Chapter IV. What formally constitutes the divine nature according to our imperfect mode of knowing it

42. The problem. The Deity, as it is in itself, cannot be known by our natural powers. But among the divine perfections which are contained formally and eminently in it, and of which we have a natural knowledge, is there not one which claims priority over the others? Various solutions.

Having proved that God is, we must proceed to the consideration of what He is. We have already (n. 32) proved that reason can acquire some knowledge of the divine essence, but that it is incapable of knowing positively what properly constitutes the Deity or of knowing it guidditative. “God can be known indeed,” says St. Thomas,’ in a natural way “through the images of His effects,” in that these effects are a reflection of Him.? Now there cannot be equality between the divine effects and the infinite virtue or power which produced them, and they can be only imperfect and very faint images of this power, so that they present as multiplied and divided the attributes which are present in the first cause in an absolutely simple unity. Thus, in a way, the sun contains eminently the various forms of energy which we undoubtedly find on the earth. Thus colors are contained in light, and in a higher order the unity of the human soul includes the¹² perfection of the sensitive and vegetative souls, such as we find these in animals and plants.? Therefore all the perfections which are many and separate in creatures are found unitedly in the eminent simplicity of the Deity. We see this to be particularly so from the proof based on the various degrees in being (fourth proof), arguing as it does from the multiple to the one, from the composite to the simple, from the imperfect to the perfect (n. 39).

St. Thomas discusses this question at length in connection with the names given to God. “When any term expressing perfection,” he says, “is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term ‘wise’ applied to a man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man’s essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas, when we apply it to God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence or power or existence. Thus also this term ‘wise’ (or the term ‘being’), applied to man, in some degree circumscribes, envelops, and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as a perfection which infinitely surpasses all the meanings of which it is susceptible. Hence it is evident that this term ‘wise’ is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures . . . but in an analogous sense.

“However, we cannot say, as some have said, that the names predicated of God and of creatures are purely and simply equivocal, in such a way that there is no similarity between the uncreated and the created being. If such were the case, nothing could be known or demonstrated of God through creatures; for the rea-

8 These are but very faint analogies. Solar energy is not, in fact, of a higher order than terrestrial energy. Light is not of a higher order than colors. Finally, the human soul, which contains eminently and formally sensitive life and vegetative life, is still very defective, for sensitive life applies univocally to man and beast, whereas nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures, soning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation; the same term would be employed in totally different senses, a verbal similarity being the only thing in their favor. How could the Philosopher have demonstrated so many important truths concerning the Author of all things? How could the Apostle St. Paul have said in Rom. 1:20: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made’?

“If the names of the absolute perfections predicated of God and of creatures are neither univocal nor equivocal, what are they? They are analogous. This means that they denote things essentially different between which there is a certain proportion.” 4

We have already (n. 29) proved the transcendent or analogical validity of the primary ideas which denote absolute perfections. These perfections, as we said, may be predicated of God not merely by way of metaphor, as when we say of God that He is angry; but they may be said of Him literally. As a matter of fact, they imply no imperfection and therefore are in no way opposed to the supremely perfect Being.”

Although they may be predicated of God according to their proper meaning, or formally, these notions denote, nevertheless, things essentially different when applied to God and to creatures. Thus, even in the created order, the notion of knowledge which is applied, according to its proper meaning, both to sensation and to intellection, denotes in both cases essentially different things, there being a resemblance only of analogy or proportion between them. Sensation is to the sensible as intellection is to the intelligible. For this reason we can truly say of each that it is knowledge.

In like manner we say that the first cause is to its existence, as the creature is to its existence: the first cause is to its goodness, as the creature is to its goodness. This permits us to say of God that

He is good, and to call Him “being,” using these terms in an analogous sense.

It is only in a negative and relative way that we can acquire by our natural powers a knowledge of the divine mode of these perfections. Thus we say that God is an infinite being, meaning by this that He is not finite, not limited. Or again, by comparison with the goodness of created beings, we say of God that He is the sovereign Good. The argument from causality enables us to affirm the existence of God and of His perfections. The mode of the presence of these attributes in God is but very imperfectly determined by way of negation and of eminence.®

In chapter three we will explain how these absolute perfections can all be found formally identified in the eminence of the Deity without being destructive of one another, and without ceasing to be formally in the Deity.”

It is of importance to point out here that the formal principle of the Deity as to what properly constitutes it as such, cannot be known by our natural powers. This proves that in God there are truths of a supernatural order. Cajetan, merely repeating the doctrine of St. Thomas and recalling the terms used by Dionysius, says that the formal concept of the Deity is superior to the concepts of being, of unity, and of goodness. “The divine reality is

T The classical text of St. Thomas on this point is that taken from the first book of his Sentences, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, O: “That God exceeds the power of our intellect, this is due, on the part of God Himself, to the plenitude of His perfection, and slso on our part, to the feebleness of the intellect which fails to comprehend this perfection, Hence it is evident that a plurality of these notions is not only due to the nature of our intellect but also because of God Himself, in that His perfection surpasses each concept of our intellect. Therefore, there is something in the object which corresponds to the plurality of those notions, as to what God is, not indeed the plurality of the object, but a fulness of perfection, and hence it comes about that these concepts are applied to it.” See also the explanation of this text given by the Thomists at the beginning of their treatises on God, e. g., Billuart, De Deo, diss. 2, a. 3; also John of St. Thomas, Gonet. 8 Summa, Ia, q. 12, a 4.

prior to being and to all its differences: it is above being and above the one.” °

The Deity contains formally the notes of being, unity, and goodness, but it is above these. That is why they can be identified in the eminence of the Deity without being eradicated.

All Thomists agree in saying that there is no real or formal distinction between the divine attributes previous to that made by the mind. Likewise in created things, between the genus and specific difference (animality and rationality, for instance, as found in man), there is no distinction previous to that made by the mind.

9 Cajetan, in his commentary on the Summa (la, q. 39, a. 1, n. 7), speaking of the Holy Trinity, says: “In the order of realities (so far as a thing is), in God a thing is one, not in a purely absolute sense nor in a purely relative sense nor is it mixed or composite or a result of both these, but it is one in a most eminent and formal way, containing in itself something relative (in fact, many things relative) and also something absolute. In the formal order (that of formal concepts), in itself, not according to our manner of speaking, in God there is but one formal concept, which is not purely absolute nor purely relative nor purely communicable, nor purely incommunicable. But it is a concept which in a most eminent and formal way contains whatever there is of absolute perfection, and whatever is demanded by the Trinity in a relative sense. It must be so, because to anything absolutely simple in itself and absolutely one, there must correspond a formal and adequate concept: otherwise the thing would not be intrinsically and immediately the one intelligible of whatsoever intellect. We have a confirmation of this in the ‘Verbum Dei,’ because it is the only one of its kind. Evidently if the word is perfect, it should adequately represent that of which it is the word,

“We make a mistake, however, in arguing from absolute and relative things to the knowledge of God, in that we imagine that the distinction between the absolute and the relative is, as it were, prior to the divine reality. Yet quite the opposite is the case: for the divine reality is prior to being and all its differences. It is above being and above the one.”

In like manner Cajetan (op. cit., Ia, q. 13, a. 5, n. 7) remarks: “Thus the formal concept of wisdom, and the formal concept of justice are elevated so as to constitute one formal concept of a higher order, the proper concept, namely, of the Deity. They constitute numerically one forma! concept, containing eminently what is implied in each concept: not virtually, however, as the concept of light includes the concept of color, but formally, as the concept of light includes the concept of calorific energy.”

St. Thomas had said about the same: “God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple; yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions, because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself” (la, q. 13, a. 12).

We also say that they are only virtually distinct, or that their reality is the foundation for making this distinction which actually exists as such only in the mind. Even less than this is the virtual distinction between the divine attributes. We are right in conceiving the genus as potential and imperfect, and the specific difference as its extrinsic perfection, which is superadded to it and which is its determining element. But in God there is no foundation for such a distinction. We have no grounds for conceiving a divine perfection as potential, imperfect, and determined by another divine perfection extrinsic to it. Hence, even according to our very imperfect mode of knowing, the divine perfections must be conceived not as extrinsic to one another, but as actually included in one another in an implicit way, though each is not explicitly included in the others; otherwise we would have to admit a purely verbal distinction between them. Among the virtual distinctions, this one between the attributes is therefore the least that can be conceived.!®

Hence we see that it is impossible for us to know, by the natural power of reason, what formally constitutes the divine nature as it is in itself. To arrive at a knowledge of God, according to what

10 Such is the common teaching of the Thomists. See John of St. Thomas, Gonet, and Billuart, at the beginning of their treatises on God. Billuart, for instance, in his De Deo, diss. 2, a. 2, sec. 3, writes as follows: “The divine attributes are not distinguished from each other, and from the divine essence; nor do the divine relations differ from the divine essence by an actual-formal distinction, which is commonly called the Scotist distinction. [It is a formal distinction, though actual on the part of the thing.) Between each of the divine attributes and between them and the divine essence, also between the relations and the essence, there is a virtual distinction, or one known as rationis ratiocinatae [a purely mental distinction]. This distinction is not of the major kind, when the objective concept of a thing excludes that of another; but it is of the minor kind, which is by the way of explicit and implicit concepts.”

When the Thomists say that the divine essence actually and implicitly contains the divine attributes, they have in mind the divine essence according to our mode of knowing it. Thus, one who speaks of God as the self-existing Being, docs not explicitly speak of His justice. But the divine essence, such as it is in itself, according to the proper, intrinsic, and eminent notion of the Deity, contains actually and explicitly all the divine attributes.

properly and intrinsically constitutes the Deity, there must be a» ~~ supernatural revelation. It is only by divine faith that we are able in this life to know in an obscure manner the mystery of the intimate life of God. But to have evident knowledge of what constitutes the Deity, we should have to see it directly, as the blessed do in heaven. Only then could we see the intimate manner in which the divine perfections, which can be known in a natural way, are indentified in the eminence of the Deity without being destructive of one another.

Although it is not possible to know in a natural way what constitutes the Deity as it is in itself, among the absolute perfections which can be known in a natural way, is there not one, according to our imperfect mode of knowing them, which is the fundamental principle of the distinction between God and the world and which is the source of all the divine attributes? If such be the case, we should be right from the logical point of view of our imperfect knowledge in, saying that this perfection is what formally constitutes the divine essence. It would be in God what rationality is in man: the specifying principle which distinguishes Him from other beings, and from which His properties are derived.

The divine perfections, as they are in themselves, though not distinct from one another, are all equal, in the sense that no one of them is more perfect than the others, each of them implying the others. But, inasmuch as they are distinct from one another according to our mode of knowing them, and are analogically like created perfections, it is possible to find a certain order among them, in that there is a first among them."

The problem thus stated has been solved in various ways by the Scholastics. We must give a brief account of these solutions.

1. Ockham and the Nominalists do not admit that any one of the perfections explains all the others. This is perfectly in agreement with their theory about universals. They maintain that an

essence is merely a collection of individuals; a substance, the aggregation of its different characteristics. Likewise, according to them, the divine essence is nothing more than the grouping of all the perfections, and there is no need to seek for a logical priority of one of them over the others. Moreover, the Nominalists admitted merely a verbal distinction between the divine attributes, a purely mental one (rationis ratiocinantis), such as we have between Tullius and Cicero.

This opinion of the Nominalists leads to Agnosticism. In fact, it would no longer be possible to deduce the other divine attributes from one divine and fundamental perfection. Absolute immutability, for instance, would not have logical priority over eternity. Theology as a science would no longer be possible.

2. According to Scotus, the divine essence is formally constituted by radical infinity, and he considers that this means the exigency of all possible perfections. Also, according to this view, these perfections would be formally distinct from one another in God, before any consideration on the part of our mind.

The Thomists reject this opinion, because radical infinity or the exigency of all perfections cannot be thought of, so they say, except in a subject whose essence includes precisely this idea of exigency. This latter does not constitute the divine essence, but presupposes it and is founded upon it. In fact, we shall see that infinity is deduced from the fact that God is the self-subsisting Being (la, q. 7, a. 1). Besides, infinity is a mode of each of the divine attributes and not the principle from which they are derived. Finally, the simplicity of God does not admit of a formal distinction between the divine perfections previous to any consideration of them on our part. God would thus be an accumulation of perfections and not Perfection itself.

3. Several theologians—among whom are the Thomists John of St. Thomas, Gonet, and Billuart—are of the opinion that what formally constitutes the divine essence is subsistent intellection which is always in actu. This reminds us of Aristotle’s véyos vonoews vonows: thinking is a thinking on thinking.

Their principal argument is as follows: The most perfect of the metaphysical degrees is intellection, according to the gradation which we find among beings. Lifeless creatures have only being; above them we have beings endowed with life, and intelligence belongs to the higher form of life.

This opinion differs totally from absolute intellectualism, such as we find, for instance, advocated by Hegel. According to his view, being resolves itself into thought, an opinion which leads to panlogism and to the negation of freedom.

4. Most theologians consider self-subststing Being (aseity, ens a se) as formally constituting the divine nature, that is, ultimately distinguishing it from everything created, and as the principle from which are deduced all the divine perfections, intellection included. First of all, according to this view, God is “He who ts,” as revealed to Moses (Exod, ch. iii). This is what Aristotle means when he says that God is Actus purus. Among the Thomists holding this opinion, we have Capreolus, Bannez, Gotti, Contenson, Ledesma, Del Prado, and others. Molina, Vasquez, Torres, and others not of the school of St. Thomas side with these Thomists,

Before examining the soundness of these two last named opinions, let us point out the principal solutions given by those outside the Catholic schools of theology.

5. Certain ones are inclined to hold the priority of goodness ~ over all the other attributes. This view recalls the following famous passage of Plato: “In the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual world. However beautiful science and truth may be, you can feel sure, without fear of being deceived, that the good exceeds them in dignity.” Republic, Bk. VII, 517, D. ‘ 6) Modern Voluntarists, such as Secrétan, maintain that liberty is what formally constitutes the divine nature. For absolute being to be its own reason for what it ts (ratio sui), according to Secrétan, it must be absolute liberty, liberty of second potency, free to be free. “As substance, it gives itself existence; as living, it gives itself substance; as spirit, it gives itself life; as absolute, it gives itself liberty. . . . The finite spirit is both spirit and nature, and not merely spirit. It would be the perfection of the spirit to be a pure spirit, having nothing material. The pure spirit consists only in what it does, which means that it is absolute liberty. . . . Z am what I wish. This formula is therefore the factotum.” !* Lequier, too, had to admit that the fundamental truth in the deductive order, the truth which is the principle upon which all others are based, is the fact of divine liberty, since for him the fundamental truth in the order of invention is not the principle of identity, but the fact of human liberty. He also maintains with Secrétan that God willed to restrict His foreknowledge with regard to our acts so as to leave us free. Boutroux held and taught a similar view. “In God, power or liberty is infinite; it is the source of His existence and what comes from it is not subject to the constraint of fatality. The divine essence co-eternal with its power is actual perfection. Its necessity is that of the practical order, that is, it ought to be realized, and cannot be itself, unless it freely becomes a reality.” 14 Not long ago in Germany, Dr. Hermann Schell held that God is not only ratio sui, but causa sui.

It is difficult to conceive of other ways of solving the problem as to what formally constitutes the divine essence. Priority is given

18 See Lequier, La Recherche d'une vérité première (fragments posthumes), pp. 82-85.

14 Contingence des lois de la nature, 3d ed., p. 156.

either to Being or to the Good or to the Infinite or to intellection or to liberty. Whether we consider in God what is subjective or what is objective, no other answers than these can be found.

43. Neither free will nor the good is what formally constitutes the divine nature.

It is easy to explain why Scholastic philosophy never thought of saying that liberty is what formally constitutes the divine essence. In fact, it is difficult to conceive liberty as being prior to intelligence. Even Secrétan admits this without seeming to suspect that this acknowledgment means the very ruin of his libertarian system. “Liberty without intelligence is impossible,” he says, “it would be mistaken for chance, which latter is not a species of causality but its negation. . . . It would be a potency which of itself would unconsciously determine the law according to which it becomes a reality. That is a contradiction in terms. No, the free being is intelligent. It is useless to dwell on this point.” 15 “But, on the contrary,” remarks Pillon on this subject, in his criticism of this philosophy, “it is of great importance to dwell on this point,” for we must say whether, in the Absolute, liberty is dependent upon intelligence as it is with us—and this would be the ruination of Secrétan’s system—or, if the reverse is true, “whether absolute freedom cannot be distinguished from this radical contingency which they tell us is the negation of causality. That is the dilemma which must be faced and which really deserves some notice. Secrétan passes over it without making the least effort to escape from it.” 2° Whereas we cannot think of liberty without deliberation of the intellect, we can conceive of intellect apart from liberty. First comes the intellect, and liberty, as we shall see, is derived from it. Besides, the Libertarian thesis leads one to hold with Ockham and Descartes, that by a purely arbitrary decree God has

15 La Philosophie de la liberté, 2d ed., Vol. 1, lesson 17, p. 403. 16 Pillon, La Philosophie de Secrétan, p. 33.

distinguished good from evil. St. Thomas looked upon this doctrine as blasphemous." It is “dishonoring” God, as Leibniz says. “Why should not God be, therefore, just as well the principle of evil which the Manichaeans believed in, as the principle of good of orthodox thinkers?” 18

It is no less contradictory to maintain that God is cause of Himself. For a thing to cause, it must exist, “for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused,” says St. Thomas (Ia, q. 3, a. 4). God can only be ratio sui (His own sufficient reason), inasmuch as His essence in its formal concept implies actual existence; now this is precisely what is meant by aseity. God is a se, of Himself, without being cause of Himself. Likewise, in the order of invention, the principle of causality is not the ultimate principle. It is but a principle derived from that of sufficient reason, and this latter refers back to the principle of identity.

Neither can we admit that the Good is what formally constitutes the divine essence. St. Thomas (la, q. 5, a. 2: “Whether goodness is prior in idea to being.”) proves that being has a logical priority over the good. The formal concept of goodness adds something to that of being. Goodness is being that has reached its fullness and perfection, that is capable of appealing to the appetitive faculty, as something desirable, of arousing one’s love for it, of perfecting one, and of making one happy. The good is what all seek for. In a word, the good is being inasmuch as it is desirable, and it is virtuous good that is meant, for which we are by nature ordained in our actions. It is being inasmuch as it is what must be desired. For this reason, the notion of good is less simple, hence less independent, less absolute, less universal than the notion of being. Being does not presuppose the good; it is the good that

17 De veritate, q. 23, a. 6: “To say that justice depends simply on the will, is to say that the divine will does not act according to wisdom, and this is blasphemy.”

18 Leibniz, Theodicy, Il, sec. 176 f, presupposes being, and this latter is the first of notions. We shall see that God is the sovereign Good only because He is the plenitude of being, the self-subsisting Being. In the same way, intellect which receives its specification from being, is superior to the will which receives its specification from the good, and that is why the intellect directs the will.®

But if in itself and absolutely (simpliciter) being is prior to goodness, in a certain sense (secundum quid), goodness is prior to being. The explanation given by St. Thomas is as follows: “From the point of view of causality, goodness is prior to being. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. It is for this reason that Dionysius (De div. nom., ch. v), among the names signifying the divine causality or the relation of God to creatures, gives good priority over being” (Ia, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1um). Wherefore, for us, or in the causal relations which He establishes with us, God is, first of all, the good God, Goodness itself: for good is essentially diffusive of itself. And this sums up all the truth contained in the famous passage we have quoted from Plato’s Republic. But if we consider God as He is in Himself and as He is related to us, He is pre-eminently Being itself. Being is, in itself and absolutely so, prior to good.

It is by this profound distinction that St. Thomas reconciles his doctrine with that of the Augustinians, who instead of considering the object of theology as it is in itself, considered it as it is related to us, in that it is the object of the appetitive faculty or of the will, and of its two acts of fruition and of use. In Peter Lombard’s Sentences this relative aspect of the object of theology is made the principle in distinguishing between God and created things. In the Sentences, God is primarily the being which for us cannot be

19 See Ia, q. 82, a. 3: “Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect.”

the means, but which must be the source of our joy, whereas created things serve as the means by which we attain to eternal happiness. On the other hand, in the Summa theologica, St. Thomas considers the object of theology as it is in itself, in which God is primarily the First Being. “As far as our intellect can judge of the matter, goodness, action, and desire belong essentially to being, and are modes of being. It is impossible for us to say that being is a mode of the good and of action. It is the ontological concept of being which comprises the dynamic concept, and not vice versa.” *°

That St. Augustine and St. Thomas held opposite opinions on this point, has been far too much exaggerated, we think, in these latter times.” It is particularly from the psychological and moral standpoint that St. Augustine considers the object of theology, whereas St. Thomas considers the object from the metaphysical point of view. In this there is no contradiction, but subordination of views. The way in which St. Thomas reconciles these two points of view, is-by distinguishing, as we have just explained, between God considered either as He is in Himself or only as He is related to us.

44. Does being itself or subsistent thought formally constitute the divine nature?

In determining God's nature, St. Thomas (Ia, q. 3) begins by proving that God is pure Spirit,?? and that He is Being itself.?8

20 Cf. Gardeil, Du donné révélé à la théologie, pp. 279-284; also his article “Bien” in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. In his Du donné révélé à la théologie, Gardeil insists more on the difference between the Augustinian and Thomistic points of view, without excluding the possibility of reconciling these views.

21 We find this same exaggeration in various articles published in the Annales de philosophie chrétienne, 1905-1913. The same may be said of certain hise toriars of the Thomistic school of thought, whose viewpoint differs from that advorated by the Annales,

22 See Ia, q. 3, a. 1: “Whether God is a body”; a, 2: “Whether God is composed of matter and form.”

28 See Ia, q. 3, a. 4: “Whether essence and existence are the same in God.”

This, we think, solves the problem which confronts us. God is pure Spirit. How could He have a body? However perfect this body might be, however subtle, delicate, and endowed with vitality, the divine soul which gave it life would still be the nobler part. We should have to say, therefore, that there is something imperfect and limited in God. This body would not be life, but only a participation in life.?* This body would not be the prime mover, the principle of all motion, but would itself be set in motion.?® This body would not be the principle of all order in the universe, but would itself require an organizing principle.?® Finally, this body would constitute with the divine soul a composite, more perfect than the parts. But, for the elements of a composite to be united, a cause is required (see n. 26). The First Being, as we have said, must be absolutely simple,”” simpler than a perfect diamond, and therefore must be pure spirit.

This prime being is without organs of sense perception, sees not with the eyes but in a purely spiritual manner. It has no passions or emotions, but a love which is entirely spiritual. Only in a metaphorical sense can we, to express the strictness of its justice, speak of it as being angry.

In this life we can have no positive concept of this spirit, except by denoting it in terms borrowed from corporeal things, as when we say that it is a substance and that it acts. But we can have only a negative and relative knowledge, derived from objects of sense experience, of what properly constitutes this being as such. In a negative way, we say of this being that it is incorporeal and immaterial, which means that it is without a body and without matter. In a relative way we try to define this being, referring to what is nobler in the sensible order, comparing it to light, as when

24 This would be an open contradiction of the fourth proof of God's existence.

25 Contrary to the conclusion of the first proof of God's existence.

26 This would be a denial of the conclusion established by the fifth proof of

God's existence. 27 Sce the fourth proof of God's existence.

we say that it is a bright light, at the same time remarking that its light is of a higher order than material light. Though we know quite well that a spirit has no spatial dimensions, yet, by way of analogy, we attribute dimensions to it, as when we speak of a highminded person, a profound intellect, an intellect of wide range, one so vast that it sees things from on high and from afar. By way of analogy with the resistance of material objects, we speak of a firm mind, or of one that is inconstant, yielding, or subtle. When we wish to designate an unusual subtlety of mind, we speak of the sharpness of the intellect.

Even though we were to know definitely what constitutes a pure spirit, we should still be in ignorance of what formally constitutes the divine nature. In fact, it is possible for a pure spirit to be created; our created intellect is of the purely spiritual order, and faith tells us of the existence of angels. But a speck of dust compared with an angel is not so insignificant as an angel compared with God. Whether we consider the vast number of angels in the heavenly choirs, or the numerous suns of the nebulae, or the innumerable grains of sand on the seashore, all of these, in a sense, are equally infinitesimal compared with God. What separates a speck of dust from God is infinity, and between an angel and God the difference is also infinity.

By what name, then, shall we truly designate God, if it does not suffice to say of Him that He is pure Spirit? God Himself has told us His name. He revealed it to Moses from the midst of the burning bush: “Moses said to God: Lo, | shall go to the children of Israel, and say to them: The God of your fathers hath sent me to you, If they should say to me: What is His name? what shall I say to them? God said to Moses: J am who am. Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel. He who is has sent me to you” (Exod. 3:13, 14). The Hebrew word “Yahveh,” from which the word “Jehovah” is derived, is the equivalent of “He who is.” “This is my name forever, and this is my memorial unto all generations.” We come across the same words in the last book of the New Testament (Apoc. 1:4, 8): “I am Alpha and Omega, saith the Lord, who is and who was and who is to come, the Almighty.” Thus God revealed Himself to His saints, as He did, for instance, to St. Catherine, when He said to her: “I am He who is, thou art who art not.”

God is not only pure spirit, He is Being itself, that subsists immaterial as such above all created things, not subject to any of the limitations that can be imposed on beings by space, matter, or any of the finite spiritual essences. The fourth proof of God’s existence, based on the degrees of being, makes this point quite clear. (See n. 39.)

From the standpoint of our imperfect knowledge, is it not true that self-subsisting Being, or Actus purus, as Aristotle termed it, is the formal constituent of the divine essence? It seems easy to prove this.?®

The formal constituent of the divine nature, according to our imperfect mode of knowing it, is what we conceive in God as being the fundamental principle that distinguishes Him from creatures, and that is the source of His attributes. Now, since God is self-subsisting Being, He is fundamentally distinct from everything created, and all absolute perfections must be attributed to Him. Therefore, self-subsisting Being is the formal constituent of the divine nature.

This doctrine is explained by the very prominence which St. Thomas gives to the fundamental proposition: “The divine essence is the self-subsisting existence, the self-subsisting Being.” The article in which this question is discussed *° is the terminus in the

2, ch. ii; Zigliara, O.P., Summa phil, theol., Bk, Il, ch. i. 80 St, Thomas, Ia, q. 3, a 4.

ascendent order of metaphysical reasoning, the culminating point of the five ways by which we prove the existence of God who is distinct from the world. This article also gives us the principle in the descendent process of metaphysical reasoning, or of that method by which we deduce the divine attributes and establish in what way the world is related to God.

The prime mover, as we have said, must be its very own activity and, being Actus purus in the operative order, it must be so also in the entitative order; for the mode of operation follows the mode of being. Its essence, therefore, is not only capable of existing, it is its very Being.

St. Thomas is more explicit when he says: “Existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality.”** And since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above, it follows that in Him the essence does not differ from existence.

The first cause must find within itself the reason of its own existence. But it cannot cause itself, for to do so it would have to be already in existence. Therefore it did not receive existence, but is this very existence.5?

Necessary being implies existence as an essential predicate, which means that it must not only have existence, but that it must be its very existence.

The supreme being, absolutely simple and perfect, could not participate in existence, but must be essentially Being; therefore there could be no distinction in it of an essence as limiting and of an existence as limited,** of an essence as capable of existence and of an existence as actualizing or determining this essence.

The first intelligence, which directs all things to their ends, cannot be itself directed to being, as to an object distinct from itself; it must be Being itself always actually known to itself.

As we have said, such is the conclusion to which we come from the proofs of God's existence, a conclusion which constitutes the fundamental principle of the distinction between God and the world, This distinction comes first to our notice from the fact that God is immutable, and the world is subject to change (first, second, and third proofs). It is confirmed by the fact that God is absolutely simple and perfect, whereas the world is composite and imperfect (fourth and fifth proofs). Its definite formula and ultimate claim to recognition come from the fact that God is He who is, Being itself, whereas everything else which exists is by its very nature only capable of existing, and is a composite of essence and existence.** It is clear that no created being can be self-existent; even when actually existing, it is only contingent or non-essential existence that can be predicated of it. This existence is really distinct from the actual essence in which it is received and by which it is limited. “Along with the essence given by God, He produces that which the essence receives.” 35

This real distinction, which is beyond the scope of the senses or of experience, is imposed upon human reason so as to enable it to decide the arguments advanced by Parmenides against the multiplicity of beings. This multiplicity is a fact, and cannot be explained except by admitting a limiting principle, which is that of real and created essence. In fact, existence cannot of itself be multi-

84 St. Thomas, Ia, q. 7, a. t ad 3um: “From the fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, this shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject.” See also Michel, art. “Essence” in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. Cf. Hugon, O.P., Cursus phil, V, 15 ff, 25 ff., 46 £., 71 ff.

plied, but only in so far as it is received in essences capable of existing, just as the form is multiplied only in so far as it is received in matter. This composite of essence and existence is the principle of the imperfection and the mutability in created things. It presupposes that the notion of being as such is not univocal (as Scotus maintained),°7 but analogous (Ia, q. 13, a. 5). Only in this sense can it be said that real essence, a potentiality which in recciving existence limits the same, is a part of being, though it is not existence. Being is predicated analogically or in a different way, of these two elements which constitute created being. Thus sensation and intellection are spoken of as knowledge, though the connotation is essentially different in each case, as also when the term is applied to the thought of created beings and of the uncreated Being.

To declare, on the contrary, that the notion of being as such is univocal, makes impossible any explanation of the fact of the multiplicity of beings, and thus obliges the acceptance of Monism, as St. Thomas remarked of Parmenides; and the same may be said of Spinoza, the modern Parmenides. The old philosopher of Elis, as also Spinoza, was of the opinion that being is univocal, and from this he concluded the unicity of both being and sub-

88 See St. Thomas, Ia, q. 44, a. 1: “It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown (q. 3, a. 4), when treating of the divine simplicity, that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being. And also it was shown (q. 11, a. 4) that subsisting being must be one: as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation.” See also Contra Gentes, Bk. Il, ch. lii. De ente et essentia, chs. 5, 6; De veritate, q. 27, a. 1 ad 8um: “Everything which is of the genus of substance, is made up of parts which unite to form a real composite . . . at least of essence and existence (ex esse et quod est). For other texts of St. Thomas, see Del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae, pp. 24-30.

87 See Scotus (Oxford), I, d. 3, q. 2, n. 5 ff. CÉ. also the other texts of Scotus in his Summa theologica Joannis Scoti, edited by Montefortino, Ia, q. 13, a. 5.

stance. St. Thomas reduced the Eleatic argument to this syllogism: A thing that is simple cannot be diversified by itself, but only by something other than itself. Now being as such is simple; and what is not being, is nothing. Therefore, being cannot be diversified, and so there is only one being.

To this objection St. Thomas replies as follows: “The mistake which Parmenides made was in believing that being, like a genus, is univocal. But, as a matter of fact, being is not a genus, and is predicated of the different types of being in very different senses.” 38 If it were a genus, like animality, it could be diversified only by differences which would be extrinsic to it, and since what is not being is nothing, there is no way by which it could be diversified,

As a matter of fact, being is analogous, and the only unity it has is that of proportion, like that of the word “know,” which denotes either sense perception in its relation to the sensible object, or intellectual perception in its relation to the intelligible object. From this point of view, being as such contains actually and implicitly the various modes by which being is diversified. It is predicated, but with very different meanings, of potentiality and of act, and also of created things which are composites consisting of potentiality and of act, and it is also predicated of pure act.

Certain theologians, following Scotus, reject the real distinction between essence and existence in created things, and cause the analogy of being to be merged in univocity.®® It is not surprising that the Thomists consider that these theologians thus undermine

88 The comment of St. Thomas (Metaphysica, Bk. I, ch. v, lesson 9) is as follows: “In this Parmenides erred, in that he always referred to being as if it had one meaning and one nature, as is the case with genus. But this is impossible, For being is not a genus, but is predicated of various things and in many different senses.

89 Suarez, Disp. Met., disp. 2, sec. 2, n. 34. See also infra, at the end of ch. iii.

the distinction between God and the world and prepare the way for Pantheism.*°

On the other hand, by at once admitting these fundamental and essentially connected truths,*! we avoid all forms of Pantheism as well as the theory of those who say that we are modes of the divine essence, and the theory of those who make God the formal principle by which all beings are determined.

It is truly impossible to conceive the divine essence as passing through a process of evolution and enriching itself by the acquisition of new modes of being. God is being itself, completely determined, and therefore incapable of further determination (Ia, q: 3, a. 6).

It is equally absurd to maintain that God is the formal principle by which all beings are determined. In that case these beings would participate in His nature, as matter participates in the form (Ia, q. 3, a. 8). He would constitute with these beings a composite more perfect than Himself.

God cannot be the subject of the material or spiritual changes

40 Cf, Del Prado, De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae, a criticism of the principles of the metaphysics of Suarez (chs. ix-xi); John of St. Thomas, O.P., Cursus phil., Phil. nat., q. 7, a. 4; Hugon, O.P., Cursus phil., V, 67. See also De Maria, S.J., Ontologia (tr., I, q. 1, a. 5); Cardinal Billot, S.J., De Deo and De Verbo incarnato, passim; Michel, art. “Essence” in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique.

41 St. Thomas (De potentia, q. 7, a. 7) says: “The diversity of reference to existence in created things prevents us from predicating being univocally of them. God is His own existence, which cannot be said of anything created.”

Objection might be made, that all danger of Pantheism is sufficiently avoided by admitting that being is analogous, and that we need not go futher than this and admit a real distinction between essence and existence in created beings.

In truth, the analogy of being suffices in explaining the diversification of the different essences viewed as merely possible: but when we consider this same analogy in beings which actually exist, or between the essence and the existence, in each of them, it demands a real distinction between essence and existence, since existence is but a contingent and non-essential predicate of created being. To deny this distinction is to be brought to the alternative of maintaining that existence is an essential predicate of everything which exists; hence, everything which exists is identified with God.

which we observe in the world, nor can He be the formal law of these changes. His relations with the world cannot be those of immanent cause but only of extrinsic cause, both efficient and final (Ia, q. 3, a. 8).

Spinoza admitted only an immanent cause for the origin of the world, because of his theory of absolute realism by which he maintained that universal being exists as such apart from spirit. , Thus he confuses being as such with the divine Being, at the same time admitting both the univocity and unicity of being. Another reason for this view held by Spinoza was that he unjustly applied to metaphysics that process of reasoning which belongs to mathematics.

This latter science, which is concerned only with quantity, rightly abstracts *? from sensible qualities, as well as from efficient and final causality. This cannot be the case with that science which is concerned only with being and which considers individual things in so far as they have being, and in so far as they come into existence and are kept in existence. This science must seek for the efficient and final cause of these beings. (See also Appendix III: “The Various Kinds of Pantheism Refuted by St. Thomas.”)

Being itself is finally the principle of all the divine attributes. Despite what Scotus says, this principle could not consist in radical infinity or in the exigency of all possible perfections. For we cannot conceive of this exigency apart from a subject whose essence precisely calls for all perfections.

In the “question” treating of the Perfection of God, St. Thomas clearly explains what is the foundation of this exigency. (Ia, q. 4, a. 2). “God is existence itself, of itself subsistent. Consequently He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfec-

42 See Aristotle, Metaph., Bk. VI, ch. i; St. Thomas’ commentary, lect. 1.

tion; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. All created perfections, however, are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely in so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows, therefore, that no perfection is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius in his De divinis nominibus (ch. v), when he says: God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being in Himself, absolutely, without limitation.” Being itself demands all perfections, both those of the operative order and those of the entitative order, since operation presupposes being. In the discussion which follows we shall see how each particular attribute is deduced from subsistent Being.

Thought or subsistent intellection, since that is merely the basis of those perfections pertaining to the intellect and to the will, cannot be taken as the principle upon which we base this derivation. The derivation of these attributes is based upon the immateriality of the divine Being (Ia, q. 14, a. 1). God is intelligence because He is the absolutely immaterial Being. Moreover, intelligence presupposes an intelligible object, and the supremely intelligible is none other than Being itself, which contains virtually all possible beings viewed as so many analogical reflections of itself, somewhat after the manner of light which contains virtually all colors. Hence St. Thomas does not study the question of God’s knowledge of Himself until he has discussed the attributes relating to the divine Being, and has touched upon those relating to the divine operations.**

From the fact that intellection denotes the highest degree of being, above all that is corporeal, and all forms of vegetative and sensitive life, we cannot conclude that it is what formally constitutes the divine nature, In fact, what constitutes the divine

nature, is not a degree of being however noble, but it must be that which is presupposed in every being, the very self-subsisting Being in all the plenitude of its being.**

With regard to the Hebrew tetragrammaton Yahveh (or Jehovah), St. Thomas (la, q. 13, a. 11), with his usual precision of thought, says: “This name, He who is, is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:

“First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other, it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God.

“Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other divine names are either less universal than ‘He who is’ or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform it and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself; but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly are they applied to God. Hence Damascene *® says: ‘He who is, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance.’ Now by any other name some mode of substance is

44 St. Thomas (Ia, q. 4, a. 2 ad 3um) has this to say: “Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence, nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself." Again (Ia Iae, q. 2, a. 5 ad 2um) we read: “Being taken simply as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it... . But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing (in a stone), then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent,” See also Sentences, la, dist. 8, q. 1, a. 1, 8; De potentia, q. 8, a. 2 ad gum. Cf. also Gotti,

De Deo tr. Il, dub. 3, sec. 3; and Contenson, De Deo, diss. 2, ch, ii, spec. 2. 45 De fide orthodoxa, Bk. I, ch. xii.

determined, whereas the name He who is, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all, and therefore it denominates the infinite ocean of substance.

“Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trinitate, V).”

Finally, no matter what the modern idealists may say, all the theologians admit priority of being over thought. This latter, from both the subjective and the objective points of view, can be defined only by reason of its reference to being. Thought is the thought of a thinking being, and its tendency is for the being thought of.

In the passage in which Aristotle discusses the vóņois vopoews vonows, the thinking on thinking (Met., XII, ch. ix), he shows that the perfection of intellection consists precisely in this, that it receives its specification from the intelligible object. “What proves this,” he says, “is that there are things which it is better not to know.” To know them is not a perfection. Hence perfection of knowledge depends upon the dignity of the thing that is known. Also pure Act is considered by Aristotle to be the very first intelligible, 73 mpôrov vonrév (Met., XII, ch. vii). It is the objective venous more so than the eternal act of intellection, which has for its object this supreme intelligible. In this we recognize the old objectivism.

Whereas being is an absolute of direct apprehension, intelligence cannot be conceived except as something which is vitally related to being. Our very first idea in the order of invention, is the idea of being; our very first principle is the principle of identity, which enunciates what applies primarily to being, that “a being is what it is and cannot be what it is not.” In the synthetic or deductive order, in via judici, it is this first principle of identity which is the fundamental truth. It is that which ultimately explains all other things, and which is the answer to our final inquiries about God and the world. But it is now expressed in the following form: “I am who am and cannot not be.” As Father Del Prado has shown in his treatise De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae,*® of such a nature is this principle that it constitutes the corner-stone of the treatise on God. It is the terminus of the proof of God’s existence, and the startingpoint in the deduction of the divine attributes. Along with the principle of identity implied in the first of our ideas, which is that of being, there is needed a being in whom essence is identical with existence, one who is pure being, without any admixture of potentiality, without limitation, who is to being as A is to A, in whom the principle of identity is completely realized and who is Being instead of simply having being: “I am He who is” (Exod., ch. iii).

By making intelligence dependent upon truth or upon being, we depart from the absolute intellectualism of Leibniz. As Boutroux remarks (La Monadologie, p. 84), “Leibniz, taking the modern point of view of the glorification of personality, considers intelligence . . . the indispensable substratum of truth.” 47 It may well be questioned whether Leibniz’ absolute intellectualism, in which liberty is stripped of everything but the name, does not logically result in Hegel’s absolute idealism, which relegates being to thought, and hence consigns what is to what must be, liberty to necessity, actual fact to right, success to morality.*® If we take this view of the question, we are obliged to make “becoming” the fundamental reality, and thus deny the objective validity of the principle of non-contradiction, which therefore

46 Published in rorr.

47 Cf, Leibniz, Opera philosophica, Erdmann ed., 562, b.

#8 As Ollé-Laprune remarks in his Raison et le Rationalisme, the Rationalistic thesis is based on the principle that being refers to thought, and not thought to being, or reason to being. Such reasoning results in the denial both of liberty and of the claims of divine faith.

ceases to be the norm for the reasoning mind and its abstractions. St. Thomas, as we shall see later on, by maintaining that the will is subordinate to the intellect, avoids the error of psychological determinism; for he is more emphatic than Leibniz in affirming the dependence of the intellect upon being. If being, conceived as an absolute, is prior to intelligence conceived as related to being, then what the real denotes need not be positively intelligible and of itself predetermined, in order that the transition from Being itself to the existence of this world by means of creation, and the transitions from the infinite to the finite, from the one to the multiple, from the universal to the particular, be deduced from the principle of sufficient reason. Intellectualism limits itself when it claims to be a realism, and when it distinguishes in being—which it regards as prior to thought—two elements, one completely intelligible (act), and the other (potency) thoroughly obscure for the intellect, but necessary so as to enable it to solve the arguments advanced by Parmenides and also to explain multiplicity and becoming in terms of being. At present we cannot insist further on the importance of these notions, but we will return to the subject in chapter four. Therefore we conclude that self-subsisting Being is what formally constitutes the divine nature, according to our imperfect way of knowing it. This thesis is confirmed by the fact that the attributes are derived from the self-subsisting Being. These attributes are in this Being, not merely in a virtual manner (as properties are contained virtually in the created essence from which they are derived), but in an actual and implicit manner, although not as yet explicitly expressed. That is why the Thomists and almost all theologians say there is only a virtual and minor distinction between the divine attributes and the divine essence.*® Since, in speaking thus of the divine essence, we do not simply mean to imply our imperfect mode of knowing it,

#9 Sce Billuart, De Deo, diss. 2, a. 3.

but the divine essence as it is in itself, then we must say that in the eminence of the Deity, according to what properly and intrinsically constitutes it as such, are contained all the divine perfections actually and explicitly,®° and that there is no distinction between them except those made by the human mind, That is why St. Thomas (Ia, q. 13, a. 11 ad 1um) says: “The name God is more proper than the name He who is, as regards the object intended by the name, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature.” 54

Between the divine essence and the attributes there is no mental distinction either for God or for the blessed who contemplate Him face to face. The intimate life of the Deity in its eminent simplicity is the immediate object of the beatific vision.5?

Sanctifying grace is a physical, formal, and analogical participation of the divine nature. If in this life we had such a knowledge of grace that we could say in what it intimately consists, we should then have a certain knowledge of what intimately constitutes the divine nature. There is resemblance by way of analogy, between inanimate beings and God, in so far as He is being; between living beings and God, in so far as He is living; between intelligent beings and God, in so far as He is intelligent. That is why we say that beings are made to God’s image (Ia, q. 93, a. 2). By the supernatural life of grace we are like unto God, precisely in this that He is God, and we thus participate in the intimate life of the Deity according to the strict acceptation of the term. Hence St. Thomas says: “The least degree of sanctifying grace in the soul of a single man or infant is incomparably more precious than all created beings both corporeal and spir-

51 Gotti, in his De Deo (tr. II, q. 3, dub. 3, 20), says that the word “man” is more proper than the expression “rational animal”; for this term is used to designate human nature and not the elements which constitute it.

52 See Billuart, De Deo, diss. 2, a, 3, appendix. This view is at least the most probable one.

itual.” “The good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe” (Ia Ilae, q. 113, a. 9 ad 2um).

Pascal likewise says: “The least of minds is greater than all material objects, the firmament, the stars, the earth and its kingdoms; for the mind has knowledge of all these things and of itself; whereas things material have no knowledge at all. Bodies and minds, all these taken together and the effects produced by them, do not equal the least act of charity. This latter is of an infinitely higher order. From the sum-total of material things, there could not possibly issue one little thought, because thought is of another order. From bodies and minds we cannot possibly have an act of true charity, for the latter, too, is of another order, pertaining to the supernatural. The saints have their realm, their glory, their victory, their luster, and have no need of temporal or spiritual aggrandisement, which in no way affects them, neither increasing nor decreasing their greatness. The saints are seen by God and the angels, not by bodies or by curious minds. God sutiices for them.” 5%

Sanctity, which is the life of grace having reached its perfection, is a participation of the intimate life of God, of that which properly constitutes the Deity such as it is in itself.

53 Pascal, Peasées (Havet ed.), art. XVII, 1

Footnotes

1. Summa theol., Ia, q. 13, a. 5; q. 12, a. 12. ↩

2. The proper or proportionate object of a created intelligence is created being; and the proper object of a created intelligence united to a body is the essence of sensible things or what there is of the intelligible in the sensible. Cf. Ia, q. 12, a. 4. See also infra (n. 47), on the invisibility of God, ↩