Article 3 — Whether attrition can become contrition?

Objection 1: It would seem that attrition can become contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead faith becomes living. Therefore, attrition can become contrition.

Obj. 2: Further, matter receives perfection when privation is removed. Now sorrow is to grace as matter to form, because grace informs sorrow. Therefore, the sorrow that was previously unformed while guilt remained receives perfection through being informed by grace: and so the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, Things which are caused by principles altogether diverse cannot be changed, one into the other. Now the principle of attrition is servile fear, while filial fear is the cause of contrition. Therefore, attrition cannot become contrition.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question: for some say that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes living faith. But seemingly this is impossible; since, although the habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does an act of lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act passes away and remains no more, as soon as charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (Sentences III, D. 27, Q. 2, A. 4; I, Q. 65, A. 4). Hence, until grace is infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be elicited; so that attrition can in no way become contrition: and this is the other opinion.

Reply Obj. 1: There is no comparison between faith and contrition, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: When the privation is removed from matter, the matter is formed if it remains when the perfection comes. But the sorrow which was lifeless does not remain when charity comes, wherefore it cannot be formed.

It may also be replied that matter does not take its origin from the form essentially, as an act takes its origin from the habit which informs it. Wherefore nothing hinders matter being informed anew by some form whereby it was not informed previously: whereas this cannot be said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically same thing to arise from a cause wherefrom it did not arise before, since a thing is brought into being but once.