to their whole being by which they subsist. And thus, through the species which have flowed into them by divine art, the angels not only know universals, but also particulars, as God does also.

There is, nevertheless, a difference between the two. This is first because ideas which are in the divine mind are productive forms of things and not only principles of knowing, while species which are received in an angelic mind are only principles of knowing and are not productive, but patterned on productive forms. Second, this is because an intellect, as much as it is higher and more perspicacious, so much more is able to know many things from one. And, because the divine intellect is highest, it knows all things through its own one simple essence, nor is there some plurality of ideal forms there, unless according to diverse respects of the divine essence to the things known. But in a created intellect, what is one according to the thing in the divine mind is multiplied according to the thing, so that it cannot know all things through one, such that, nevertheless, as much as a created intellect is higher, so much does it have fewer forms effective for knowing many. And this is what Dionysius says in the twelfth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy: that superior orders have more universal knowledge than inferior ones; (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 12.2 (PG 3:291); cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 3.3.2, s.c. 1.) and in the Book of Causes it is said that superior intelligences have more universal forms. (Book of Causes, prop. 9 [10].) Nevertheless, this having been observed: that in the lowest angels there are still only universal forms such that through one form they can know all individuals of that same species, thus it is that that species is made a proper likeness of each of the particulars according to its diverse respects with regard to the particulars, just as the divine essence is made a proper likeness of singulars according to diverse respects.

But the human intellect, which is last in the order of intellectual substances, has forms particularized to such a degree that through one species it cannot know anything except one thing. And for this reason, the likeness of a species existing in a human intellect does not suffice for knowing many singulars, and on account of this there are joined to the (human) intellect the senses by which it may receive singulars.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that an angel in no way knows singulars through an acquired species, because neither through a species received from a thing (for in that way things would act upon its intellect, which is impossible), nor through some species newly poured in by God, with he himself revealing something newly to an angel, because the species which an angel has con-created with it suffice for knowing all knowable things. But, according as the intellect of an angel is elevated through a higher light, it can advance from those species to higher conceptions, just as also from the same species of phantasms the intellect of a prophet aided by the light of prophecy receives some knowledge for which the natural light of the agent intellect does not suffice. It remains, therefore, that an angel knows singulars through con-created species. Yet just as through one con-created species it can know diverse individuals, so also much more can it know through one species whatever is in one individual, so that it is not necessary that it should have some species by which it knows the color and odor of one apple, but by knowing this apple it simultaneously knows whatever is in that apple both essentially and accidentally. Yet the effect is not in its cause so that it can be known in it, unless the cause be determined unto that effect, as is clear in necessary causes, by the knowing of which their effects are known. But a contingent cause is not determined to its effect except when it actually produces it, hence in a contingent cause its effect is not in it such that it can be known in it except when it already has been produced actually. And for this reason, an angel knowing through con-created species the universal causes of all contingent singular things does not know their effects by natural knowledge before they are in act, but immediately when they are actually.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that when something begins to be present, an angel knows it newly. There is not some innovation that has been made in the angel itself, but in the knowable thing, in which there is something which before there was not, which is known simultaneously when the thing is known.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that that application must be understood through that mode by which God applies ideas to the things to be known, not as one knowable to another, but as a medium of knowing to the thing known. Otherwise, it would avail nothing for the intention, as has been shown in the objection.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that the intellect of an angel neither knows all things by one species nor has so many species as there are individuals, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that that one species is made a proper reason of knowing any individual according to the relation to it, as is clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Whether the knowledge which Augustine calls the mind’s offspring is an accident or not

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that the knowledge posited by Augustine as the mind’s offspring is not in the mind as an accident is in a subject. (Augustine, On the Trinity 9.12, para. 18 (CCSL 50:310; PL 42:972).)

Obj. 1: For no accident exceeds its subject. But knowledge exceeds the mind, because the mind not only knows its own self, but also other things through knowledge. (Augustine, On the Trinity 9.4, para. 5 (CCSL 50:298; PL 42:963).) Therefore, knowledge is not an accident of the mind.

Obj. 2: No accident is equal to its subject. But knowledge is equal to the mind, otherwise the image of the Trinity would not consist in knowledge, mind, and love, which Augustine posits. (Augustine, On the Trinity 9.12, para. 18 (CCSL 50:310; PL 42:972).) Therefore, knowledge is not an accident of the mind.

Obj. 3: This same thing is seen from the words of Augustine, who in the ninth book of On the Trinity says that knowledge and love exist in the soul substantially or, so that I might speak thus, essentially, not as in a subject as color or figure in a body. (Augustine, On the Trinity 9.4, para. 5 (CCSL 50:297–98; PL 42:963).)

On the contrary: Knowledge of the mind seems to be nothing else than understanding. But knowledge is an accident, since it is in the first species of quality. (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 7, 8b25–35.) Therefore, so too is knowledge.

I answer that knowledge can be understood in four ways: first, as the knowing nature itself; second, as the knowing power; third, as the knowing habit; fourth, as the very act of knowing. So, too, the name “sense” sometimes names the sensitive nature, namely, as it is a principle of this difference which is sensible, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 413b20; 3.2, 427a17.) whereas sometimes it names the very power, and sometimes the act. By speaking of knowledge, therefore, understood in the first way, it is agreed that it is not in the substance of the mind as an accident in a subject, but essentially and substantially, just as it is said that rational is in living and living in being. Yet if we speak of “knowledge” understood in the other three modes, thus it can be considered in two ways. It can be considered either with respect to the knower, and thus it is in the knower as an accident in a subject, and thus it does not exceed the subject, because it is never found to be in anything except the mind. Or it can be considered with respect to the knowable, and in this case it does not exist within, but it relates to another. Yet this relation to another does not have the character of an accident from this: that it is related to another, but only from this: that it exists within. Hence only relation with respect to the character of its genus remains with substance in the divine persons, nor, nevertheless, is it there as an accident. And thus, knowledge according to this consideration is not in the soul as in a subject, and according to this comparison it exceeds the mind inasmuch as other things are known by the mind through the knowledge. According to this consideration there is also posited an image of the Trinity, because even the divine persons are distinguished according as they relate to each another. Thus there is also a certain equality of knowledge to mind, inasmuch as it extends itself to all things to which the mind can extend itself.

Reply Obj. 1–3: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Question 2

On the enjoyment of the soul of Christ in his Passion

Article 1

On the enjoyment of the soul of Christ in his Passion

Then there was a question concerning the enjoyment of the soul of Christ in his Passion. And it seems that that enjoyment would have reached even to the essence of the soul.

Obj. 1: For the soul of Christ enjoyed perfectly. Yet the enjoyment would not have been perfect if it did not reach to the essence of the soul but rather stopped at one power only, namely, superior reason. Therefore, it reached even to the essence of the soul.

Obj. 2: The soul of Christ enjoyed more perfectly than the souls of the saints in the fatherland. But the enjoyment of the saints in the fatherland touches even unto the essence of the soul. Therefore, so much the more is this the case in Christ.

On the contrary: One enjoys nothing except what he knows because, according to Augustine, we enjoy things known, in which the will rests delighted for its own sake. (Augustine, On the Trinity 10.10, para. 13 (CCSL 50:327; PL 42:981).) But to know belongs not to the essence of the soul, but to the power. Therefore, enjoyment did not reach to the essence of the soul.

I answer that enjoyment in a certain act consists where God is seen and loved. Yet all acts are acts of a subsisting thing. Hence, properly speaking, neither the power of the soul nor the essence enjoys, but rather the man or soul subsisting through itself. But nevertheless, the powers of the soul are principles of the works of life, just as the essence of the soul is the principle of living being. And according to this it is necessary to say that superior reason, (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 24.2.2.) whose object is an eternal thing which is to be enjoyed, is the principle of enjoyment, namely, that by which the soul enjoys. Yet enjoyment cannot reach to the other powers or to the essence of the soul except through a certain overflow, namely, just as from that enjoyment of superior reason some effect is left in the essence of the soul or in the inferior powers. And thus, enjoyment came to the essence of the soul in Christ’s Passion in one way, and in another way, not. For if the essence of the soul is considered as the act of the body, enjoyment did not thus reach to it, otherwise the body would have been made glorious. Similarly, it neither reached to the essence according as it is the root of the inferior powers, because thus the joy of enjoyment totally would have evacuated the pain of the Passion, which was in the inferior powers. Yet it reached to the essence of the soul according as it was the root of superior reason. And, because the essence of the soul is simple and whole in any of its powers, for this reason, it is said that the whole soul enjoyed in Christ, namely, inasmuch as it is the root of superior reason, and the whole soul suffered, namely, inasmuch as it is the act of the body and the root of the inferior powers.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the perfection of a thing is not impeded unless something of its essentials is destroyed. Yet the glory of the body and of the inferior powers pertains to the accidental joy of beatitude, since although in Christ it would not have reached to the essence of the soul as the act of the body, nor as the root of the inferior powers, it does not follow that enjoyment, or beatitude, would have been imperfect in Christ.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the soul of Christ enjoyed more perfectly than the souls of the saints in the fatherland, intensively speaking, yet not extensively speaking. For in the fatherland the joy of enjoyment will reach to the inferior powers and even to the body which will be glorified, which if it had been in Christ, he would not have been a wayfarer.

Question 3

On the plurality found in spiritual substances

Then there were questions concerning the plurality found in spiritual substances. And about this there were two questions:

first, whether divine immeasurability excludes plurality of persons;

second, whether angelic simplicity is composed of accident and subject.

Article 1

Whether divine immensurability excludes plurality of persons

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that divine immeasurability excludes plurality of persons.

Obj. 1: For every immensurable thing, since it is indeterminate, stays in one. But whatever is in divine things is immensurable. When, therefore, a person is in divine things, it will stay in one, such that there will not be many persons there.

Obj. 2: If it is said that persons stay in one in this way: that all are one essence, then to the contrary: just as essence is immensurable, so also person. But immeasurability of essence makes it that there is only one essence. Therefore, immensurability of person makes it that there is only one person.

Obj. 3: If it is said that a person is not immensurable except by immeasurability of essence, then to the contrary: a person by means of understanding adds something beyond essence. But whatever is understood in divine things is understood as immensurable. Therefore, besides immeasurability of essence, there is in divine things immeasurability of person, which makes in divine things only one person.

On the contrary: It is said in 1 John 5:7: there are three who give testimony in heaven.

I answer that immeasurability does not exclude plurality except insofar as it destroys determination, which is the principle of plurality. Yet as was said before, (Above: q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.) determination is twofold, namely, of limitation and of distinction. Yet in divine things, determination of limitation in no way occurs, yet determination of distinction occurs there in two ways: one way is according to how it is distinguished through its essence from all created things as not limited from limited; another way is according to how a person is distinguished from another person through relation of origin, which distinction, indeed, is not on account of some limitation, but by reason of the opposition which is in relation. Hence the divine immeasurability does not exclude this immensity, and consequently neither plurality of persons.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the first is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, although a person is immensurable, nevertheless immeasurability is essential, (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 22.1.4, obj. 2, ad 2.) not personal, just as a person is good by essential goodness. Hence it is not necessary for immeasurability to make indistinction in the persons, but only in the being of the nature.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that a person is not said to add something beyond essence by its understanding as though we should think of this as something added to essence. For this would be a false understanding. Rather, by understanding the person, I necessarily understand the essence, yet not conversely. Hence the objection does not proceed.

Article 2

Whether angelic simplicity is composed of accident and subject

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that angels are not composed of accident and subject.

Obj. 1: Since accidental being is caused by substantial being, therefore, so too is accidental composition caused by substantial composition. But in angels there is not substantial composition, because they are simple substances, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 1.3 (PG 3:122–23); 2.2 (PG 3:138); On the Divine Names 7.2 (PG 3:867–70); 4.1 (PG 3:694).) Therefore, neither is there accidental composition.

Obj. 2: Boethius says in the book On the Trinity that a simple form cannot be a subject. (Boethius, On the Trinity 2 (PL 64:1250).) But angels are simple forms according to Dionysius. (Above: obj. 1.) Therefore, they cannot be the subject of an accident.

On the contrary: Augustine posits that spiritual substances fall short of divine simplicity through this: (Augustine, On the Trinity 6.6, para. 8 (CCSL 50:237; PL 42:929).) that there is in them composition of accident and subject.

I answer that something is receptive of substantial or accidental form from having some potentiality, since having some potency means that it underlies act, which is called form. Yet concerning angels diverse men think diverse things: for certain men say that they are composed of matter and form; others say they are composed of being and what is, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Hebdomads (PL 64:1311–14).) Either way, it is necessary to posit potentiality in an angel. Concerning the first way this is clear; similarly, it can be made clear concerning the second, because everything which is not its own being requires it to have being received from another which is the cause of being for itself. And thus, considered in itself it is in potency in respect of that being which it receives from another. And in this way, at least, it is necessary to posit potentiality in an angel, because an angel is not its own being, for this belongs to God alone. And thus, it remains that an angel can be the subject of accidental form.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that substantial simplicity in angels excludes composition of form and matter, yet not composition of being and what is, which composition is at least presupposed by the accidental composition in angels. And again, it is not necessary, if accidental being is caused by substantial being, for accidental composition to be caused by substantial composition, because a substance in some way simple can be the subject of an accident, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that Boethius speaks concerning that simple form which is pure act, to which nothing of potentiality is admixed; (Boethius, On the Trinity 2 (PL 64:1250).) and such is God only.