Lecture 4 — Error of more recent philosophers about the one and the many

Even the more recent of the ancient thinkers were alarmed lest the same thing should turn out to be both one and many. So some, like Lycophron, were led to omit “is,” and others to change the mode of expression and say “man whitened” instead of “is white” and “walks” instead of “is walking,” for fear that, if they added the word “is,” they should be making the one to be many—as if “one” and “being” were always used in one way.

What “is” may be many either in definition (for example “to be white” is one thing and “to be musical” another, yet the same thing may be both, so the one is many) or by division, as the whole and its parts.

On this point, indeed, they were already getting into difficulties and admitted that the one was many—as if there was any difficulty about the same thing being both one and many.

For these are not opposites, since “one” may mean either “one in potency” or “one in act.” If, then, we approach the thesis in this way, it seems impossible for all things to be one.

25. Having disproven the opinion of Parmenides and Melissus that being is one, the Philosopher here shows that certain later philosophers fell into the difficulty on the same basis.

Parmenides and Melissus erred because they did not know how to distinguish the uses of the term “one.” Thus, they said that what is one in a certain respect is one simply. But the later philosophers, also not knowing how to distinguish the uses of the term “one,” thought it absurd that the same thing should be in some way one and many. Yet, being convinced by the arguments, they were forced to believe it. And so Aristotle says that the later philosophers were alarmed (that is, fell into a difficulty similar to that of the ancients, Parmenides and Melissus) lest they be forced to say that one and the same thing is one and many. Now, this seemed absurd to both groups of philosophers. So, the earlier philosophers, holding that all is one, rejected all multiplicity. The later philosophers, on the other hand, tried to remove multiplicity from anything they held to be one.

26. Thus some, such as Lycophron, removed the verb is from propositions. They said that we must not say man is white, but rather white man. For they thought that man and white were in some way one; otherwise, white would not be predicated of man. And it seemed to them that the word is, since it is a verbal copula, must serve as a copula between two. And so, wishing to remove all multiplicity from that which is one, they said the verb is must not be used.

But because such speech seemed to be imperfect, and because an imperfect understanding was produced in the soul of the listener if names were spoken without the addition of any verb, some changed the mode of speech, wishing to correct this. They did not say white man, because of the imperfection of this mode of speech. Nor did they say man is white, lest they give the impression that there is multiplicity.

Rather, they said man whitened, because, by this expression whitened, a thing is not understood (as it seemed to them), but rather a certain change in the subject. And in like manner, they said that we must not say, man is walking, but man walks, lest by the addition of the verbal copula is, they make that which they thought to be one (namely, white man) to be many, as if one and being were used singularly, that is, in only one way and not in many.

27. But this is false, for that which is one in one respect can be many in some other respect, as what is one in subject can be many in concept. Thus, the white thing and the musical thing are the same in subject but many in concept; for the concept of music is one thing, and the concept of white is another. Hence it can be concluded that the one may be many.

This may happen also in another way. That which is actually one as a whole may be many according to a division of parts. Thus, the whole is one in its totality but it has multiplicity of parts. And, although those who wished to remove the verb is or alter it, as was said above, found some solution to the objection that things could be one in subject and many in definition, nevertheless on this point, namely, on the whole and parts, they, in their ignorance, failed to respond to the objection altogether, believing that it was something of a problem that the one should be many.

But it is not problematic if the one and the many are not taken as opposites. For the one in act and the many in act are opposed, but the one in act and the many in potency are not opposed. And, because of this, he adds that “one” is said in many ways—namely, one in potency and one in act. And so, nothing prohibits the same thing from being one in act and many in potency, as is clear with regard to the whole and the parts.

28. Finally, he draws the conclusion that he primarily intended, namely, that it is clear from the foregoing arguments that it is impossible for all beings to be one.