Lecture 1 — Eternity of the Word

^1:1^ In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. [n. 24]

^1:2^ He was in the beginning with God. [n. 60]

23. John the Evangelist, as already indicated, makes it his principal object to show the divinity of the incarnate Word. Accordingly, his Gospel is divided into two parts.

In the first he states the divinity of Christ;

in the second he shows it by the things Christ did in the flesh, at and on the third day (John 2:1).

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First he shows the divinity of Christ;

second he sets forth the manner in which Christ’s divinity is made known to us, at and we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten (John 1:14).

Concerning the first he does two things.

First he treats of the divinity of Christ;

second of the incarnation of the Word of God, at there was a man sent from God, whose name was John (John 1:6).

Because there are two items to be considered in each thing, namely, its existence and its operation or power,

first he treats the existence of the Word as to his divine nature;

second of his power or operation, at all things were made through him (John 1:3).

In regard to the first he does four things.

First he shows when the Word was: in the beginning was the Word;

second where he was: and the Word was with God;

third what he was: and the Word was God;

fourth, in what way he was: he was in the beginning with God.

The first two pertain to the inquiry of whether something exists; the second two pertain to the inquiry of what something is.

24. With respect to the first of these four we must examine the meaning of the statement, in the beginning was the Word. And here three things present themselves for careful study according to the three parts of this statement. First it is necessary to investigate the name Word; second the phrase in the beginning; third the meaning of the Word was in the beginning.

25. To understand the name Word we should note that according to the Philosopher, vocal sounds are signs of the affections that exist in our soul (De interpretatione 1, 16a3–4). It is customary in Scripture for the things signified to be themselves called by the names of their signs, as in the statement, and the rock was Christ (1 Cor 10:4). It is fitting that what is within our soul, and what is signified by our external word, be called a word. But whether the name ‘word’ belongs first to the exterior vocal sound or to the conception in our mind, is not our concern at present. However, it is obvious that what is signified by the vocal sound, as existing interiorly in the soul, exists prior to the vocal expression inasmuch as it is its actual cause.

Therefore if we wish to grasp the meaning of the interior word, we must first look at the meaning of that which is exteriorly expressed in words.

Now there are three things in our intellect: the intellectual power itself, the species of the thing understood, which is its form, and this form being to the intellect what the species of a color is to the eye; and third, the very activity of the intellect, which is to understand. But none of these is what is signified by the exterior vocal word.

For, the name ‘stone’ does not signify the substance of the intellect because this is not what the one naming intends; nor does it signify the species, which is that by which the intellect understands, since this also is not the intention of the one naming; nor does it signify the act itself of understanding since to understand is not an action proceeding to the exterior from the one understanding, but an action remaining within. Therefore, that is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms when understanding.

Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two operations. According to its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; while according to its operation by which it unites and separates, it forms an enunciation or something of that sort. Hence, what is thus formed and expressed by the operation of the intellect, whether by defining or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies. So the Philosopher says that the notion that a name signifies is a definition (De interpretatatione 16a20–b5). Hence, what is thus expressed, i.e., formed in the soul, is called an interior word. Consequently it is compared to the intellect, not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which it understands, because it is in what is thus expressed and formed that it sees the nature of the thing understood. Thus we have the meaning of the name ‘word.’

Second, from what has been said we are able to understand that a word is always something that proceeds from an intellect existing in act; and furthermore, that a word is always a notion and likeness of the thing understood. So if the one understanding and the thing understood are the same, then the word is a notion and likeness of the intellect from which it proceeds. On the other hand, if the one understanding is other than the thing understood, then the word is not a likeness and notion of the one understanding but of the thing understood, as the conception which one has of a stone is a likeness of only the stone. But when the intellect understands itself, its word is a likeness and notion of the intellect. And so Augustine sees a likeness of the Trinity in the soul insofar as the mind understands itself, but not insofar as it understands other things (De Trin. 9.5.8).

It is clear then that it is necessary to have a word in any intellectual nature, for it is of the very nature of understanding that the intellect in understanding should form something. Now what is formed is called a word, and so it follows that in every being which understands there must be a word.

However, intellectual natures are of three kinds: human, angelic and divine; and so there are three kinds of words. The human word, about which it is said: the fool said in his heart: there is no God (Ps 13:1). The angelic word, about which it is said in Zechariah, and in many places in Sacred Scripture, and the angel said to me: I will show you what these are (Zech 1:9). The third is the divine word, of which it is said, and God said: let there be light (Gen 1:3).

So when the Evangelist says, in the beginning was the Word, we cannot understand this as a human or angelic word, because both these words have been made since man and angel have a cause and principle of their existence and operation, and the word of a man or an angel cannot exist before they do. The word the Evangelist had in mind he shows by saying that this word was not made, since all things were made by it. Therefore, the word about which John speaks here is the Word of God.

26. We should note that this Word differs from our own word in three ways.

The first difference, according to Augustine, is that our word is formable before being formed, for when I wish to conceive the notion of a stone, I must arrive at it by reasoning (De Trin 15.4.25). And so it is in all other things that are understood by us, with the sole possible exception of the first principles, which, since they are known in a simple manner, are known at once without any discourse of reason.

So as long as the intellect, in so reasoning, casts about this way and that, the formation is not yet complete. It is only when it has conceived the notion of the thing perfectly that for the first time it has the notion of the complete thing and a word. Thus in our mind there is both a cogitation, meaning the discourse involved in an investigation, and a word, which is formed according to a perfect contemplation of the truth. So our word is first in potency before it is in act. But the Word of God is always in act. In consequence, the term cogitation does not properly speaking apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says: the Word of God is spoken of in such a way that cogitation is not included, lest anything changeable be supposed in God (De Trin. 15.4.25). Anselm was speaking improperly when he said: for the supreme Spirit to speak is for him to look at something while cogitating (Monolog. 63).

27. The second difference is that our word is imperfect, but the divine Word is most perfect.

For since we cannot express all our conceptions in one word, we must form many imperfect words through which we separately express all that is in our knowledge. But it is not that way with God. For since he understands both himself and everything else through his essence, by one act, the single divine Word is expressive of all that is in God, not only of the persons but also of creatures; otherwise it would be imperfect. So Augustine says: if there were less in the Word than is contained in the knowledge of the one speaking it, the Word would be imperfect; but it is obvious that it is most perfect; therefore, it is only one. God speaks once (Job 33:14). (Augustine, De Trinitate (CPL 0329), bk. 15, ch. 14, par. 23.)

28. The third difference is that our word is not of the same nature as we; but the divine Word is of the same nature as God. And therefore it is something that subsists in the divine nature.

For the understood notion which the intellect is seen to form about some thing has only an intelligible existence in our soul. Now in our soul, to understand is not the same as the nature of the soul, because our soul is not its own operation. Consequently, the word which our intellect forms is not of the essence of our soul, but is an accident of it. But in God, to understand and to be are the same; and so the Word of the divine intellect is not an accident but belongs to its nature. Thus it must be subsistent, because whatever is in the nature of God is God. Thus Damascene says that God is a substantial word, and a hypostasis, but our words are concepts in our mind (De fide orth. 1.13).

29. From the above it is clear that the Word, properly speaking, is always understood as a person in the divinity, since it implies only something expressed, by the one understanding;

also, that in the divinity the Word is the likeness of that from which it issues; and that it is co-eternal with that from which it issues, since it was not first formable before being formed, but was always in act; and that it is equal to the Father, since it is perfect and expressive of the whole being of the Father; and that it is co-essential and consubstantial with the Father, since it is his substance.

It is also clear that since in every nature that which issues forth and has a likeness to the nature from which it issues is called a son, and since this Word issues forth in a likeness and identity to the nature from which it issues, it is suitably and appropriately called a son, and its production is called a generation.

So now the first point is clear, the meaning of the term Word.

30. There are four questions on this point, two of them from Chrysostom.

The first is: why did John the Evangelist omit the Father and begin at once with the Son, saying, in the beginning was the Word? (John Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John, hom. 2, ch. 7.)

There are two answers to this. One is that the Father was known to everyone in the Old Testament, although not under the aspect of Father, but as God; but the Son was not known. And so in the New Testament, which is concerned with our knowledge of the Word, he begins with the Word or Son.

The other answer is that we are brought to know the Father through the Son: **Father, I have manifested your name to the men whom you have given to me **(John 17:6). And so wishing to lead the faithful to a knowledge of the Father, the Evangelist fittingly began with the Son, at once adding something about the Father when he says, and the Word was with God.

31. The second question is also from Chrysostom.

Why did he say Word and not Son, since, as we have said, the Word proceeds as Son? (Commentary on Saint John, hom. 2, ch. 7.)

There are also two answers to this. First, because Son means something begotten, and when we hear of the generation of the Son, someone might suppose that this generation is the kind he can comprehend, that is, a material and changeable generation. Thus he did not say Son, but Word, which signifies an intelligible proceeding, so that it would not be understood as a material and changeable generation. And so in showing that the Son is born of the Father in an unchangeable way, he eliminates a faulty conjecture by using the name Word.

The second answer is this. The Evangelist was about to consider the Word as having come to manifest the Father. But since the idea of manifesting is implied better in the name Word than in the name Son, he preferred to use the name Word.

32. The third question is raised by Augustine in his book Eighty-Three Questions; and it is this. In Greek, where we have Word, they have Logos; now since Logos signifies in Latin both notion and word, why did the translators render it as Word and not notion, since a notion is something interior just as a word is? (Q. 63)

I answer that notion, properly speaking, names a conception of the mind precisely as in the mind, even if through it nothing exterior comes to be; but word signifies a reference to something exterior. And so because the Evangelist, when he said Logos, intended to signify not only a reference to the Son’s existence in the Father, but also the operative power of the Son, by which, all things were made through him: and without him was made nothing, our predecessors preferred to translate it Word, which implies a reference to something exterior, rather than notion which implies merely a concept of the mind.

33. The fourth question is from Origen, and is this. (Origen, Commentary on John 2.37–41.) In many passages, Scripture, when speaking of the Word of God, does not simply call him the Word, but adds of God, saying, the Word of God, or of the Lord: the Word of God on high is the foundation of wisdom (Sir 1:5); his name is the Word of God (Rev 19:13). Why then did the Evangelist, when speaking here of the Word of God, not say, in the beginning was the Word of God, but said in the beginning was the Word?

I answer that although there are many participated truths, there is just one absolute truth, which is truth by its very essence, that is, the divine act of being; and by this truth all words are words. Similarly, there is one absolute wisdom elevated above all things, that is, the divine wisdom, by participating in which all wise persons are wise. Further, there is one absolute Word, by participating in which all persons having a word are called speakers. Now this is the divine Word which of itself is the Word elevated above all words.

So in order that the Evangelist might signify this supereminence of the divine Word, he pointed out this Word to us absolutely without any addition. And because the Greeks, when they wished to signify something separate and elevated above everything else, did this by affixing the article to the name, as did the Platonists, wishing to signify the separated substances, such as the separated good or the separated man, called them the good per se, or man per se, so the Evangelist, wishing to signify the separation and elevation of that Word above all things, affixed an article to the name Logos, so that if it were stated in Latin we would say the Word.

34. Second, we must consider the meaning of the phrase, in the beginning.

We must note that according to Origen, the word ‘principium’ has many meanings. (Origen, Commentary on John 1.90.) Since the word ‘principium’ implies a certain order of one thing to another, one can find a principium in all those things which have an order.

First of all, order is found in quantified things; and so there is a principle of number and lengths, as for example, a line.

Second, order is found in time; and so we speak of a beginning of time, or of duration.

Third, order is found in learning; and this in two ways: as to nature, and as to ourselves, and in both cases we can speak of a beginning. By this time you ought to be teachers (Heb 5:12). As to nature, in Christian doctrine the beginning and principle of our wisdom is Christ, inasmuch as he is the wisdom and Word of God, i.e., in his divinity. But as to ourselves, the beginning is Christ himself inasmuch as **the Word has become flesh **(John 1:14), i.e., by his incarnation.

Fourth, order is found in the production of a thing. In this perspective there can be a principium on the part of the thing generated, that is, the first part of the thing generated or made; as we say that the foundation is the beginning of a house. Another is on the part of the generator, and in this perspective there are three principles: of intention, which is the purpose, which motivates the agent; of reason, which is the idea in the mind of the maker; and of execution, which is the operative faculty.

Considering these various ways of using the term, we now ask how beginning is used here when it says, in the beginning was the Word.

35. We should note that this word can be taken in three ways.

In one way so that principium is understood as the person of the Son, who is the principle of creatures by reason of his active power acting with wisdom, which is the conception of the things that are brought into existence. Hence we read: Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24). And so the Lord said about himself: the source, who also speaks to you (John 8:25).

Taking principium in this way, we should understand the statement, in the beginning was the Word, as though he were saying, the Word was in the Son, so that the sense would be: the Word himself is the principle, in the sense in which life is said to be in God, when this life is not something other than God. And this is the explanation of Origen. (Origen, Commentary on John 1.116–17.)

And so the Evangelist says in the beginning here in order, as Chrysostom says, to show at the very outset the divinity of the Word by asserting that he is a principle because, as determining all, a principle is most honored. (Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John, hom. 2, ch. 3.)

36. In a second way principium can be understood as the person of the Father, who is the principle not only of creatures, but of every divine process. It is taken this way in, yours is princely power in the day of your birth (Ps 110:3).

In this second way one reads in the beginning was the Word as though it means, the Son was in the Father. This is Augustine’s understanding of it, as well as Origen’s. (Augustine, De Trinitate (CPL 0329), bk. 6, ch. 2, par. 3. Origen, Commentary on John 1.102.)

The Son, however, is said to be in the Father because both have the same essence. Since the Son is his own essence, then the Son is in whomsoever the Son’s essence is. Since, therefore, the essence of the Son is in the Father by consubstantiality, it is fitting that the Son be in the Father. Hence it is said: I am in the Father, and the Father in me (John 14:10).

37. In a third way, principium can be taken for the beginning of duration, so that the sense of in the beginning was the Word is that the Word was before all things, as Augustine explains it. (De Trinitate (CPL 0329), bk. 6, ch. 2, par. 3.) According to Basil and Hilary, this phrase shows the eternity of the Word. (Basil the Great, Homily on the Beginning of the Gospel of John 1. Hilary of Poitiers, The Trinity (CPL 0433), bk. 2, ch. 13.)

The phrase in the beginning was the Word shows that no matter which beginning of duration is taken, whether of temporal things, which is time, or of aeviternal things, which is the aeon, or of the whole world or any imagined span of time reaching back for many ages, at that beginning the Word already was. Hence Hilary says: go back season by season, skip over the centuries, take away ages. Set down whatever you want as the beginning in your opinion: the Word already was. And this is what Proverbs says: the Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything (Prov 8:23). (Hilary of Poitiers, The Trinity (CPL 0433), bk. 2, ch. 13.) But what is prior to the beginning of duration is eternal.

38. And thus the first explanation asserts the causality of the Word; the second explanation affirms the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, who utters the Word; and the third explanation affirms the co-eternity of the Word.

39. Now we should consider that it says that the Word was, which is stated in the past imperfect tense. This tense is most appropriate for designating eternal things if we consider the nature of time and of the things that exist in time. For what is future is not yet in act; but what is at present is in act, and by the fact that it is in act what is present is not described as having been. Now the past perfect tense indicates that something has existed, has already come to an end, and has now ceased to be. The past imperfect tense, on the other hand, indicates that something has been, has not yet come to an end, nor has ceased to be, but still endures. Thus, whenever John mentions eternal things he expressly says was, but when he refers to anything temporal he says has been, as will be clear later (C. 1, L. 4).

But so far as concerns the notion of the present, the best way to designate eternity is the present tense, which indicates that some thing is in act, and this is always the characteristic of eternal things. And so it is said: I am who am (Exod 3:14). And Augustine says: he alone truly is whose being does not know a past and a future. (Augustine, De Trinitate (CPL 0329), bk. 5, ch. 2, par. 3.)

40. We should also note that this verb was, according to the Gloss, is not understood here as indicating temporal changes, as other verbs do, but as signifying the existence of a thing. (The Gloss mentioned here and throughout was a collection of authoritative or celebrated commentaries that, in St. Thomas’s time and throughout the middle ages, featured standardly as annotations in the margins and interlinear spaces of Vulgate manuscripts.) Thus it is also called a substantive verb.

41. Someone may ask how the Word can be co-eternal with the Father since he is begotten by the Father: for a human son, born from a human father, is subsequent to his father.

I answer that there are three reasons why an originative principle is prior in duration to that which derives from that principle. First of all, if the originative principle of anything precedes in time the action by which it produces the thing of which it is the principle; thus a man does not begin to write as soon as he exists, and so he precedes his writing in time. Second, if an action is successive; consequently, even if the action should happen to begin at the same time as the agent, the termination of the action is nevertheless subsequent to the agent. Thus, as soon as fire has been generated in a lower region, it begins to ascend; but the fire exists before it has ascended, because the motion by which it tends upward requires some time. Third, by the fact that sometimes the beginning of a thing depends on the will of its principle, just as the beginning of a creature’s coming-to-be depends on the will of God, such that God existed before any creature.

Yet none of these three is found in the generation of the divine Word. God did not first exist and then begin to generate the Word: for since the generation of the Word is nothing other than an intelligible conception, it would follow that God would be understanding in potency before understanding in act, which is impossible. Again, it is impossible that the generation of the Word involve succession: for then the divine Word would be unformed before it was formed, as happens in us who form words by cogitating, which is false, as was said. Again, we cannot say that the Father pre-established a beginning of duration for his Son by his own will, because God the Father does not generate the Son by his will, as the Arians held, but naturally: for God the Father, understanding himself, conceives the Word; and so God the Father did not exist prior to the Son. (The Arians were a loose group of clergy and theologians who followed the view of Arius (AD 256–336), an influential presbyter from Alexandria, Egypt, who argued that the Son, because he is begotten of the Father, can be neither co-eternal nor equal in divinity with him. Arius and his views were condemned at the Council of Nicaea in 325 AD.)

An example of this, to a limited degree, appears in fire and in the brightness issuing from it: for this brightness issues naturally and without succession from the fire. Again, if the fire were eternal, its brightness would be coeternal with it. This is why the Son is called the brightness of the Father: the brightness of his glory (Heb 1:3). But this example lacks an illustration of the identity of nature. And so we call him Son, although in human sonship we do not find coeternity: for we must attain our knowledge of divine things from many likenesses in material things, for one likeness is not enough. The Council of Ephesus says that the Son always coexists with the Father: for brightness indicates his unchangeability, birth points to the Word himself, but the name Son suggests his consubstantiality. (The Council of Ephesus (431), “Canonical Epistle of St. Cyril,” Cum Salvator Noster.)

42. And so we give the Son various names to express his perfection, which cannot be expressed by one name. We call him Son to show that he is of the same nature as the Father; we call him image to show that he is not unlike the Father in any way; we call him brightness to show that he is coeternal; and he is called the Word to show that he is begotten in an immaterial manner.

43. Then the Evangelist says, and the Word was with God.

This is the second clause which the Evangelists posits in his narration. The first thing to consider is the meaning of the two words which did not appear in the first clause, that is, God, and with; for what is signified by Verbum and principium has already been related. Therefore, let us diligengly continue investigating that which is new in the second clause, namely God and with.

And to better understand the explanation of this second clause, we must say something about the meaning of each so far as it is relevant to our purpose.

44. At the outset, we should note that the name God signifies the divinity concretely and as inherent in a subject, while the name ‘deity’ signifies the divinity in the abstract and absolutely. Thus it cannot naturally and by its mode of signifying stand for a divine person, but only for the divine nature. But the name God can, by its natural mode of signifying, stand for any one of the divine persons, just as the name ‘man’ stands for any individual possessing humanity. Therefore, whenever the truth of a statement or its predicate requires that the name ‘God’ stand for the person, then it stands for the person, as when we say, God begets God. Thus, when it says here that the Word was with God, it is necessary that God stand for the person of the Father, because the preposition with signifies the distinction of the Word, which is said to be with God. And although this preposition signifies a distinction in person, it does not signify a distinction in nature, since the nature of the Father and of the Son is the same. Consequently, the Evangelist wished to signify the person of the Father when he said God.

45. Here we should note that the preposition with signifies a certain union of the thing signified by its grammatical antecedent to the thing signified by its grammatical object, just as the preposition ‘in’ does. However, there is a difference, because the preposition ‘in’ signifies a certain intrinsic union, whereas the preposition with implies in a certain way an extrinsic union. And we state both in divine matters, namely, that the Son is in the Father and with the Father. Here the intrinsic union pertains to consubstantiality, but the extrinsic union (if we may use such an expression, since extrinsic is improperly employed in divine matters) refers only to a personal distinction, because the Son is distinguished from the Father by origin alone. And so these two words designate both a consubstantiality in nature and distinction in person: consubstantiality inasmuch as a certain union is implied; but distinction, inasmuch as a certain otherness is signified as was said above.

The preposition in, as was said, principally signifies consubstantiality, as implying an intrinsic union and, by way of consequence, a distinction of persons, inasmuch as every preposition is transitive. The preposition with principally signifies a personal distinction, but also a consubstantiality inasmuch as it signifies a certain extrinsic, so to speak, union. For these reasons the Evangelist specifically used here the preposition with in order to express the distinction of the person of the Son from the Father, saying, and the Word was with God, that is, the Son was with the Father as one person with another.

46. We should note further that this preposition with has four meanings, through which four contrary objections are eliminated.

First, the preposition with signifies the subsistence of its antecedent, because things that do not subsist of themselves are not properly said to be with another; thus we do not say that a color is with a body, and the same applies to other things that do not subsist of themselves. But things that do subsist of themselves are properly said to be with another; thus we say that a man is with a man, and a stone with a stone. Second, it signifies authority in its grammatical object. For we do not, properly speaking, say that a king is with a soldier, but that the soldier is with the king. Third, it asserts a distinction. For it is not proper to say that a person is with himself but rather that one man is with another. Fourth, it signifies a certain union and fellowship. For when some person is said to be with another, it suggests to us that there is some social union between them. Considering these four conditions implied in the meaning of this preposition with, the Evangelist quite appropriately joins to the first clause, in the beginning was the Word, this second clause, and the Word was with God.

For if we omit one of the three explanations of, in the beginning was the Word, namely, the one in which principium was understood as the Son, certain heretics make a twofold objection against each of the other explanations, namely, the one in which principium means the same as before all things, and the one in which it is understood as the Father. Thus there are four objections, and we can answer these by the four conditions indicated by this preposition with.

47. The first of these objections is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., before all things. But before all things there was nothing. So if before all things there was nothing, where then was the Word?

This objection arises due to the imaginings of those who think that whatever exists is somewhere and in some place. But this is rejected by John when he says, with God, which indicates the union mentioned in the last four conditions. So, according to Basil, the meaning is this: where was the Word? The answer is: with God; not in some place, since he is unsurroundable, but he is with the Father, who is not enclosed by any place. (Basil the Great, Homily on the Beginning of the Gospel of John 4.)

48. The second objection against the same explanation is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., before all things. But whatever exists before all things appears to proceed from no one, since that from which something proceeds seems to be prior to that which proceeds from it. Therefore, the Word does not proceed from another.

This objection is rejected when he says, the Word was with God, taking with according to its second condition, as implying authority in what is causing. So the meaning, according to Hilary, is this: from whom is the Word if he exists before all things? The Evangelist answers: the Word was with God, i.e., although the Word has no beginning of duration, still he does not lack a beginning or author, for he was with God as his author. (Hilary of Poitiers, The Trinity (CPL 0433), bk. 2, ch. 14.)

49. The third objection, directed to the explanation in which principium is understood as the Father, is this. You say that in the beginning was the Word, i.e., the Son was in the Father. But that which is in something does not seem to be subsistent, as a hypostasis; just as the whiteness in a body does not subsist.

This objection is solved by the statement, the Word was with God, taking with in its first condition, as implying the subsistence of its grammatical antecedent. So according to Chrysostom, the meaning is this: in the beginning was the Word, not as an accident, but he was with God, as subsisting, and a divine hypostasis. (John Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John, hom. 4, ch. 1.)

50. The fourth objection, against the same explanation, is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., in the Father. But whatever is in something is not distinct from it. So the Son is not distinct from the Father.

This objection is answered by the statement, and the Word was with God, taking with in its third condition, as indicating distinction. Thus the meaning, according to Alcuin and Bede, is this: the Word was with God, and he was with the Father by a consubstantiality of nature, while still being with him through a distinction in person.

51. And so, and the Word was with God, indicates: the union of the Word with the Father in nature, according to Basil; their distinction in person, according to Alcuin and Bede; (Alcuin, Commentaria in sancti Joannis Evangelium 1. Bede the Venerable, Expositio in Evangelium Sancti Joannis 1.) the subsistence of the Word in the divine nature, according to Chrysostom; and the authorship of the Father in relation to the Word, according to Hilary.

52. We should also note, according to Origen, that the Word was with God shows that the Son has always been with the Father. (Origen, Commentary on John, bk. 2, par. 8.) For in the Old Testament it says that the Word of the Lord was with Jeremiah or someone else, as is plain in many passages of Sacred Scripture. But it does not say that the Word of the Lord was with Jeremiah or anyone else, because the Word comes to those who begin to have the Word after not having it. Thus the Evangelist did not say that the Word came to the Father, but was with the Father, because, given the Father, the Word was with him.

53. Then he says, and the Word was God. This is the third clause in John’s account, and it follows most appropriately considering the order of teaching. For since John had said both when and where the Word was, it remained to inquire what the Word was, that is, the Word was God, taking Word as the subject, and God as the predicate.

54. But since one should first inquire what a thing is before investigating where and when it is, it seems that John violated this order by discussing these latter first.

Origen answers this by saying that the Word of God is with man and with God in different ways. (Origen, Commentary on John, bk. 2, par. 8–10.) The Word is with man as perfecting him, because it is through him that man becomes wise and good: she makes friends of God and prophets (Wis 7:27). But the Word is not with God as though the Father were perfected and enlightened by him. Rather, the Word is with God as receiving natural divinity from him, who utters the Word, and from whom he has it that he is the same God with him. And so, since the Word was with God by origin, it was necessary to show first that the Word was in the Father and with the Father before showing that the Word was God.

55. It is to be noted however, that this clause also enables us to answer two objections which arise from the foregoing: the Word was God.

The first is based on the name Word, and is this. You say that in the beginning was the Word, and that the Word was with God. Now it is obvious that ‘word’ is generally understood to signify a vocal sound and the statement of something necessary, a manifesting of thoughts. But these words pass away and do not subsist. Accordingly, someone could think that the Evangelist was speaking of a word like these.

According to Hilary and Augustine, this question is sufficiently answered by the above account. (Hilary of Poitiers, The Trinity (CPL 0433), bk. 2, ch. 15.) Augustine says that it is obvious that in this passage Word cannot be understood as a statement because, since a statement is in motion and passes away, it could not be said that in the beginning was the Word, if this Word were something passing away and in motion. (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John (CPL 0278), tract. 1, par. 8.) The same thing is clear from and the Word was with God: for to be in another is not the same as to be with another. Our word, since it does not subsist, is not with us, but in us; but the Word of God is subsistent, and therefore with God. And so the Evangelist expressly says, and the Word was with God. To entirely remove the ground of the objection, he adds the nature and being of the Word, saying, and the Word was God.

56. The other question comes from his saying, with God. For since with indicates a distinction, it could be thought that the Word was with God, i.e., the Father, as distinct from him in nature. So to exclude this he adds at once the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, saying, and the Word was God. As if to say: the Word is not separated from the Father by a diversity of nature, because the Word itself is God.

57. Note also the special way of signifying, since he says, the Word was God, using God absolutely to show that he is not God in the same way in which the name of the deity is given to a creature in Sacred Scripture. For a creature sometimes shares this name with some added qualification, as when it says, I have appointed you the God of Pharaoh (Exod 7:1), in order to indicate that he was not God absolutely or by nature, because he was appointed the god of someone in a qualified sense. Again, it says in a psalm: I said: you are gods (Ps 81:6) as if to say: in my opinion, but not in reality. Thus the Word is called God absolutely because he is God by his own essence, and not by participation, as men and angels are.

58. We should note that Origen disgracefully misunderstood this clause, led astray by the Greek manner of speaking and this was the occasion of his error.

It is the custom among the Greeks to put the article before every name in order to indicate a distinction. In the Greek version of John’s Gospel the name Word in the statement, in the beginning was the Word, and also the name God in the statement, and the Word was with God, are prefixed by the article, so as to read the Word and the God, in order to indicate the eminence and distinction of the Word from other words, and the principality of the Father in the divinity. But in the statement, the Word was God, the article is not prefixed to the noun God, which stands for the person of the Son. Because of this Origen blasphemed that the Word, although he was Word by essence, was not God by essence, but is called God by participation; while the Father alone is God by essence. (Origen, Commentary on John, bk. 2, par. 12–18.) And so he held that the Son is inferior to the Father.

59. Chrysostom proves that this is not true, because if the article used with the name God implied the superiority of the Father in respect to the Son, it would never be used with the name God when it is used as a predicate of another, but only when it is predicated of the Father. (John Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John, hom. 4, ch. 3.) Further, whenever it would be said of the Father, it would be accompanied by the article.

However, we find the opposite to be the case in two statements of the Apostle, who calls Christ God, using the article. For he says, the coming of the glory of the great God and our savior Jesus Christ (Titus 2:13), where God stands for the Son, and in the Greek the article is used. Therefore, Christ is the great God. Again he says: Christ, who is God over all things, blessed forever (Rom 9:5), and again the article is used with God in the Greek. Further, it is said: that we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ; he is the true God and eternal life (1 John 5:20) . Thus, Christ is not God by participation, but truly God. And so the theory of Origen is clearly false.

Chrysostom gives us the reason why the Evangelist did not use the article with the name God, namely, because he had already mentioned God twice using the article, and so it was not necessary to repeat it a third time, but it was implied. (John Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John, hom. 4, ch. 3.)

Or it could be said, and this is a better reason, that God is used here as the predicate and is taken formally. And it is not the custom for the article to accompany names used as predicates, since the article indicates a distinction. But if God were used here as the subject, it could stand for any of the persons, as the Son or the Holy Spirit; then, no doubt, the article would be used in the Greek.

60. Then he says, he was in the beginning with God.

This is the fourth clause and is introduced because of the preceding clause. For from the Evangelist’s statement that the Word was God, two false interpretations could be held by those who misunderstand. One of these is by the pagans, who acknowledge many and different gods, and say that their wills are in opposition. For example, those who put out the fable of Jupiter fighting with Saturn; or as the Manicheans, who have two contrary principles of nature. (The Manicheans were an eclectic, Mesopotamian religious movement that emerged in the third century AD. The Manichaeans held a dualistic cosmology in which good and evil were represented by two more-or-less equal deities whose rivalry constituted the fundamental dynamism of history.) The Lord said against this error: hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord (Deut 6:4).

Since the Evangelist had said, the Word was with God, and the Word was God, they could adduce this in support of their error by understanding the God with whom the Word is to be one God, and the Word to be another, having another, or contrary, will to the former; and this is against the law of the Gospel.

And so to exclude this he says, he was in the beginning with God, as if to say, according to Hilary: I say that the Word is God, not as if he has a distinct divinity, but he is with God, that is, in the one same nature in which he is. (Hilary of Poitiers, The Trinity (CPL 0433), bk. 2, ch. 16.) Further, lest his statement, and the Word was God, be taken to mean that the Word has an opposed will, he added that the Word was in the beginning with God, namely, the Father; not as divided from him or opposed, but having an identity of nature with him and a harmony of will. This union comes about by the sharing of the divine nature in the three persons, and by the bond of the natural love of the Father and the Son.

61. The Arians were able to draw out another error from the above. They think that the Son is less than the Father because it says: the Father is greater than I (John 14:28). And they say the Father is greater than the Son both as to eternity and as to divinity of nature. And so to exclude this the Evangelist added: he was in the beginning with God.

For Arius admits the first clause, in the beginning was the Word, but he will not admit that principium should be taken for the Father, but rather for the beginning of creatures. So he says that the Word was in the beginning of creatures, and consequently is in no sense coeternal with the Father. But this is excluded, according to Chrysostom, by this clause, he was in the beginning, not of creatures, but in the beginning with God, i.e., whenever God existed. (John Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John, hom. 4, ch. 1.) For the Father was never alone without the Son or Word, but he, that is, the Word, was always with God.

62. Again, Arius admits that the Word was God, but nevertheless inferior to the Father. This is excluded by what follows.

For there are two attributes proper to the great God which Arius attributed solely to God the Father, that is, eternity and omnipotence. So in whomever these two attributes are found, he is the great God, than whom none is greater. But the Evangelist attributes these two to the Word. Therefore, the Word is the great God and not inferior. He says the Word is eternal when he states, he was in the beginning with God, i.e., the Word was with God from eternity, and not only in the beginning of creatures, as Arius held; but he was with God, receiving being and divinity from him. Further, he attributes omnipotence to the Word when he adds, **all things were made through him **(John 1:3).

63. Origen gives a rather beautiful explanation of this clause, he was in the beginning with God, when he says that it is not separate from the first three, but is in a certain sense their epilogue. (Origen, Commentary on Saint John, bk. 2, par. 64–69.)

For the Evangelist, after he had indicated that truth was the Son’s and was about to describe his power, in a way gathers together in a summary form, in this fourth clause, what he had said in the first three. For in saying he, he understands the third clause; by adding was in the beginning, he recalls the first clause; and by adding was with God, he recalls the second, so that we do not think that the Word which was in the beginning is different than the Word which was God; but this Word which was God was in the beginning with God.

64. If one considers these four propositions well, he will find that they clearly destroy all the errors of the heretics and of the philosophers.

For some heretics, as Ebion and Cerinthus, said that Christ did not exist before the Blessed Virgin, but took from her the beginning of his being and duration; for they held that he was a mere man, who had merited divinity by his good works. (Cerinthus was a first-century gnostic figure associated with the Gospel of Cerinthus and the view that Jesus was the natural-born son of Joseph and Mary who received the spirit of Christ during his baptism. Ebion, who Tertullian identifies as the successor of Cerinthus, held a similar “adoptionist” view of Jesus that essentially denies the Incarnation.) Photinus and Paul of Samosata, following them, said the same thing. (Photinus, a bishop from the region of modern-day Serbia, was deposed in 336 for denying the incarnation and, more generally, the divinity of Jesus Christ. Following Socrates Scholasticus, theologians have typically associated him with Paul of Samosata and Marcellus (see Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History bk. 4, ch. 6). Paul of Samosata was an especially wealthy bishop of Antioch in 260–268 who was deposed in 272 for his “adoptionist” view that Christ was initially merely human and was subsequently “adopted” and indwelt by the Logos (see Eusebius, Church History bk. 7, ch. 27–30).) But the Evangelist excludes their errors saying, in the beginning was the Word, i.e., before all things, and in the Father from eternity. Thus he did not derive his beginning from the Virgin.

Sabellius, on the other hand, although he admitted that the God who took flesh did not receive his beginning from the Virgin, but existed from eternity, still said that the person of the Father, who existed from eternity, was not distinct from the person of the Son, who took flesh from the Virgin. (Sabellius, a third-century priest, advanced a position that is sometimes called “modalism,” according to which the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three distinct persons but three modes or manifestations of one divine Person.) He maintained that the Father and Son were the same person; confusing the trinity of persons in the divine. The Evangelist says against this error, and the Word was with God, i.e., the Son was with the Father, as one person with another.

Eunomius declared that the Son is entirely unlike the Father. (Eunomius, a fourth-century bishop of Cyzicus (in the northwestern coast of modern-day Turkey) and intellectual heir of Arius, argued the unbegottenness and begottenness of the Father and Son respectively must constitute an essential difference between them such that they cannot even be said to be similar to one another in essence.) The Evangelist rejects this when he says, and the Word was God.

Finally, Arius said that the Son was less than the Father. The Evangelist excludes this by saying, he was in the beginning with God, as was explained above.

65. These words also exclude the errors of the philosophers.

Some of the ancient philosophers, namely, the natural philosophers, maintained that the world did not come from any intellect or through some purpose, but by chance. Consequently, they did not place at the beginning as the cause of things a reason or intellect, but only matter in flux; for example, atoms, as Democritus thought, or other material principles of this kind as different philosophers maintained. Against these the Evangelist says, in the beginning was the Word, from whom, and not from chance, things derive their beginning.

Plato, however, thought that the ideas of all the things that were made were subsistent, i.e., existing separately in their own natures; and material things exist by participating in these. For example, he thought men existed through the separated idea of man, which he called man per se. So lest you suppose, as did Plato, that this idea through which all things were made be ideas separated from God, the Evangelist adds, and the Word was with God.

Other Platonists, as Chrysostom relates, maintained that God the Father was most eminent and first, but under him they placed a certain mind in which there were the likenesses and ideas of all things. (John Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John, hom. 2, ch. 4.) So lest you think that the Word was with the Father in such a way as to be under him and less than he, the Evangelist adds, and the Word was God.

Aristotle, however, thought that the ideas of all things are in God, and that in God, the intellect, the one understanding, and what is understood, are the same. (See Aristotle, Physics 8; Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle 2536–2551, 2600–2663.) Nevertheless, he thought that the world is coeternal with him. Against this the Evangelist says, he, the Word alone, was in the beginning with God, in such a way that he does not exclude another person, but only another coeternal nature.

66. Note the difference in what has been said between John and the other Evangelists: how he began his Gospel on a loftier plane than they. They announced Christ the Son of God born in time: when Jesus was born in Bethlehem (Matt 2:1); but John presents him existing from eternity: in the beginning was the Word. They show him suddenly appearing among men: now you dismiss your servant, O Lord, in peace, according to your word; because my eyes have seen your salvation,which you have prepared in the sight of all people, a light to reveal you to the nations and the glory of your people Israel (Luke 2:29); but John says that he always existed with the Father: and the Word was with God. The others show him as a man: they gave glory to God who had given such authority to men (Matt 9:8); but John only says that he is God: and the Word was God. The others say he lives with men: while living in Galilee, Jesus said to them (Matt 17:21); but John says that he has always been with the Father: he was in the beginning with God.

67. Note also how the Evangelist designedly uses the word was to show that the Word of God transcends all times: present, past and future. It is as though he were saying: he was beyond time: present, past and future, as the Gloss says.