Article 1 — Whether there is any procession in the divine persons

The first point of inquiry is whether there is any procession in the divine persons. (Parallel texts: ST I.27.1; In I Sent. 13.1; SCG IV.11.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that there are not. For whatsoever proceeds from a thing is distant from it. But the divine persons are not distant from one another. Thus, the Son says: I am in the Father and the Father in me (John 14:10): and the same applies to the Holy Spirit, namely, that he is in the Father and the Son and vice versa. Therefore, in God one person does not proceed from another.

Obj. 2: Nothing that pertains to motion can be properly attributed to God, just as nothing that indicates matter. Now, “procession” signifies a certain motion. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to God in its proper sense.

Obj. 3: Whatsoever proceeds is understood as prior to its procession, for the one proceeding is the subject of the procession. Now, in God nothing that proceeds can be understood as prior to the procession; for the divine essence does not proceed, just as neither is it begotten; and relation is not understood as prior to procession, but contrariwise, as we have already stated. (Q. 8, a. 3.) Therefore, procession is impossible in God.

Obj. 4: Just as everything that proceeds is from something, so also does it proceed to something. But that which proceeds to something is not self-subsistent. Therefore, seeing that the divine persons are self-subsistent, proceeding seems not to belong to them.

Obj. 5: Since nobler creatures are also more like God, what is found in the lower creatures but not in the higher is also not found in God; for instance, dimensive quantity, matter, and so forth. Now, procession is found in the lower creatures, where one individual engenders another of the same species, whereas this does not obtain in the higher creatures. Neither therefore in God is procession to be found.

Obj. 6: We should by no means attribute to God anything that is derogatory to his dignity. Now, the divine dignity consists most of all in his being the first cause of existence and not deriving existence from anything else; and this seems incompatible with procession, since whatsoever proceeds is in some way from another. Therefore, it must not be said that anything proceeds in God.

Obj. 7: A person is a “hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity.” But receiving from another (which is implied by procession) does not seem to pertain to dignity. Therefore, procession should not be ascribed to the divine persons as though it were a personal property.

Obj. 8: A thing must in some way be the cause of that which proceeds from it. But one divine person cannot be the cause of another; for one cannot be an intrinsic, that is, a formal or material cause, of the other, since in God there is no composition of form and matter; nor can it be an extrinsic cause, since one person is within the other. Hence, there is no procession in God.

Obj. 9: Whatsoever proceeds issues from another as from its principle. Now, one divine person cannot be described as the principle of another, because—since “principle” is said in reference to what comes from the principle—we should have to say that some divine person is from a principle, and this seems to belong to creatures alone. Hence, there is no procession in God.

Obj. 10: The word “principle” would seem to indicate priority, whereas, according to Athanasius, there is no priority or posterity in God. (Aquinas is referring to the Quicumque, also called the Athanasian creed (PG 28:1583); cf. above, q. 2, a. 5, obj. 1.) Therefore, one person is not the principle of another and one should not be described as proceeding from the other.

Obj. 11: Every principle is operative or productive. Now, one person is not productive or operative of another, else in God there would be something made or created. Therefore, a divine person has no principle and does not proceed.

Obj. 12: If B proceeds from A, B must have something in common with A and communicated to it by A, and something proper whereby it is distinguished from A; for nothing proceeds from its very self. Now, wherever there is something and something else there is composition. Therefore, wherever there is procession, there is composition. But there is no composition in God. Consequently, neither is there procession.

Obj. 13: That which proceeds from another receives something from it. Now, whatsoever receives something is of a needy nature, for if it did not need, it would not receive. For which reason, even in natural things receptivity is ascribed to matter. Therefore, whatsoever proceeds is by nature needy. But in God there is no such thing as need, for he is supremely perfect. Therefore, there is no procession in God.

Obj. 14: To this it will be replied that the recipient is imperfect when it exists before receiving, and when having received, it is in possession and no longer needy. Now, the Son and the Holy Spirit do receive from the Father, but they do not exist before receiving; and thus, they are not in need.

On the contrary, every creature is needy by nature, and yet it does not exist before receiving existence from God. Therefore, the fact of not existing before receiving does not disprove need.

Obj. 15: Whatsoever has a thing only by receiving it from another, considered in itself lacks that thing. Thus, air considered in itself lacks light, which it receives from something else. If, then, the Son and the Holy Spirit have being only through receiving it from the Father (which one must say if they proceed from the Father), it follows of necessity that considered in themselves they are nothing. Now, that which considered in itself is nothing, if it receive being from another, must necessarily come from nothing and consequently must be a creature. If, then, the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father, they must be creatures; and this is the blasphemy of Arius. Therefore, there is no procession in God.

Obj. 16: That which proceeds from something proceeds so that it might exist. But what proceeds so that it might exist did not always exist; for example, what proceeds to a place was not always in that place. But the divine persons are eternal. Therefore, no divine person proceeds.

Obj. 17: The principle from which something proceeds has a certain authority over that which proceeds from it as from a principle. If, then, one divine person proceeds from another, for instance, the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father, there must be in the Father some authority over the Son and the Holy Spirit. And thus, since authority is a kind of dignity, there will be a dignity in the Father that is not in the Son and the Holy Spirit; and consequently, there will be inequality in the divine persons—which is contrary to the Athanasian statement that in the Trinity there is neither priority nor posteriority, neither greater nor lesser: but all three persons are coeternal and coequal with one another. (Athanasius, Athanasian Creed 8 (PG 28:1583).) Therefore, there is no procession in the divine persons.

On the contrary (1), the Son says: from God I proceeded and came (John 8:42).

Furthermore (2), it is stated that the Spirit of truth proceeds from the Father (John 15:26). Therefore, there is procession in the divine persons.

I answer that in us intellectual knowledge takes its beginning from the imagination and the senses, which do not extend beyond the continuous. For this reason, based on the things that are found in the continuous we transfer names to all the things that we grasp with our intellect. This is clear, for instance, in the word “distance,” which is found first in place and is afterwards transferred to any difference of forms; wherefore, all contraries of any genus whatsoever are said to be the most distant, although distance is found first of all in a where, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3–4, 1054b25–1055a10.)

In like manner, the term “procession” was first found to signify that local movement whereby a thing in an orderly way passes from one place through intermediate places sequentially to an extreme place; and from this it is transferred to signify everything in which there is some order of one from another or after another. Hence, we apply the word “procession” to all kinds of movement: for instance, we say that a body proceeds from whiteness to blackness, or from a great to a small quantity, or from non-being to being, and vice versa, and in like manner we use the word “procession” where there is some emanation of one thing from another. For example, we say that the ray proceeds from the sun, and every activity from the actor, and so even the thing done, as the artwork from the artisan, or the thing generated from the generator, and universally we signify such order of all things with the name “procession.”

Now, activity is twofold. There is an activity that passes from the one acting into something extrinsic, as heating passes from fire into wood, and this activity is not a perfection of the one acting but of the thing brought about, since the fire gains nothing by its heating, whereas the thing heated acquires heat. Another activity does not pass into something outside but remains in the one acting, such as understanding, sensation, willing, and the like. But these activities are perfections of the one acting, for the intellect is not perfect except by actually understanding, nor are the senses except by actually sensing.

The first genus of activities is common to the living and the non-living, whereas the second genus is proper to living things. Wherefore, if we take “movement” in a wide sense for any sort of activity—as the Philosopher takes it in On the Soul 3, where it is stated that sensing and understanding are a certain movement, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432a15–18.) not indeed the movement that is the act of the imperfect, as defined in Physics 3, but that which is the act of the perfect (Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 201a3–b5.)—it would seem proper to something living; and it is in this account that something seems to be the mover of its very self. For whenever we observe that a thing acts through itself and in itself in whatever way, we say that it lives; and in this sense Plato says that the first mover moves its very self. (Plato, Timaeus 30a–34a.)

However, a certain procession is found in creatures according to both genera of activity. In regard to the first genus, we say that the thing generated proceeds from its generator and the thing made from its maker. With regard to the second genus of activity, we say that a word proceeds from a speaker and love from a lover. And we attribute both genera of activity to God: we attribute to God the genus of activity passing into something else that is extrinsic insofar as we say that he creates, preserves, and governs all things. Nor by this do we signify that any perfection accrues to God by such an activity, but rather that the creature acquires perfection from the divine perfection.

We attribute the other genus of activity to God insofar as we say that he himself is understanding and willing, whereby we indicate his own perfection. For he would not be if did not actually understand and will; and for this reason we acknowledge him to be living.

Therefore, according to each activity we attribute a procession to God. According to the first kind of activity we speak of divine wisdom or goodness as proceeding to created things, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, and even of created things as proceeding from God. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 9.3, 9.9 (PG 3:911–12, 915–16).) As regards the second kind of activity we say that there is in God a procession of Word and Love; and this is the procession of the person of the Son from the Father, who is his Word, and of the Holy Spirit, who is his Love and life-giving breath. Hence, Athanasius, in a discourse pronounced in the Council of Nicaea, says that the Arians, (In the letter against those who said that the Holy Spirit is a creature. Cf. Letter to Serapion 1.22–28, 2.5, 2.9 (PG 26:581–96, 615, 621–24).) through maintaining that the Son and Holy Spirit are not consubstantial with the Father, seemed in consequence to say that God is not a living and intelligent being, but dead and mindless.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the procession that is viewed according to an activity passing into something extrinsic. But the divine persons do not proceed in this way; rather, it is more through the mode of a procession that is viewed according to an activity remaining within the one acting. For what proceeds in this way is not distant from that from which it proceeds, just as a human word is in the intellect of the speaker and not distant from him.

Reply Obj. 2: Insofar as it signifies a local movement, “procession” is not said to be in the divine persons, but rather insofar as it indicates a certain order of emanation.

Reply Obj. 3: In a procession that is a local movement, it is necessary that the one proceeding be understood in advance of the procession, since it is the subject thereof, but in a procession that indicates an order of origin, the one proceeding stands to the procession as its terminus. Hence, if the one proceeding be composed of matter and form and is brought into being by generation, the matter exists before the procession as its subject, whereas the form or even the composite follows, according to the intellect, the procession as its terminus; for example, when fire proceeds from fire by generation. But when that which proceeds is not composite but a pure form, or even if it be brought into being by creation—the terminus of which is the whole substance—then that which proceeds is in no way understood as prior to the procession, but rather vice versa. Thus, the creature is not understood as prior to its creation, nor brightness to its procession from the sun, nor a word to its proceeding from its speaker—and likewise, neither the Word as to his procession from the Father.

Reply Obj. 4: According to a procession that indicates an order of origin, something can proceed as self-subsistent without relation to another thing; although as regards a local procession, something does not proceed so as to subsist in itself simply, but so as to be in a place. Such procession, however, is not in the divine persons.

Reply Obj. 5: In intellectual substances, which are the most noble creatures, there is also procession according to the activities of intellect and will; and in this respect the image of the uncreated Trinity is in them. In them, however, word and love are not subsistent persons; for their understanding and willing are not their very substance. Rather, this is proper to God; hence in God, word and love proceed as subsistent persons, but not so in the intellectual creatures.

Reply Obj. 6: It would be derogatory to God’s dignity to originate from something essentially diverse, for this is proper to the creature, but to originate from that which is consubstantial pertains more to the divine perfection. For there would not be perfection in the divine nature unless the understanding and willing there were actual. And this being the case, it is necessary to assert in God the procession of Word and Love.

Reply Obj. 7: Although receiving does not in itself connote perfection, it does imply perfection on the part of the one from whom something is received; and especially in the divine persons, who receive the fullness of the Godhead.

Reply Obj. 8: Seldom or never do the Latin doctors employ the word “cause” to signify the origin of the divine persons. For with us cause connotes an effect; wherefore, lest we be forced to say that the Son and Holy Spirit are made, we do not say that the Father is their cause. Further, with us the word “cause” signifies something diverse in its essence, for we call a “cause” that on which something else follows. Further, the gentile philosophers apply the word “cause” to God to denote his relation to created things; for they say that God is the first cause and that created things are his effects. Hence, lest anyone suspect that the Son and the Holy Spirit should be reckoned among created things, differing essentially from God, we avoid the word “cause” when we speak of God. On the other hand, the Greeks employ the word “cause” more absolutely when speaking of God, signifying only origin thereby; wherefore, they apply the word “cause” to the divine persons. For an expression may be objectionable in Latin, whereas in Greek it is admissible on account of a peculiarity of idiom. And if in speaking of God we admit the use of the word “cause” in Greek, it does not follow that it is being taken in the same way as when applied to creatures, insofar as it is divided by philosophers into the four genera.

Reply Obj. 9: Of all the terms relating to origin, the word “principle” is most appropriate to God. For since we are unable to comprehend the things of God, it is more fitting for us to indicate them by means of general terms that have an indefinite meaning, than to employ special words that express a species of thing in a definite way. Wherefore, the name “He who is” is said to be most appropriate (Exod 3:13–14), seeing that according to Damascene it signifies the infinite sea of substance. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.9 (PG 94:835).) Now, just as “cause” is a more general term than “element,” which denotes something primary and simple in the genus of material cause, so is “principle” a more general term than “cause.” Thus, the first part of a movement or of a line is called a principle but not a cause. From this it is clear that a principle may be something that is not distinct according to essence, as a point in relation to a line, whereas a cause cannot, especially if we speak of an originating, that is, an efficient, cause. Now, though the Father is said to be the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit, it does not seem right to say without qualification that the Son or Holy Spirit is derived from a principle, although the Greeks use the expression, which may be allowed to pass, if understood aright. Nevertheless, we must avoid using words that seem to indicate any diminution, lest they be attributed to the Son or the Holy Spirit and we fall into the error of the Arians. Thus, Hilary, while granting that the Father is greater than the Son on account of his pre-eminence as origin, (The Marietti edition is here choosing an alternative reading of the Latin text, taking into account the passage’s context. As the Marietti edition points out, in Aquinas’s small work, Contra errores Graecorum (Against the Errors of the Greeks), ch. 2, we read: secundum quem modum dicit Hilarius, quod Pater est maior Filio, propter auctoritatem originis, that is, “In the same way, Hilary says that the Father is greater than the Son, on account of the production of origin.”) denies that the Son is less than the Father, since he received equality of being from him. (Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity 7.15, 7.22, 7.37 (PL 10:211, 217–18, 230–31).) Likewise, we must not stress such terms as subordinate authority and derivation from a principle in the Son, although we employ the words authority and principle in speaking of the Father.

Reply Obj. 10: Although “principle,” according to the account of the name, is derived from “priority,” it is imposed not for the sake of signifying priority but rather origin, just as the word “stone” (lapis) is not imposed for the sake of signifying the hurt done to the foot (laesio pedis), although the name would seem to be taken from this. Thus, although the Father is not prior to the Son, he is his principle.

Reply Obj. 11: Not every principle is active or productive, for in neither way is a point the principle of a line.

Reply Obj. 12: In the Son, there is something common to the Father, namely, the essence; and something whereby he is distinguished from the Father, namely, the relation. Nonetheless, there is no composition here, because the relation is the essence in reality, as we have explained in previous discussions. (Q. 8, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 13: The recipient before receiving is in need—since he receives in order to supply his need—but after receiving, he no longer needs, since he has what he needed. If, then, there be something that does not exist before receiving, but is always in the state of having received, it is by no means in need. Now, the Son does not receive from the Father as though he previously did not have and afterwards received; rather, he receives because the very thing that he is he has from the Father. Hence, it does not follow that he is in need.

Reply Obj. 14: The creature receives from God a certain existence that would not endure unless it were divinely preserved; wherefore, even after it has received existence, it needs the divine activity to preserve it in existence, and in this way it is of a needy nature. However, the Son receives from the Father numerically the same existence and numerically the same nature as the Father possesses; wherefore, he is not of a needy nature.

Reply Obj. 15: The Son is considered in himself in reference to that which he has absolutely, and this is the essence of the Father: and in this respect he is not nothing, but one with the Father. And if we consider him in reference to the Father, we conceive him as receiving being from the Father; wherefore, thus again he is not nothing. Consequently, in no sense is the Son nothing. He would, however, be nothing considered in himself if there were anything absolute in him distinct from the Father, as is the case with creatures.

Reply Obj. 16: The Son does indeed proceed such that he may exist, but his procession is eternal, just as the procession of light from the sun is coeval with the sun; wherefore, the Son also is eternal.

Reply Obj. 17: The authority in the Father is nothing but the relation of a principle. Now, the equal and the unequal are not spoken of according to relation but according to quantity, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.6, 6.4 (PL 42:914–15, 927).) Hence, the Son is not unequal to the Father.