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Book II, Chapter II

Inquiry concerning the truth of the first doubt has been made as accurately as the nature of the subject permitted; we have now to inquire concerning the second, which is: Whether the Roman people assumed to itself of right the dignity of the Empire? And the first thing in this question is to find the truth, to which the reasonings concerning it may be referred as to their proper first principle.

It must be recognised, then, that as there are three degrees in every art, the mind of the artist, his instrument, and the material on which he works, so we may look upon nature in three degrees. For nature exists, first, in the mind of the First Agent, who is God; then in heaven; as in an instrument, by means of which the likeness of the Eternal Goodness unfolds itself on shapeless1 matter. If an artist is perfect in his art, and his instrument is perfect, any fault in the form of his art must be laid to the badness of the material; and so, since God holds the summit of perfection, and since His instrument, which is heaven, admits of no failure of its due perfection (which is manifest from our philosophy touching heaven), it follows that whatever fault is to be found in the lower world is a fault on the part of the subject matter, and is contrary to the intention of God who makes nature,2 and of heaven; and if in this lower world there is aught that is good, it must be ascribed first to the artist, who is God, and then to heaven, the instrument of God's art, which men call nature; for the material, being merely a possibility, can do nothing of itself.3

Hence it is apparent that, since all Right4 is good, it therefore exists first in the mind of God; and since all that is in the mind of God is God, according to the saying, "What was made, in Him was life;"5 and as God chiefly wishes for what is Himself, it follows that Right is the wish of God, so far as it is in Him. And since in God the will and the wish are the same, it further follows that this Right is the will of God. Again it follows that Right in the world is nothing else than the likeness of the will of God, and therefore whatever does not agree with the divine will cannot be Right, and whatever does agree with the divine will is Right itself. Therefore to ask if a thing be by Right is only to ask in other words if it is what God wills. It may therefore be assumed that what God wills to see in mankind is to be held as real and true Right.

Besides we must remember Aristotle's teaching in the first book of his Ethics, where he says: "We must not seek for certitude in every matter, but only as far as the nature of the subject admits."6 Therefore our arguments from the first principle already found will be sufficient, if from manifest evidence and from the authority of the wise, we seek for the right of that glorious people. The will of God is an invisible thing, but "the invisible things of God are seen, being understood by the things which are made." For when the seal is out of sight, the wax, which has its impression, gives manifest evidence of it, though it be unseen; nor is it strange that the will of God must be sought by signs; for the human will, except to the person himself who wills, is only discerned by signs.7

Footnotes

  1. "Fluitantem." ↩

  2. "Dei naturantis." ↩

  3. Witte refers to Parad. xiii. 67, xxix. 32, i. 127-130. Cf. Thom. Aquin. Summ. I., q. 66, art. 1-3; q. 110, art. 2; q. 115, art. 3-6. This view satisfied thinkers to the time of Hooker (E.P. I. iii.), but was criticised by Bacon, Nov. Org. i. 66. ↩

  4. "Jus." ↩

  5. St. John i. 3.--(W.) ↩

  6. Eth. i. 7, from Thom. Aq. Lect. XI.--(W.) ↩

  7. The image of the wax and seal was a favourite one. V. Parad. vii. 68, viii. 127, xiii. 67-75, quoted by Witte, who also refers to the Epist. ad Reges, § 8, p. 444, ed. Fraticelli. ↩

Chapter 18 of 45