Preliminary II

God Commonly Gives to All the Just the Grace Necessary to Observe the Precepts, and to All Sinners the Grace to Be Converted

If God then wills the salvation of all, He consequently gives to all the grace and the helps necessary to attain salvation; otherwise it could not be said that He has a true will to save all. Antecedentis voluntatis, says St. Thomas, qua Deus vult omnium salutem, effectus est ordo naturae in finem salutis, et promoventia in finem omnibus communiter proposita, tam naturalia, quam gratuita. It is certain, against what Luther and Calvin have blasphemed, that God does not impose a law impossible to observe. On the other hand it is certain that without the help of grace the observance of the law is impossible, as Innocent I declared against the Pelagians, saying: Necesse est ut quo auxiliante vincimus, Eo non adjuvante vincamur. And Pope Celestine declared the same. If then the Lord gives to all a law that can be observed, He consequently also gives to all the grace necessary to observe it, either immediately or mediately through prayer, as the Sacred Council of Trent has too clearly declared: Deus impossibilia non jubet sed jubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adjuvat ut possis (Session 6, Chapter 13). Otherwise, if God denied us both the proximate and the remote grace to fulfill the law, either the law would have been given in vain, or sin would be necessary; and being necessary, it would no longer be sin, as we shall demonstrate at length below.

And this is the common sentiment of the Fathers. Let us see. St. Cyril of Alexandria says: Quod si quis perinde, atque alii, et ex aequo, cum ipsis Divinae gratiae opibus praeditus propria voluntate delapsus est; quomodo non eum servasse dicitur Christus, qui, quantum ad cavendi peccati auxilia concessa pertinet, hominem liberavit? How (the Saint asks) can that sinner who received equally with others who were faithful the helps of grace, and who willingly chose to sin, then complain of Jesus Christ, who for His part has already freed him by means of the helps granted him? St. John Chrysostom asks: Unde nam alii vasa irae, alii misericordiae sunt? And answers: Ex libera sua utique voluntate; nam Deus cum sit valde bonus in utrisque parem benignitatem ostendit. Then, speaking of Pharaoh, called in Scripture hardened of heart, he adds: Si salutem Pharao non est adeptus, totum id illius voluntati tribuendum est, cum nihil minus, quam qui salutem assecuti sunt, concessum illi fuerit. And in another place, speaking of the request of the mother of the sons of Zebedee, on the words Non est meum dare vobis etc., he says: Hoc Illum significare voluisse, non suum esse tantummodo dare, sed et certantium esse capere; nam si istud ex Se uno penderet, omnes utique salvi essent Homines. St. Isidore of Pelusium: Etenim serto, et modis omnibus Deus vult eos adjuvare, qui in vitio volutantur, ut excusationem eripiat. St. Cyril of Jerusalem: Ad aeternae vitae januam Dominus aperuit, ut omnes ea, quantum in ipso est, nullo impediente potiantur.

But the doctrine of these Greek Fathers does not please Jansenius, who has the temerity to say that the Greek Fathers spoke most imperfectly of grace: Nulli imperfectius de Gratia quam Graeci locuti sunt. Must we then, regarding the matter of grace, not follow the teachings of the Greek Fathers, who were the first masters and pillars of the Church? Was the doctrine of the Greeks, especially on so important a matter, different from that of the Latin Church? When on the contrary it is certain that the true doctrine of the Faith passed from the Greek Church to the Latin; hence, as St. Augustine wrote against Julian, who alleged the authority of the Greek Fathers, it cannot be doubted that the Faith of the Latins is the same as that of the Greeks. And whom should we follow? Perhaps his errors, already condemned as heretical by the Church — he having had the audacity to say that even for the just the grace is lacking which would make certain precepts possible for them; and that man merits and demerits even though he acts by necessity, provided he is not forced by violence? These and his other errors spring from his utterly false system of relatively victorious delectation, which we shall speak of at length in refuting it in Chapter III.

But since the Greek Fathers do not satisfy Jansenius, let us see what the Latin Fathers say. But these in no way disagree with the Greeks. St. Jerome says: Nihil boni operis Homo agere potest absque Eo, qui ita concessit liberum arbitrium, ut suam per singula opera gratiam non negaret. Note well: per singula opera gratiam non negaret — He did not deny His grace for each individual work. St. Ambrose: Quia enim venit, et januam pulsat, vult semper intrare, sed in nobis est quod non semper ingreditur. St. Leo: Juste instat praecepto, qui praecurrit auxilio.

St. Hilary: Nunc per unum in omnes donum justificationis gratia abundavit. Innocent I: Quotidiana praestat Homini remedia, quibus nisi freti nitamur, nequaquam humanos vincere poterimus errores.

St. Augustine: Non tibi deputatur ad culpam quod invitus ignoras, sed quod negligis quaerere quod ignoras. Neque illud quod vulnerata membra non colligis, sed quod volentem sanare contemnis, ista tua propria peccata sunt: nulli enim homini ablatum est scire utiliter quaerere. In another place: Quod ergo ignorat Anima quid sibi agendum sit, ex eo est quod nondum accepit, sed hoc quoque accipiet, si hoc quod accepit bene usa fuerit: accepit autem, ut pie ac diligenter quaerat, si volet. Note well: accepit autem, ut pie ac diligenter quaerat. So that everyone receives at least the remote grace to seek, and whoever uses it well will then receive the proximate grace to do what he could not previously do. And the Holy Doctor bases all of this on the principle that no one sins in that which he cannot avoid; therefore (he adds) if man sins in something, he sins insofar as he can avoid it with the grace of the Lord, which is lacking to no one: Neminem peccare in eo, quod nullo modo caveri potest. Peccatur autem; caveri igitur potest, sed opitulante Illo, qui non potest falli. This is an evident reason that makes clear (as we shall better examine below, speaking of the sins of the obstinate) that if the grace necessary to observe the precepts were lacking, there would be no sin.

St. Thomas teaches the same in many places. In one place, explaining the text of the Apostle Qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri, he says: Et ideo gratia nulli deest, sed omnibus (quantum in se est) se communicat, sicut nec sol deest oculis caecis. So that, just as the sun spreads its light to all, and only those who voluntarily blind themselves are deprived of it, so God communicates grace to all for observing the law, and men are lost only because they do not wish to avail themselves of it. In another place: Hoc ad Divinam providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis ad salutem, dummodo ex parte ejus non impediatur. If then God gives to all the graces necessary for saving themselves, since actual grace is necessary for overcoming temptations and observing the precepts, it must necessarily be concluded that He gives to all the actual grace for doing good, either immediately or mediately — but without the need of another grace to put the means into execution (such as prayer), in order to obtain the proximate actual grace. In another place, on those words of St. John — Nemo venit ad me etc. — he says: Si non elevatur cor humanum, non est defectus ex parte Trahentis, qui quantum in Se est non deficit, sed est propter impedimentum ejus qui trahitur. Scotus says the same: Vult omnes homines salvare, quantum est ex parte sui, et voluntate sua antecedente, pro qua dedit eis dona communia sufficientia ad salutem. The Council of Cologne: Quanquam nemo convertatur nisi tractus per Patrem, attamen nemo excusationem praetexat quod non trahatur; Ille semper stat ante ostium pulsans per internum et externum verbum.

Nor did the Holy Fathers speak at random, but grounded in the Divine Scriptures, since the Lord too clearly in so many places assures us that He does not fail to assist us with His grace, if we are willing to avail ourselves of it to persevere being justified, or to convert if we are sinners: Sto ad ostium et pulso, si quis mihi aperuerit, intrabo (Rev. 3:20). Bellarmine argues well on this text, saying that the Lord, knowing already that man cannot open without His grace, would knock in vain at the door of his heart if He had not already previously conferred the grace to open when he wills. And precisely this St. Thomas taught, explaining the same text; he said that God gives to each one the grace necessary for salvation, to correspond if he wills: Deus voluntate sua liberalissima dat eam omni praeparanti se (Apoc. 3. Ecce sto ad ostium, et pulso). Et ideo gratia Dei nulli deest, sed omnibus, quantum in se est, se communicat. Adding in another place: Hoc ad Divinam providentiam pertinet, ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis ad salutem.

So that, as St. Ambrose wrote, the Lord knocks at the door because He truly wishes to enter; but He does not enter, or does not remain in our souls, because we impede His entrance, or having entered we drive Him out: Quia enim venit, et januam pulsat, vult semper intrare; sed in nobis est quod non semper ingreditur, non semper manet.

Quid est quod debui ultra facere vineae meae, et non feci? An expectavi ut faceret uvas, et fecit labruscas? (Isa. 5:4). Bellarmine says on this passage: Si non dedisset facultatem ad faciendas uvas, quorsum diceret Dominus, Expectavi? And if God did not give to all the grace necessary for saving themselves, He could not have said to the Jews: Quid debui ultra facere? — because they could have answered that they had not borne fruit because the help necessary for it was lacking to them. Bellarmine says the same in the cited place on those words of Jesus Christ: Quoties volui congregare filios tuos... et noluisti? (Matt. 23:38). Quomodo voluit (asks the aforesaid cardinal) ut quaeratur a nolentibus, si eos non juvit ut possint velle?

Suscepimus Deus misericordiam tuam in medio templi tui (Ps. 47:10). St. Bernard comments: In medio enim Templi misericordia est, non in angulo aut diversorio, quia non est personarum acceptio apud Deum; in communi posita est, offertur omnibus, et nemo illius expers, nisi qui renuit.

An divitias bonitatis ejus... contemnis? ignoras quia benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam te adducit? (Rom. 2:4). Here the sinner through his own malice does not convert, despising the riches of the Divine goodness that calls him, and does not cease to move him with His grace to be converted. God hates sin, but at the same time does not cease to love the sinful soul while it lives on this earth, giving it the help necessary to save itself. Parcis autem omnibus, quoniam tua sunt, Domine, qui amas animas (Wis. 11:28). From which it is seen, says Bellarmine, that God does not deny the grace to resist temptations to any sinner, however obstinate and blinded he may be: Auxilium ad novum peccatum vitandum semper omnibus adest vel immediate, vel mediate — that is, through prayer — quo possint a Deo majora praesidia impetrare, quibus adjuti peccata vitabunt. To this also pertains what the Lord says through Ezekiel: Vivo ego, dicit Dominus Deus, nolo mortem impii, sed ut convertatur impius a via sua, et vivat (Ezek. 33:11). St. Peter says the same: Patienter agit propter vos, nolens aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poenitentiam reverti (2 Pet. 3:9). If then God wills that all should actually be converted, it must necessarily be supposed that He gives to all the grace they need to actually be converted.

I know well that there are theologians who maintain that God denies even sufficient grace to certain obstinate sinners; and among other things they avail themselves of a doctrine of St. Thomas, who says: Quamvis autem illi, qui in peccato sunt, vitare non possint per propriam potestatem, quin impedimentum gratiae praestent vel ponant, ut ostensum est, nisi auxilio gratiae praeveniantur, nihilominus tamen hoc eis imputatur ad culpam, quia hic defectus ex culpa praecedente in eis relinquitur, sicut ebrius ab homicidio non excusatur, quod per ebrietatem committit, quam sua culpa incurrit. Praeterea, licet ille qui est in peccato, non habeat hoc in propria potestate, quod omnino vitet peccatum, habet tamen potestatem nunc vitare hoc vel illud peccatum, ut dictum est; unde quodcunque committit, voluntarie committit, et ita non immerito sibi imputatur ad culpam. From this they wish to conclude that the Saint means that some sinners can indeed avoid particular sins, but not all sins, because as punishment for sins previously committed they are deprived of every actual grace.

But we answer that in this place St. Thomas does not speak of actual grace, but of habitual or sanctifying grace, without which the sinner cannot maintain himself for a long time without falling into new sins, as he teaches in many places. And that he means the same in the passage cited above is seen clearly from the context of the words he premises there, which must be quoted more fully to understand the Saint's true meaning. First of all, the title of the cited Chapter 160 is this: Quod homo in peccato exsistens sine gratia peccatum vitare non potest. Here the title itself explains that the Holy Doctor means nothing other than what he said in the other places cited. Then in the cited place he says: Cum enim mens hominis a statu rectitudinis declinaverit, manifestum est quod recessit ab ordine debiti finis... Quandocunque igitur aliquid occurrerit conveniens inordinato fini, repugnans fini debito, eligetur, nisi reducatur ad debitum ordinem ut finem debitum omnibus praeferat, quod est gratiae effectus. Dum autem eligitur aliquid quod repugnat ultimo fini, impedimentum praestat gratiae quae dirigit in finem: unde ab omni peccato, antequam per gratiam ad debitum ordinem manifestum est quod post peccatum non potest homo abstinere reducatur... Unde apparet stulta Pelagianorum opinio, qui dicebant, hominem in peccato existentem sine gratia posse vitare peccatum. And then he writes the words already quoted above — Quamvis autem illi etc. — which the opponents use. So that first of all, St. Thomas's intent is not to prove that some sinners are deprived of all actual grace and yet, though unable to avoid every sin, still sin and are worthy of punishment; rather, his intent is to prove against the Pelagians that man living without sanctifying grace cannot refrain from sinning. And it is already seen that here the Saint certainly speaks of sanctifying grace, since this alone is what restores the soul to right order. Now it is of this same sanctifying grace that he means to speak when he says next nisi auxilio gratiae praeveniantur, wishing to say that if the sinner is not prevented — that is, not first informed by grace and restored to the right order of holding God as his last end — he cannot avoid committing new sins. And so the Thomists understand it, such as Ferrariensis on the said place, and Gonet, explaining this very passage. But without having recourse to others, this is made evident by what St. Thomas himself says in the Summa, where he speaks of the same point and gives identically the same reasons, with the same words he wrote in the book Contra Gentes in the cited Chapter 160, and there he expressly speaks of nothing but habitual or sanctifying grace alone.

And it could not be that the Holy Doctor understood it otherwise, since elsewhere on the one hand he teaches that the Divine grace is never lacking to anyone, as he says commenting on St. John: Sed ne credas effectum ipsum esse ex remotione verae lucis, hoc excludens Evangelista subdit: Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem. Illuminat scilicet Verbum, quantum de se est, quia ex parte sua nulli deest, imo vult omnes homines salvos fieri. Quod si aliquis non illuminatur, ex parte hominis est avertentis se a lumine illuminante. And on the other hand he teaches that there is no sinner so lost and abandoned by grace that he cannot lay down his obstinacy and unite himself with the Divine will — which he certainly cannot do without the help of grace: In statu viae nullus est qui mentis obstinationem non possit reponere, et sic Divinae voluntati conformari. In another place he says: Quandiu manet homini usus liberi arbitrii in hac vita... potest se praeparare ad gratiam de peccatis dolendo. Repenting of sins cannot be done without grace. In another place he says: Aliquis homo in statu viae non potest esse ita obstinatus in malo, quin ad suam liberationem cooperari possit. Cooperating necessarily implies that the help of grace is present. In another place, on the words of St. Paul Vult omnes salvos fieri, he says: Ideo gratia Dei nulli deest, sed omnibus quantum in se est se communicat. In another on the same words of the Apostle, Vult omnes etc., he says: Deus quantum in se est, paratus est omnibus dare gratiam. Illi ergo soli gratia privantur, qui in seipsis gratiae impedimentum praestant; et ideo excusari non possunt, si peccent.

And when the Saint says Paratus est omnibus dare gratiam, he does not mean to speak of actual grace, as we have seen above, but of sanctifying grace alone. Hence Cardinal Gotti rightly refutes some who say that God keeps the helps sufficient for salvation prepared in Himself, but in fact does not give them to all. What use would it be to the sick man (says this learned author), if the physician only kept the remedies prepared at home but then did not wish to apply them? Hence, speaking to the purpose of our point, he concludes that it must necessarily be said: Deus nedum offerre, sed etiam conferre singulis hominibus, et infidelibus, et induratis auxilia sufficientia, vel proxima, vel saltem remota, ad observanda praecepta. For the rest, St. Thomas says that only the sins of the demons and the damned cannot be erased by penitence, but on the contrary: Dicere quod aliquod peccatum sit in hac vita, de quo quis poenitere non possit, erroneum est... quia per hoc derogaretur virtuti Gratiae. If grace were lacking to anyone, he certainly could not repent. Moreover, as we have already seen above, St. Thomas himself expressly teaches in many places, especially in his commentary on Chapter 12 of St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews, that God for His part denies to no one the grace necessary for conversion, saying: Gratia Dei nulli deest, sed omnibus quantum in se est, se communicat. Hence the learned author of the Theology for the Seminary of Perigueux rightly asserts: Non nisi ergo calumniose S. Thomae inputari potest quod peccatores aliquos a Deo totaliter deseri docuerit. Speaking of this point, Cardinal Bellarmine wisely distinguishes and says that as regards avoiding new sins, every sinner at every time has at least the mediate help: Auxilium sufficiens ac necessarium ad vitanda peccata omnibus, et omni tempore, vel immediate vel mediate, a Divina benignitate praestatur... Dicimus vel mediate, quoniam certum est aliquos non habere auxilium, quo possint a Deo majora praesidia impetrare, quibus adjuti peccata vitabunt. As for the grace to convert, he says that this is not given at every moment to the sinner, but that no one will ever be so abandoned ut certo et absolute per omnem vitam destituatur auxilio Dei, ut de salute desperare possit.

And the Thomist theologians, his disciples, say the same. The most learned Father Dominic Soto says: Certo certior sum, quin vero et certissimos credo semper fuisse sanctos Doctores, qui fuerint hoc nomine digni, neminem unquam a Deo fuisse derelictum, in hac mortali vita. And the reason is clear, because if the sinner were completely abandoned by grace, either his sins could no longer be imputed to him as faults if he continued to sin, or he would remain obliged to what he cannot fulfill. But it is an undoubted rule of St. Augustine that one never sins in that which cannot be avoided: Neminem peccare in eo quod nullo modo caveri potest. And this is in accord with what the Apostle says: Fidelis autem Deus est, qui non patietur vos tentari supra id quod potestis, sed faciet etiam cum tentatione proventum, ut possitis sustinere (1 Cor. 10:13).

That proventum is understood as the Divine help, which the Lord always gives to the tempted to resist temptation, as St. Cyprian explains: Faciet cum tentatione facultatem evadendi. And more clearly Primasius: Illud faciet provenire, quod poterimus sustinere; id est in tentatione roborabit gratiae praesidio, quo possitis eam sustinere. St. Augustine and St. Thomas go so far as to say that God would be unjust and cruel if He obliged anyone to a precept that he cannot observe.

St. Augustine says: Peccati reum tenere quenquam, quia non fecit quod facere non potuit, summae iniquitatis est. And St. Thomas then says: Deus non est magis crudelis quam homo; sed homini imputatur ad crudelitatem, si obliget aliquem per praeceptum ad id quod implere non possit; ergo de Deo nullatenus est aestimandum. Otherwise, the Saint says, it is quando ex ejus negligentia est, quod gratiam non habet, per quam potest servare mandata. Which is properly understood when man neglects to avail himself of the remote grace of prayer, by which he can well obtain the proximate grace to observe the precept, according to what the Tridentine teaches: Deus impossibilia non jubet, sed jubendo monet et facere quod possis, et petere quod non possis, et adjuvat ut possis (Session 6, Chapter 13).

What St. Augustine then said in the cited place — namely, that there is no sin in that which cannot be avoided — he confirms in many other places. In one place he says: Sive autem iniquitas, sive justitia, si in potestate non esset, nullum praemium, nulla poena justa esset. In another he says: Si denique his abstinendi ab opere suo potestas nulla conceditur, nullum peccatum eorum tenere possumus. In another he says: Dat quidem ille Daemon consilium, sed Deo auxiliante nostrum est eligere vel repudiare quod suggerit; et ideo cum per Dei adjutorium in potestate tua sit, quare non magis Deo, quam ipsi obtemperare deliberas? In another place he says: Ex eo igitur quod non accepit, nullus reus est. In another: Nemo vituperatione dignus, qui id non facit, quod facere non potest. The same say St. Jerome: Nec ad virtutes, nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur; alioquin ubi necessitas est, nec damnatio, nec corona est. Tertullian: Non enim poneretur lex ei, qui, non habet obsequium debitum legi in sua potestate. Mark the Hermit: Occulta nobis opitulatur gratia; verum in nobis situm est agere, vel non agere bonum pro potestate. The same say St. Irenaeus, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. John Chrysostom, and others.

Nor does it stand as an obstacle that St. Thomas says grace is denied to some as punishment for original sin: Auxilium Gratiae quibuscunque datur, misericorditer datur; quibus autem non datur, ex justitia non datur in poenam praecedentis, aut saltem originalis peccati, ut Augustinus dicit.

For the most learned Cardinal Gotti answers well that St. Augustine and St. Thomas speak of the proximate actual grace for satisfying the precepts of faith and charity, which are in fact the precepts St. Thomas speaks of in the said place; but by this they do not intend to deny that the Lord gives to each one the internal grace by which he can at least mediately obtain the grace of faith and salvation. For, as we have seen above, the mentioned Holy Doctors do not doubt that God grants to each one at least the remote grace to satisfy the precepts. To this must be added the authority of St. Prosper, who wrote: Adhibita semper est universis hominibus quaedam supernae mensura doctrinae, quae etsi parcioris gratiae fuit, sufficit tamen quibusdam ad remedium, omnibus ad testimonium.

Nor could this be understood otherwise, because if it were ever true that some sinned while lacking even the remote sufficient grace — on account of original sin being imputed to them as fault — it would have to be said that for sinning it suffices to have the liberty of the will that we interpretatively had in the sin of Adam. But this cannot be said, because it is expressly condemned in the First Proposition of Michael Baius, which said: Ad peccatum formale, et ad demerendum sufficit illa libertas, qua voluntarium ac liberum fuit in causa sua, peccato originali, et libertate Adami peccantis. Against which proposition what Cardinal Bellarmine wrote is pertinent: that to commit a personal sin distinct from the sin of Adam, there is needed a new exercise of liberty and a liberty distinct from the liberty of Adam; otherwise it is not a distinct sin, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, who teaches: Ad peccatum personale requiritur potentia absoluta personalis. Moreover, with respect to the baptized, the Council of Trent declared that in them nothing of damnation remains: In renatis nihil odit Deus, quia nihil est damnationis iis, qui vere consepulti sunt cum Christo per Baptisma in mortem. And it adds that concupiscence is not left as punishment but ad agonem relicta est, quae nocere non consentientibus non valet (Session 5, Decree on Original Sin). Concupiscence left in us would on the contrary greatly harm man if on account of it God denied men even the remote grace to obtain salvation.

From all that has been said, many theologians conclude that to say God denies some the help sufficient for satisfying the precepts would be against the Faith, since God would be obliging them to the impossible. Thus says Father Nunez: Deus nunquam denegat auxilium sufficiens ad implenda praecepta, alias nullo pacto possent impleri; et sic rediret Lutheri haeresis, quod Deus obligavit hominem ad impossibile. And in another place he says: Fidei est, ita ut oppositum sit haeresis manifesta, quod omnis homo, dum est in via, potest poenitentiam agere de peccatis. And Father Ledesma: Certum est secundum Fidem, quod non est peccatum, quod non est in hominis libera potestate.

Juvenin says that the sinner becomes guilty through the liberty of exercise, in voluntarily choosing this or that sin, even though at that point he necessarily sins, lacking the actual grace sufficient to free him from all sin. But this doctrine — namely, that a fallen man sins while having no other liberty than to choose which sin he wishes to commit, but being necessitated to sin — justly causes horror to the learned Bishop de Saleon, Archbishop of Vienne in France, who in his book Jansenismus Redivivus wrote thus: Quis patietur audire posse hominem lapsum absente gratia, non alia gaudere libertate, praeter eam qua cum necessitate ad peccandum potest unum prae alio eligere? Is a man condemned to death, who has no other liberty than to choose the sword, the poison, or the fire that must kill him, to be said to die voluntarily and freely in choosing his death? And how can sin ever be imputed as fault to one who is necessitated to sin in one way or another? Proposition 67 of Baius was condemned, which said: Homo peccat etiam damnabiliter in eo quod necessario facit. Where is the liberty where there is the necessity of sinning? Jansenius answers that for sinning it suffices to have the liberty of the will that we interpretatively had in the sin of Adam. But this too was condemned in the First Proposition of the same Baius: Ad peccatum formale, et ad demerendum, sufficit illa libertas, qua voluntarium ac liberum fuit in causa sua, peccato originali, et libertate Adami peccantis.

The opponents continue to say that the sinner abandoned by grace, although he cannot avoid all mortal sins collectively, can nevertheless avoid each sin distributively — that is, taken individually — per simplicem suspensionem seu negationem actus, as they say. But this cannot be admitted for several reasons. First, because when a vehement temptation presses, requiring much effort to resist, it cannot morally be overcome (as all theologians say) except with the help of grace, or else by clinging to another opposing vicious passion; so that such a sinner deprived of grace would then be without remedy necessitated to sin in one way or another — which is horrifying to say, as we have noted above. Second, when a strong sinful concupiscence presses in a matter, there is not always — indeed rarely is there — another disordered motive in the opposite direction with enough force to induce a man to refrain from consenting to it; and so when this opposing motive is lacking, the sinner would already be necessitated to commit that particular evil to which he feels inclined. Third, the abstaining from sin per simplicem negationem actus, as they say, can hardly be conceived in the case of negative precepts, but absolutely cannot take place, as Tournely and Cardinal Gotti rightly observe, when there is an urgent positive precept to fulfill some supernatural act, such as the acts of faith, hope, love, and contrition; since these are supernatural acts, the supernatural Divine help is necessarily required to fulfill them. So that at least in such a case, grace being lacking, man would necessarily sin by not satisfying such a positive precept, even though he could not avoid the sin. But to assert this, says Father Banez, is against the Faith: Quotiescunque aliquis peccat (these are his words), necesse est ut ille de facto receperit Divinam inspirationem. Haec conclusio asseritur a nobis certa secundum Fidem, quia nemo peccat, propter quod non facit, quod facere non potest, ut certum est secundum Fidem; sed homo cui nihil datum est, quam quod ad naturam humanam pertinet, non habet unde possit operari supra naturam, ergo non peccat non operando aliquid supernaturale.

Nor is it valid to say that if that sinner is deprived of grace, he is deprived of it through his own fault, and therefore, even though abandoned by grace, he still sins. For Cardinal Gotti answers well that the Lord can justly punish such a sinner for his previously committed faults, but not for the transgressions he will commit in the future regarding those precepts he can no longer fulfill. If a servant, says the aforesaid author, were sent to a place and through his own fault fell into a ditch, his master could indeed punish him for his carelessness in falling, and also for the future fault of not being willing to obey if he gave him the means (such as a rope or a ladder) to get out of the ditch and the servant refused to avail himself of them. But supposing the master did not offer him the help to get out, he would be a tyrant if he wished to require him to continue on his way and punish him if he did not continue. Hence he concludes: Cum ergo homo peccando in foveam lapsus impotens factus sit prosequendi iter ad aeternam salutem, esto ipsum possit ob talem culpam punire, et similiter si gratiam, qua fiat potens, oblatam respuet; sed si Deus ipsum in sua impotentia relinquere velit, non poterit nisi injuste obligare, ut viam percurrat, et nisi percurrat punire.

They then object with many texts of Scripture where this Divine abandonment seems to be declared. Excaeca cor populi hujus... ne forte videat, et convertatur, et sanem eum (Isa. 6:10). Curavimus Babylonem, et non est sanata, derelinquamus eam (Jer. 51:9). Appone iniquitatem super iniquitatem eorum, et non intrent in justitiam tuam (Ps. 68:28). Propterea tradidit illos in passiones ignominiae (Rom. 1:26). Ergo Deus cujus vult miseretur et quem vult indurat (Rom. 9:18). And others similar. But to all these passages it is commonly and easily answered that in the Sacred Scriptures the Divine permissions are often called operations; hence, in order not to blaspheme with Calvin that God positively destines and determines some to sin, it must be said that He permits some sinners, as punishment for their faults, on the one hand to be assailed by vehement temptations (which is the punishment from which we pray the Lord in the Our Father to deliver us by those words Et ne nos inducas in tentationem), and on the other, that they remain morally abandoned in their sin — in such a way that their conversion and the resistance they could offer to temptations, though not impossible and desperate, is nevertheless made very difficult through their own fault and through the bad habits they have formed, since being placed in such a dissolute life they will have only very weak and rare desires and impulses to resist their bad habits and to return to the way of salvation. And this is that imperfect obstinacy in which the sinner remains hardened, and of which St. Thomas speaks, saying: Induratum esse eum, qui non de facili possit cooperari ad hoc quod exeat de peccato; et haec est obstinatio imperfecta quia aliquis potest esse obstinatus in statu viae, dum scilicet habet ita firmatam voluntatem in peccato, quod non surgunt motus ad bonum nisi debiles. On one side, the darkened mind; the will grown hard to Divine inspirations and attached to the pleasures of the senses, so that it despises and is nauseated by spiritual goods; the passions and sensible appetites, which through bad habits formed have come to dominate the soul. On the other side, the lights and calls of God, which are rendered ineffective in moving the soul through its own fault, on account of the contempt and bad use it has made of them, and indeed it feels a certain aversion to them, not wishing to be disturbed in its sensual delights. All these things together constitute the moral abandonment in which, once placed, the sinner can only with the utmost difficulty escape from his wretched state and return to leading an ordered life.

To escape and pass in one step from such disorder to a state of salvation, an abundant and extraordinary grace would be needed; but God rarely grants such a grace to obstinate sinners. He grants it sometimes for some, says St. Thomas, choosing them as vessels of mercy, as the Apostle writes, in order to make known His goodness. But to others He justly denies it and leaves them in their unhappy state, to demonstrate His justice and His power: Interdum (says the Angelic Doctor) ex abundantia bonitatis suae etiam eos qui impedimentum Gratiae praestant, auxilio suo praevenit, convertens eos etc. Et sicut non omnes caecos illuminat, nec omnes languidos sanat, ita non omnes qui Gratiam impediunt, auxilio suo praevenit ut convertantur... Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit (Rom. 9:22): Deus volens ostendere iram, et notam facere potentiam suam sustinuit in multa patientia vasa irae apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae preparavit in gloriam. Then the Holy Doctor adds: Cum autem Deus hominum qui in eisdem peccatis detinentur, hos quidem praeveniens convertat, illos autem sustineat, sive permittat secundum ordinem rerum procedere, non est ratio inquirenda, quare hos convertat, et non illos. Hinc est quod Apostolus dicit (Rom. 9:21): An non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam?

We do not deny, then, to conclude this point, that there exists a moral abandonment of certain obstinate sinners, such that their conversion is morally impossible — that is, most difficult. And this moreover can well suffice for the good intent of the opponents in defending their position — namely, to curb the wicked and lead them to reform before they fall into so deplorable a state. But it is cruelty (as the Petrocorian rightly says) to wish to deprive them of all hope and utterly close the way of salvation, by claiming they have fallen into total abandonment so as to remain deprived of all actual grace for avoiding new sins and for converting — at least mediately through prayer (which is not denied to anyone while he lives, as we shall demonstrate in what follows), by which they can then obtain the abundant helps to place themselves in a state of salvation. For the fear of total abandonment would not only lead them to despair, but also to give themselves up still more to vice, believing themselves entirely destitute of grace, so that no hope whatever would remain to them of avoiding eternal damnation.