Lecture 6 — Does simple generation exist? Problem and solution.

Now that we have established the preceding distinctions, we must first consider whether there is anything which comes-to-be and passes-away in the unqualified sense: or whether nothing comes-to-be in this strict sense, but everything always comes-to-be something and out of something—I mean, e.g. comes-to-be-healthy out of being-ill and ill out of being-healthy, comes-to-be-small out of being big and big out of being-small, and so on in every other instance.

For if there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, 'something' must—without qualification—'come-to-be out of not-being',

so that it would be true to say that 'not-being is an attribute of some things'.

For qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified not-being (e.g. out of not-white or not-beautiful), but unqualified coming-to-be is a process out of unqualified not-being.

Now "unqualified" means either (i) the primary predication within each Category, or (ii) the universal, i.e. the all-comprehensive, predication.

Hence, if "unqualified not-being" means the negation of 'being' in the sense of the primary term of the Category in question, we shall have, in 'unqualified coming-to-be', a coming-to-be of a substance out of not-substance. But that which is not a substance or a 'this' clearly cannot possess predicates drawn from any of the other Categories either—e.g. we cannot attribute to it any quality, quantity, or position. Otherwise, properties would admit of existence in separation from substances. If, on the other hand, 'unqualified not-being' means 'what is not in any sense at all', it will be a universal negation of all forms of being, so that what comes-to-be will have to come-to-be out of nothing.

Although we have dealt with these problems at greater length in another work, where we have set forth the difficulties and established the distinguishing definitions, the following concise restatement of our results must here be offered: In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no 'being' without qualification: yet in another sense they come-to-be always out of what is'. For coming-to-be necessarily implies the pre-existence of something which potentially 'is', but actually 'is not'; and this something is spoken of both as 'being' and as 'not-being'.

These distinctions may be taken as established: but even then it is extraordinarily difficult to see how there can be 'unqualified coming-to-be' (whether we suppose it to occur out of what potentially 'is', or in some other way), and we must recall this problem for further examination.

For the question might be raised whether substance (i.e. the 'this') comes-to-be at all. Is it not rather the 'such', the 'so great', or the 'somewhere', which comes-to-be? And the same question might be raised about 'passing-away' also.

For if a substantial thing comes to be, it is clear that there will 'be' (not actually, but potentially) a substance, out of which its coming-to-be will proceed and into which the thing that is passing-away will necessarily change. Then will any predicate belonging to the remaining Categories attach actually to this presupposed substance? In other words, will that which is only potentially a 'this' (which only potentially is), while without the qualification 'potentially' it is not a 'this' (i.e. is not), possess, e.g. any determinate size or quality or position? For (i) if it possesses none of these determinations actually, but all of them only potentially, the result is first that a being, which is not a determinate being, is capable of separate existence; and in addition that coming-to-be proceeds out of nothing pre-existing—a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers. On the other hand (ii) if, although it is not a 'this somewhat' or a substance, it is to possess some of the remaining determinations quoted above, then (as we said)' properties will be separable from substances.

42. After determining about generation and alteration according to the opinions of others, the Philosopher here begins to inquire about them according to his own opinion.

First, he asks whether there is any simple generation, according to which something is said to be generated absolutely;

second, the difference between alteration and simple generation, at next we must state (319b6; [73]).

With respect to the first he does two things.

First he states his intention (317a32) and says that after having determined the foregoing, the first point in the inquiry into the truth is to see whether something is generated and corrupted absolutely, or whether properly, i.e., absolutely or principally, nothing is generated or corrupted, but that always something is generated from something and into something—which seems to pertain to generation and corruption in a qualified sense. And he gives as an example the case when, from something laboring, i.e., ill, something healthy comes to be. In this case absolute being is not produced, because it already existed, but something, namely, to be healthy, is, since previously "healthy" was not, but laboring, i.e., ill. And the same holds when something is made ill from healthy, or the small from the large, or conversely, and so on for all changes stated in this manner—for such generation in a qualified sense is found in every class of mobile being, as is plain in Physics VIII.

43. Second, at **for if there is to be coming-to-be **(317b1), he carries out his proposal:

first, he states a doubt;

second, he resolves it, at although we have dealt (317b13; [48]);

third, he objects to the solution, at these distinctions may be taken (317b18; [49]).

Regarding the first he does two things:

first, he states the doubt;

second, he rejects one answer, at now "unqualified" means (317b5; [46]).

As to the first he does three things:

First he proposes a certain consequence (317b1) saying that, if absolute generation should occur, it would follow that something would be generated from absolute non-being.

44. Second, at so that it would be true (317b3), he shows that the consequent is impossible. For that from which something is generated can be called it; for example, if from wood a cabinet is generated, it can be said that the cabinet is wood. If, therefore, from absolute non-being being is generated, it will be true to say that nonbeing exists, i.e., that it is being—which is to have contradictories true at the same time. Consequently the antecedent is seen to be impossible, namely, that something be generated absolutely from non-being. Now this inadmissibility follows if something should be said to be produced from non-being absolutely, as from a permanent subject; it does not follow, however, if it is pointed out that something is produced from non-being absolutely according to order alone, i.e., that after non-being is produced being. But Aristotle is objecting here in a disputative manner.

45. Third, at** for qualified coming-to-be** (317b3), he shows the necessity of the first consequence. For just as some particular generation is related to some particular non-being, so absolute generation is related to absolute non-being. But a certain generation, i.e., a generation according to which something is said to be generated in a qualified sense is from a certain non-being, for example, from non-white, when something becomes white, or from non-good, when something becomes good. Therefore, absolute generation, according to which something is said to be generated absolutely, is from absolute now-being.

46. Then, at now "unqualified" means (317b5), he excludes a certain solution that could be given by distinguishing absolute being. Hence he first presents the distinction and says that "absolute being" may be understood in two ways: in one way as meaning that which is the first among the predicaments of being, namely, substance; in another way as meaning universal being, which includes all the predicaments. According to these distinctions, absolute non-being may be said either of what is not substance, or of what is in no way being.

47. Second, at hence, if "unqualified not-being" (317b7), he shows that according to both senses something inadmissible follows. For if "absolute being" is taken to mean the first being, which is substance, then "absolute non-being" will be non-substance. If, therefore, absolute generation requires that there be absolute being from absolute nonbeing, it will follow that there will be substance from non-substance. But when it is assumed that neither substance exists nor a this (which implies an individual substance), then it is plain that none of the other predicaments will remain, i.e., neither quality, nor quantity, nor where—because otherwise it would follow that passions, i.e., accidents, would exist separated from substances, which is impossible.

But if it should be said that that from which something is generated absolutely is universal non-being, in the sense that "absolute being" is taken to mean common being, it will follow that the expression, "non-being," means the negation of all beings. Hence it will follow that what would be generated absolutely would be generated from absolutely nothing. But this is against the notion of natural generation, and against the doctrines of all the natural philosophers, who discussed natural generation.

48. Then at although we have dealt (317b13), he resolves this doubt. And he says that this matter has been more fully discussed, i.e., discussed at greater length, also in other books, namely, in Physics I, with the difficulties presented and the determinations made. Therefore now it is enough to state more briefly that something is absolutely generated in a way from non-being, and in a way from being - for that which pre-exists to the generation must be being in potency but non-being in act. Consequently, what is said on both sides is true, namely, that absolute generation is from being, and from non-being.

49. Then, at these distinctions may be taken (317b18), he objects against this solution. Concerning this he does three things:

first, he presents the objection;

second, he uses this as an occasion for asking another question and answering it, at we must therefore concentrate (317b33; [52]);

third, he answers the doubt under discussion, at the cause implied in this solution (318a25; [58]).

In regard to the first he does three things:

First, he states his intention (317b18) and says that because the foregoing determination begets a wondrous question, it will be necessary once more to investigate how absolute generation takes place, i.e., whether from being in potency, or in some other way.

50. Second, at for the question might be raised (317b20), he raises a certain question: Is simple generation only of substance and of this, i.e., the individual in the genus of substance, and not of quantity or quality or "where" or the other predicaments, which are not beings absolutely? And the same question can be put with regard to corruption. And it is to be supposed as a certainty that simple generation and corruption are of substance alone.

51. Third, at for if a substantial thing (317b23), he continues with the problem. And he says that if the only thing generated absolutely is the what, i.e., something existing in the genus of substance, and if that from which something is generated is being in potency, as was said above, and not in act, it follows that that from which substance is generated, as well as that into which it is changed when corrupted, is substance in potency and not in act. Therefore it remains to inquire whether it is any of the other predicaments in act, such as quantity or quality or "where" or any of the other predicaments, while at the same time being potentially this being, i.e., substance, which is being absolutely, although not existing absolutely, i.e., in act, as this, i.e., as substance or being.

Whichever part of this difficulty is conceded, something inadmissible follows. For if it is none of the others in act, but is all of the genera of the predicaments in potency, it follows first of all than non-being is separated, i.e., that matter, which is being in potency, is existing under privation, which is non-being, but without any form. Second, there follows what the first philosophers most feared, namely, that something be generated from no pre-existing thing: for what is not being in act, is nothing.

But if it is supposed that that from which substance is generated is not a this something, i.e., an individual in the genus of substance, nor substance in act, but is one of the other predicaments in act, there follows the inadmissible consequence we adduced before, namely, that passions, i.e., accidents, exist isolated from substances—which is plainly impossible.

Consequently, it seems that absolute generation cannot occur in this way, namely, that a substance be generated from what is non-being in act and being in potency, as the foregoing solution suggested.