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Article 4 — Whether the marriage act is meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act is not meritorious. For Chrysostom says in his commentary on Matthew: although marriage brings no punishment to those who use it, it affords them no reward (Hom. 1 in the Opus Imperfectum). Now merit bears a relation to reward. Therefore, the marriage act is not meritorious.

Obj. 2: Further, to refrain from what is meritorious deserves not praise. Yet virginity, whereby one refrains from marriage, is praiseworthy. Therefore, the marriage act is not meritorious.

Obj. 3: Further, he who avails himself of an indulgence granted him avails himself of a favor received. But a man does not merit by receiving a favor. Therefore, the marriage act is not meritorious.

Obj. 4: Further, merit, like virtue, consists in difficulty. But the marriage act affords not difficulty, but pleasure. Therefore, it is not meritorious.

Obj. 5: Further, that which cannot be done without venial sin is never meritorious, for a man cannot both merit and demerit at the same time. Now there is always a venial sin in the marriage act, since even the first movement in such like pleasures is a venial sin. Therefore, the aforesaid act cannot be meritorious.

On the contrary, Every act whereby a precept is fulfilled is meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such is the marriage act, for it is said: let the husband render the debt to his wife (1 Cor 7:3). Therefore, etc.

Further, Every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the aforesaid act is an act of justice, for it is called the rendering of a debt. Therefore, it is meritorious.

I answer that, Since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is indifferent, as stated in the Book II of the Sentences, (D. 40, Q. 1, A. 3; I-II, Q. 18, A. 9) the marriage act is always either sinful or meritorious in one who is in a state of grace. For if the motive for the marriage act be a virtue, whether of justice, that they may render the debt, or of religion, that they may beget children for the worship of God, it is meritorious. But if the motive be lust, yet not excluding the marriage blessings, namely, that he would by no means be willing to go to another woman, it is a venial sin; while if he exclude the marriage blessings, so as to be disposed to act in like manner with any woman, it is a mortal sin. And nature cannot move without being either directed by reason, and thus it will be an act of virtue, or not so directed, and then it will be an act of lust.

Reply Obj. 1: The root of merit, as regards the essential reward, is charity itself; but as regards an accidental reward, the reason for merit consists in the difficulty of an act; and thus the marriage act is not meritorious except in the first way.

Reply Obj. 2: Man can merit in lesser things and in greater things: and so when someone foregoes a lesser good so that he might do the greater, his abandoning a less meritorious act is to be praised.

Reply Obj. 3: An indulgence sometimes has to do with lesser evils; and thus the marital act is indulged according as sexual desire moves one to it while remaining within the bounds of marriage, for thus it is a venial sin. But according as virtue moves one to it, so that it is meritorious, it does not require an indulgence unless as to the indulgence of lesser goods, which is the same as a concession. Nor is it unfitting that that man who takes advantage of this concession merits: for the good use of the benefits of God is meritorious.

Reply Obj. 4: Difficulty of a work is required for the merit of the accidental prize, but for meriting the essential prize, the difficulty required consists in ordering to the mean, and this is also in the marital act.

Reply Obj. 5: The first movement, according to which it is called venial sin, is the motion of the appetite toward something inordinately delectable, which is not in the marital act; and thus the argument does not follow.

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