Lecture 15 — Matter is distinguished from privation and is neither generable nor corruptible per se

Others, indeed, have apprehended the nature in question, but not adequately. In the first place, they allow that a thing may come to be without qualification from not being, accepting on this point the statement of Parmenides. Second, they think that, if the substratum is one numerically, it must be also one in potency.

But this is a very different thing. For we distinguish matter and privation and hold that one of these, the matter, is non-being only accidentally, while the privation in its own nature is non-being, and that the matter is nearly, in a sense is, substance, while the privation in no sense is.

They, on the other hand, identify their great and small alike with not being, and that whether they are taken together as one or separately. Their triad is, therefore, of quite a different kind from ours. For they got so far as to see that there must be some underlying nature, but they make it one, and even if one philosopher makes a dyad of it, which he calls great and small, the effect is the same, for he overlooked the other nature.

For the one that persists is a joint cause, with the form, of what comes to be—a mother, as it were. But the negative part of the contrariety may often seem, if you concentrate your attention on it as an evil agent, not to exist at all. For admitting with them that there is something divine, good, and desirable, we hold that there is a principle contrary to it.

But there is another principle, which of its own nature desires and yearns for it.

But the consequence of their view is that the contrary desires its extinction. Yet the form cannot desire itself, for it is not defective; nor can the contrary desire it, for contraries are mutually destructive. The truth is that what desires the form is matter, as the female desires the male and the ugly the beautiful—only the ugly or the female not per se, but per accidens.

The matter comes to be and ceases to be in one sense, while in another it does not. As that which contains the privation, it ceases to be in its own nature, for what ceases to be—the privation—is contained within it.

But, as potentiality, it does not cease to be in its own nature, but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be.

For if it came to be, something must have existed as a primary substratum from which it should come and that should persist in it; but this is its own special nature, so that it will be before coming to be.

(For my definition of matter is just this—the primary substratum of each thing, from which it comes to be without qualification, and that persists in the result.)

And, if it ceases to be, it will pass into that at the last, so it will have ceased to be before ceasing to be.

The accurate determination of the first principle in respect of form, whether it is one or many and what it is or what they are, is the province of first philosophy, so these questions may stand over till then. But of the natural (that is, perishable) forms, we shall speak in the expositions that follow.

The above, then, may be taken as sufficient to establish that there are principles and what they are and how many there are. Now let us make a fresh start and proceed.

129. Having excluded the problems and errors of the ancient philosophers that stem from their ignorance of matter, the Philosopher here excludes the errors that stem from their ignorance of privation.

Concerning this, he makes three points.

First, he sets forth the mistakes of those who erred.

Second, at but this is a very different (192a2; [132]), he shows how this position differs from the truth determined by him above.

Third, at for the one that persists (192a13; [134]), he proves that his own opinion is true.

130. He therefore says first (191b35) that some philosophers touched upon matter but did not understand it sufficiently. For they did not distinguish between matter and privation. Hence, they attributed to matter what belongs to privation. And because privation, considered in itself, is non-being, they said that matter, considered in itself, is non-being. And so, just as a thing comes to be simply and per se from matter, so they believed that a thing comes to be simply and per se from non-being.

And they were led to hold this position for two reasons.

First, they were influenced by the argument of Parmenides, who said that whatever is other than being is non-being. Since, then, matter is other than being, because it is not being in act, they said that it is non-being simply.

Second, it seemed to them that that which is one in number or subject is also one in account. And Aristotle calls this a state of being one in potency, because things that are one in account are such that each has the same power. But things that are one in subject but not one in account do not have the same potency or power, as is clear in the white and the musical. But subject and privation are one in number, such as the bronze and the unshaped. Hence it seemed to them that they would be the same in account or in power. Hence this position accepts the unity of potency.

131. But, lest anyone, because of these words, be in doubt about what the potency of matter is and whether it is one or many, it must be pointed out that act and potency divide every genus of beings, as is clear in Metaphysics 9, (Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ.1; cf. St. Thomas, Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 9, lect. 1.) and in book 3 of the present work. (Lect. 3, n. 296.) Hence, just as the potency for quality is not something outside the genus of quality, so the potency for substantial being is not outside the genus of substance. Therefore, the potency of matter is not some property added to its essence. Rather, matter in its very substance is potency for substantial being. Moreover, the potency of matter is one in subject with respect to many forms. But, in its account, there are many potencies according to its relation to different forms. Hence, in book 3, it will be said that to be able to be healed and to be able to be ill differ according to account. (Lect. 2, n. 290.)

132. Next, at but this is a very different (192a2), he explains the difference between his own opinion and the opinion just given.

Concerning this, he makes two points.

First, he clarifies our understanding of his own opinion.

Second, at they, on the other hand (192a6; [133]), he shows what the other opinion holds.

He therefore says first that there is a great difference between a thing’s being one in number or subject and its being one in potency or account. For as is clear from the above, we say that matter and privation, although one in subject, are other in account. (Lect. 12, n. 104ff.; lect. 13, n. 112.)

And this is clear for two reasons.

First, matter is non-being accidentally, whereas privation is non-being per se. For “unshaped” signifies non-being, but “bronze” does not signify non-being except insofar as “unshaped” happens to be in it.

Second, matter is near to the thing and exists in some respect, because it is in potency to the thing and is in some respect the substance of the thing, since it enters into the constitution of the substance. But this cannot be said of privation.

133. Next, at they, on the other hand (192a6), he clarifies his understanding of the opinion of the Platonists. He says that the Platonists also held a certain duality on the part of matter, namely, the great and the small. But this duality is different from that of Aristotle. For Aristotle held that the duality was matter and privation, which are one in subject but different in account. But the Platonists did not hold that one of these is privation and the other matter; rather, they joined privation to both, namely, to the great and the small. They either took both of them together, not distinguishing in their speech between the great and the small, or else they took each one separately.

Hence it is clear that the Platonists, who posited form and the great and the small, held three principles completely different from those of Aristotle, who posited matter and privation and form. The Platonists realized more than the other ancient philosophers that it is necessary to suppose some one nature for all natural forms, which nature is prime matter. But they made it one both in subject and in account, not distinguishing between it and privation. For although they held a duality on the part of matter—namely, the great and the small—they made no distinction at all between matter and privation. Rather, they spoke only of matter, under which they included the great and the small. And they ignored privation, making no mention of it.

134. Next, at for the one which persists (192a13), he proves that his opinion is true.

Concerning this, he makes two points.

First, he states his position, namely, that it is necessary to distinguish privation from matter.

Second, at the matter comes to be (192a25; [139]), he shows how matter is corrupted or generated.

He treats the first point in two ways:

first, by presenting it;

second, by reducing the opposite opinion to the impossible, at but there is another principle (192a18; [136]).

135. Therefore, he says first (192a6) that this nature that is the subject—namely, matter—together with form, is a cause of the things that come to be according to nature after the manner of a mother. For just as a mother is a cause of generation by receiving, so also is matter.

But if one takes the other part of the contrariety—namely, the privation—we can imagine, by stretching our understanding, that it does not pertain to the constitution of the thing, but rather to some sort of evil for the thing. For privation is altogether non-being, since it is nothing other than the negation of a form in a subject and is outside the whole being. Thus, the argument of Parmenides that whatever is other than being is non-being has a place in regard to privation, but not in regard to matter, as the Platonists said.

He shows that privation would pertain to evil as follows. Form is something divine and very good and desirable. It is divine, because every form is a certain participation in the likeness of the divine being, which is pure act. For each thing is in act insofar as it has form. Form is very good, because act is the perfection of potency and is its good. It follows as a consequence of this that form is desirable, because every thing desires its own perfection. Privation, on the other hand, is opposed to form, since it is nothing other than the removal of form. Hence, since that which is opposed to the good and removes it is evil, it is clear that privation pertains to evil. Hence it follows that privation is not the same as matter, which is the cause of a thing like a mother.

136. Next, at but there is another principle (192a18), he proves the same thing by an argument that reduces the opposite position to the impossible in this way. Since form is a sort of good and is desirable, matter, which is other than privation and other than form, naturally seeks and desires form according to its nature. But, for those who do not distinguish matter from privation, this involves the problem that a contrary seeks its own corruption, which is absurd.

That this is so he shows as follows. If matter seeks form, it does not seek a form insofar as it is under this form. For in this latter case, the matter does not stand in need of being through this form (but every appetite exists because of a need, for an appetite is a desire for what is not possessed.)

In like manner, matter does not seek form insofar as it is under the contrary or privation, for one of the contraries is corruptive of the other, and thus something would seek its own corruption.

It is clear, therefore, that matter, which seeks form, is other in account than both form and privation. For if matter seeks form according to its proper nature, as was said, and if it is held that matter and privation are the same in account, it follows that privation seeks form, and thus seeks its own corruption, which is impossible.

Hence it is also impossible that matter and privation be the same in account. Nevertheless, matter is a this, namely, something having privation.

Hence, if the feminine seeks the masculine, and if the base seeks the good, this is not because baseness itself seeks the good, which is its contrary; rather, it seeks it accidentally, because that in which baseness happens to be seeks to be good.

And likewise femininity does not seek masculinity; rather, that in which the feminine happens to be seeks the masculine.

And in like manner, privation does not seek to be form; rather, that in which privation happens to be, matter, seeks to be form.

137. But Avicenna opposes this position of the Philosopher in three ways.

First, because matter has neither animal appetite (as is obvious in itself) nor natural appetite, whereby it would seek form. For matter does not have any form or power inclining it to anything—it is through form that, for example, the heavy naturally seeks the lowest place, insofar as it is inclined by its heaviness to such a place.

Second, he objects that, if matter seeks form, this is so because it lacks every form, or because it seeks to possess many forms at once—both of which are impossible—or because it dislikes the form that it has and seeks to have another form, and this also is meaningless. Hence it seems that we must say that matter in no way seeks form.

His third objection is as follows. To say that matter seeks form as the feminine seeks the masculine is to speak figuratively, namely, as a poet, not as a philosopher.

138. But it is easy to resolve objections of this sort. For we must note that everything that seeks something either knows that which it seeks and orders itself to it or else tends toward it by the ordination and direction of someone who knows, as the arrow tends toward a determinate mark by the direction and ordination of the archer. Therefore, natural appetite is nothing but the ordination of things to their end in accordance with their proper natures. However, a being in act is ordered to its end not only by an active power but also by its matter, insofar as it is potency. For form is the end of matter. Therefore, for matter to seek form is nothing other than matter being ordered to form as potency to act.

And, because matter still remains in potency to another form while it is under some form, there is always in it an appetite for form. This is not because of a dislike for the form that it has, nor because it seeks to be the contrary at the same time, but because it is in potency to other forms while it has some form in act.

Nor does he use a figure of speech here; rather, he uses an example. For it was said above (Lect. 13, n. 118.) that prime matter is knowable by way of proportion, insofar as it is related to substantial forms as sensible matters are related to accidental forms. And thus, in order to explain prime matter, it is necessary to use an example taken from sensible substances. Therefore, just as he used the example of unshaped bronze and the example of the non-musical man to explain matter, so now to explain matter he uses the example of the appetite of the woman for the man and the example of appetite of the base for the good. For this happens to these things insofar as they have something that is of the account of matter.

However, it must be noted that Aristotle is here arguing against Plato, who used such metaphorical expressions, likening matter to a mother and the feminine, and form to the masculine. And so, Aristotle uses Plato’s own metaphors against him.

139. Next, at the matter comes to be (192a25), he shows how matter is corrupted. He says that in a certain respect matter is corrupted and, in a certain respect, it is not. For insofar as privation is in it, it is corrupted when the privation ceases to be in it, as if we should say that unshaped bronze is corrupted when it ceases to be unshaped. But in itself, insofar as it is a certain being in potency, it is neither generated nor corruptible.

This is clear as follows. If matter should come to be, there would have to be something that is the subject from which it comes to be, as is clear from what was said above. (Lect. 12, nn. 104, 107ff.)

But that which is the first subject in generation is matter. For we say that matter is the first subject from which a thing comes to be per se and not per accidens, and is in the thing after it has come to be. (And privation differs from matter on both of these points. For privation is that from which a thing comes to be per accidens and is not in the thing after it has come to be.) It follows, therefore, that matter would be before it would come to be, which is impossible.

And, in like manner, everything that is corrupted is resolved into prime matter.

Therefore, at the very time that prime matter began to exist, it would be corrupted; and, thus, if prime matter is corrupted, it will have been corrupted before it is corrupted, which is impossible.

Therefore, it is impossible for prime matter to be generated and corrupted. But by this we do not deny that it comes into existence through creation.

140. Next, at the accurate determination (192a34), he indicates that, since the errors about matter and privation have been eliminated, then the errors and problems about form should also be eliminated. (Cf. lect. 14, n. 120.) For some have posited separated forms (that is, ideas), which they reduced to one first idea.

And so he says that first philosophy treats questions such as whether the formal principle is one or many, and how many there are, and what kind there are. Hence, these questions will be reserved for first philosophy. For form is a principle of existing, and being as such is the subject of first philosophy. But matter and privation are principles of mutable being, which is considered by the natural philosopher. Nevertheless, we shall treat of natural and corruptible forms in the following books on this discipline.

Finally, he summarizes what has been said. It has been determined that there are principles, what the principles are, and how many there are. But it is necessary to make a new start in our study of natural science, inquiring into the principles of the science.