Introduction
- Notion, division, and derivation in general of the attributes.
The expression “divine attribute,” in its strict sense, is usually defined as an absolutely simple perfection which exists necessarily and formally in God and which, according to our imperfect mode of knowing it, is deduced from what we conceive as constituting the divine essence.
God’s free acts and the real relations which constitute the Trinity of divine persons are not attributes in the strict sense of the term, Of course, any perfection (such as rationality or animality) which essentially includes imperfection cannot be called a divine attribute. These mixed perfections are not in God formally but only virtually, in that He can bring them into existence. Maimonides and the Agnostics erred in claiming that even absolute perfections exist in God only virtually. From this point of view, we should have no more right to attribute intelligence to God, than to attribute animality or materiality to Him (Ia, q. 13, a. 2). Nothing is opposed to God except in so far as it is an imperfection.
St. Thomas! considers first those divine attributes which refer to the being of God, and then those which concern His operations. The attributes which relate to God's very being are, first of all, those properties belonging to being as such and considered in the highest degree of their perfection. They are simplicity or1 unity, truth, goodness or perfection, Then come infinity which excludes any limitation of essence, immensity and omnipresence which exclude spatial limitation, eternity which excludes all time limitation; finally, with regard to our natural knowledge, the being of God is invisible, and it is incomprehensible, yet able to be known by analogy with created things.
In the attributes which relate to the divine operations, a division is made between those referring to the immanent divine operations and those which are causes of an effect external to God.? To the former class belong, on the part of the intellect, wisdom and providence; and on the part of the will, love and its two great virtues of mercy and justice. The immediate principle of the external divine effects is omnipotence, both creative and conservative, upon which depends the divine concurrence which is necessary for all beings to enable them to act and attain their end.
Such is the main division of the divine attributes. From a secondary point of view and more as regards the mode of our knowledge, we distinguish between positive and negative attributes, In fact, there are some perfections expressed by terms that are positive in form but negative in implication, such as simplicity, which is the negation of composition. On the other hand, there are attributes expressed by terms which are negative in form (such as infinity), but which denote a positive perfection.
Anyone who has duly considered the orderly arrangement of the questions in the treatise on God, which forms part of St. Thomas’ Summa theologica, can easily enough, by following this order closely, derive all the attributes from the self-subsisting Being.
We will give a general outline of the derivation of these attributes. After that we will consider each of them in turn and endeavor to solve the seeming antinomies which confront one in2 the reconciliation of these attributes. The derivation of the attributes may be summed up by the following diagram.
Ki nor edge Providence Justice Mercy
Vision
If unity, truth, and goodness (see Vol. I, nn. 18, 20, 29) are transcendental properties of being as such, which transcends or dominates species and genera, then the self-subsisting Being must be absolutely one (simple and unique, Ia, q. 3, 11). More than just intelligible, He must be Truth itself, or the first intelligible, 6 mpôrov vonrév (Met., XII, ch. vii; Ia, q. 16).*
$ This diagram gives the main positive attributes as these are related to the supreme Being and to the Deity. The names grouped around the curves denote the attributes which would exist, even if nothing else did or could exist. The other attributes are considered in their relations to created things, either actual or possible. The triangle by which the figure is bounded is the ordinary symbol of the Trinity. The three angles are really distinct and yet each of the same dimensions. They are equal (or should be regarded as equal) and are essentially related to one another.
4In this general derivation of the attributes we have adhered closely to the order of the questions as presented by St. Thomas in the Summa theologica.
Having plenitude of being, He is also the sovereign good, capable of attracting to Himself the primary desirable, rò zpérov épexrdv, the one who constitutes the basis of all our obligations, the rò åyafòv xat rò åpıorov, the good and the best (Ia, q. 4, 5, 6). He must also be infinite, which means without limitation of essence (Ia, q. 7).
Necessarily above the limitations of space and time, He is immense, everywhere present by His power with which He conserves all creatures in existence (Ia, q. 8). He is absolutely immutable (Ia, q. 9), and consequently eternal (Ia, q. 10).
Lastly, as regards our naturally acquired knowledge, He is invisible and incomprehensible (la, q. 12). However, He can be known in a natural way, by analogy derived from creatures (Ia, q. 13).
We will consider Him in His operations, and what these operations are (la, q. 14, prologue).
From the definition of self-subsisting Being it follows that He is immaterial and consequently the intelligible in act and the Intellect in act (Ia, q. 14, a. 1). Since the intellect is defined by reason of its immediate reference to being, it too, like being, is analogous and, like being, can have every imperfection eliminated from it. The same must be said of the will and of love which are defined by reason of their immediate reference to good."
Being itself is not only intelligent but is independent of all material and spatial limitations, especially of any limitation of essence. He is supremely intelligent, and His intelligence cannot be a mere faculty or potentiality, but is an eternal act of intellection. And this thought ever in act cannot but be identified with Being itself supremely intelligible and always actually known.
But, for the sake of a simpler arrangement, we have changed the relative position of the question of truth, which St. Thomas rightly discusses after the question of knowledge,
Let us not seek here, as Fichte or Spencer did, for a duality of subject and object. This duality, says St. Thomas (la, q. 14, a. 2), comes about only as the result of the potentiality or imperfection of subject and object. When the subject can know but is not knowledge itself, when the object can be known without being the Truth always known, then the two are distinct. But eternal intellection demands that it be absolutely identified with the supremely intelligible Being, and vice versa. Not only the general requirements of divine simplicity make this identification a necessity, but each of these two perfections peculiarly demands it. When all potentiality has been eliminated, pure thought is pure being, and pure being is pure thought: éorw 4 vóņois vongews vonows: its thinking is a thinking on thinking (Met., XII, ch. ix).
Divine wisdom, in so far as its object is the divine essence and all possible things virtually contained in it, is called knowledge of simple intelligence. In so far as things created, either past, present, or future, constitute its object, it is called knowledge of vision.
If He who is is intelligence itself, it must be most evident, continues St. Thomas (la, q. 18), for life to be attributed to Him in the highest degree. The more immanence there is in life, the greater is its perfection, since vital movement is that which proceeds, not from an external principle, but from a principle within the living being. This same immanence is more or less perfect, varying in degree, according as the life is vegetative, sensitive, or intellectual. It reaches its perfection in supreme Thought, which does not have to seek for its object outside itself, and which is under no necessity of being aroused to action by the illuminating concurrence of a higher Cause. “There is life in God,” said Aristotle, “for the act of the intellect is life, and God is intellect supremely in act. It is this eternal act of Thought which gives Thought its perfect life. We also say of God that He is a perfect and eternal living being: {@ov didiov dprrov. Hence eternal life belongs to God, for it is God Himself” (Met., Bk. XII, ch. vii).
If He who ts is intellect and life itself, then will must also be attributed to Him. Will indeed follows upon intellect, says St. Thomas (Ia, q. 19, a. 1), just as a natural and unconscious inclination follows upon the form itself or the nature of unconscious beings. Besides, since will and love are defined by reason of their immediate relation to good, which is a property of being, they too, like being, are analogous and can have every imperfection removed from them. The will in God, just as much as the intellect, is not a faculty or potentiality. It is the act itself of the love of the good, and the good itself always actually loved.
The divine will is free (la, q. 19, a. 3), not as regards the absolute Good which it must love, but as regards finite good by which no further perfection can accrue to it. What constitutes the basis of divine liberty is that the self-subsisting Being is absolutely independent of everything created, It is nothing but the predominating indifference of Being with regard to what is simply possible and is not repugnant to existence, but which has no claim to existence. It is fitting that He who is the sovereign Good should impart what is in Him to others; but He does so with absolute freedom, for there can be no increase in His perfection from the fact that He allows others to share in it.
Still more so God is free to create a certain world in which all things are wisely ordained, rather than some other which would also be a proof of His wisdom. Whatever be the inequality between two things of finite goodness, they remain equally the same for the infinity of the supreme Good (la, q. 25, a. 5, 6).®
The One who is being itself must also be omnipotent, which means that He can give reality to everything which does not imply contradiction, to everything which can be. In fact, being is the proper effect of the first Being, who gives reality to things just as light illumines, and fire generates heat (Ia, q. 25). As first
® Concerning the seeming antinomies with reference to liberty, see ch. iv.
cause and first mover of everything which exists, God must be present to all things, preserving them in their being (Ia, q. 8).
Providence is attributed to the One who is being itself, because His external action extending to all created beings even to their smallest parts, is the action of an intelligent agent. But an intelligent agent acts for an end known by it, and this end is the raison d'être of all the means that are employed. God, therefore, orders all things to an ultimate end, which is Himself. Providence, or this type of the order in things to an end, is also a pure perfection and is defined, like the intellect by which it functions, by reason of its relation to being or to the raison d'étre of things (Ia, q. 22, a. 1).
The One who is being itself is just and merciful; justice and mercy are virtues which reside in His will. He is just because His intelligence and goodness oblige Him to give to each created nature all that is necessary for its attainment of the end assigned to it (Ia, q. 21, a. 2). On the other hand, loving as He must His own good above all things, He is bound to see to it that His inalienable rights are respected and must punish violation of them (Ia Iae, q. 87, a. 1, 3).
The One who is being itself is merciful, for it belongs properly to the omnipotent and infinitely good Being to give what is good to others, to come to their assistance, to raise them up from their wretchedness, and, if we may so speak, to bring being out of nothingness, good out of evil, repentance and love out of sin, a love corresponding in intensity to the malice of the sin. Therein is God’s triumph and the motive attracting “extreme wealth to extreme poverty.” “It belongs to divine mercy,” says St. Thomas, “to give generously to others and to help them in their need. And this properly concerns the superior in his dealings with his subjects (et hoc maxime superioris est: and this most properly concerns the superior). Hence mercy properly belongs to God” (Ia, q. 21, a. 3; Ila Ilae, q. 30, a. 4).
The One who is being itself is supremely happy. Beatitude is the perfect felicity of an intellectual nature, which finds its satisfaction in the good which it possesses, knowing itself to be beyond the reach of passing misfortune, and being always master of its actions. Evidently all these conditions for happiness are verified in God, since He is the embodiment of all perfection and intelligence (Ia, q. 26, a. 1).
Lastly, the One who is being itself is also beauty, consisting in the closest and most striking harmony between most varied perfections, so varied, indeed, that some of them, though seeming in certain respects to be irreconcilable, such as infinite mercy and infinite justice, are nevertheless identified in the divine love of the supreme Good (la, q. 5, a. 4 ad tum).
The One who is being itself is also holiness, or that indissoluble union of all spiritual perfections in their highest degree without any trace of imperfection (Ila Iae, q. 81, a. 8).
The sum-total of these attributes thus derived from Being itself enables us to say of God that He is personal. In fact, personality is nothing else but subsistence which is independent of matter and which is the basis of intelligence, of consciousness, and of liberty in beings. God, as we have just seen, subsists independently of the world of corporeal beings, like every immaterial being. Besides this, He is intelligent, conscious of Himself, and free. Moreover, since God is absolutely and solely self-subsistent, independently of every other being, since He is omniscient and absolutely free of everything created, He is supremely personal. However, as Vacant remarks, “The Vatican Council did not adopt the formula: God is a personal being. This way of speaking of the divine nature contradicts the error of materialists. However, it has the disadvantage of giving the impression that there is only one person in God. But the Catholic Church believes in the Trinity of divine persons.”* To be3 sure, it is only by means of revelation that we can know of this mystery which introduces us into the intimate life of God, such as He is in Himself, according to what properly constitutes Him (la, q. 32, a. 1).
It is not the province of theology to demonstrate the possibility of a real distinction between the divine persons, or, what comes to the same thing, that én itself this distinction is not impossible or contradictory. To affirm the possibility of this demonstration would be to confuse the natural with the supernatural.* Theology merely shows that we cannot see anything evidently contradictory in the Trinity of divine persons. After the revelation of this mystery, each of the divine persons is conceived as a subsistent relation or as a relative subsistence. Reason does not have to prove positively the analogical validity of this concept of relation, as it had to do in the case of the concepts of natural theology. Since God has made use of this concept as the means of revealing Himself to us, it suffices if theology proves that the relation does not posit in God an evident imperfection, but on the contrary that there are certain congruent reasons which permit us to surmise its possibility and its necessity.
We also see that the natural knowledge of God is not anthropomorphic, as the Modernists claimed it to be. We do not conceive God as if He were a man of infinite proportions; but we conceive of Him as Being itself, and we admit in Him only those attributes which are derived necessarily from this concept of self-subsisting Being. We do not conceive God in the image of man; it is man who is made in the image of God, inasmuch as man has been given an intellect, the object of which is being and
8ft was for this reason that Rosmini's twenty-fifth proposition was condemned. The proposition reads as follows: “Provided the mystery of the Trinity has been revealed, its existence can be demonstrated by merely speculative arguments, though they are negative and indirect, so that by such arguments this truth is classed among the philosophical subjects and, like the rest of them, becomes a scientific proposition.” See Denzinger, n. 1915.
its absolute laws. “The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us” (Ps. 4:7). The human intellect is not merely human, it is also an intellect. Inasmuch as it is human (united to the body), its object is the essence of sensible things. Inasmuch as it is an intellect, its object, like that of every intellect, is being itself, and consequently it can rise to the knowledge of God.
Though we do not attain to a knowledge of God as He is in Himself, it is truly God Himself that is known by our reason. Do we not know our friends, though not knowing them such as they are in themselves? Moreover, we cannot stress too much in these days of Agnosticism, that, in one way, we have a more certain knowledge of God than of the intrinsic properties of plants or animals, These essentially material natures cannot be fully intelligible to us. They are within close range of our senses, but they are far removed from the source of all intelligibility, as Aristotle said.? And we have a far more certain knowledge of God than we have of men with whom we are living in close intimacy. Reason alone actually assures us that we are more certain of the goodness of God in our regard than of the rectitude of our own intentions. We know the goodness of God better than we do the uprightness of our own heart.
Footnotes
Chapter 9 of 19