Appendix to Part I: The Thomistic Proofs for the Existence of God in Relation to the Notion of Proper Cause
Tue Tuomistic PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE oF Gop IN THEIR RELATION To THE Notion oF Proper CAUSE
St. Thomas defines the notion of proper cause in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book V, ch. ii, lect. 3, and in the Analytica Post., Book I, lect. 10, entitled “Quartus Modus Dicendi per se,” i. e., the fourth mode of per se predication. His teaching, which constitutes the basis of the proofs for the existence of God, is summed up in the following propositions.
The proper cause is that which can produce a certain effect by itself (per se) and immediately as such (primo). It is that cause upon which the effect per se primo, necessarily and immediately, depends, just as a property depends upon the essence from which it is derived, e. g., the properties of a circle from the nature of the circle. The proper effect is like a property manifested ad extra.
The proper cause, inasmuch as it is a necessary requisite, differs from the accidental cause, just as there is opposition between these two propositions: a man generates a man; Socrates generates a man. It is purely accidental for the one who generates to be Socrates, and still more so for him to be a philosopher. Thus we say that the movements in the universe required a prime mover, but we should be guilty of precipitation if we at once concluded that this prime mover must be free.
The proper cause, inasmuch as it is an immediate requisite, differs from every other cause, no matter how strictly it is required. Thus, to carve a statue requires a sculptor. To say that it requires an artist would be to designate too general a cause. We must state precisely the kind of cause required. Similarly, it would not be definite enough to say that the movements in the universe require a primary being: what they immediately demand is a prime mover.
The most particular causes are the proper cause of the most particular effects. Thus, this animal is the proper cause of the genera- tion of this living exemplar of the same species; but it does not explain the existence of animal life on earth, and it stands as much in need of being explained, as does its proper effect, of which it is said to be the univocal cause or one which belongs to the same species. We have here a causality of a very inferior order. St. Thomas writes: “Tt is clear that of two things in the same species, one cannot per se cause the form of the other as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form inasmuch as it is in matter, in other words, it may be the cause that this particular matter receives this particular forms
The most universal effects demand as their proper cause a cause higher than all others.? This body, which is in motion, may truly be the cause of this other motion, but if the motion itself, wherever we find it realized, whether in corporeal or incorporeal beings, has not within itself its own sufficient reason for what it is, then it must have for its cause a primary and universal mover of corporeal and incorporeal beings. Therefore, this cause must be a prime mover, superior to all motion, of a much higher order, and for this reason the cause is said to be equivocal and not univocal.
Finally, we must distinguish between the proper cause and becoming, t.e., the apparition of such and such an individual effect; also, between the proper cause of the being itself and the conservation of this effect.® According to Aristotle’s example, the builder is the proper cause of the construction of the house, and if he stops working before the house is completed, the house is no longer in course of construction; but he is not the proper cause of the beting of this house; if he dies, the house will not cease to exist. Likewise, the son survives his father; the heat of the sun is necessary, not only for the generation of plants and animals, but also for their preservation. Hence, universal and higher causes are not only productive, but likewise preservative of their effects. Their causality is permanent, always in act, and we affirm the same of God’s causality.
This notion of proper cause illuminates the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God, so that we can perceive the connection between them.
In each of these a posteriori proofs, St. Thomas starts from a fact12 known as certain from experience, and from a rational principle, which is necessary and evident, he proves the existence of God, the proper and universal cause of the universal effects which originate from Him. “Oportet enim universaliores effectus in universaliores et priores causas reducere” (for the more universal effects must be reduced to more universal and prior causes).*
The order of these five proofs corresponds to the natural process of the reasoning mind. In fact, St. Thomas begins with the most evident signs of the contingency of earthly things, such as motion, and then goes on to consider those which bear a deeper significance, such as the imperfection and the orderly arrangement of composite things. Likewise, in order to arrive at the conclusion of his proofs, he shows step by step the necessary existence and absolute transcendence of the First Cause, so as to make it evident that this cause is essentially distinct from the world, which is changeable, composite, and imperfect, and that the name of God can be given to it. In fact, what people generally understand by this name is the prime mover, the first cause, the necessary and supreme being, who has created and ordained the whole universe.
All these arguments can be summed up in a more general one, based on the principle of causality, which may be stated as follows: That which does not exist by itself, can exist only by another, which is self-existent. Now, experience shows that there are beings endowed with activity, life, and intelligence, which do not exist of and by themselves, since they are born and die. Therefore, they received their existence from another, who must be existence, life, and intelligence itself. If such were not the case, we should have to say that the greater comes from the less, the higher form of life from the lower, and that the plurality of beings comes from a primary being less perfect than all the others taken together.
First Proor: From Motion That there is motion in the world is a certainty attested by experience. There is not merely local motion, but there are also substantial changes, qualitative movements according to the increasing or de-
creasing intensity of a quality, and even spiritual movements of the intellect and will.®
Now, everything which is in motion is moved by another. This principle is a necessary and absolutely universal one. Motion, in fact, is the transition from potentiality to act, from indetermination to determination. Thus a body which was cold becomes warm, an inert body is moved locally. Now, nothing can be reduced from potentiality to act, except by a being which is already in act, and it is impossible for a being to be at one and the same time and in identically the same sense, both in potentiality and in act. In living beings, one part is moved by another; but as this other part is itself set in motion by a movement of a different order, this can only be the result of the influence exerted upon it by a mover of a higher order. Therefore, every being that is in motion, body, soul, or spirit, is moved by another.®
Moreover, there cannot be an infinite series of movers essentially and actually subordinated one to another. It is not a question here of a regressive series of movers, such as we find amongst generators in a series of animals generated; for these movers are but accidentally subordinated to one another, and none of them exerts an actual influence upon the other. Also, as St. Thomas says," “it is not impossible for a man to be generated by a man ab aeterno, that is to say, without there having been a first in this series of human generations.” But it is impossible for motion to find its completely sufficient reason or its first cause in a series of past movers, even if the series were ab aeterno, since each of these movers was himself set in motion by another. If this series is eternal, or had no beginning, it is eternally insufficient, for it has not in itself a sufficient reason for existing.
Therefore, we are dealing with movers which actually exert an influence upon one another and which are essentially subordinated one to the other. Thus the moon attracts the bodies which surround it, and is itself attracted by the earth; the earth in turn is attracted by the sun, and the sun has some other center of attraction. We cannot go on indefinitely in this ascending series. If, indeed, each of these
Sla, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2um; q. 79, a. 4; q. 82, a. 4, ad 3um; q. 105, a. 2, 3, 4, 5; Ia Ilae, q. 9, a. 4.
®Cfr. Summa Theol., Ia, q. 105, a. 5, where St. Thomas considers in inverse order how the prime mover is related to all motion and created activity.
movers essentially subordinated to one another, receives an impetus which it transmits to another, in such a manner that there is no prime mover which is the source of motion, which is itself not set in motion, then there never will be any motion. Thus a clock will not go without a spring, and multiplying the number of its movements ad infinitum would not give to it a principle of movement.
We must, therefore, conclude that there is a prime mover, who is not himself set in motion by a mover of a higher order, and whom we call God. This supreme mover is immobile, not with an immobility of an inferior kind, or the inertia of passive potency, which implies far more of imperfection than motion itself; but with an immobility of a nobler kind, namely, that of act, which has no need of being premoved or conditioned so that it may act. In other words, we must admit the existence of a prime mover, who acts by himself, who has never been reduced from potentiality to act, but who is Ais own activity, his own action,® and consequently, Ais very own being, for action presupposes being, and the mode of action follows the mode of being.®
The prime and most universal mover of bodies and of spirits must, therefore, be pure act, without any admixture of potentiality capable of further determination, and consequently free from all imperfection, both with regard to action and with regard to being. In other words, it (or rather he) must be the self-subsisting Being.’
And so it is evident that this prime and immobile mover is transcendental, being by his very nature infinitely above the world of corporeal and incorporeal beings, which he moves incessantly.
This argument refutes the theory of absolute Evolutionism, according to which becoming, or the evolution of phenomena, is the principle of all things. This is impossible, since the sufficient reason or cause of becoming cannot be found in this process itself, but becoming involves the presence of an additional element, which calls for a higher cause, otherwise we should have to say that the greater comes from the less, being from nothingness, without any cause. This would not only be a greater mystery than creation, but a manifest absurdity, which, as Hegel admits, must be acknowledged by
8 Ia, q. 3, a. 63 q. 9, a. 1; q. 25, a. I, ad 3um; q. 54, a. I. 9la, q. 25, a. 2. 10 Ja, q. 3, a 4. 11 Ja, q. 3, a 8.
all who believe in a progressive evolution, in the course of which the more perfect is always produced by thé less perfect.
Szconp Proor: From Erricient CAUSES
Weare not here concerned with movements or changes which happen in the world, but with efficient causes upon which depend such permanent beings as plants, animals, and men. In other words, this proof does not start precisely from the principle of motion or from becoming, but from being, which is the terminus of becoming, and leads us to admit the existence of a first efficient cause, which is necessary not only for the production of all things, but also for their preservation in existence.?*
In the world there are efficient causes which are essentially subordinated to one another, e.g., all those cosmic influences, such as the chemical action in the air, atmospheric pressure, solar heat, etc., which are necessary not only for the production, but also for the preservation of plants and animals. Thus the ancient philosophers used to say that “man and the sun codperate in the generation of man,” for the sun is necessary both for the production and the preservation of vegetable and animal life on this earth of ours.
Now, these effictent causes, which are thus subordinated to one another, presuppose a first cause which is not caused. On the one hand, it is impossible for ma being to cause itself, for in that case it would exist before it actually did exist; on the other hand, it is impossible to proceed ad infinitum in a series of essentially subordinated causes, as we have seen above (first proof).
Hence, there exists, above the caused efficient causes, a first cause which is not caused, which has being from itself, not from another. This first cause must, therefore, be Being itself (a point which will be more clearly understood at the close of the next proof) and may justly be called God.!*
Tump Proor: From THe ContINcENcy oF Berncs IN THE WorLD
There are beings in the world which are evidently contingent, that is to say, they can exist or not exist. Thus plants and animals live 12 To understand this demonstration fully, consult the Summa of St. Thomas, Ia, q. 104, a. 1 and 2. 38 Ta, q. 3, a 4 and die, and science assures us that there was a time when there were neither plants nor animals, nor men on this earth, and when the stars were not as they are to-day, but in a nebulous state.
Now, contingent beings presuppose a necessary and self-existing being. What is contingent has not its own raison d’étre within itself, nor is it the cause of its own existence. Therefore, there must be some necessary being, Moreover, if the necessity of this being or principle is merely relative (for instance, limited from the physical point of view, so as to account for the physico-chemical phenomena of the lower order), then we must continue our inquiry, until we arrive at an absolutely necessary being; for, as we have seen, we cannot proceed ad infinitum in a series of causes which are essentially subordinated one to another. Consequently, there must be an absolutely necessary Being, the cause of all the others."
a) This necessary Being is not the sum-total of contingent beings, even if this series were infinite in space and time; for we may go on increasing the number of contingent beings, but they will always be contingent, and can no more constitute a necessary being, than a countless number of idiots can constitute an intelligent man.
b) Neither is the necessary Being the law of contingent beings, since this law depends for its existence upon the existence of contingent beings.
c) Finally, the necessary Being is not a substance common to all phenomena; for this substance would be subject to motion (see First Proof), and would receive determinations or new perfections, which it could not have produced itself, since the greater cannot come from the less. The necessary Being can certainly give, but it cannot receive; it can determine, but it cannot be determined. It has of itself and from all eternity, all that it can have.'®
Moreover, from the fact that the necessary Being is self-existent, it follows that its essence is not merely a capacity to exist—which capacity receives and limits existence—but it is unreceived or subsistent existence, self-subsisting Being.**
Fourtu Proor: From tHe Decrees or PERFECTION IN BEINGS
The special feature of this proof is the perfection of the First Cause. It runs as follows: The beings in this world form a hierarchy: some of them are more perfect than others, in passing through the various degrees of the vegetative and sensitive life, from the stone up to man. All beings have their perfection or goodness, but the word good denotes merely a similitude or analogy in such phrases as: a good stone, a good fruit, a good house, a good master, a thoroughly good man, In like manner, unity is of various degrees, and the unity of the soul excels that of the body. Thus, also, there is a greater degree of truth in principles than in conclusions, and in Necessary propositions than in those that are contingent.
Now, we speak of different things as more or less perfect, according to the varying degrees in which they approach that which is the most perfect, and the cause of the others. In fact, as St. Thomas points out,’ “whatever belongs to a thing by its very nature, and has not been caused in it, cannot belong to it in an imperfect manner.” A being which has but imperfect goodness does not possess this quality of and by itself; for if the goodness were not caused in it, it would demand such limitation by and of itself, and at the same time it would not demand such limitation by and of itself, since it is not limited in the same manner. In other words, every imperfect being is caused, because it is composite, mixed, and the perfection which it contains is mingled with imperfection. Now, as St. Thomas says, “things which are in themselves different cannot unite, unless something causes them to unite.”*® Thus, existence, perfection, and beauty, are limited in different ways in plants, in animals, and in man. Of themselves they do not imply this or that particular limitation, and in their formal concepts they do not even imply any limitation. Therefore, in all these imperfect beings, existence, perfection, and beauty are the effects of a Supreme Cause, which must be absolutely perfect, free from all imperfection, and absolutely simple. Moreover, this Cause must be a self-subsisting Being, unlimited, infinitely perfect, i.e. Goodness, Truth, and Beauty itself. Hence it follows that this Supreme Being is absolutely
transcendental, really and essentially distinct from the world, which is always composite and imperfect.!*
This proof clearly differs from that of St. Anselm, since it does not start from the notion of the supremely perfect Being, but from the actual existence of various degrees of perfection in things. Thus it ascends by way of causality to the absolutely perfect Being, because no imperfect being can have its raison d’étre in itself.
It is by this demonstration that St. Thomas establishes the existence of intelligence,”° of truth,?4 of goodness,** and of the natural law.?8
Firtu Proor: FROM THE ORDER PREVAILING IN THE UNIVERSE
We observe that irrational beings act for an end. Indeed, we notice that there is a wonderful order prevailing in the regular courses of the heavenly bodies. The centripetal and centrifugal forces are so regulated that the heavenly bodies move in their orbits with enormous speed and in perfect harmony. No less striking are the unity and variety which we behold in the organic structures of plants, animals, and man. Finality, or the relation to an end, is clearly seen in the evolution of an egg, which virtually contains a certain determined organism, and in the case of those organs which are adapted to certain very special functions, such as the eye, which is for seeing, and the ear, which is for hearing. Finally, we find the same to be the case with those animals which act by instinct, for instance, the bee, which builds its hive.
What particularly manifests this finality, as St. Thomas notes, is the fact that natural agents of the irrational order “always or nearly always act in the same way, and in a way designed to obtain that which best agrees with their nature,” e. g., for their development, nutrition, reproduction, etc.”*
24 “We see things which lack intelligence, such as material bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best. Whence it is plain that they achieve their end not fortuitously, but designedly. Now, whatever lacks intelligence, cannot tend towards
This terminus of their action, precisely because it is something determinate and in complete conformity with their nature, is entitled to the name of end; for the end is the good in view of which an agent acts,
Moreover, even before the existence of God has been proved, the necessity and universality of the principle of finality are evident truths. The principle may be expressed by the following formula: “Every agent acts for an end.” “Were it otherwise,” says St. Thomas, “one thing would not follow from the action of the agent more than another, except by chance. ... For the natural agent to produce an effect which is determinate, it must be determined for some particular effect, and this is what is meant by the word end.” 75
It will not do to have recourse to chance, for chance is an accidental cause (causa per accidens), and hence is not the cause of what happens always and according to nature. Otherwise, the accidental would no longer be accidental; instead of being something which accrues (accidit) to the essence, it would be its foundation, and in that case the essential would be subordinate to the accidental, which is absurd. The wonderful order existing in the universe would be the result of no order, the greater would proceed from the less.
Neither will it do to appeal solely to the efficient cause, and to reject the final cause. For in that case we could not give any reason for the action of an agent: why, for instance, a certain organ has a certain determinate tendency; nor could we say why an agent acts instead of not acting. There would be no raison d’être for the action. The active potency or the inclination of the agent is not without a motive, called tendency, because it tends essentially towards something, just as the imperfect tends towards the perfect. “Potentia dicitur ad actum,” potency essentially refers to act, or is essentially of the intentional order. For instance, the faculty of sight is expressly designed for seeing.?®
Therefore, we cannot doubt the existence of finality in the world, an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; just as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore, some intelligent being exists, by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.” (la, q. 2, a. 3).
25 Summa Theol., la, q. 44, a. 4; Ia Ilae, q. 1, a. 2; C. Gentes, Bk. III, c. 2.
26 See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. Il, c. 8 ff., and the Commentary of St. Thomas, lect. 7-14.
the wonderful order of which is nothing else but the suitable arrangement of means in view of an end (apta dispositio mediorum ad finem). The bird flies not only because it has wings (efficient cause), but the wings are for the purpose of flying (final cause). Otherwise, the particular formation of its wings would be without a sufficient reason. To affirm that anything is without a sufficient reason, is to formulate a proposition which is unintelligible and absurd (see supra, n. 24). St. Thomas would have said: “It would be foolish to make such an assertion,” just as he said that “David of Dinant foolishly declared God to be prime matter.” ** According to the philosophical acceptation of the word stultitia, namely, the opposite of wisdom, there is nothing more foolish than Materialism or Mechanism.
Now, irrational beings cannot tend towards an end, unless they are directed by an intelligence, as the arrow is shot to the mark by the archer. In fact, one thing cannot be directed to another, unless there be a directing cause, which must, of necessity, be intelligent, for, “sapientis est ordinare.” Why? Because an intelligent being alone perceives the raison d’étre of things, and the end is the raison d'étre of the means. “Irrational beings,” says St. Thomas, “tend towards an end by natural inclination; they are, as it were, moved by another and not by themselves, since they have no knowledge of the end as such.” ** Animals have a sensitive knowledge of the thing which constitutes their end, but they do not perceive the formal end as such in this thing. If, therefore, there were no intelligent designer directing the world, the order and intelligibility existing in things, which science reveals to us, would be the effect of an unintelligible cause, and, in addition to this, our own intelligences would originate from a blind and unintelligent cause, and again we should have to say that the greater comes from the less, which is absurd.
There is, therefore, a supreme intelligent Being, who directs all things to their respective ends. It will not do to say that the universal Designer has, like ourselves, an intellectual faculty directed to intelligible being, but what is demanded is a designing intelligence of a higher order. The supreme Designer cannot be designed for any
other purpose. He must be Thought itself, self-subsisting Intellection, just as he is self-subsisting Being: “ipsum intelligere subsistens.” *°
Tue One Enp To Wuicn ALL Five Proors CONVERGE
We have pointed out that the result of each of these five demonstrations is to move us to admit the existence of a divine attribute which can be predicated only of the self-subsisting Being, as St. Thomas explicitly proves.*° The article referred to serves the double purpose of pointing out to us what is the terminus in the ascending process of reason, which rises from sensible things until it reaches the supreme cause, and it is also the principle in the descending or synthetic process, by which reason deduces the divine attributes of the one who is Being itself, and judges of all things by the highest cause. These two inverse methods are called by St. Thomas, respectively, via inventionis and via judicii”!
In fact, as we have seen, the prime and universal mover must be his own action (suum agere), and, therefore, his own existence (suum esse), and the same must be said of the first uncaused cause, of the necessary being, of the sovereignly perfect being, and of the ruler of the universe. Thus the supreme truth of Christian philosophy, or the fundamental truth in the synthetical order (in via judicii) is that in God alone essence and existence are identical. God is “He who is” (Ex. III, 14).
Such are the five metaphysical proofs for the existence of God, to which all others can be easily reduced. If we study them carefully, we. see, contrary to the assertions of modern Agnostics, that the existence of God, who is transcendental or distinct from the world, cannot be denied without denying the principle of causality, namely, that “every being which is mobile, contingent, composite, imperfect, and relative, is caused, and in its final analysis requires a primary and immovable being, one which is absolutely simple, perfect, and intelligent.” Now, the principle of causality cannot be denied or doubted without denying or doubting the princtple of contradiction, for “a contingent and uncaused being” would exist neither of itself,
nor by reason of another, and consequently, could not be distinguished from nothingness, since it would exist without a sufficient raison d'être, either intrinsic or extrinsic. This would mean the subversion of the principle of contradiction, that “being is not nonbeing,” and of the principle of identity, that “being is being, non-being is non-being,” and human reason would be lost in absurdity.
If, on the contrary, the principle of contradiction or identity is the supreme law of reality and of our reason, then the supreme reality must indeed be the identity of essence and existence, or selfsubsisting Being (ipsum esse subsistens). Thus the five ways which lead to the existence of God, unite in the opposition prevailing between the principle of identity and the changeableness and composition of the world, or the lack of identity displayed in the latter. From this opposition it is at once evident that the world is contingent and depends upon the immutable and pre-eminently simple Being whose name, as given to Moses, “I am who am,” denotes absolute identity.
Hence, the ancient philosophers used to say that our intellect knows God in the mirror of sensible things, by means of the broken ray of light reflected from rational principles. The principle of identity or of contradiction shows the contingency of this mirror and is reflected in the image of the principle of causality, which manifests to us the existence of the supreme Being.
It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to choose between the existence of the true God, transcendental or distinct from the world, and the Hegelian denial of the principle of contradiction as the law of reality. In other words, we must choose between Theism and Atheistic Evolutionism, which latter maintains that the more perfect comes from the less perfect, and that contradictories are identified in a universal process of becoming. Thus we see in absolute Evolutionism an incontestable proof by the reductio ad absurdum of the existence of the true and transcendental God, since this existence cannot be denied without at the same time denying the validity of the principle of contradiction, and without positing a fundamental absurdity at the root of all things.
This radical absurdity is expressed in the first of the propositions condemned in the Syllabus of Pius IX, which reads as follows: “There is no supreme Being, who is all-wise, ruler of the universe, and distinct from it; God is identical with the nature of things, and is, therefore, subject to changes; God really becomes or begins to be in man and in the world, and all things are God and have the same substance with Him; thus God and the world, spirit and matter, necessity and liberty, truth and falsehood, goodness and evil, justice and injustice are all identified in the one same and only reality.” 5?
To avoid this manifest absurdity, we must affirm the existence of God, who, according to the Vatican Council, “being one, sole, absolutely simple ** and immutable ™ spiritual substance, is to be declared as really and essentially distinct from the world, of supreme beatitude in and from Himself, and ineffably exalted above all things which exist or can be conceived beside Himself.” 35
82 Denzinger, Enchiridion, n. 1701.
38 See the fourth and fifth proofs of St. Thomas for the existence of God. 84 See the first, second, and third proofs of St. Thomas,
85 Denzinger, Enchiridion, n. 1782.
BI101 .G262 1934 / copy 1/ volt Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, father, b. God his existence and his nature; a B
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Footnotes
Chapter 7 of 19