Article 5 — Whether the Holy Spirit would still be distinct from the Son if he did not proceed from him

The fifth point of inquiry is whether the Holy Spirit would still be distinct from the Son if he did not proceed from him. (Parallel texts: ST I.35.2, 4; SCG IV.25; In I Sent. 11.2.4; 29.4.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that he would. For Richard of Saint Victor says that the persons differ in origin, in that one has an origin and the other lacks an origin, or if one has an origin, the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other. (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 4.13, 4.15 (PL 196:938–39).) Now, the origin of the Holy Spirit differs from that of the Son because the Holy Spirit proceeds as spirated, whereas the Son proceeds as begotten. Therefore, the Holy Spirit would differ personally from the Son even if he did not proceed from him, on account of the difference of origin.

Obj. 2: Anselm says: the Son and the Holy Spirit have their being from the Father, but each in a different way; one by birth, the other by procession, so that thus they are distinct from each other, and afterwards he adds, for even if for no other reason were the Son and Holy Spirit distinct, this alone would distinguish them. (Anselm of Canterbury, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit 4 (PL 158:292–93).) Therefore, even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be a distinct person from the Son on account of the different mode of origin.

Obj. 3: The divine persons are distinct from one another on account of one being from another according to a particular mode of origin. Now, in God one person proceeds according to one mode of origin. Consequently, if there be two modes of origin, there will be two proceeding persons, even though one does not proceed from the other. Now, it is established that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father according to different modes of origin. Therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct persons even if we suppose that one does not proceed from the other.

Obj. 4: No hypostasis can possibly proceed in respect of one nature by multiple processions, since a hypostasis receives the nature by that which proceeds. Thus, the Son has two nativities corresponding to his two natures. Now, in God there are two processions, one in respect of nativity, the other in respect of spiration. Consequently, it is impossible that one and the same person proceed by these processions. Therefore, the persons who proceed by these two processions must be distinct. Therefore, the Holy Spirit would still be personally distinct from the Son even if he did not proceed from him.

Obj. 5: The eternal relations in God are neither accidents nor what is existing-toward but are subsistent persons. Consequently, that which a plurality of relations follows in God suffices for a distinction of persons. Now, specific diversity of actions suffices for a diversity of relations. For from the action of governing follows the relation of lordship, while from the action of begetting follows another relation, which is paternity. Even so, different relations follow from specifically different quantities, for the relation double results from two, and triple results from three. Now, in God, processions are signified through the mode of actions. Wherefore, if there are two processions, there must be two relations resulting from the processions, and consequently two persons, so that we come to the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 6: Procession is more perfect in God than in created realities; therefore, the Apostle says that from the heavenly Father, all paternity in heaven and earth is named (Eph 3:15). Now, in created realities, procession suffices to distinguish the proceeding supposits; for distinct men are born by distinct processions or births. Therefore, in God, a difference of procession suffices to distinguish the divine persons, namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 7: Procession through the mode of nature is not the same as procession through the mode of love. Now, the name “Son” designates a person proceeding through the mode of nature, while the name “Holy Spirit” indicates a person proceeding through the mode of love. Therefore, even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be distinct from him for the sole reason that their processions are different.

Obj. 8: In the Father, one finds an active generation and an active spiration. Now, to generate and to spirate distinguish the persons in God. Therefore, as the Son proceeds from the Father as a distinct person by the fact that he is begotten of the Father, so too the Holy Spirit, by the fact that he is spirated by the Father, proceeds as a distinct person from the Father. Thus, then, there are three persons in God even if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son.

Obj. 9: In On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, Anselm says that the Holy Spirit is as perfectly from the Father as from the Father and the Son. (Anselm of Canterbury, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit 17, 23–24 (PL 158:310–11, 318–19).) Now, he proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from both. Therefore, he would still be distinct from both, even if he proceeded from the Father alone.

Obj. 10: The Father is a sufficient and perfect principle. Now, the perfect principle of a thing needs no other in order to produce perfectly that whereof it is the principle. Consequently, the Father does not need the Son in order to produce a third person, namely, the Holy Spirit. Therefore, granted that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, there would still be three distinct persons in God.

Obj. 11: The removal of that which follows does not of necessity involve the removal of what precedes; for example, if we remove “man,” we do not thereby remove “animal.” Now, three things are predicated of the divine persons, namely, “procession,” “communion,” and “kinship.” But the account of procession precedes the account of community and even the account of kinship. But there would be neither communion nor kinship in God without plurality of persons multiplied by procession. Consequently, if we remove communion and kinship from God, procession still remains. Hence, even if there were not community of Father and Son in spirating the Holy Spirit, nor kinship of the Holy Spirit to the Son resulting from his proceeding from him, there would still remain procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, and thus there would still be three distinct persons, namely, two proceeding and one from whom they proceed.

Obj. 12: We speak of properties, relations, and notions as being in God. Now, the account of property is prior to the account of relation or of a notion, since one understands the persons constituted with their personal properties before they are referred or made known in reference to each other. Moreover, setting aside the relations, the properties constituting the persons still remain. Therefore, even if the Holy Spirit were not related to the Son as existence from him, the Son and Holy Spirit would still be distinct persons by reason of their properties.

Obj. 13: Filiation is the property of the Son constituting his person, and procession is the property of the Holy Spirit constituting his person. But filiation is not procession nor is it opposed thereto relatively. Therefore, even if we entirely remove relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son, the Son and Holy Spirit will still be distinct persons.

Obj. 14: Many, the Greeks for instance, have denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and yet acknowledged three persons in God. Therefore, even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would still be distinct from him.

Obj. 15: Damascene says: we assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father but not from the Son, but we call him the Spirit of the Son. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.8 (PG 94:831–34).) Consequently, even if he does not proceed from the Son, he is still the Spirit of the Son and therefore distinct from him.

Obj. 16: The Greek saints, in speaking of the Son and Holy Spirit in comparison with the material world, say that they are like two rays of the paternal brilliance, like two streams of the font of divinity that is in the Father, and like two flowers of the paternal nature. (Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names (PG 3:586–996).) Now, rays, streams, and flowers are distinguished from each other, even if one does not proceed from the other. Therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit are, in like manner, distinct from each other.

On the contrary (1), Boethius says that in God relation alone makes manifold the Trinity. (Boethius, On the Trinity 1.6 (PL 64:1255).) But if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, there will not be a relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son. Therefore, he would not be personally distinct from him.

Again (2), Anselm says that the Father and Son are in every respect one except insofar as they are distinguished by relative opposition; (Anselm of Canterbury, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit 4 (PL 158:292).) and this is by reason of the unity of essence. Now, the Son and Holy Spirit are likewise one in essence. Therefore, they are one in every respect except in those things wherein relative opposition makes them distinct. But if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, relative opposition would in no way make them distinct, and consequently they would in no way be distinct from each other.

Again (3), Richard of Saint Victor says that in the Trinity there can be but one person who proceeds from only one. (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 5.14 (PL 196:959–60).) Now, if the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, then, like the Son, he will be from one person only, namely, the Father, and consequently the Son and Holy Spirit will be but one person.

Again (4), he says that in God there can be but one person from whom no other person proceeds. (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 5.1, 5.14 (PL 196:948–49, 959–60).) But if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, then just as he has no person proceeding from him, so neither has the Son. And thus, the Son and the Holy Spirit will be only one person.

Again (5), wherever persons are distinguished by relations, the persons thus distinguished must be related to each other. Now, in God the persons are distinguished by relations since they cannot be distinguished by anything absolute. Therefore, in God there is no distinction where there is no relation. But if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, he is not related to him and consequently is not personally distinct from him.

Again (6), one member of a pair of opposites does not differentiate its subject from anything but what the other member is in. Thus, whiteness differentiates a thing only from something else that blackness is in. Therefore, a relation distinguishes its subject only from the subject of the opposite relation. Now, the relation proper to the Holy Spirit, whereby he is a distinct person, is procession. Consequently, he is personally distinct only from the person in whom is the opposite relation, which is active spiration; and this is not in the Son if the Holy Spirit is not from him. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit be not from the Son, he is not personally distinct from him.

Again (7), in God there are two things belonging commonly to relation, one from whom the other is and one who is from the other. Now, he from whom the other is is not personally distinguished through a diverse mode of origin; for the same person of the Father is the one from whom the Son is, by generation, and the Holy Spirit is, by procession. Neither, then, is he who is from another by spiration (that is, the Holy Spirit) distinguished from him who is from another by generation (that is, from the Son).

Again (8), Richard states the difference between the two processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit in the following terms: communion of majesty, so to speak, was the cause of the one’s origin, namely, the Son’s; communion of love was the cause of the other’s origin, (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 6.6 (PL 196:972).) namely, the Holy Spirit’s. Now, the procession of the Holy Spirit would not be caused by communion of love unless the Father and the Son loved each other, and thus the Holy Spirit proceeded from them. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would be no difference between the procession of the Holy Spirit and the generation of the Son, and consequently neither would the Holy Spirit be personally distinct from the Son.

I answer that if we take careful note of the statements of the Greeks, we shall find that they differ from us more in words than in meaning. Thus, they will not grant that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, either through ignorance, obstinacy or sophistry or some other cause, no matter what, and yet they acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son and that he is from the Father through the Son, which would not be true if the procession of the Holy Spirit were entirely independent of the Son. Hence, we may infer that even the Greeks themselves understand that the procession of the Holy Spirit has a certain order as regards the Son.

But I say that, if the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, and if the Son is in no way a principle of the Holy Spirit’s procession, then it is impossible that the Holy Spirit is a person distinct from the Son, and further, that it is impossible for the procession of the Holy Spirit to differ from the generation of the Son.

This will be evident if we consider those things in reference to which various writers explain the distinction between the divine persons. Thus, some refer the distinction of the persons to the relations; others, to the modes of origin; others, to the essential attributes.

If, then, we consider the mode of distinguishing the persons through the relations, it is evident that the Holy Spirit cannot be personally distinguished from the Son if he does not proceed from him.

First, because things cannot be properly distinct from one another otherwise than either on account of a material or quantitative division or on account of a formal division.

Now, distinction according to material and quantitative division is found in corporeal realities, wherein there are several individuals of the same species by reason of the specific form being found in diverse parts of matter according as it is quantity of the division. Wherefore, if there is an individual consisting of all the matter in which the form of the species is capable of existing, it is impossible that there be more than one individual of that species, as Aristotle proves about the world in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.18–20, 277b9–279a10; cf. On the Heavens 1.17, 276b26–277a12.) Now, this mode of distinction is utterly foreign to God, seeing that in him there is neither matter nor corporeal quantity. But a distinction of things that possess one nature, at least in their genus, cannot exist through a formal division except by reason of some opposition. Whence, we find that the differences of any genus are in opposition to one another.

And consequently, it is impossible and even inconceivable that there be any distinction save one of opposition in the divine nature, because it is one not only in genus but also in number. Wherefore, since the divine persons are distinguished from one another, this must be on account of a relative opposition, in that no other opposition is possible in God. This is sufficiently evident, since no matter how much certain things may differ according to a diverse account, for instance, the essential attributes, they do not distinguish the persons, since they are not mutually opposed to one another. Thus again, several notions are found in one divine person for the reason that they are not opposed to one another; for instance, in the Father there are innascibility, paternity, and active spiration. For we first find distinction where first there is relative opposition, for instance, in what it is to be Father and Son. Accordingly, in God, wherever there is no relative opposition, there can be no real distinction, which is a distinction of persons.

Now, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, there will be no opposition between them, and so the Holy Spirit will not be a distinct person from the Son. Nor can it be said that, for this distinction, opposition of affirmation and negation is enough; for this sort of opposition follows distinction and does not cause distinction, since that which already exists is distinguished from another by something inhering in it either substantially or accidentally, whereas that this is not that is a result of their being distinct. Likewise, it is evident that the truth of a negative statement about things in existence is based on the truth of a positive statement; for example, the truth of this negation, “an Ethiopian is not white” is based on the truth of this affirmation, “an Ethiopian is black.” Wherefore, all differences in respect of affirmation and negation must be reducible to a difference of positive opposition. Consequently, the primary reason for the distinction between the Son and Holy Spirit cannot be that the Son is begotten and not spirated, the other spirated and not begotten, unless we presuppose a distinction between begetting and spirating, and between Son and Holy Spirit, by reason of an opposition between two affirmations.

Second, because according to Augustine, whatever is said of God absolutely is common to the three persons. (Augustine, On the Trinity 6.2 (PL 42:925–26).) Whence it follows that distinction between the divine persons can only be in respect of what is said to be toward-something; for these two categories are in the divine. Now, the primary distinction that is found according to relation in God is through these two things: that from which another one is and that which is from no one. But if one of these should be subdivided, namely, that which is from another, it must be subdivided through things that are of the same account. For as the Philosopher teaches, it does not follow the correct order of subdivision to subdivide a thing in reference to that which is accidental to it and does not belong to it through itself; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043b4–1044a14; 8.6, 1045a20–b23.) thus, if one were to say that animals are divided into rational and irrational, and irrational animals are divided into white and black, the division would not be correct, because, since things that are accidental do not combine to make that which is simply one, the ultimate species resulting from many differences would not be one thing, simply speaking.

Accordingly, if in God, he who is from another were to be distinguished or subdivided, this must be in reference to differences of the same account, namely, that one of those who is from another is from the other; and this involves a difference of processions, which is indicated when we say that one proceeds by generation, the other by spiration. Hence, Richard of Saint Victor distinguishes one proceeding from another thus: one has another proceeding from him and one does not. (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 5.10 (PL 196:956–57).)

Third, although in the Father there are two relations, paternity and active spiration, only the paternity constitutes the person of the Father; this is why it is called a “personal property” or “relation,” whereas active spiration is not the person’s personal relation, as though supervening on the already constituted person. Hence, it is plain that the active generation, that is, the paternity, is presupposed, according to the order of understanding, to active spiration. Consequently, in like manner the filiation, which corresponds to paternity as its opposite, must in some order be presupposed by passive spiration, which is the procession of the Holy Spirit. This is, then, either such that passive spiration is understood as supervening on the filiation in the same person, just as active spiration supervenes on the paternity, and thus, the same person will be spirated and born, just as the same person begets and spirates; or there must be some other order between filiation and passive spiration. But there is no order in God other than that of nature, in respect of which one is from another, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity and Unity of God 1.5 (PL 42:1198–1200); cf. On the Trinity 1.13, para. 30 (PL 42:842–43).) It follows, then, that either the Son and the Holy Spirit are one person or the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

Moreover, we shall come to the same conclusion if we consider the distinction of the divine persons in reference to their very origin but not to their relations of origin. This will be evident for the following reasons.

First, if we consider what is proper to the divine nature, we shall see it is impossible that there be a plurality of divine persons unless through one originating from another, but in no way through two originating from one.

This is made plain if we observe how distinction is found in diverse realities. For in the material realities, wherein, as stated above, it is possible for things to be multiplied by a division of matter and quantity, two individuals of the same species can be on an equal footing, just as two parts of a quantity may be equal. But where the primary difference is found to be according to form, it is impossible for two individuals to be on equal footing. For as the Philosopher says, the forms of things are like numbers, in which the species vary by the addition or subtraction of the unit, and the formal differences of things consist in a certain order of perfection. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043b30–1044a14.) For the species of the plant differs from that of the stone in that it has life in addition, and the species of the brute animal from that of the plant in that it has sensation in addition, and man differs from the brute in that he adds reason. Wherefore, in immaterial realities, which cannot be multiplied by a division of matter, there cannot be plurality without some order. Indeed, in created immaterial substances, there is an order of perfection, insofar as one angel is of a more perfect nature than another. And because some philosophers thought that every imperfect nature is created by a more perfect one, they therefore contended that in separated substances there cannot be multiplication otherwise than by reason of cause and effect. The true faith, however, does not hold this, since we believe that the various orders of immaterial substances were brought into existence from the order of divine wisdom.

But since there cannot be order of perfection in God, as the Arians contended, saying that the Father is greater than the Son and each of them greater than the Holy Spirit, we must conclude that plurality in the divine persons cannot even be conceived otherwise than according to the sole order of origin, such that, namely, the Son is from the Father and the Holy Spirit from the Son. For if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, then he would be related to the Father in an equal way in point of origin. Wherefore, either they would not be two persons, or there would be an order of perfection between them (as the Arians pretended), or there would be a material division between them (which is impossible). Hilary follows this line of argument when he says that to assert that in God there are two who are unbegotten, that is, who are not existing from another, is to posit two Gods; (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 17.51 (PL 10:518); 27.64 (PL 10:523–24).) for if multiplication is not by the order of origin, it must be by the order of nature. And the same argument avails if we do not acknowledge an order of origin between the Son and Holy Spirit.

Second, because that which proceeds naturally from one thing must itself be one; for nature is always oriented to one effect, whereas things that proceed from something through an acting will can be many even though they proceed from one; for example, from one God a diversity of creatures proceeded according to his will. Now, it is certain that the Son proceeds from the Father naturally and not through his will (as the Arians maintained); and this is because, as Hilary says, that which proceeds from its source naturally is of the same nature as its source, but that which proceeds according to an acting will is not of the same nature as he from whom it proceeds, but such as he wishes it to be. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 24.58–25.59 (PL 10:520–21).) Now, the Son is such as the Father, while creatures are such as God wished them to be. Hence, the Son is from the Father naturally, and creatures are from him according to his will. In like manner, the Holy Spirit is such as the Father, for he is not a creature (as Arius and Macedonius asserted). Wherefore, he must proceed from the Father naturally, for which reason he is said, by Athanasius and other holy men, to be the natural Spirit of the Father and the Son. Consequently, it is impossible that the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father except in such wise that from the Father alone proceeds one alone, namely, the Son, and from the Father and Son, inasmuch as they are one, proceeds one Holy Spirit.

Third, because as Richard proves, there cannot be a mediated procession in God. (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 5.9 (PL 196:955–56).) For because each divine person is within the other, each must be ordered immediately to the other. But if the Son and Holy Spirit were from the Father without the Holy Spirit being from the Son, there would not be an immediate order of the Holy Spirit to the Son, since they would not be ordered to each other except through the one from whom they exist, like two brothers begotten of one father. Hence, it is impossible that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from the Father in this way: as two distinct persons, such that one of them is not from the other.

Again, if we consider the distinction of the persons through an order to the essential attributes, we shall come to the same conclusion.

First, because in this respect we say that the Son proceeds through the mode of nature and the Holy Spirit through the mode of will. For the procession of nature is always the principle and origin of every other procession; for all things that occur through art and the will or the intellect proceed from things that are according to nature. Hence, Richard says that it is certain that, of all modes of procession, the first and chief place belongs to the mode of proceeding that belongs to the Son from the Father. For unless the Father had preceded, neither of the other persons would have had any foundation for his existence. (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 6.17 (PL 196:981–82).)

Second, this is evident if we realize that the Son proceeds by an intellectual procession as the Word, and the Holy Spirit by a procession of the will as Love. For it is both impossible and inconceivable that an object can be loved that has not first been understood by the intellect; wherefore, when speaking of love in an intellectual nature, all love proceeds from some word.

Third, it is evident, if we say with Athanasius that the Holy Spirit is the life-giving breath of divinity. For every vital movement and action is directed by understanding, unless the contrary occur on account of an imperfection of nature.

Hence, from all that has been said we infer that the Holy Spirit would not be a person distinct from the Son if he did not proceed from him, nor would spiration be distinct from generation.

Reply Obj. 1: The Holy Spirit is substantially distinguished from the Son in that the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other; but this very difference of origin is due to the Son’s being from the Father alone, whereas the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son. Richard of Saint Victor makes this plain in On the Trinity 2, when he says: observe that this difference of properties consists merely in the number of persons producing, for the first has being from no other, the second from one only, the third from two. (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 5.10 (PL 196:957).)

Reply Obj. 2: Anselm is quite correct in saying that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from each other by this alone: that they proceed in different ways, (Anselm of Canterbury, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit 4 (PL 158:292–93).) but as we have already shown, they cannot proceed in different ways unless the Holy Spirit were to proceed from the Son. Wherefore, if it be denied that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, it must likewise be denied that he is distinct from the Son. However, it is Anselm’s intention first to indicate the points in which we agree with those who deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and yet assert that he is a distinct person from him. Wherefore, the words quoted from Anselm are in the nature of an argumentative hypothesis rather than a statement of the truth.

Reply Obj. 3: If there are two modes of origin in God, it is right to infer that there are two persons who proceed, but, as we have shown, there cannot be two modes of origin except by reason of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son.

Reply Obj. 4: The same answer applies to the fourth objection.

Reply Obj. 5: There need not be as many subsistent persons in God as there are relations, since in the one person of the Father there are two relations, namely, paternity, whereby he is referred to the Son, and common spiration, whereby he is referred to the Holy Spirit. For the relation of paternity constitutes a subsistent person, whereas the relation of common spiration is not a property constituting a person but a relation inherent to a subsistent person. Thus, if two relations result from generation and procession, it does not follow that therefore there are only two subsistent persons. And one might further reply that there are not two processions unless one of the proceeding persons is from the other, as we have already stated.

Reply Obj. 6: From this may be gathered the reply to the sixth objection.

Reply Obj. 7: As already explained, that which proceeds through the mode of love must proceed from that which proceeds through the mode of nature.

Reply Obj. 8: Spiration distinguishes the Holy Spirit from the spirator, just as generation distinguishes the begotten from the begetter; nonetheless it does not follow that the spirated is distinct from the begotten, since both spirator and begetter are the same person. Nor does it follow from the fact that the same thing cannot proceed by two diverse processions; rather, processions in God cannot differ except by reason of one proceeding person being from another, as proved above. (Q. 10, a. 4.)

Reply Obj. 9: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as perfectly as from the Father and Son; yet he is distinct from the Son not because he proceeds from the Father but because he proceeds from the Son.

Reply Obj. 10: The Father is the sufficient principle of the Holy Spirit, nor does he need another principle for the Holy Spirit’s spiration; for in spirating the Holy Spirit, the Son is not a distinct principle from the Father but is one principle with him.

Reply Obj. 11: Although procession is prior in understanding to communion, as the common is prior to the proper, nevertheless in this particular kind of procession—namely, that of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, communion, and bond of the Father and the Son—is not prior in understanding to communion. Wherefore, it does not follow that if we remove communion, procession remains. Thus, animal is prior to man in understanding, whereas rational animal is not.

Reply Obj. 12: In God, the properties, relations, and notions are the same according to their reality, except that there are only three properties (namely, paternity, filiation, and procession) whereas there are four relations, common spiration being added to the three aforesaid relations; for it is a relation but not a property, inasmuch as it belongs not to one person but to two. And there are five notions, since they include innascibility, which is not a relation but a notion, inasmuch as by it the Father is made known; it is also a property, since it belongs to the Father alone, but not a personal property, since it does not constitute the person of the Father.

Accordingly, as regards the reality, there can be no order between the properties, relations, and notions, since the same thing is identified with all three. But if we consider their order in the light of their respective accounts, then “notion” is prior to relation in the same way as one thing is prior to another for us, while “relation” and “property” are prior in the order of real priority. If, however, we seek the order between relation and property, we can find no such order in created realities. For some properties are relations, but not all, and in like manner, some relations are properties, but not all. If, however, we consider property in something absolute, then property is first in the order whereby the absolute is prior to the relative. However, in the divine persons, it is necessary that the account of relation precedes the account of property; for since the proper is that which belongs to one alone, the account of property presupposes distinction. And in God nothing is distinct otherwise than by reason of a relation. Wherefore, relation, which is the principle of distinction in God, is prior in account to property.

It must be observed, however, that neither property nor relation as such have the account of constituting a person. For since a person is an individual substance of rational nature, that which is outside substance cannot constitute a person; wherefore in created things, properties and relations are not constituent of but are incidental to the persons already constituted. However, in God the relation itself, which is also a property, is the divine essence; by this very fact, that which is constituted by it is a person, for unless paternity were the divine essence, the name “father” could by no means signify a person but only a relative accident of a person, as in the case of human persons. Hence, paternity, inasmuch as it is the divine essence, constitutes a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature; but inasmuch as it is a relation, it distinguishes; and inasmuch as it is a property, it belongs to one person only and not to another; and inasmuch as it is a notion it is the principle whereby that person is made known. Accordingly, according to the order of understanding, the first is what constitutes the person, the second is what distinguishes it, the third is what is a property, and the fourth is what is the notion.

Reply Obj. 13: Although filiation is not opposed relatively to procession, nevertheless the one proceeding is opposed relatively to the Son; and thereby procession is distinguished from filiation.

Reply Obj. 14: Although the Greeks do not acknowledge that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, still they believe that the Son in some way is the principle whence the Holy Spirit originates. This is plain from the fact that they state that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son and that he is the Spirit of the Son. And yet nothing prevents something one grants from implying a contradiction while one does not know it explicitly; and thus, someone can say, without understanding it, that the Holy Spirit is not from the Son even though he is distinct from the Son.

Reply Obj. 15: By acknowledging that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, Damascene implies that in some way the Holy Spirit originates from the Son. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.8 (PG 94:831–34).)

Reply Obj. 16: The Holy Spirit and the Son are said to be two streams inasmuch as both proceed from the Father. Yet the Greek doctors also say that the Son is the fount of the Holy Spirit, but that the Holy Spirit is not from the Son. The same applies to the other comparisons.