Lecture 12 — In every coming to be, three principles are found

We will now give our own account, approaching the question first with reference to generation in its widest sense, for we shall be following the natural order of inquiry if we speak first of common characteristics and then investigate the characteristics of special cases.

We say that one thing comes to be from another thing, and one sort of thing from another sort of thing, in the case both of simple and of complex things. I mean the following. We can say, “man becomes musical,” “the non-musical becomes musical,” or “the non-musical man becomes musical.” Now, what becomes in the first and second—“man” and “non-musical”—I call simple, and what each becomes—“musical”—simple also. But, when we say, “the non-musical man becomes a musical man,” both what becomes and what it becomes are complex.

As regards one of these simple “things that become,” we say not only, “this becomes so-and-so,” but also “from being this comes to be so-and-so,” as “from being not-musical comes to be musical”; as regards the other, we do not say this in all cases, as we do not say, “from being a man he came to be musical,” but only, “the man became musical.”

When a “simple” thing is said to become something, in one case it survives through the process, but in the other it does not. For man remains a man and is such even when he becomes musical, whereas what is not musical or is unmusical does not continue to exist, either simply or combined with the subject.

With these distinctions drawn, one can gather from surveying the various cases of becoming in the way we are describing that, as we say, there must always be an underlying something—namely, that which becomes—and that this, though always one numerically, in form at least is not one. (By that I mean that it can be described in different ways.) For “to be man” is not the same as “to be unmusical.”

One part survives, while the other does not: what is not an opposite survives (for “man” survives), but “not-musical” or “unmusical” does not survive, nor does the compound of the two, namely “unmusical man.”

We speak of “becoming that from this,” instead of “this becoming that,” more in the case of what does not survive the change—“becoming musical from unmusical,” not “from man”—but there are exceptions, as we sometimes use the latter form of expression even of what survives; we speak of “a statue coming to be from bronze,” not of the “bronze becoming a statue.”

The change from an opposite that does not survive, however, is described indifferently in both ways, “becoming that from this” or “this becoming that.” We say both that “the unmusical becomes musical” and that “from unmusical he becomes musical.”

And so, both forms are used of the complex, “becoming a musical man from an unmusical man” and “unmusical man becoming a musical man.”

But there are different senses of “coming to be.” In some cases, we do not use the expression “come to be,” but “come to be accidentally.” Only substances are said to “come to be” simply. Now, in all cases other than substance, it is plain that there must be some subject, namely, that which becomes.

For we know that, when a thing comes to be of such a quantity or quality or in such a relation, time, or place, a subject is always presupposed, since substance alone is not predicated of another subject, but everything else of substance.

But that substances too, as well as anything else that can be said “to be” without qualification, comes to be from some substratum, will appear on examination. For we find in every case something that underlies, from which proceeds that which comes to be, such as animals and plants from seed.

Generally, things that come to be do so in different ways: by change of shape, as a statue; by addition, as things that grow; by taking away, as the Hermes from the stone; by putting together, as a house; by alteration, as things that “turn” in respect of their material substance.

It is plain that these are all cases of coming to be from a substratum.

Thus, clearly, from what has been said, whatever comes to be is always complex. There is, on the one hand, something that comes into existence, and again something that becomes that—the latter in two senses, either the subject or the opposite. By the “opposite,” I mean the “unmusical,” and by the “subject,” “man,” and similarly I call the absence of shape or form or order the “opposite,” and the bronze or stone or gold the “subject.”

98. After the Philosopher has investigated the number of principles by means of disputation, he here begins to determine the truth.

This section is divided into two parts.

First, he determines the truth.

Second, at we will now proceed (191a23; [120]), using the already determined truth, he rules out certain difficulties and errors of the ancients.

The first part is divided into two parts.

First, he shows that, in any natural coming to be, three things are found.

Second, at thus, if there are (190b17; [110]), he shows from this that these three things are principles.

Concerning the first part, he makes two points.

First, he states his intention;

second, he pursues his intention at we say that (189b32; [100]).

99. Because he had said above (Lect. 11, n. 97.) that the question of whether there are only two principles of nature or three involves much difficulty, he concludes that he must first speak of generation and production as common to all the species of change. For in any change, there is found a certain coming to be. For example, when something is altered from white to black, the non-white comes to be from the white, and the black comes to be from the non-black. And the same is true of other change.

He also points out the reason for this order of procedure. It is necessary to speak first of those things that are common, and afterwards to think of those things that are proper to each thing, as was said in the beginning of the book. (Lect. 1, n. 6ff.)

100. Next, at we say that one thing (189b32), he develops his position.

Concerning this, he makes two points.

First, he sets forth certain things that are necessary to prove his position.

Second, at with these distinctions drawn (190a13; [103]), he proves his point.

Concerning the first part, he makes two points.

First, he sets up a certain division;

second, at as regards one (190a5; [102]), he points out the differences among the parts of the division.

101. He therefore says first (189b32) that, in any coming to be, one thing is said to come to be from another thing with reference to coming to be in regard to substantial being, or one comes to be from another with reference to coming to be in regard to accidental being. Hence, every change has two termini. The word “terminus,” however, is used in two ways, for the termini of a production or change can be taken as either simple or composite.

He explains this as follows. Sometimes we say, man becomes musical, and then the two termini of the production are simple. It is the same when we say that the non-musical becomes musical. But, when we say that the non-musical man becomes a musical man, each of the termini is a composite. For when coming to be is attributed to man or to the nonmusical, each is simple. And thus, that which becomes—namely, that to which coming to be is attributed—is said to come to be simply.

But that in which the very coming to be is terminated, which also means “to come to be simply,” is musical. Thus we say, man becomes musical, or the non-musical becomes musical.

But, when each is signified as coming to be as composed (both what becomes, or that to which the coming to be is attributed, and what it becomes, or that in which the coming to be is terminated), then we say that the non-musical man becomes musical.

For then, there is composition on the part of the subject only, and simplicity on the part of the predicate. But, when I say that the non-musical man becomes a musical man, then there is composition on the part of each.

102. Next, at as regards one (190a5), he points out two differences between the things said above. The first is that, in some of the cases mentioned above, we use two modes of speech: we say, this becomes this, and from this, this comes to be. For we say, the non-musical becomes musical, and from the non-musical, the musical comes to be. But we do not speak this way in all cases. For we do not say, the musical comes to be from man, but man becomes musical.

He points out the second difference at when a “simple” thing (190a9). He says that, when coming to be is attributed to two simple things—namely, the subject and the opposite—one of these is permanent but the other is not. For when someone has already been made musical, “man” remains. But the opposite does not remain, whether it be opposed negatively, as the non-musical, or privatively or as a contrary, as the unmusical.

Nor is the composite of subject and the opposite permanent, for the non-musical man does not remain after man has been made musical. And so coming to be is attributed to these three things, for it was said that man becomes musical, that the non-musical becomes musical, and that the non-musical man becomes musical. Of these three subjects, only the first remains complete in a production; the other two do not remain.

103. Next, at with these distinctions drawn (190a13), having assumed the foregoing, he proves his position, namely, that three things are found in any natural production.

Concerning this, he makes three points.

First, he enumerates two things that are found in any natural production.

Second, at one part survives (190a17; [105]), he proves what he had supposed.

Third, where he says, thus, clearly (190b10; [109]), he draws his conclusion.

104. He therefore first (190a13) says that, if anyone, taking for granted what was said above, wishes to consider coming to be in all the things that come to be naturally, he will agree that there must always be some subject to which the coming to be is attributed, and that that subject, although one in number and subject, is not the same in species or nature.

For when it is said of a man that he becomes musical, the man is indeed one in subject, but two in account. For man and the non-musical are not the same according to account. Aristotle does not, however, mention here the third point—that, in every generation, there must be something generated—for this is obvious.

105. Next, at one part survives (190a17), he proves the two things that he had assumed.

He shows first that the subject to which the coming to be is attributed is two in account.

Second, at but there are different (190a31; [107]), he shows that it is necessary to assume a subject in every coming to be.

He shows the first point in two ways. First (190a17), he points out that, in the subject to which the coming to be is attributed, there is something that is permanent and something that is not permanent. For that which is not an opposite of the terminus of the production is permanent, for man remains when he becomes musical, but the non-musical does not remain. And from this it is clear that man and the non-musical are not the same in account, since the one remains but the other does not.

106. Second, at we speak of (190a21), he shows the same thing in another way. With reference to the non-permanent things, it is much better to say, this comes to be from this, than it is to say, this becomes this (although this latter also may be said, but not as properly). For we say that the musical comes to be from the non-musical. We also say that the non-musical becomes musical, but this is accidental, insofar as that which happens to be non-musical becomes musical.

But, in permanent things, this is not said. For we do not say that the musical comes to be from man; rather, we say that the man becomes musical.

Even in reference to permanent things, we sometimes say, this comes to be from this, as we say that a statue comes to be from bronze. But this happens because, by the name “bronze,” we understand the “unshaped,” and so this is said by reason of the privation that is understood.

And, although we say, this comes to be from this, with reference to permanent things, yet it is better to say with reference to non-permanent things both that this becomes this and that this comes to be from this, whether non-permanent things are taken as opposites or as composed of the opposite and the subject. Thus, from this very fact that we use different modes of speech with reference to the subject and the opposite, it is clear that the subject and the opposite, such as man and the non-musical, are two in account.

107. Next, at but there are different (190a31), he proves the other point that he had assumed: in every natural production, there must be a subject. The proof of this point by argumentation belongs to metaphysics. Hence this is proved in Metaphysics 7. (Aristotle, Metaphysics Z.7; cf. St. Thomas, Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 7, lect. 6.) He proves it here only by induction.

He does this first in regard to the things that come to be;

second, in regard to the modes of coming to be, at generally, things (190b4; [108]).

He therefore first (190a31) says that, since “to come to be” is used in many ways, “to come to be simply” is said only of the coming to be of substances, whereas other things are said to come to be accidentally. This is so because “to come to be” implies the beginning of existing.

Therefore, in order for something to come to be simply, it is required that previously it was not simply, which happens in those things that come to be substantially. For when a man comes to be, not only was he previously not a man, but it is true to say that he simply was not. But when a man becomes white, it is not true to say that he previously was not, but that he previously was not such.

However, those things that come to be accidentally clearly depend upon a subject. For quantity and quality and the other accidents, whose coming to be is accidental, cannot be without a subject. For only substance does not exist in a subject. Further, it is clear, if one considers the point, that even substances come to be from a subject. For we see that plants and animals come to be from seed.

108. Next, at generally, things (190b4), he shows the same thing by induction from the modes of coming to be. He says that, of things that come to be, some come to be by change of figure, as the statue comes to be from the bronze; others come to be by addition, as is clear in all instances of increase, as the river comes to be from many streams; others come to be by subtraction, as an image of Mercury comes to be from stone by sculpture; still other things come to be by composition, such as a house; and others come to be by alteration, as those things whose matter is changed, either by nature or by art. And, in all of these cases, it is apparent that they come to be from some subject.

Hence it is clear that everything that comes to be comes to be from a subject. But it must be noted that artificial things are here enumerated along with those things that come to be simply (even though artificial forms are accidents), because artificial things are in some way in the genus of substance by reason of their matter.

Or else perhaps he lists them because of the opinion of the ancients, who thought of natural things and artificial things in the same way, as will be said in book 2. (Lect. 2, n. 149.)

109. Next, at thus, clearly, from what (190b10), he draws his conclusion. He says that it has been shown from what was said above that that to which coming to be is attributed is always composed.

And since, in any production, there is “that at which the coming to be is terminated” and “that to which the coming to be is attributed,” the latter of which has two parts—namely, the subject and the opposite—it is then clear that there are three things in any coming to be: the subject, the terminus of the production, and the opposite of this terminus.

Thus, when a man becomes musical, the opposite is the non-musical, the subject is the man, and musical is the terminus of the production. And, in like manner, shapelessness and lack of figure and lack of order are opposites, while bronze and gold and stone are subjects in artificial productions.