On the Sacrament of the Altar

Question 4

On the sacrament of the altar

Then there were questions about the sacrament of the altar. And about this there were three questions:

first, whether the whole quantity of the body of Christ is contained under the species of bread;

second, whether in the same instant there is bread and the body of Christ;

third, whether God can make there be whiteness and other qualities without quantity, just as he makes there be quantity in the sacrament of the altar without subject.

Article 1

Whether the whole quantity of the body of Christ is contained under the species of bread

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the whole body of Christ cannot be contained under those species of bread.

Obj. 1: For it cannot happen, even through a miracle, for two contradictories to be simultaneously true, as Augustine says in Against Faustus. (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 26.5 (CSEL 25:732; PL 42:481–82).) Yet this would follow if the whole body of Christ were under those species. For if the whole is under those species, it is not more than those species, since it does not exceed them; at the same time, according to the truth of the thing it is more, since it is two cubits or greater; (Cf. Augustine, City of God 16.8 (CCSL 48:508; PL 41:485); above: q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Aristotle, History of animals 8.12, 597a6–7.) and thus it would be at the same time more and not more. Therefore, it cannot happen, even through a miracle, for the whole to be contained under those species.

On the contrary: Wherever there is a part of some body, the whole body is also there, unless the body is divided. But the body of Christ is not divided, since it is impassible. Therefore, since something of the body of Christ is under those species, as is said in Matthew 26:26: this is my body, it is necessary for the whole body of Christ to be contained under those species.

I answer that under those species without a doubt there is contained the whole body of Christ and all its quantity.

To show this, it must be known that in the sacrament of the altar something is contained in two ways: in one way, from the power of the sacrament; in another way, from natural concomitance. For example, under the species of bread there is both the body and the blood of Christ, but the body is from the power of the sacrament, while the blood from natural concomitance, since the body of Christ is not without blood. Yet under the species of wine the converse is true. That which is contained in the sacrament from the power of the sacrament is the term of transubstantiation.

And on account of this, the soul and divinity are not contained in the sacrament from the power of the sacrament, since bread and wine are not converted into them, but from natural concomitance, by which the soul inseparably is united to that body and the divinity to the humanity. Yet since on the part of bread the substance passes away and the quantity remains with the rest of the accidents, it is clear that the term of transubstantiation directly is the substance of the body of Christ. And thus, the very substance of the body of Christ is there from the power of the sacrament, but quantity from natural concomitance.

Hence it is clear that the substance of the body of Christ is directly related to the remaining dimensions of bread, whereas the quantity of the body of Christ only consequently. Yet the contrary is true in the order of a placed thing to a place, because the substance of a placed thing is related to a place by its own mediating dimensions. And hence it is necessary for the dimensions of the placed thing to be commensurate with the dimensions of the containing place, (Cf. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 37, P. 1, a. 1, q. 2, concl., 1:641; Aristotle, Physics 4.4, 211a1–2, 33.) yet it is not necessary for the dimensions of the body of Christ to be commensurate with the dimensions of the species. And thus, the whole body of Christ can be under any small dimensions of bread, just as the whole nature of the substance of some body is present in any part of that body.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that it does not follow from this that the body of Christ is not more than those species because it is contained under them, since it is not contained as though commensurate. And thus, it does not follow that there are contradictories simultaneously.

Article 2

Whether in the same instant there is bread and the body of Christ

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that in the same instant there is the substance of bread and the body of Christ under those species.

Obj. 1: For let the last instant in which there is bread be granted, as well as the first instant in which there is the body of Christ. Therefore, either there are two instants or one. But there are not two, because, since between any two instants there is a middle time, (Aristotle, Physics 6.3, 234a7–8, 10; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 8, comm. 69.) this would be to give some time in which there is neither the body of Christ nor the substance of bread there. Therefore, it is necessary for there to be one instant. And thus, in the same instant there is bread and the body of Christ there.

Obj. 2: If it is said that there is no last instant in which there is bread, then to the contrary: to be bread is measured by a certain time; but a proper measure is equal to the thing measured. Therefore, in whatever instant of that time, there is bread there; and thus, there is bread in the last instant.

Obj. 3: Just as time is to continuous motion, so an instant is to an instantaneous change. But time includes both of the terms of a continuous motion. Therefore also, one instant includes both of the terms of transubstantiation, which is an instantaneous change. Yet its termini are bread and the body of Christ. Therefore, in the same instant there is bread and the body of Christ.

Obj. 4: In any instantaneous change it is simultaneously true to say that it becomes and it has become, because before and after cannot be understood in an instant. Therefore, since transubstantiation is an instantaneous change, it is simultaneously true to say that there it becomes and has become the body of Christ. But the body of Christ concerns permanent things, in which what becomes, is not, and what has become, is. Therefore, the body of Christ simultaneously is there and is not. But when the body of Christ is not there, the substance of bread is there. Therefore, simultaneously in the same instant the body of Christ and the substance of bread is there.

On the contrary: Two disparate substantial forms cannot be in the same thing in the same instant. But the form of bread and that of the body of Christ are of this sort. Therefore, they cannot be simultaneously in the same thing in the same instant.

I answer that in no way is the body of Christ and the substance of bread there in the same instant, nor is it possible to assign the last instant in which there is bread there, but the last time, which is continued unto that instant in which the body of Christ is first there.

To show this, it must be known that in natural things instantaneous changes (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4, comm. 129; 6, comm. 32.) always are the termini of motions. The reason for this is that changes of this sort have form and privation for termini, just as the generation of fire has fire and not fire. Yet between form and privation there cannot be some medium except incidentally, namely, inasmuch as that which is deprived of a form more and less approaches to the form by reason of some disposition to the form which is intensified and retarded through continuous motion. And for this reason, it is necessary for the motion of alteration to preexist, which is terminated unto generation.

And thus, alteration has two termini: one of its own genus, namely, the last disposition, which is necessity unto form, (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 9, a. 1, q. 3, concl., ad 3, 2:246.) because alteration is motion in a quality; (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 226a26–27.) and the other of another genus, namely, substantial form. In the same way illumination (Example from Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4, comm. 129; 6, comm. 32.) is a terminus only of local motion, which is an instantaneous change between the form of light and its privation, namely, darkness. Yet for any motion measured by some time it is necessary for the last terminus to be in the last instant of time. Hence, since substantial form is a certain terminus of alteration, it is necessary in the last instant of that time for a substantial form to be introduced. Yet corruption and generation occur simultaneously, because the generation of one is the corruption of another. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994b5–6; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption, bk. 1, lect. 7, n. 57; bk. 1, lect. 9, n. 70.) It is necessary, therefore, in the last instant of that time for there to be a terminus of the corruption of one thing, such as air, and the terminus of the generation of another, such as fire. Yet the terminus of corruption is non-being. It is necessary, therefore, in the last instant of that time for there to be not air for the first time and fire for the first time.

But we cannot pick out a penultimate before the last instant of time, because between any two instants there is a middle time, (Aristotle, Physics 6.3, 234a7–8, 10; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 8.69.) according to the Philosopher. And thus, it is not possible to understand a last instant in which there is air, but in the whole time measuring the motion of alteration there was air, and in its last instant there is not air for the first time and there is fire for the first time.

Similarly, transubstantiation is the terminus of a certain motion which consists in the pronouncing of words, hence in the last instant of the time measuring that pronouncing, for the first time there is not bread and for the first time there is the Body of Christ, and thus it is not possible to give a last instant in which there is bread, but a last time. Yet between a time and an instant it is not necessary for there to fall some medium, as neither between a line and a point, and thus it is not necessary at some time for there to be neither bread nor the body of Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: And thus, the solution to the first is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a point added or subtracted from a line does not make more and less, (Cf. Aquinas, In III Sent. 6.2.3, ad 1.) and it is likewise concerning an instant added on to time or subtracted from it. Hence, although in the last instant of the time measuring the being of bread, there is no bread, nevertheless, it does not follow that that time is more than the duration of the being of bread and thus that the measure is not equal to the thing measured.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that an instant is said to measure some instantaneous change inasmuch as it measures its terminus-to-which, because its terminus-from-which is joined with the whole preceding motion and thus is measured by the time measuring the preceding motion. But time measures motion by the account of both termini, and for this reason, it is not similar.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that to become is said in two ways: one way is to be moved to being, and thus that which is generated in the whole time of the preceding alteration is said to become, and the Philosopher speaks in this way about becoming in the sixth book of the Physics, where he shows that every having-become precedes a becoming, and every becoming precedes a having-become. And thus, it is not true that something simultaneously becomes and has become, but thus it is true that that which becomes, is not. (Aristotle, Physics 6.6, 237b3–22.) Another way a thing is said to become is when a form is introduced, and thus becoming is not being moved, but a motion being terminated; hence, just as a motion simultaneously is terminated and has been terminated, so simultaneously something becomes and has become. But in this way, that which becomes, is, because the terminus of the production is being, in which being is posited as that which in this way is called becoming. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 8.8, 263b20–23.)

Article 3

Whether God can make there be whiteness and other qualities without quantity, just as he makes there be quantity in the sacrament of the altar without subject

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that God cannot make there be whiteness or any bodily quality without quantity.

Obj. 1: For quantity is the first disposition of a body, since it adheres immediately to a substance, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 2.1 (PL 64:201–2); cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 2, obj. 6.) But the first in any genus is the cause of those which are after, as is said in the second book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b24–27.) Therefore, from quantity all other accidents are bodily dispositions. Therefore, with quantity removed, no bodily quality remains.

Obj. 2: A spiritual quality, such as knowledge or virtue, (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 8, 8b29.) is nobler than a bodily quality. But a spiritual quality cannot be without a subject, even miraculously, as it seems. Therefore, much less can a bodily quality be without a subject, at least the subject which is quantity.

Obj. 3: It is more foreign from the nature of a bodily quality for it to be altogether without a subject than for it to be in a spiritual subject, because to be in a spiritual subject is a spiritual quality, which is in the same category with bodily quality, while to be altogether without a subject belongs to substance, which is another category. But it cannot happen miraculously for a bodily quality to be in a spiritual subject, such as whiteness in an angel. Therefore, much less can it happen for a bodily quality to not have a subject, at least quantity.

Obj. 4: Quality depends on subject more than the converse. But God could not make some created substance without any accident, because it is necessary for a relation at least to its creator to be in a creature. Therefore, much less can it happen that a quality is without any subject.

On the contrary (5): The reason that in the sacrament of the altar quantity is without substance is because quantity through its essence differs from substance. But similarly, quality differs through its essence from quantity. Therefore, for the same reason quality can be without quantity.

I answer that to divine power, by reason of its immensurability, must be attributed whatever does not suggest a defect. Nevertheless, there are some things which created nature does not allow to happen on account of some repugnance implied by an implicit contradiction. And concerning such things certain men often say that God can do them, (Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 42 A, a. 6; ad 4, 26:364b.) even though they cannot be done.

Therefore, to see whether it can happen by God for whiteness to be without quantity, it must be known that in whiteness and any other bodily quality it is necessary to consider two things, namely, the very nature of whiteness through which it obtains its species, and also its individuation according as it is this sensible whiteness distinct from that sensible whiteness. Therefore, it could happen by a divine miracle for the nature of whiteness to subsist without every quantity. Nevertheless, that whiteness would not be like this sensible whiteness, but it would be a certain intelligible form, in the manner of the separated forms which Plato posited. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 10, nn. 123–26.) But for this sensible whiteness to be individuated without quantity cannot happen, although it could happen for quantity to be individuated without substance, because quantity is not individuated only out of its subject like the other accidents, but also out of its site, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3, ad 3; d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3.) from the character of dimensive quantity itself, which is quantity having position. (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 6, 4b21–22; 5a15–37.) And for this reason, it is possible to imagine two separate lines of the same species diverse in number according to diverse site. Otherwise, a line would not be divisible from the very character of its genus: for a line is not divided except into lines; yet it is impossible to imagine many whitenesses of the same species without a subject. And thus, it is clear that whiteness is not individuated except from its subject, and on account of this it could not be individuated unless it were in some subject, at least in quantity. But quantity can be individuated, even without a subject, and for this reason, through a miracle there can be this sensible quantity even without a subject, as is clear in the body of Christ. (That is, in the Blessed Sacrament.)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that whiteness, if it were without quantity, already would not be bodily quality, but spiritual, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that concerning spiritual quality it seems that altogether the same thing must be said as that said about bodily quality.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, since spiritual substance lacks quantity, it cannot happen that a bodily quality is in a spiritual substance except in that manner by which it can be without quantity, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that, because created substance is compared to God, some accident follows upon it, as the very relation of creation or of servitude or another similar relation. Hence, just as God cannot make it that a creature does not depend on him, so he could not make it that it would be without accidents of this sort. Yet he could make it that it would be without other accidents. Yet an accident does not have a subject because it is compared to God, and for this reason, nothing prohibits God from being able to make some accident be without a subject.

Reply Obj. 5: To that objected to the contrary, it is clear there is not the same reason for quantity and quality, as is clear from what has been said.