Chapter IV — God gives everyone the grace to pray

Given, then, that God wills all to be saved, and that on His part He gives everyone the graces necessary to attain salvation, we say that to all there is given the grace to be able actually to pray (without need of another new grace), and by praying to obtain all the other helps for keeping the commandments and being saved. But note well: when we say “without need of another new grace,” we do not mean that common grace gives prayer without the help of aiding grace; for to perform any act of piety, beyond exciting grace, there is certainly also required aiding, or cooperating, grace. We mean that common grace gives each person the ability actually to pray without a new prevenient grace that physically or morally determines the human will to the act of prayer. Therefore we shall first set down the many eminent theologians who teach this position as certain, and then prove it by authorities and reasons.

So teach Isambert, Cardinal du Perron, Alfonso le Moyne, and others, and more at length and expressly Honoré Tournely. All these authors prove that each person, with ordinary sufficient grace alone, can actually pray without another help, and by prayer obtain all the other graces needed for doing even the more difficult things.

The most eminent Cardinal de Noris also teaches this. He expressly proves that when a precept urges, man with ordinary grace alone can pray if he wills, without another help. He argues: Manifestum est potentiam ad orandum debere esse proximam in Justo sive Fideli... In other words: since for keeping the precepts and being saved it is necessary to pray, as we proved at the beginning when speaking of the necessity of prayer, each person must have proximate power to pray, and then by prayer obtain proximate power to do good. Hence all can pray with ordinary grace alone, without another help. Otherwise, if another power were required to have proximate power for the act of prayer, yet another grace would then be required for that power, and so on to infinity; and man would no longer have in hand cooperation in his own salvation.

The same author confirms this doctrine more distinctly elsewhere, saying: Etiam in statu naturae lapsae datur adjutorium sine quo... That is, in the present fallen state there is for everyone the auxilium sine quo (ordinary sufficient grace), which produces in us weak acts — namely less fervent prayers for fulfilling the commandments — and this prayer obtains the auxilium quo, that is efficacious grace, by which the commandments are fulfilled. Thus Cardinal de Noris holds as certain that for everyone there is in this present state the ordinary grace which, without another help, gives prayer; and by prayer one obtains efficacious grace to keep the precepts. In this sense the scholastic axiom is rightly understood: Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam — to the one who prays and makes good use of sufficient grace, with which he can already do easier things such as praying, God does not deny efficacious grace for the harder things.

Lodovico Tomassino likewise teaches this. He first marvels at those who claim that sufficient helps do not in fact suffice for doing any good work or avoiding any sin: Si enim haec auxilia vere auxilia sunt... If sufficient helps are truly helps, and give proximate power, how can it be that among so many thus helped, no one keeps the precept? And how can they be truly sufficient if efficacious grace besides is necessary? One who lacks a necessary help not in his power does not have sufficient power.

As St. Thomas says: Deus non deficit ab agendo, quod est necessarium ad salutem. It is true on the one hand that God is not bound to give us His graces, since graces are not debts; but on the other hand, once He gives precepts, He is bound to provide the necessary help for keeping them. And as the Lord obliges us actually to keep each precept when it obliges, so He must also then provide us (at least mediately and remotely) the necessary help for keeping it, without requiring another grace not common to all.

Hence Tomassino concludes that to say sufficient grace is enough for salvation and yet efficacious grace is needed for keeping the whole law, one must say: sufficient grace suffices for praying and similar easy acts; through those, efficacious grace is then obtained for fulfilling difficult acts. And this is, without doubt, according to St. Augustine: Eo ipso quo firmissime creditur Deum impossibilia non praecipere... We are thus admonished what to do in easy matters and what to ask in difficult ones. On this passage Cardinal de Noris likewise concludes: Igitur opera facilia... facere possumus... quod tamen in difficilioribus petendum est.

Tomassino also cites St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others, and says: Omnibus ea placuere sufficientia auxilia vere sufficientia, quibus assentitur quandoque voluntas, quandoque non. He demonstrates this in several parts of his work with long series of scholastic authorities. Habert, bishop of Vabres and doctor of the Sorbonne, one of the first to write against Jansenius, says: sufficient grace is ordered to efficacious grace as disposition; by good use of it God afterward grants grace effective for complete consent. He also says all Catholic doctors in the schools taught and teach that there is a truly intrinsic grace that can elicit the will’s consent to good, and yet because of free resistance does not always elicit it.

He then says sufficient helps are dispositive toward efficacious grace and are efficacious secundum quid with respect to an incomplete effect — first remotely, then more closely, then proximately — such as acts of faith, hope, fear, and among all these, prayer. Hence the famous Alfonso le Moyne called sufficient grace the grace of asking or prayer, spoken of so often by St. Augustine. So, in Habert’s judgment, sufficient grace differs from efficacious grace in this: efficacious grace is joined with complete effect; sufficient grace obtains its effect contingently or mediately through prayer. He also says sufficient grace, by good use, disposes to obtaining efficacious grace. Therefore man has no excuse if he does not do that for which he already has sufficient grace; with that grace, without another help, he either acts or at least obtains the greater help to act.

Charles du Plessis d’Argentré, another Sorbonne theologian, cites over a thousand theologians who expressly teach that easy works are indeed done with sufficient grace, and that when man acts with sufficient grace he then obtains more abundant help for full conversion. In this very sense, as said above, the famous axiom accepted in the schools is to be understood: Facientibus quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam — namely the more abundant and efficacious grace.

The very learned Denis Petau proves at length that with sufficient grace alone man does act, and says that to affirm the contrary would be monstrous. He says this doctrine is not only of theologians but of the Church. He adds that grace for fulfilling precepts follows prayer, and that this gift of prayer God gives at the same time He imposes the precepts: Donum istud quo Deus dat ut jussa faciamus, effectum Orationis subsequitur... Therefore, as the law is imposed on all, so the gift of prayer is given to all.

The author of the theology used in the Seminary of Périgueux says that with sufficient grace alone one can act well and sometimes does act well. Thus, of two persons equally preveniently helped, one may very often perform easier acts (preceding full conversion), while the other does not. He says this is according to St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and their first disciples, especially Fr. Bartolomeo Medina, who wrote: Cum sola gratia sufficienti aliquando homo convertitur. I also found the same asserted as common doctrine by Fr. Ludovico Granata: theologians posit two kinds of helps, one sufficient and one superabundant; by the first men are sometimes converted, sometimes refuse conversion; and this first help extends as broadly as possible to men.

The same author says man with sufficient help alone can perform certain acts of piety, namely humbly imploring God, and sometimes does so; by these he prepares himself for further graces. This, he says, is the order of Divine Providence: by good use of earlier graces, later graces follow. He concludes that full conversion and final perseverance are infallibly obtained by prayer, for which sufficient grace — present to everyone — fully suffices.

Cardinal d’Aguirre teaches the same, wholly following St. Augustine. Fr. Antonio Boucat of the Order of St. Francis of Paola also defends that everyone can already by prayer, without a new help, obtain grace of conversion. Besides Gammacheus, Duval, Habert, and Le Moyne, he cites for this view Peter of Tarentaise, Godfrey of Fontaines, Henry of Ghent, and others. Gaudenzio Buontempi likewise wrote that efficacious grace is obtained through prayer with sufficient grace, given to all who wish to use it. Cardinal Robert Pullen establishes two graces: one always victorious, and another with which man sometimes acts and sometimes does not. Fr. Fortunato da Brescia holds similarly that all have mediate grace of prayer for keeping the precepts, and judges this indubitable in St. Augustine.

Richard of St. Victor similarly teaches there is sufficient grace to which man sometimes consents and sometimes resists. Domingo Soto asks: why, of two persons whom God is ready to convert, is one drawn by grace and not the other? He answers: no other reason can be given except that one gives consent and cooperates, while the other does not. Matthias Felicius, writing against Calvin, defines ordinary (that is sufficient) grace as a divine motion or instinct by which man is moved to good, denied to no one. Men relate differently to this instinct: some acquiesce and are thereby congruously disposed to habitual grace, because God is believed not to fail those who do what is in them; others resist. Andrea Vega likewise says these helps given to all are called by many inefficacious because they do not always have their effect but are sometimes frustrated by sinners. Therefore sufficient graces sometimes have their effect and sometimes do not.

Cardinal Gotti, in one place in his theology, seems not to differ from us. Asked how man can persevere if he cannot of himself have the special help required for perseverance, he answers that though this special help is not in man’s power, yet man can, by God’s grace, ask and obtain it. In this way one can say man has in his power the help necessary for persevering, by obtaining it through prayer. Therefore, for it to be true that perseverance is in man’s power, it is necessary that he can by prayer obtain help for actually persevering, without another grace; and thus also necessary that, with sufficient grace common to all, he can actually pray and then obtain perseverance by prayer. Otherwise one could not say everyone has the grace necessary for perseverance, at least remotely and mediately through prayer. And if Cardinal Gotti did not so mean it, certainly St. Francis de Sales does, saying the grace to pray in act is given to each who wills to use it, and from this he infers that perseverance is in each person’s power. The same is taught by Cardinal Bellarmine: Auxilium sufficiens ad salutem... mediate vel immediate omnibus datur... those with use of reason receive holy inspirations, and thus immediately have exciting grace; if they consent, they can be disposed for justification and reach salvation.

Let us now see the proofs of this doctrine. First, it is proved by the Apostle, who assures us God is faithful and never permits us to be tempted beyond our strength, while always giving help (immediate or mediate through prayer) to resist the attacks of enemies: Fidelis Deus, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis, sed faciet cum tentatione proventum, ut possitis sustinere (1 Cor 10:13). Jansenius says this text concerns only the predestined, but this has no foundation, since St. Paul wrote to all the faithful of Corinth, whom he certainly did not suppose all predestined. St. Thomas therefore rightly understands it universally: God would not seem faithful if He denied us (as far as concerns Him) those means by which we can come to Him.

It is further proved from all those Scriptures by which the Lord exhorts us to convert and to have recourse to Him for the graces necessary to salvation, promising to hear us if we recur: Sapientia foris praedicat... Convertimini ad correptionem meam... Venite ad me omnes... Petite, et dabitur vobis and many more cited above. If God did not give each person grace actually to recur to Him and to pray, all these invitations and exhortations would be vain — when He says, “Come all of you, and I will refresh you. Seek, and you shall receive.”

Second, this is clearly proved by the Council of Trent, Session 6, chapter 11. I ask the reader to note this proof carefully. The innovators said that, because man had been deprived of free will by Adam’s sin, man’s will now does nothing in good acts but passively receives from God, without itself producing them; and therefore they inferred that observance of precepts is impossible for those not efficaciously moved and predetermined by grace to avoid evil and do good. Against this error, the Council pronounced St. Augustine’s sentence: Deus impossibilia non jubet, sed jubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adjuvat ut possis.

So, to prove against heretics that divine precepts are impossible to no one, the Council declared that all men have help either to do good, or at least grace of prayer by which they obtain the greater help to do it. That means each person, with common grace, can do easy things (such as praying) without another extraordinary grace, and by prayer obtain strength for difficult things, according to St. Augustine’s doctrine already cited: ...in facilibus quid agamus, et in difficilibus quid petamus. Thus, according to the Council, divine precepts are possible to all at least through prayer, by which one then obtains greater help to keep them. Therefore, if God imposed His precepts on all and made their observance possible at least mediately through prayer, it necessarily follows that all have grace to pray. Otherwise, for one lacking this grace, the precepts would not be possible.

And since through prayer the Lord gives actual grace for doing good and thus renders all precepts possible, He also gives all the actual grace to pray. Otherwise, for one lacking actual grace to pray, precepts become impossible, because he cannot even mediately obtain by prayer the help to observe them.

Given this, it does not help to say those words, monet facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, mean only “being able to pray,” not “actually praying.” For if common grace gave only power to pray but not actual praying, the Council would not have said “do what you can, and ask what you cannot,” but rather “be able to do and be able to ask.” Moreover, if the Council meant only to declare that one can observe precepts or can pray to obtain grace for observing them, without speaking of actual grace, it would not have said monet facere quod possis; for monet refers properly to actual operation, and means not only enlightening the mind but moving the will to do that good which it can already actually do.

Hence by saying monet facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, the Council very clearly expressed not only ability to act and ability to pray, but also actual acting and actual praying. For if man, to act and pray in act, needed another extraordinary grace he does not have, why would the Lord admonish him to do or ask what he cannot actually do or ask without efficacious grace? Fr. Fortunato da Brescia speaks wisely here: if all are not given actual grace to pray, but to pray one needs efficacious grace not common to all, then prayer would be impossible to many; and it would be wrong to say God admonishes to ask what one cannot ask because the actual help is lacking. Thus divine admonition to act and pray must be understood of acting and praying in act, without another extraordinary grace. This is exactly what St. Augustine intended: ...in facilibus quid agamus, et in difficilibus quid petamus — if all do not have grace for difficult things, at least all have grace to pray, because praying is easy for all.

To summarize: the Council says God does not impose impossible precepts, because He either gives help to observe them or gives grace to pray for this help, which once asked He gives. If it were ever true that the Lord does not give all at least mediate grace of prayer for actually observing all His precepts, then Jansenius would be right that even the just can lack grace for some precepts in act.

I do not see how the Tridentine text could otherwise be understood if sufficient grace did not give all the power actually to pray without efficacious grace, which opponents claim necessary for every pious act. Supposing that necessity of a new grace even to pray, I also do not see how another Tridentine teaching could stand: Deus sua gratia semel justificatos non deserit, nisi prius ab eis deseratur. If ordinary sufficient grace did not suffice for actual prayer, but efficacious grace (not common to all) were required, then when a just person were tempted to the first mortal sin and God did not give him efficacious grace at least to pray for strength to resist, if he fell, one would rather have to say he was abandoned by God before he abandoned God.

Opponents object with a passage of St. Augustine that seems to say grace of prayer is not given to all: Nonne aliquando ipsa oratio nostra sic tepida est... But Cardinal Sfondrati wisely replies: one thing is that sinners do not pray; another is that they do not have what enables them to pray. St. Augustine does not say some lack grace to pray rightly; he says our prayer is sometimes so lukewarm as to be almost nothing — not because divine help is lacking, but by our fault, which renders prayer null. Tournely answers similarly concerning Jansenius’s first condemned proposition: the just do not always pray as they ought; this is their fault, since by grace they have strength to pray.

Moreover, Cardinal de Noris writes on that Augustinian text that even lukewarm prayer obtains more fervent prayer, and then efficacious grace to observe the precepts: Colligo ipsammet tepidam Orationem... He confirms this by St. Augustine himself, who on Psalm 17 wrote: Ego libera et valida intentione preces ad Te direxi, quoniam ut hanc habere possem, exaudisti me infirmius orantem.

Nor does it oppose what St. Augustine says on St. Paul’s words, Spiritus postulat pro nobis gemitibus inenarrabilibus, namely that the Holy Spirit makes us intercede and gives us the affection of interceding. For in this the Saint means only against the Pelagians that no one can pray without grace. He explains himself on Psalm 52: Quod dono Illius tu facis, Ille facere dicitur: quia sine Illo tu non faceres.

Third, our position is proved by the Fathers. St. Basil says that when one is allowed to fall into temptation, the purpose is that he may endure and ask God’s will through prayer. So the Saint presupposes that where man lacks enough help to conquer temptation, he at least has the actual common help of prayer for obtaining the greater grace needed. St. John Chrysostom says the law was given to disclose wounds so men might seek the physician; and elsewhere that no one can be excused who did not wish to conquer the enemy, while he ceased to pray. If one did not have grace necessary to pray and by prayer obtain aid to resist, he could be excused if conquered. St. Bernard says similarly: God sought this, that seeing our defect and lacking other help we run with all humility to His mercy.

Thus the Lord imposed a law impossible by our own strength, so that by recourse and prayer we obtain strength to observe it. But if anyone were denied grace actually to pray, for him the law would become wholly impossible. The same St. Bernard says: many complain grace is lacking to them, but much more justly grace complains many are lacking to it. God has more reason to complain of us for failing grace with which He assists us, than we to complain grace is lacking.

No Father says it more clearly than St. Augustine in many places. In one place: Pelagians think they know something great when they say God would not command what man cannot do. Who does not know this? But He commands some things we cannot do so we may know what to ask of Him. Elsewhere: it is not imputed to your fault that against your will you do not know, but that you neglect to seek what you do not know... no man is deprived of knowing how to seek usefully. Thus the Saint says grace to pray and by prayer obtain help for conversion is denied to none; otherwise one’s non-conversion could not be imputed as fault.

Elsewhere: what else is shown us except that He grants both asking, seeking, and knocking, who commands us to do these things? Elsewhere: “Receive once and understand: are you not yet drawn? Pray that you may be drawn.” Elsewhere he says that if the soul does not yet know what to do, this is because it has not yet received it; but it will receive it if it uses well what it has received; and it has received this: to seek piously and diligently, if it wills. Note well: Accepit autem, ut pie et diligenter quaerat — therefore everyone has grace necessary for prayer; and if used well, he receives grace to do what he could not immediately do before.

Elsewhere: one who wills and cannot, let him pray to have so much will as suffices for fulfilling the commandments; thus he is helped to do what is commanded. Elsewhere: free will was admonished by command to seek God’s gift; and in vain would it be admonished unless it had first received some love, so as to ask that more be added by which it may fulfill what is commanded. Note: aliquid dilectionis — here is sufficient grace, by which man can then by prayer obtain actual grace to fulfill the precept. Elsewhere: God commands so that, striving to do what is just and wearied by our weakness, we may know to ask help of grace.

Thus the Saint presupposes that with ordinary grace we cannot yet do difficult things, but can by prayer obtain the necessary help. Therefore he adds: the law entered so that sin might abound when men do not implore grace; but when by divine calling they understand to whom they must groan and invoke, then is fulfilled: where sin abounded, grace superabounded. Here, as Petavius says, we see both absence of abundant grace and presence of ordinary common grace, by which one prays, and which the Saint here calls divine calling.

Elsewhere he says: in this mortal life free will remains not so man may fulfill justice whenever he wills, but so that with suppliant piety he may turn to Him by whose gift he can fulfill it. So, when St. Augustine says man is powerless to observe the whole law and that only prayer remains for obtaining help, he certainly presupposes that God gives everyone grace actually to pray, without another extraordinary help not common to all. Otherwise, lacking that special help, nothing would remain to free will for actually observing all divine precepts, at least the harder ones.

Therefore, when the Saint speaks so, he certainly cannot mean sufficient grace gives only power but not act of prayer; because as to power, it is certain sufficient grace gives it for every difficult work. He therefore means (as he teaches elsewhere) that easy things, such as praying, can indeed actually be done by each person with sufficient grace; difficult ones then by the help obtained through prayer.

Above all, two texts of St. Augustine are decisive. The first: Certum est nos mandata servare, si volumus; sed quia praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab Illo petendum est, ut tantum velimus quantum sufficit, ut volendo faciamus. So he says it is certain we will keep the precepts if we will; and yet he says to will and to keep them in fact we must pray. Therefore all are given grace to pray and by prayer obtain abundant grace that makes us observe precepts. Otherwise, if actual prayer required efficacious grace not common to all, those to whom it is not given could neither observe precepts nor have will to observe them.

The second text is where the holy Doctor answers the monks of Adrumetum, who said: if grace is necessary and without it I can do nothing, why rebuke me, who cannot act and have no grace to do so? Rather pray to the Lord for me, ora potius pro me. The Saint replies: you are to be corrected not because you do not act without strength, but because you do not pray to obtain this strength: Qui corripi non vult, et dicit, ora potius pro me; ideo est ut faciat etiam ipse pro se, that is, ut oret etiam ipse pro se.

Now if the Saint had not believed each person has grace by which he prays (if he wills) without another help, he could not have said that one ought to be corrected for not praying. For he could have replied: if I am not to be corrected for not acting because I lack special grace to act, likewise I cannot be corrected for not praying when I lack special grace actually to pray.

The same St. Augustine writes elsewhere: let not those deceive themselves who say, “why are we commanded to turn from evil and do good, if God works in us to will and to do?” He answers: when men do good, they must thank God who gives strength; when they do not, they must pray to receive this strength they do not have: Quando autem non agunt, orent ut quod nondum habent accipiant. If they did not even have grace to pray actually, they could answer: why are we commanded to pray, if God works prayer in us? How can we pray without receiving necessary help for actual prayer?

St. Thomas does not speak expressly of prayer here, but presupposes as certain what we assert, saying: Hoc ad Divinam Providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis ad salutem, dummodo ex parte ejus non impediatur. Since God gives all graces necessary for salvation, and since to pray one needs grace that gives actual power to pray and by prayer obtain the greater help for what we cannot do with ordinary help, we must necessarily say God gives all sufficient grace to pray actually, if they will, without efficacious grace.

Add here Bellarmine’s answer to heretics who from Christ’s words, Nemo potest venire ad me, nisi Pater meus traxerit eum, inferred that one cannot come to God unless properly drawn by Him. Bellarmine writes that this only concludes not all have efficacious help by which they actually believe; it does not conclude all do not have at least help by which they can believe, or at least by which they can ask for help.

Let us come finally to the reasons of this doctrine. The very learned Petavius with Duval and others asks: why does God command things we cannot observe by common ordinary grace? Because, they answer, the Lord wills us to recur to Him by prayer, as the holy Fathers commonly say. Hence he concludes we must hold as certain that each person has grace actually to pray and by prayer obtain greater help for what cannot be done with common grace; otherwise God would have imposed an impossible law. The reason is very strong.

To this can be added another: if God commands all to actually observe the precepts, one must suppose He also commonly gives all grace necessary for actual observance, at least mediately through prayer. Therefore, for the law to be reasonable and rebuke just, each person must have sufficient power — at least mediate through prayer — actually to satisfy the precepts, and at times pray without another help not common to all. Otherwise, lacking this mediate or remote power actually to pray, one cannot say each has from God sufficient grace actually to observe the law.

Tomassino and Tournely gather many more reasons, which I omit. I cling to one that seems evident, founded on the precept of hope, by which all are obliged certainly to hope from God for eternal life. I say: if we were not certain that God gives all grace actually to pray without another particular grace not common to all, then no one without special revelation could hope for salvation as he ought.

Let me therefore first set out the foundations of this reason.

The virtue of hope is so dear to God that He has declared He delights in those who trust in Him: Beneplacitum est Domino... in eis, qui sperant in misericordia ejus (Ps 146:11). He promises victory over enemies, perseverance in grace, and eternal glory to those who hope, and because they hope: Quoniam in me speravit, liberabo eum... (Ps 90:14); Salvabit eos, quia speraverunt (Ps 36:40); Conserva me, quoniam speravi in te (Ps 15:1); Nullus speravit in Domino, et confusus est (Sir 2:11). Heaven and earth may pass, but God’s words and promises cannot fail: Caelum et terra transibunt, verba autem mea non pertransibunt (Mt 24:35).

Hence St. Bernard says all our merit consists in placing all our hope in God: Hoc totum hominis meritum, si totam spem suam ponat in eo. The reason: whoever hopes in God greatly honors Him: Invoca me... eruam te, et honorificabis me (Ps 49:15). He honors God’s power, mercy, and fidelity, believing God can and wills to save him and cannot fail His promises to those who trust Him.

The Prophet assures us that the greater our confidence, the more divine mercy will be poured upon us: Fiat Misericordia tua super nos, quemadmodum speravimus in te (Ps 32:22).

Now this virtue of hope, so pleasing to the Lord, He has willed to impose under grave precept, as theologians commonly teach and Scripture shows in many places: Sperate in eum omnis congregatio populi (Ps 61:9), Qui timetis Dominum, sperate in Illum (Sir 2:9), Spera in Deo tuo (Hos 12:6), Sperate in eam, quae vobis offertur gratiam (1 Pet 1:13). This hope of eternal life must be firm and certain, as St. Thomas defines: Spes est certa exspectatio Beatitudinis. The Council of Trent expressly declared this: all must place and repose most firm hope in God’s help, for God, unless they fail His grace, will perfect the good work He began, working both willing and accomplishing.

St. Paul had already declared this of himself: Scio cui credidi, et certus sum, quia potens est depositum meum servare (2 Tim 1:12). In this Christian hope differs from worldly hope. Worldly hope, to be hope, can be uncertain; one may doubt whether the man who promised has now or later the will to give. But Christian hope of eternal salvation is certain on God’s side: He can and wills to save, and has promised salvation to those who keep His law, also promising for this end the graces necessary to keep it, to those who ask.

It is true hope is accompanied by fear, as St. Thomas says; but that fear comes not from God’s side, rather ours, because we may fail by not corresponding and by placing obstacles through our faults. Therefore Trent rightly condemned innovators who, denying free will, wanted each faithful person to have infallible certainty of perseverance and salvation. This is condemned (Sess. 6, cap. 13; can. 15 and 16), because our cooperation is also required and is uncertain and fallible.

Thus the Lord wants us, on one side, always to fear ourselves lest we fall into presumption by trusting our own strength; yet on the other, to be certain of His good will and His help to save us whenever we ask, so that we may have certain confidence in His goodness. St. Thomas says we must certainly expect eternal beatitude from God, trusting in His power and mercy, believing God can and wills to save us.

So, since hope of our salvation in God must be certain (certa expectatio Beatitudinis), the ground of hope must likewise be certain. Otherwise, if the foundation were doubtful, we could not certainly hope and expect from God salvation and the means necessary for it. But St. Paul requires us to be stable and immovable in hope if we wish to be saved: Si tamen permanetis in fide fundati, et stabiles et immobiles a spe Evangelii (Col 1:23). Elsewhere he says our hope must be like a safe and firm anchor, founded on God’s promises who cannot lie (Heb 6:11–19). Hence St. Bernard says our hope cannot be uncertain, since it rests on eternal promises of Truth.

Therefore St. James wills that one who asks divine graces do so in faith, nothing wavering: Postulet autem in fide nihil haesitans (Jas 1:6). Otherwise, he says, he will receive nothing: Qui enim haesitat... non ergo aestimet homo ille, quod accipiet aliquid a Domino (Jas 1:6–8). St. Paul likewise praises Abraham for not wavering at God’s promise, knowing that what God promises He is able to perform (Rom 4:20). So Christ admonishes us that we shall receive all graces we desire when we ask believing we receive them: Omnia quaecumque orantes petitis, credite quia accipietis, et evenient vobis (Mk 11:24). In sum, God does not will to hear us unless we believe with certainty we shall be heard.

Now to our point. Our hope of salvation and necessary means must therefore be certain in God on His side. The grounds of this certainty, as seen, are divine power, mercy, and fidelity; among these, the strongest and surest is God’s infallible fidelity in the promise made us through the merits of Christ, to save us and grant needed graces. For although we believe God is infinite in power and mercy, as Juvenin rightly notes, we could not with certain confidence hope for salvation from the Lord if He had not certainly promised it.

But this promise is conditional: if we cooperate by works and if we pray, as Scripture plainly shows: Petite et accipietis; Si quid petieritis Patrem in nomine meo, dabit vobis; Dabit bona petentibus se; Oportet semper orare; Non habetis propter quod non postulatis; Si quis indiget sapientia, postulet a Deo, and many similar texts already cited. Therefore, as holy Fathers and theologians commonly say (as we proved in Part One, Chapter I), prayer is a means necessary for salvation.

Now if we were not certain God gives all grace actually to pray, without need of another special grace not common to each one, we could not have in God a certain and stable foundation for certainly hoping salvation; only an uncertain and conditional one. When I am certain that by praying I shall obtain eternal life and all needed graces, and know God will not deny me grace actually to pray (since He grants it to all) if I will, then I have certain foundation to hope for salvation from God, if I myself do not fail.

But when I doubt whether God will give me that particular grace, not given to all, yet required for actual prayer, then I have no certain foundation in God for hope of salvation, only a doubtful and uncertain one — uncertain whether God will give this special grace needed to pray, since He denies it to many. This uncertainty would then be not only on my side but on God’s side too; and thus Christian hope, which according to the Apostle must be immovable, firm, and secure, would be destroyed. Truly I do not see how the Christian can fulfill the precept of hope, hoping as he ought with certain confidence from God for salvation and the graces necessary to it, without holding as certain that God commonly gives each person grace actually to pray, if he wills, without another special help.

Therefore, to conclude: with our system, or doctrine (already held by many theologians and by our least Congregation), one can well reconcile, on one side, intrinsically efficacious grace, with which we infallibly (though freely) do good; for it cannot be denied that God can by His omnipotence incline and move human hearts to will freely what He wills, according to Scripture: Cor Regis in manu Dei est, et quocunque voluerit, inclinabit illud (Prov 21:1), Spiritum meum ponam in medio vestri, et faciam ut in praeceptis meis ambuletis (Ez 36:28), Consilium meum stabit, et omnis voluntas mea fiet (Is 46:10), Qui immutat cor Principum (Job 12:24), Deus pacis... aptet vos... faciens in vobis quod placeat coram se (Heb 13:21).

And it cannot be denied that St. Augustine and St. Thomas taught efficacy of grace from itself and by its nature. This appears from many texts, especially these: St. Augustine says God does this through men’s own wills, having most omnipotent power to incline human hearts; elsewhere, God acts in hearts so as through them to do what He wills; elsewhere, though men do good works for worship of God, He makes them do what He commands; elsewhere, it is certain we act when we act, but He makes us act by giving most efficacious strength to the will; elsewhere on Deus est qui operatur in nobis velle et perficere, he says: we will, but God works in us both willing and accomplishing; elsewhere: since will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask Him to will as much as suffices that, by willing, we do; elsewhere: God knows how to work in hearts not so unwilling men believe (impossible), but so from unwilling they become willing; elsewhere: He works in hearts not only true revelations but good wills; elsewhere: our wills are as powerful as God willed them to be; elsewhere: wills that govern worldly creation are in God’s power, and He inclines them as and when He wills. St. Thomas says similarly: God immutably moves the will because of the efficacy of the mover’s power, which cannot fail; and that if God moves the will to something, it is impossible the will not be moved thereto.

On the other side, with our doctrine true sufficient grace common to all is also preserved; and to this grace, and with this grace, if man corresponds, he will have efficacious grace. But if he does not correspond and resists, efficacious grace is justly denied him. Thus every excuse is removed from sinners who say they have no strength to overcome temptations; for if they prayed according to the ordinary grace already given each one, they would obtain this strength and be saved.

Otherwise, if one does not admit this ordinary grace by which each can at least pray (without another special grace not common to all), and by praying obtain greater help to keep the law, I do not know how so many passages of Scripture can be understood where souls are exhorted to return to God, conquer temptations, and correspond to divine calls: Praevaricatores redite ad cor (Is 46:8), Revertimini, et vivite (Ez 18:32), Convertimini, et agite poenitentiam (Ez 18:30), Solve vincula colli tui (Is 52:2), Venite ad me omnes qui laboratis (Mt 11:28), Resistite fortes in fide (1 Pet 5:9), Ambulate dum lucem habetis (Jn 12:35).

If it were true that grace to pray and by prayer obtain greater help for salvation is not given to all, I do not know how these Scriptures could be understood, or how sacred preachers could with such force exhort all to conversion, resistance to enemies, walking in virtue, and for attaining all this, praying with confidence and perseverance — if grace to do good, or at least to pray, were not granted to each person, but only to those given efficacious grace.

Nor do I know how just could be the universal reproach made to sinners who resist grace and despise the divine voice: Vos semper Spiritui Sancto resistitis (Acts 7:51), Quia vocavi, et renuistis... despexistis omne consilium meum (Prov 1:24), if they had lacked even the remote yet efficacious grace of prayer (supposed by opponents necessary for actual prayer). I do not know, I say, how all this reproach could be made.

I end. Someone perhaps, as I think, would have desired that in this work I had extended myself more in distinctly examining the great controversy concerning where efficacy of grace consists according to the many systems now taught by theologians — physical premotion, congruous grace, concomitant grace, relatively victorious delectation by superiority of degrees. But for this, a little book would not suffice; and deliberately I sought to make this one small, so it might be more easily read. To traverse such a vast sea would require many volumes; this labor has sufficiently been done by others; nor was this my intent.

I wished, however, to establish the point proposed in this second part for honor of Divine Providence and goodness, to help sinners so they do not abandon themselves to despair by believing themselves destitute of grace; and also to remove all excuse if they say they lack strength to resist assaults of sense and hell. I have shown that no one of the damned is damned for Adam’s original sin, but only for his own fault, since God denies to none the grace of prayer, by which one obtains from God help to conquer every concupiscence and temptation.

Besides this, my principal intent has been to urge everyone to use this most powerful and necessary means of prayer, so each may attend to it with greater diligence and courage if he desires to be saved; for thus many poor souls lose divine grace, continue in sin, and at last are lost: because they do not pray and do not recur to God for help.

And what is worse (I cannot refrain from repeating it): few preachers and few confessors apply themselves expressly to urging their hearers and penitents to prayer, without which it is impossible to keep divine precepts and obtain perseverance in divine grace.

Having observed the absolute necessity of prayer imposed by all Divine Scripture, old and new Testaments alike, I have sought to introduce in the missions of our Congregation — as has been practiced for many years — that the sermon on prayer always be given. And I say, and repeat, and will always repeat while I live, that all our salvation lies in praying. Therefore all writers in their books, all sacred preachers in their sermons, and all confessors in administering penance should inculcate nothing more than this: always to pray; always to admonish, cry out, and continuously repeat: Pray, pray, and never cease to pray. For if you pray, your salvation is certain; but if you cease praying, your damnation is certain. So should all preachers and directors act; for according to every Catholic school, no one doubts this truth: whoever prays obtains grace and is saved. But too few practice it; and for this reason so few are saved.