Lecture 7 — Incarnation of the Word

^1:14^ And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. [n. 165]

165. Having explained the necessity for the Word’s coming in the flesh as well as the benefits this conferred, the Evangelist now shows the way he came, at and the Word was made flesh.

He thus resumes the thread with his earlier statement, he came unto his own (John 1:11). As if to say: the Word of God came unto his own. But lest anyone suppose that he came by changing his location, he shows the manner in which he came, that is, by an incarnation. For he came in the manner in which he was sent by the Father, by whom he was sent, i.e., he was made flesh. God sent his Son made from a woman (Gal 4:4). And Augustine says about this that he was sent in the manner in which he was made. (Augustine, The Trinity (CPL 0329), bk. 5, ch. 19, par. 26.)

According to Chrysostom, however, he is here continuing the earlier statement, he gave them power to be made the sons of God (John 1:12). (John Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John hom. 11, ch. 1.) As if to say: if you wonder how he was able to give this power to men, i.e., that they become sons of God, the Evangelist answers: because the Word was made flesh, he made it possible for us to be made sons of God. God sent his Son . . . so that we might receive our adoption as sons (Gal 4:5).

But according to Augustine, he is continuing the earlier statement, who are born . . . of God (John 1:13). (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John (CPL 0278), tract. 2, par. 15.) For since it seemed a hard saying that men be born from God, then, as though arguing in support of this and to produce belief in the existence of the Word, the Evangelist adds something which seems less seemly, namely, that the Word was made flesh. As if to say: do not wonder if men are born from God, because the Word was made flesh, i.e., God became man.

166. It should be noted that this statement, the Word was made flesh, has been misinterpreted by some and made the occasion of error.

For certain ones have presumed that the Word became flesh in the sense that he or something of him was turned into flesh, as when flour is made into bread, and air becomes fire. One of these was Eutyches, who postulated a mixture of natures in Christ, saying that in him the nature of God and of man was the same. (Eutyches (c. 380–456) first rose to prominence for his opposition to Nestorius (c. 386–450), who denied the appropriateness of Mary’s epithet “mother of God” (theotokos) on the ground that she could only have been the mother of Christ’s human nature. Nestorius’s view was condemned at the Council of Ephesus (431) as implying that Christ comprised two distinct persons or hypostases. At the opposite extreme, Eutyches defended the theotokos by denying any duality of natures in Jesus, in whom, he argued, humanity and divinity were fused into a single nature (mono physis). At the Council of Chalcedon (451), this monophysite view of Jesus as possessed of a single hybrid nature was condemned as a heresy.)

We can clearly see that this is false because, as was said above, the Word was God (John 1:1). Now God is immutable, as is said, I am the Lord, and I do not change (Mal 3:6). Hence in no way can it be said that he was turned into another nature. Therefore, one must say in opposition to Eutyches, the Word was made flesh, i.e., the Word assumed flesh, but not in the sense that the Word himself is that flesh. It is as if we were to say: the man became white, not that he is that whiteness, but that he assumed whiteness.

167. There were others who, although they believed that the Word was not changed into flesh but assumed it, nevertheless said that he assumed flesh without a soul; for if he had assumed flesh with a soul, the Evangelist would have said, the Word was made flesh with a soul. This was the error of Arius, who said that there was no soul in Christ, but that the Word of God was there in place of a soul.

The falsity of this opinion is obvious, both because it is in conflict with Sacred Scripture, which often mentions the soul of Christ, as: my soul is sad, even to the point of death (Matt 26:38), and because certain affections of the soul are observed in Christ which can not possibly exist in the Word of God or in flesh alone: he began to be sorrowful and troubled (Matt 26:37). Also, God cannot be the form of a body. Nor can an angel be united to a body as its form, since an angel, according to its very nature, is separated from body, whereas a soul is united to a body as its form. Consequently, the Word of God cannot be the form of a body.

Furthermore, it is plain that flesh does not acquire the specific nature of flesh except through its soul. This is shown by the fact that when the soul has withdrawn from the body of a man or a cow, the flesh of the man or the cow is called flesh only in an equivocal sense. So if the Word did not assume flesh with a soul, it is obvious that he did not assume flesh. But the Word was made flesh; therefore, he assumed flesh with a soul.

168. And there were others who, influenced by this, said that the Word did indeed assume flesh with a soul, but this soul was only a sensitive soul, not an intellectual one; the Word took the place of the intellectual soul in Christ’s body. This was the error of Apollinaris. He followed Arius for a time, but later in the face of the authorities cited above, was forced to admit a soul in Christ which could be the subject of these emotions. But he said this soul lacked reason and intellect, and that in the man Christ their place was taken by the Word.

This too is obviously false, because it conflicts with the authority of Sacred Scripture in which certain things are said of Christ that cannot be found in his divinity, nor in a sensitive soul, nor in flesh alone; for example, that Christ marvelled, as in Matthew (Matt 8:10). For to marvel or wonder is a state which arises in a rational and intellectual soul when a desire arises to know the hidden cause of an observed effect. Therefore, just as sadness compels one to place a sensitive element in the soul of Christ, against Arius, so marvelling or amazement forces one to admit, against Apollinaris, an intellectual element in Christ.

The same conclusion can be reached by reason. For as there is no flesh without a soul, so there is no human flesh without a human soul, which is an intellectual soul. So if the Word assumed flesh which was animated with a merely sensitive soul to the exclusion of a rational soul, he did not assume human flesh; consequently, one could not say: God became man.

Besides, the Word assumed human nature in order to repair it. Therefore, he repaired what he assumed. But if he did not assume a rational soul, he would not have repaired it. Consequently, no fruit would have accrued to us from the incarnation of the Word; and this is false. Therefore, the Word was made flesh, i.e., assumed flesh which was animated by a rational soul.

169. But you may say: if the Word did assume flesh with such a soul, why did the Evangelist not mention rational soul, instead of only flesh, saying, the Word was made flesh?

I answer that the Evangelist had four reasons for doing this. First, to show the truth of the incarnation against the Manichaeans, who said that the Word did not assume true flesh, but only imaginary flesh, since it would not have been becoming for the Word of the good God to assume flesh, which they regarded as a creature of the devil. And so to exclude this the Evangelist made special mention of the flesh, just as Christ showed the truth of the resurrection to the disciples when they took him for a spirit, saying: a spirit does not have flesh and bones, as you see that I have (Luke 24:39).

Second, to show the greatness of God’s kindness to us. For it is evident that the rational soul has a greater conformity to God than does flesh, and that it would have been a great sign of compassion if the Word had assumed a human soul, as being conformed to himself. But to assume flesh too, which is something far removed from the simplicity of his nature, was a sign of a much greater, indeed, of an incomprehensible compassion. As the Apostle says: obviously great is the mystery of godliness which appeared in the flesh (1 Tim 3:16). And so to indicate this, the Evangelist mentioned only flesh.

Third, to demonstrate the truth and uniqueness of the union in Christ. For God is indeed united to other holy men, but only with respect to their soul; so it is said: she passes into holy souls, making them friends of God and prophets (Wis 7:27). But that the Word of God is united to flesh is unique to Christ, according to the Psalmist: I am alone until I pass (Ps 140:10), and gold cannot equal it (Job 28:17). So the Evangelist, wishing to show the uniqueness of the union in Christ, mentioned only the flesh, saying, the Word was made flesh.

Fourth, to suggest its relevance to man’s restoration. For man was weak because of the flesh. And thus the Evangelist, wishing to suggest that the coming of the Word was suited to the task of our restoration, made special mention of the flesh in order to show that the weak flesh was repaired by the flesh of the Word. And this is what the Apostle says: the law was powerless because it was weakened by the flesh. God, sending his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and in reparation for sin, condemned sin in his flesh (Rom 8:3).

170. A question arises as to why the Evangelist did not say that the Word assumed flesh, but rather that the Word was made flesh.

I answer that he did this to exclude the error of Nestorius. He said that in Christ there were two persons and two sons, the other being the son of the Virgin. Thus he did not admit that the Blessed Virgin was the mother of God.

But if this were so, it would mean that God did not become man, for one particular suppositum cannot be predicated of another. Accordingly, if the person or suppositum of the Word is different than the person or suppositum of the man, in Christ, then what the Evangelist says is not true, namely, the Word was made flesh. For a thing is made or becomes something in order to be it; if, then, the Word is not man, it could not be said that the Word became man. And so the Evangelist expressly said was made, and not assumed, to show that the union of the Word to flesh is not such as was the lifting up of the prophets, who were not taken up into a unity of person, but for the prophetic act. This union is such as would truly make God man and man God, i.e., that God would be man.

171. There were some, too, who, misunderstanding the manner of the incarnation, did indeed admit that the aforesaid assumption was terminated at a oneness of person, acknowledging in God one person of God and man. But they said that in him there were two hypostases, i.e., two supposita; (“Suppositum” (pl. supposita) is most simply defined in terms of the distinction between properties and their bearers. A suppositum, accordingly, is an individual bearer of properties that is not itself a property. See under “suppono,” in Roy J. Deferrari, A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto, 2004.) one of a human nature, created and non-eternal, and the other of the divine nature, non-created and eternal. This is the first opinion presented in the Sentences (3, d. 6).

According to this opinion the proposition, that God was made man and man was made God, is not true. Consequently, this opinion was condemned as heretical by the Fifth Council, where it is said: if anyone shall assert one person and two hypostases in the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema. (The Second Council of Constantinople (553), canon 3.) And so the Evangelist, to exclude any assumption not terminated at a oneness of person, says, was made.

172. If you ask how the Word is man, it must be said that he is man in the way that anyone is, man, namely, as having human nature. Not that the Word is human nature itself, but he is a divine suppositum united to a human nature.

The statement, the Word was made flesh, does not indicate any change in the Word, but only in the nature newly assumed into the oneness of a divine person. And the Word was made flesh through a union to flesh. Now a union is a relation. And relations newly said of God with respect to creatures do not imply a change on the side of God, but on the side of the creature relating in a new way to God.

173. Now follows, and dwelt among us. This is distinguished in two ways from what went before.

The first consists in stating that above the Evangelist dealt with the incarnation of the Word when he said, the Word was made flesh; but now he touches on the manner of the incarnation, saying, and dwelt among us. For according to Chrysostom and Hilary, by the Evangelist saying the Word was made flesh, someone might think that he was converted into flesh and that there are not two distinct natures in Christ, but only one nature compounded from the human and divine natures. (John Chrysostom, Commentary on Saint John, hom. 11, ch. 2. Hilary of Poitiers, The Trinity (CPL 0433), bk. 10, ch. 22.) And so the Evangelist, excluding this, added, and dwelt among us, i.e., in our nature. Furthermore, something which is not distinct from another does not dwell in it, because to dwell implies a distinction between the dweller and that in which it dwells. But the Word dwelt in our nature; therefore, he is distinct in nature from it. And so, inasmuch as human nature was distinct from the nature of the Word in Christ, the former is called the dwelling place and temple of the divinity: ***but he spoke of the temple of his body (***John 2:21).

174. Now although what is said here by these holy men is orthodox, care must be taken to avoid the reproach which some receive for this. For the early doctors and saints were so intent upon refuting the emerging errors concerning the faith that they seemed meanwhile to fall into the opposite ones. For example, Augustine, speaking against the Manichaeans, who destroyed the freedom of the will, disputed in such terms that he seemed to have fallen into the heresy of Pelagius. (Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Liber contra Errores Graecorum pt. 1 where he elaborates this point. The point is not that Augustine had actually held to a form of Pelagianism in his polemics against the Manicheans but that prior to the Pelagian controversy there had been no need for him to qualify his affirmations of the freedom of the will. The broader point is that the teaching of earlier fathers, because it is often underqualified in relation to later controversies, needs to be interpreted carefully and reverently in light of the teaching of the Church.)

In this way, lest through saying the Word was made flesh it might be thought that there was a confusion or change of natures in Christ, John the Evangelist added, and dwelt among us. Nestorius misunderstood this phrase and said that the Son of God was united to man in such a way that there was not one person of God and of man. For he held that the Word was united to human nature only by an indwelling through grace. From this, however, it follows that the Son of God is not man.

175. To clarify this we should know that we can consider two things in Christ: his nature and person.

In Christ there is a distinction in nature, but not in person, which is one and the same in the two natures, since the human nature in Christ was assumed into a oneness of person. Therefore, the indwelling which the saints speak of must be referred to the nature, so as to say, he dwelt among us, i.e., the nature of the Word inhabited our nature; not according to the hypostasis or person, which is the same for both natures in Christ.

176. The blasphemy of Nestorius is further refuted by the authority of Sacred Scripture.

For the Apostle calls the union of God and man an emptying, saying of the Son of God: he, being in the form of God . . . emptied himself, taking the form of a servant (Phil 2:6). Clearly, God is not said to empty himself insofar as he dwells in the rational creature by grace, because then the Father and the Holy Spirit would be emptying themselves, since they too are said to dwell in man through grace: for Christ, speaking of himself and of the Father says, we will come to him, and will make our abode with him (John 14:23); and of the Holy Spirit the Apostle says: the Spirit of God dwells in us (1 Cor 3:16).

Furthermore, if Christ was not God as to his person, he would have been most presumptuous to say: I and the Father are one (John 10:30), and before Abraham was made, I am (John 8:58). Now I refers to the person of the speaker. And the one who was speaking was a man, who, as one with the Father, existed before Abraham.

177. However, another connection with what went before is possible, by saying that above he dealt with the incarnation of the Word, but that now he is treating the manner of life of the incarnate Word, saying, he dwelt among us, i.e., he lived on familiar terms with us apostles. Peter alludes to this when he says, during all the time that the Lord Jesus came and went among us (Acts 1:21). Afterwards, he was seen on earth (Bar 3:38).

178. The Evangelist added this for two reasons. First, to show the marvelous likeness of the Word to men, among whom he lived in such a way as to seem one of them. For he not only willed to be like men in nature, but also in living with them on close terms without sin, in order to draw to himself men won over by the charm of his way of life.

Second, to show the truthfulness of the Evangelist’s statements. For the Evangelist had already said many great things about the Word, and was yet to mention more wonderful things about him; and so that his testimony would be more credible he took as a proof of his truthfulness the fact that he had lived with Christ, saying, he dwelt among us. As if to say: I can well bear witness to him, because I lived on close terms with him. We tell you . . . what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes (1 John 1:1); God raised him up on the third day, and granted that he be seen, not by all the people, but by witnesses preordained by God, that is, to us who ate and drank with him (Acts 10:40).