Book II, Chapter VIII

But in order properly to discover the truth in our inquiry, we must recognise that the judgment of God is sometimes made manifest to men, and sometimes hidden from them.

It may be made manifest in two ways, namely, by reason and by faith.

There are some judgments of God to which the human reason, by its own paths, can arrive; as, that a man should risk death to save his country. For a part should always risk itself to save its whole, and each man is a part of his State, as is clear from the Philosopher in his Politics.¹ Therefore every man ought to risk himself for his country, as the less good for the better; whence the Philosopher says to Nicomachus: "The end is desirable, indeed, even for an individual, but it is better and more divine for a nation and State."² And this is the judgment of God, for if it were not so, right reason in men would miss the intention of nature, which is impossible.

There are also some judgments of God to which, though human reason cannot reach them by its own powers, yet, by the aid of faith in those things which are told us in Holy Scripture it can be lifted up: as, for instance, that no one, however perfect he may be in moral and intellectual virtues, both in habit and in action, can be saved without faith; it being supposed that he never heard aught of Christ. For human reason cannot of itself see this to be just, yet by faith it can. For in the Epistle to the Hebrews it is written, "without faith it is impossible to please God;"³ and in Leviticus, "what man soever there be of the House of Israel that killeth an ox, or lamb, or goat in the camp, or that killeth it out of the camp, and bringeth it not to the door of the tabernacle to offer an offering unto the Lord, blood shall be imputed to that man."⁴ The door of the tabernacle stands for Christ, who is the door of the kingdom of heaven, as may be proved from the Gospel: the killing of animals represents men's actions.⁵

But the judgment of God is a hidden one, when man cannot arrive at the knowledge of it either by the law of nature or by the written law, but only occasionally by a special grace. This grace comes in several ways: sometimes by simple revelation, sometimes by revelation assisted by a certain kind of trial or debate. Simple revelation, too, is of two kinds: either God gives it of his own accord, or it is gained by prayer. God gives it of his own accord in two ways, either plainly, or by a sign. His judgment against Saul was revealed to Samuel plainly; but it was by a sign that it was revealed to Pharaoh what God had judged touching the setting free of the children of Israel. The judgment of God is also given in answer to prayer, as he knew who spoke in the second book of Chronicles:⁶ "When we know not what we ought to do, this only have we left, to direct our eyes to Thee."

Revelation by means of trial is also of two kinds. It is given either by casting lots, or by combat; for "to strive" (certare), is derived from a phrase which means "to make certain" (certum facere). It is clear that the judgment of God is sometimes revealed to men by casting lots, as in the substitution of Matthias in the Acts of the Apostles.

Again the judgment of God is revealed to men by combat in two ways: either it is by a trial of strength, as in the duels of champions who are called "duelliones," or it is by the contention of many men, each striving to reach a certain mark first, as happens in the contests of athletes who run for a prize. The first of these methods was prefigured among the Gentiles by the contests between Hercules and Antæus, which Lucan mentions in the fourth book of his Pharsalia, and Ovid in the ninth book of his Metamorphoses. The second is prefigured by the contest between Atalanta and Hippomenes, described in the tenth book of Ovid's Metamorphoses.⁷

Moreover, it ought not to pass unnoticed concerning these two kinds of strife, that while in the first each champion may fairly hinder his antagonist, in the second this is not so; for athletes must not hinder one another in their strife, though our poet seems to have thought differently in the fifth Æneid where Euryalus so receives the prize.⁸ But Cicero has done better in forbidding this practice in the third book of the De Officiis, following the opinion of Chrysippus.⁹ He there says: "Chrysippus is right here, as he often is, for he says that he who runs in a race should strive with all his might to win, but in no way should he try to trip up his competitor."

With these distinctions, then, we may assume that there are two ways in which men may learn the judgment of God, as we have on this point stated; first by the contests of athletes, and secondly by the contests of champions. These ways of discovering the judgment of God I will treat of in the chapter following.

Footnotes

1. Arist. Pol. i. 2, 12.--(W.) ↩

2. Ethics, i. 1. ↩

3. Cf. Parad. xix. 70.--(W.) ↩

4. Heb. ii. 6; Levit. xvii. 3, 4.--(W.). ↩

5. Witte quotes from Isidore of Seville, a writer much used in the middle ages, the following: "In a moral sense, we offer a calf when we conquer the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we correct our irrational impulses; a kid, when we master impurity; a dove, when we are simple; a turtle-dove, when we observe chastity; unleavened bread, 'when we keep the feast not in the leaven of malice, but in the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.'" ↩

6. 2 Chron. xx. 12 (Vulg.). ↩

7. Phars. iv. 593; Metam. ix. 183, x. 569.--(W.). ↩

8. V. 335--(W.) ↩

9. III. 10.--(W.) ↩