Article 2 — Whether there is only one procession in God or more than one

The second point of inquiry is whether there is only one procession in God, or more than one. (Parallel texts: ST I.27.3; In I Sent. 13.2; SCG IV.19; De rationibus fidei, ch. 3.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that there is but one. For in On the Trinity, Boethius says that, in God, procession is substantial. (Boethius, On the Trinity 4–6 (PL 64:1252–56).) Now, in God what is substantial is not multiplied. Therefore, there are not several processions in God.

Obj. 2: To this it will be replied that the processions in God are not distinguished through a distinction of substance, which is communicated according to the procession and by reason of which the processions are called “substantial”; rather, they are distinguished through their very selves.

On the contrary, whenever a number of things are distinguished from one another, either they are distinguished through a division of matter, for instance, individuals of the same species, or formally, as things that differ either in genus or species. Now, in the divine, they are not distinguished in procession according to the mode of things that are distinguished materially, since God is altogether immaterial. Wherefore, it follows that all distinction in God is according to the mode of things that are distinguished formally. Now, all formal distinction is by reason of some opposition, especially in things of the same genus; for a genus is divided by contrary differences whereby species are distinguished, as is said in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054a26–b32.) Accordingly, if processions are distinguished in the divine, this is by reason of some opposition. But processions, actions, and movements are not mutually opposed except by reason either of their principles or of their termini, as is clear with heating and chilling, ascent and descent. Therefore, the divine processions cannot be distinguished through their very selves; but if they be distinguished, this must be either on the part of the principle of the procession or on the part of the terminus, that is, the person in whom the procession terminates.

Obj. 3: Things that can exist together are not distinctive of things; for example, white and sweet do not differentiate two substances, since they can be in the same thing; for the reason why one thing is distinguished from another is that the one cannot be the other. Now, the fact that certain things cannot be together comes from the nature of some opposition; for things are said to be opposed when they cannot be together. Hence, nothing is distinguished from something else except by reason of some opposition; for even in a division that is according to matter, an opposition is attended to in regard to position, since the same division is according to quantity. If, then, there cannot be an opposition of processions except by reason of the termini or principles, as stated above, (Q. 10, a. 2, obj. 2.) it is impossible that the processions be distinguished through their very selves.

Obj. 4: But it will be replied that the divine processions are distinguished in that one is through the mode of nature, namely, the procession of the Son, and the other through the mode of will, namely, the procession of the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, that which proceeds naturally proceeds through the mode of nature, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father naturally, for Athanasius says that he is the natural Spirit of the Father. (Athanasius, Letter to Serapion 1.2, 1.16–17 (PG 26:531–34, 567–72).) Therefore, he proceeds through the mode of nature.

Obj. 5: The will is free and consequently, that which proceeds through the mode of will proceeds by way of liberty. If, then, the Holy Spirit proceeds through the mode of will, he must proceed through the mode of liberty. Now, that which proceeds through the mode of liberty is able both to proceed and not to proceed, and to proceed in this or not to this degree; for what is done freely is not determined to one thing. Therefore, the Father could produce the Holy Spirit or not, and could give him whatsoever measure of greatness he wished. Hence, it follows that the Holy Spirit is a possible being and not a being necessarily existing through itself; and thus, he would not be of the divine nature, which is the heresy of Macedonius.

Obj. 6: Hilary, in assigning the difference between creatures and the Son, says that the will of God bestowed on all creatures their substance, while the Son received his substance from the Father by a natural birth. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 24.58 (PL 10:520).) Therefore, if the Holy Spirit proceeds through the mode of will, it follows that he proceeds in the same way as creatures.

Obj. 7: In God, nature and will differ only according to account. If, then, the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in that one is through the mode of nature and the other through the mode of will, it follows that the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit differ only in account; and thus, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinct persons.

Obj. 8: But it will be replied that the spirative and generative powers in the Father differ only in account, and yet there is a real distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit; and likewise nature and will can constitute a real distinction in processions and proceeding persons, although they differ only in account.

On the contrary, the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by things that are in them. But the generative power is not in the Son, nor is the spirative power in the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinguished by these things.

Obj. 9: The generation that is procession through the mode of nature is shown to be in God by the fact that its likeness is communicated to the creature, according to Isaiah 66:9, shall I that give generation to others be barren? But the procession through the mode of will is not communicated to the creature, since nothing created is found to receive its nature otherwise than through the mode of generation. Therefore, in God there is no procession through the mode of will.

Obj. 10: A mode adds something to a thing and consequently makes a composition, especially if there be a number of modes. Now, in God there is utter simplicity. Consequently, there are not a number of modes in him such that one could say that the Son proceeds by one mode, namely, through the mode of nature, and the Holy Spirit by another, namely, through the mode of the will.

Obj. 11: In God, the will differs from nature no more than does the intellect. But in God there is no procession through the mode of intellect other than through the mode of nature. Therefore, neither is there another procession through the mode of the will besides that which is through the mode of nature.

Obj. 12: It will be replied that the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from that of the Son in that the procession of the Son is solely from one who does not proceed, namely, the Father, whereas the procession of the Holy Spirit is both from one who does not proceed and from one who does, and simultaneously, namely, from the Father and the Son.

On the contrary, if we allow that there are two processions in God, they must differ either numerically only or specifically. If only numerically, it follows that both must be called “generation” or “birth,” and each of the proceeding persons must be called “Son.” And if they differ specifically, the nature communicated by the procession must differ specifically; for thus, the procession of a man and a horse from their respective principles differ specifically, whereas the procession of Socrates and Plato do not. Since, then, there is but one divine nature, there cannot be several specifically different processions because one is from one who proceeds and the other not.

Obj. 13: The Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinguished in the way creatures that differ specifically are, for they are hypostases of one nature. Now, processions whereby things proceed that are one in species but different numerically, do not themselves differ specifically, like the generation of Socrates and that of Plato. Therefore, the procession of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit are not specifically distinct processions.

Obj. 14: Just as it is possible for one to proceed from one who proceeds, so is it possible for one to be born of one who was born; this is clear among human beings, where one who is born from another has himself another born from him. If, then, there are two processions in God through the fact that another person proceeds from one who proceeds, there could likewise be two generations through the fact that another person is begotten of the one who is begotten.

Obj. 15: If the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the procession of the Son, in that the Holy Spirit proceeds from one who does not proceed and from one who does, that is, from Father and Son, then either he proceeds from them inasmuch as they are one or inasmuch as they are several. If inasmuch as they are several, it follows that the Holy Spirit is composite; for one simple thing cannot proceed otherwise than from one as from a principle, and if he proceeds from them inasmuch as they are one, it makes no difference whether he proceed from both or from one only. Consequently, the procession of the Holy Spirit cannot differ from that of the Son by the fact that the Son proceeds from one alone and the Holy Spirit from two.

Obj. 16: Procession is divided alongside paternity and filiation, for these are called the three personal properties. Now, in God there is but one paternity and one filiation. Therefore, there is likewise but one procession.

Obj. 17: In creatures, there is but one mode of procession whereby the nature is communicated, for which reason the Commentator says that animals generated by seed are not of the same species as those that are engendered by rotting matter and without seed. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics 7.4, 8.6.) Now, the divine nature is one only. Therefore, it cannot be communicated by more than one mode of procession. Therefore, there are not several processions in God.

Obj. 18: The Son proceeds from the Father as brilliance, according to Hebrews 1:3, who, being the brilliance of his glory: and this because he proceeds from the Father as coeternal with him, as brilliance from the sun or a fire. But the Holy Spirit likewise proceeds from the Father as coeternal with him. Therefore, he proceeds from him in the same way as the Son; and thus, there are not several processions in God.

Obj. 19: The eternal procession of the divine person is the model and cause of the temporal procession of the creature and of whatsoever is in the creature. Hence, Augustine in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis explains Genesis 1, he spoke . . . and it was made, thus: he begot the Word in whom it was that it might be made. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.6 (PL 34:267–68).) Now, the Son is the perfect model and cause of the creature’s production. Therefore, there is no need of another procession of a divine person besides that of the Son.

Obj. 20: The more perfect a nature, the fewer the things through which it works. Now, the divine nature is most perfect. Since, then, one created nature is communicated by only one mode of procession, neither could the divine nature be communicated by more than one mode of procession.

Obj. 21: From one simple thing only one thing can proceed. Now, the Father is one simple thing. Therefore, there can be but one procession from him; and thus, there are not several processions in God.

Obj. 22: A thing is said to be generated inasmuch as it receives a form; for in created realities, generation is a change terminating at a form. Now, the Holy Spirit by proceeding receives a form, that is, the divine essence, of which it is said: who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God (Phil 2:6). Therefore, the procession of the Holy Spirit is generation; and thus, it does not differ from the generation of the Son.

Obj. 23: Nativity is the way to nature, as the very word implies. Now the divine nature is communicated to the Holy Spirit through his procession. Therefore, the procession of the Holy Spirit is nativity; thus, it differs not from the procession of the Son, and consequently, there are not two processions in God.

On the other hand, it would seem that there are more than two processions in God.

Obj. 1: There is a procession through the mode of nature, in respect of which the Son is named, and a procession through the mode of intellect, in respect of which the Word is named, and a procession through the mode of will, in respect of which the proceeding Love is named. Therefore, there are three processions in God.

Obj. 2: It will be replied that in God the procession through the mode of nature is one and the same as the procession through the mode of intellect; for the Son is the same person as the Word.

On the contrary, the processions of created things are modeled on the processions of the divine persons; wherefore, it is said of God the Father that of him all paternity in heaven and earth is named (Eph 3:15). Now, in creatures, the procession of nature, whereby a man begets a man, is other than the processions of the intellect, whereby intellect produces its word. Therefore, neither in God is there a distinction between procession through the mode of intellect and procession through the mode of nature.

Obj. 3: According to Dionysius, it belongs to the divine goodness that it proceed. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 3.1, 3.4–5 (PG 3:635–42).) Now, the Father is supremely good. Therefore, he proceeds. Hence, in God there are three processions, one whereby the Father proceeds, another whereby the Son proceeds, and a third whereby the Holy Spirit proceeds.

On the contrary, it would seem that in God there are but two processions. For Augustine says in On the Trinity 5 that the procession of the Son is a begetting or nativity, but the procession of the Holy Spirit is not a nativity, yet both are ineffable. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.14–15 (PL 42:920–22).) Therefore, in God there are but two distinct processions.

I answer that the early doctors of the faith were compelled to discuss matters of faith on account of the insistence of heretics.

Thus, Arius thought that existence from another was incompatible with the divine nature; wherefore, he maintained that the Son and the Holy Spirit, whom Holy Scripture describes as being from another, are creatures. In order to refute this error, the holy fathers had to show that it is not impossible for something to proceed from God the Father and yet be co-essential with him, inasmuch as it receives from him the same nature as the Father has.

But because the Son, in that he receives from the Father the latter’s nature, is said to be born or begotten of the Father, whereas the Holy Spirit is not said in the Scriptures to be born or begotten even though he is said to be from God, Macedonius thought that the Holy Spirit is not co-essential with the Father but rather is his creature. For he did not believe it possible for anyone to receive from another the latter’s nature unless he were born of him and were his son. Hence, he thought that if the Holy Spirit received from the Father the nature and essence, it must infallibly follow that he was begotten and a Son. Wherefore, to exclude this error, it was necessary for our doctors to show that the divine nature can be communicated by a twofold procession, one being a begetting or nativity, and the other not; and this is to seek the distinction between processions in the divine.

Accordingly, some have maintained that the processions in God are distinguished through their very selves. The reason for this view was that they held that the relations do not distinguish the divine hypostases but only manifest their distinction; for they thought relations in God were according to the mode of individual properties in created realities, which latter do not cause but only manifest the distinction between individuals. They say, then, that in God the hypostases are distinct only by their origin. And seeing that those things whereby certain things are distinguished primarily must be distinguished by their very selves—like the opposite differences whereby species differ are distinguished by their very selves, otherwise one would go on to infinity—they maintain that the divine processions are distinguished by their very selves.

But this cannot be true. For one thing is distinguished from another specifically by that from which it has its species, and numerically by that by which it is individuated. Now, the difference between the divine processions must not be merely like things that differ only numerically but also like things that differ specifically, since one is a generation and the other not. Consequently, the divine processions are distinguished according to that from which they have their species. But no procession, activity, or movement has its species from itself, but rather from its terminus or principle. Hence, it is futile to say that any processions are distinguished by their very selves; rather, they must be distinguished in relation either to their principles or termini.

Wherefore, some have said that in God the processions are distinguished in relation to their principles, in the way in which I say that one procession is through the mode of nature or intellect, and the other through the mode of will, since the terms “intellect” and “will” seem to indicate principles of activities and processions.

But if we consider the matter carefully, we shall easily see that this does not suffice for the distinction of the divine persons unless something else be added. For since in that which proceeds one must find a likeness to the principle of the procession, just as in created realities a likeness to the form of the generator must be in the thing generated, it follows—if processions in God are distinguished by the fact that the principle of one is the nature or intellect, while that of the other is the will—that in the one proceeding according to one procession there will be found something pertaining only to nature or intellect, and in the other something that pertains only to the will: which is evidently false. For by the one procession, which is of the Son from the Father, the latter communicates to the Son all that he has: nature, intelligence, power, and will, and whatsoever is attributed to him absolutely; wherefore, as the Son is the Word, that is, wisdom begotten, so may he be called the begotten nature, will, or power, namely, that received by generation, or rather the recipient of these by generation.

Hence, it is plain that, since all the essential attributes concur towards the one procession of the Son, the difference between the processions cannot be found to be according to the different accounts of the attributes, such that one attribute were communicated by one procession, and another by another procession. Now, whereas the terminus of a procession is having (since a divine person proceeds so as to have what he receives by proceeding), and processions are distinguished by their termini, it follows of necessity that, in God, just as the one having is distinguished, so is the one proceeding distinguished. Now, in God, he who has is not distinguished from he who has by the fact that the one has these attributes and the other has those, but by the fact that the one has the same things from the other. For the Son has all that the Father has. Yet in this is he distinguished from the Father, that he has them from the Father.

Accordingly, one proceeding person is distinguished from the other proceeding person not because the one by proceeding receives some things while the other receives other things, but because one receives from the other. Hence, whatever is found in a divine procession that can at once be understood as being in one procession without any other procession being presupposed, belongs to one procession only; but one will at once find another procession if those same things that were received by the first procession are again derived to another procession.

Thus, it is only the order of processions, which is viewed according to their origin, that multiplies processions in God.

Hence, fittingly, some (who have held that one procession is through the mode of intellect and nature and the other through the mode of will) have said that the procession according to nature and intellect does not presuppose another procession, whereas the procession through the mode of will does presuppose another procession. For the love for some reality cannot proceed from the will except on the presupposition that the conceived word of that reality has already proceeded from the intellect; for the good understood is the object of the will.

Reply Obj. 1: Procession in God is said to be substantial because it is not viewed in reference to some accident; but rather, through it the proceeding person receives substance.

Reply Obj. 2–3: The second and third objections are granted.

Reply Obj. 4: There is nothing to prevent something proceeding from the will naturally. For the will naturally tends to the ultimate end, just as every other power naturally works to attain its own object. Hence it is that man naturally desires happiness, and in like manner God naturally loves his own goodness, just as he naturally understands his own truth. Accordingly, just as the Son as Word naturally proceeds from the Father, so the Holy Spirit naturally proceeds from him as Love. The Holy Spirit does not, however, proceed through the mode of nature, because in God to proceed through the mode of nature is to proceed in the same way as in creatures things are produced by nature and not by the will. Wherefore, to be produced naturally and to be produced through the mode of nature differ, for a thing is said to be produced naturally on account of the natural orientation it has with its own principle, whereas it is said to be produced through the mode of nature if it is produced by some principle producing the way the nature produces.

Reply Obj. 5: As Augustine teaches, the natural necessity under which the will is said to will a thing of necessity—happiness, for instance—is not incompatible with freedom of will. For freedom of will is opposed to violence or compulsion. (Augustine, City of God 5.10 (PL 41:152–53).) Now, there is no violence or compulsion when a thing is moved in accordance with the order of its own nature, but there is if its natural movement be hindered, as when a heavy body is prevented from moving down towards the center. Hence, the will freely desires happiness, although it desires it necessarily. And thus also, God by his own will freely loves his very self, although he loves his very self of necessity. Moreover, it is necessary that he love his very self as much as he is good, even as he understands his very self as much as he is. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father freely, not however potentially but necessarily. Nor was it possible for him to proceed as less than the Father; rather, it was necessary for him to be equal to the Father, even as the Son, who is the Father’s Word.

Reply Obj. 6: The creature does not proceed from the divine will naturally or necessarily; for although God by his will naturally and necessarily loves his goodness, and the Love thus proceeding is the Holy Spirit, yet neither naturally nor necessarily does he will creatures to be produced, but gratuitously. For creatures are not the ultimate end of the divine will, nor does the goodness of God (who is the ultimate end) depend on them, since nothing from creatures is added to the divine goodness, just as man too of necessity wills happiness but not the things ordained to happiness.

Reply Obj. 7: Although nature and will in God differ not in reality but only in account, nevertheless he who proceeds through the mode of will must be distinct from him who proceeds through the mode of nature, and the one procession must differ from the other. For we have already stated that to proceed through the mode of nature means to proceed from something in the same way as does that which proceeds from the nature, and that to proceed through the mode of will means to proceed as does that which proceeds from the will. Now, the will does not produce something without a presupposed procession. For the will does not tend toward something without the previous production of the intellect conceiving something, since the good understood moves the will. Now, the procession from a natural agent does not presuppose another procession, except accidentally, inasmuch as one natural agent depends on another natural agent; but this does not pertain to the account of the nature as nature. Therefore, in God this procession through the mode of nature is one that presupposes no other, while the procession through the mode of will has its beginning from a procession that is presupposed. Hence, there must be a procession from a procession, and a proceeding person from a proceeding person: and this makes for a real difference in the divine.

Reply Obj. 8: The eighth objection is granted.

Reply Obj. 9: God has implanted in created things a likeness to both processions. But nonetheless, by the procession that is through the mode of nature, the nature in created realities can be communicated, since an effect is like its agent as such. Wherefore, by an action whereof the nature is the principle, the effect can receive the nature. But by an action whereof the will is the principle, the effect can receive only a likeness of what is in the will, for instance, a likeness of an end or form, as is clear in the products of art. But whatsoever is in God is the divine nature; consequently, the nature must be communicated by either procession.

Reply Obj. 10: When we speak of procession in God through the mode of nature or will, we do not ascribe to God a mode as though it were a quality added to the divine substance; rather, we indicate a comparative likeness between the divine processions and the processions to be observed in created realities.

Reply Obj. 11: In God, there is no distinction between procession through the mode of intellect and procession through the mode of nature. But there is a distinction between both of these and the procession through the mode of will, and this for three reasons.

First, because just as procession through the mode of nature does not presuppose another procession, so neither does procession through the mode of intellect; however, procession through the mode of will necessarily presupposes procession through the mode of intellect.

Second, because just as nature produces something in likeness to itself, so also does the intellect both within and without: within, as a word is the likeness of the reality understood and of the intellect understanding its very self; without, as a form understood is introduced into a work of art. On the other hand, the will does not produce its own likeness either within or without: not within, because love, which is the internal procession of the will, is not a likeness of the will or the thing willed, but a certain impression left in the will by the thing willed, or a certain union of the one to the other; nor without, because the will imprints on the artwork the form that, in the order of reason, was understood before it was willed; wherefore, it is a likeness principally of the intellect, though secondarily of the will.

Third, because a procession of nature is from only one agent, if the agent be perfect. Nor does it matter that in animals one is generated of two, namely, the father and mother, for the father alone is agent in generation while the mother is patient. Likewise, the procession of the intellect is from one only, whereas friendship, which is mutual love, proceeds from the two loving each other.

Reply Obj. 12: Although properly speaking genus and species, or universal and particular, are not predicated of God, nevertheless, insofar as we speak of the divine according to a certain likeness to creatures, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinguished as several individuals of one species, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.4 (PG 94:997–98).)

It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of considering the species in a certain individual in the genus of substance: in one way, the species of hypostasis itself; in another way, the species of the property of the individual. For given that Socrates is white and Plato black, and granting that white and black are properties individuating Socrates and Plato, it will be true to say that Socrates and Plato are one in the species under which their hypostases are contained. For they agree in humanity, but differ in the species of their property, for white and black differ specifically. It is the same with the Father and the Son. For they are considered as one in the species of which their hypostases are supposits, in that they agree in the one nature of Godhead, but they are found to differ according to the species of personal property, since paternity and filiation are relations differing in species. It must also be observed that, in created things, generation is through itself ordered to the species, for nature intends to generate a man; wherefore, the specific nature is also multiplied by generation in created things. But in God, procession is directed to the multiplication of hypostases in which the divine nature is found to be numerically one. Wherefore, in God the processions are quasi-specifically different by reason of the difference between the personal properties, although in the proceeding persons there is one common nature.

Reply Obj. 13–14: This suffices for the replies to the thirteenth and fourteenth objections.

Reply Obj. 15: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from many if reference be made to the spirating supposits. For because the Holy Spirit is the mutual love and bond of two, he must be spirated by two. But if reference be made to that whereby they spirate, he proceeds from them insofar as they are one in the divine nature: since God can proceed only from God.

Reply Obj. 16: Procession, which is divided against paternity and filiation, is the personal property of the Holy Spirit; and although it is a relation, yet since it is not named, as are paternity and filiation, it is signified by the name “procession,” just as if filiation were unnamed and signified under the name “nativity,” which is the special name of the Son’s procession. Now, the procession of the Holy Spirit has no special name because, as already stated, in creatures no nature is found to be communicated by such a mode of procession. And we transfer names from creatures to divine things. Hence, it does not follow that in God there is only one common procession.

Reply Obj. 17: In a creature that is receptive to accidents, there can be something that is not the thing’s nature, but not in God. For this reason, in God the nature is communicated according to any mode of procession whatsoever, unlike in creatures. For although there are various processions in them, still the nature is communicated in one way only.

Reply Obj. 18: To proceed from the Father according to the mode of coeternity belongs to the Son’s procession inasmuch as it is a divine procession; wherefore, this applies also to the procession of the Holy Spirit. Yet it does not belong to the procession of the Son insofar as it is distinct from the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 19: The Son is a sufficient type of the temporal procession of the creature insofar as he is the Word and exemplar, but the Holy Spirit must be the type of that procession inasmuch as he is Love. For just as it is said that God made all things by his Word (Wis 9:1), so is it stated that he loves all things that are and hates none of the things which he has made (Wis 11:25); and Dionysius says that God’s love did not permit him to be barren. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.10 (PG 3:707–8).)

Reply Obj. 20: Perfect nature is capable of many activities, although a few things suffice it for each activity.

Reply Obj. 21: From the one and only Father there is only one procession, namely, of the Son, but from the Father and Son together, there is another procession, that of the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 22: The procession of the Holy Spirit is a procession of love. Now, by a procession of love nothing is produced as receiving the form or nature of that from which it proceeds; and consequently, the procession of love does not have the account of generation or nativity. But that the Holy Spirit receives by his own procession the nature and form of God the Father is owing to the fact that he is God’s love, wherein there is nothing that is not the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 23: This suffices for the reply to the twenty-third objection.

We must also reply to the arguments that concluded that there are more than two processions in God.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above, (Q. 10, a. 2, ad 7, ad 11.) in God it is but one and the same procession by the mode of intellect and by the mode of nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Human nature is material, that is to say, composed of matter and form; wherefore, in man there cannot be a procession by the mode of nature save in respect of some natural transmutation. But the procession that is by the mode of intellect is always immaterial, insofar as the intellect itself is immaterial; wherefore, in man the procession by the mode of nature and that by the mode of the intellect cannot be one and the same, whereas in God they are one and the same because the divine nature is immaterial.

Reply Obj. 3: To proceed into another differs from proceeding from another. For to proceed into something is to communicate one’s likeness to another, and in this sense one should understand the procession of the divine goodness into creatures, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 3.1, 3.4–5 (PG 3:635–42).) But to proceed from another is to have one’s being from another, and in this sense we are speaking of procession here, according to which mode it is clear that to proceed does not fit the Father.