Lecture 9 — The cause of the difference between absolute and qualified generation in things not reciprocally generated.

(ii) But why are some things said to 'come-to-be' without qualification, and others only to 'come-to-be-so-and-so', in cases different from the one we have been considering where two things come-to-be reciprocally out of one another? For at present we have explained no more than this:—why, when two things change reciprocally into one another, we do not attribute coming-to-be and passing-away uniformly to them both, although every coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and every passing-away some other thing's coming-to-be. But the question subsequently formulated involves a different problem—viz. why, although the learning thing is said to 'come-to-be-learned' but not to 'come-to-be' without qualification, yet the growing thing is said to 'come-to-be'.

The distinction here turns upon the difference of the categories. For some things signify a this somewhat, others a such, and others a so-much. Those things, then, which do not signify substance, are not said to 'come-to-be' without qualification, but only to 'come-to-be-so-and-so'. Nevertheless, in all changing things alike, we speak of 'coming-to-be' when the thing comes-to-be something in one of the two Columns—e.g. in Substance, if it comes-to-be Fire but not if it comes-to-be Earth; and in Quality, if it comes-to-be learned but not when it comes-to-be ignorant.

We have explained why some things come-to-be without qualification, but not others both in general, and also when the changing things are substances and nothing else; and we have stated that the substratum is the material cause of the continuous occurrence of coming-to-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to contrary and because, in substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a passing-away of another, and the passing-away of one thing is always another's coming-to-be.

But there is no need even to discuss the other question we raised—viz. why coming-to-be continues though things are constantly being destroyed. For just as people speak of 'a passing-away' without qualification when a thing has passed into what is imperceptible and what in that sense 'is not', so also they speak of 'a coming-to-be out of a not-being' when a thing emerges from an imperceptible. Whether, therefore, the substratum is or is not something, what comes-to-be emerges out of a 'not-being': so that a thing comes-to-be out of a not-being' just as much as it 'passes-away into what is not'. Hence it is reasonable enough that coming-to-be should never fail. For coming-to-be is a passing-away of 'what is not' and passing-away is a coming-to-be of 'what is not'.

But what about that which 'is' not except with a qualification? Is it one of the two contrary poles of the change—e.g. Earth (i.e. the heavy) a 'not-being', but Fire (i.e. the light) a 'being'? Or, on the contrary, does what is 'include Earth as well as Fire, whereas what is not' is matter—the matter of Earth and Fire alike?

And again, is the matter of each different? Or is it the same, since otherwise they would not come-to-be reciprocally out of one another, i.e. contraries out of contraries? For these things—Fire, Earth, Water, Air—are characterized by 'the contraries'. Perhaps the solution is that their matter is in one sense the same, but in another sense different. For that which underlies them, whatever its nature may be qua underlying them, is the same: but its actual being is not the same. So much, then, on these topics.

67. After explaining why, in the case of things that are reciprocally generated, some are generated absolutely and others in a qualified sense, the Philosopher here shows the reason for the difference between absolute generation and generation in a qualified sense in things that are not reciprocally generated.

First, he determines the question principally intended;

second, he determines certain questions connected with this, at but there is no need** (319a22; [70]).

With regard to the first he does three things:

first, he raises the question;

second, he answers it, at the distinction here (319a11; [68]);

third, he summarizes, at we have explained (319a17; [69]).

He says therefore first (319a3) that some things are said to be generated absolutely, some only in a qualified sense, not according to reciprocal generation, as was said above, in such a way, namely, that one of the things reciprocally generated is generated absolutely, the other in a qualified way. For this is what was determined above, namely, why, since every generation is the corruption of another, and every corruption the generation of another, generation and corruption are not attributed in a similar way in those things which are reciprocally generated, but one of them is said to be generated or corrupted absolutely, the other in a qualified way. But that is not the subsequent question, which concerns why it is, in cases in which things are not reciprocally changed, one thing is said to be generated absolutely and the other in a qualified sense: for example, why is the learner who is becoming a knower not said to be absolutely generated, but only in a qualified sense, i.e., as knowing, whereas a man or an animal, when born, is said to be generated absolutely, while it is plain that the learner and the newly-born are not instances of reciprocal generation?

68. Then, at the distinction here (319a11), he answers the question now raised and says that those things, some of which are said to be generated absolutely and some in a qualified sense, belong to distinct predicaments, in such a way that one signifies this something, i.e., substance, another a quantity, another a quality, and so on. Things that do not signify substance, therefore, but quantity or quality or one of the others, are not said to be generated absolutely but in a qualified sense, whereas things that signify substance are said to be generated absolutely.

The reason for this is that generation is a road from non-being to being. Consequently, that is generated absolutely which acquires a being to which another being is not presupposed. For that which is, is not made. Hence what already exists cannot be generated absolutely but only in a qualified sense. Therefore those things whose being presuppose another being are not said to be generated absolutely, but in a qualified sense. Now the being of accidents presupposes another being, namely, the being of the subject, but the being of the substance does not presuppose another being, because the subject of substantial form is not a being in act, but a being in potency. Consequently, by receiving substantial form a thing is said to be generated absolutely, but in receiving an accidental form it is said to be generated in a qualified sense.

However in all, namely, in both substances and accidents, absolute and qualified generation are diversified according to a different order, either of being to non-being, or of perfect being to imperfect being or of the sensible to the non-sensible. Hence in the case of substance, in a certain sense there is said to be absolute generation if fire is generated, but not if earth is generated; and in the case of a quality, there is said to be absolute generation if a knower is generated, but not if a non-knower is generated.

69. Then, at we have explained (319a17), he summarizes what has been said, stating that there has been a universal discussion of accidents and substances, as to the fact that some things are generated absolutely and others in a qualified sense. It has also been stated that the cause of the continuity in generation, so far as the matter is concerned, is the subject which is changed into contraries. For that is the reason why in substances the generation of one is always the corruption of some other, and vice versa, for matter is never found under the privation of one form without having another form. However, in some accidents that does happen, for a transparent body exists under a privation of light without being subject to a contrary form.

70. Then, at but there is no need (319a22), he determines three consequent questions.

The first of these asks why something is always generated from things corrupted, which is implied in his statement that the generation of one is the corruption of another.

He answers this question by saying that because corruption tends into non-being, and generation is from non-being, therefore generation must be from things corrupted. This he also proves from the opinions of others: because just as men say that something has been corrupted when it arrives at being imperceptible, which state they regard as non-being, according to the third way posited above, so too they say that something has been generated when it arrives from what is imperceptible and non-being at the state of being perceptible. It is plain, therefore, that, according to this way, that which is the terminus of corruption, is the beginning of generation. Consequently, whether there is, or is not, some subject from which generation arises, the generation of something must always be from non-being which is the terminus of corruption—for it is of the very nature of generation that it proceed from non-being; but the fact that such non-being be joined to something else which exists, is accidental to generation. Wherefore, it is plain that something is simultaneously generated from non-being and corrupted into non-being, no matter how non-being may be said. Consequently that into which corruption is terminated is the very same as that out of which generation proceeds. It is for this reason that generation proceeds from what is corrupted. It is in keeping with this, therefore, that the succession of generation and corruption never fails, as was said above; because generation is a certain corruption of non-being, and corruption a certain generation of non-being. Thus one is always conjoined to the other, since one terminates in that which the other begins.

71. The second question, at but what about (319a29), consists in the fact that someone can ask whether the non-being from which generation proceeds and into which absolute corruption is terminated, and which is in some sense being, is one of two contraries. For example, are earth and "heavy" non-being, as Parmenides said, and fire and "light" being? And he solves this by stating that it is not so, but rather earth is being, since, namely, earth comes to be by virtue of matter's receiving a certain form, which makes it to be in act. Non-being, therefore, is the matter of earth and of fire. However, matter is not non-being per se, as Plato believed, but it is non-being per accidens, by reason of the privation to which it is conjoined.

72. The third question, at **and again, is the matter **(319a33), asks whether, namely, the non-being which is matter is common to the things that are reciprocally generated one from another. And he says that if the matter of both, i.e., of fire and of earth, were diverse, they would not be generated one from the other, as happens for those who posited both fire and earth as first matters. For things that are mutually generated one from the other must have a common subject capable of acquiring the form of both. Consequently no change could take place between things mutually contrary, as was said above, since contrarieties exist first and ear se in the above mentioned elements, namely, fire and earth, water and air. Hence if nothing were changed from fire into water or from air into earth, or vice versa, neither would anything be changed from hot to cold, or vice versa, as was said above.

He adds, however, that the matter of things that are reciprocally changed is in one sense the same, and in another sense other. For they are the same as to subject. And this is what he says, namely, that the subject is the same, whatever its status as being (since, indeed, it is not being in act, but in potency). However, it is not the same according to existence or notion. For it takes on another notion and another existence according as it exists under various forms, and also according as it is ordained to diverse forms, just as body is other as to notion according as it is subject to sickness, and as it is subject to health, although it is the same as to subject. In summary, then, he concludes, saying, so much for these topics.