Article 1 — Whether God can do anything in creatures that is beyond or against nature, or contrary to the course of nature

The first point of inquiry is whether God can do anything in creatures that is beyond or against nature, or contrary to the course of nature. (Parallel texts: ST I.105.6; I.106.3; SCG III.98–99; Compendium theologiae, ch. 136.)

Obj. 1: And seemingly he cannot. For the Gloss on Romans 11:24, contrary to nature you were grafted, says: God, the author of all natures, does nothing against nature. (Glossa ordinaria 6, 150, at Romans 11:24 (PL 114:508).)

Obj. 2: Another Gloss on the same passage observes: God can no more act against the law of nature than he can act against himself. (Glossa interlinearis, at Romans 11:24 (in Glossa ordinaria 6, 149–50).) Now, he can nowise act against himself because he cannot deny himself (2 Tim 2:13). Therefore, he cannot act against the order of nature.

Obj. 3: Just as the order of human justice derives from divine justice, so does the order of nature derive from divine wisdom, since it is this that orders all things sweetly (Wis 8:10). Now, God cannot act against the order of human justice; further, he would be the cause of sin, which alone is contrary to the order of justice. Since, then, God’s wisdom is no less than his justice, it would seem that neither can he act against the order of nature.

Obj. 4: Whenever God works in creatures through the innate laws of nature, he does not act against the course of nature. Now, God cannot fittingly work in a creature independently of the innate laws of nature. Therefore, he cannot fittingly work against the course of nature. The minor proposition is proved as follows. Augustine says that visible apparitions were shown to the patriarchs by means of the angelic ministrations, inasmuch as God governs bodies through spirits. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.11–12 (PL 42:881–86).) In like manner, he governs the lower bodies through the higher, (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.4 (PL 42:873–74).) and it may also be said that he directs all effects through their causes. Since, then, the laws of nature are implanted in natural causes, it would seem that God cannot fittingly work in natural effects, except by means of the natural laws; and thus, he will do nothing contrary to the course of nature.

Obj. 5: God cannot make “yes” and “no” to be true at the same time, because this is incompatible with the very account of being as such, and therefore it is also incompatible with the account of the created, and the first of things created was being. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 4.) Now, the aforesaid principle, since it is the first principle of all things, to which all others are reduced, as is said in Metaphysics 4, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3–4, 1005b18–1006a5.) must be implied in every necessary proposition, and its opposite in every impossible proposition. Since, then, things that are contrary to the course of nature are impossible in nature, for instance, that a blind man be made to see or a dead man to live, they imply the opposite of the aforesaid proposition. Therefore, God cannot do what is contrary to the course of nature.

Obj. 6: A Gloss on Ephesians 3 says that God does not change his will so as to act against the causes which he established by his will. (Glossa ordinaria 6, 541–42, at Ephesians 3:7–9 (PL 114:593).) Now, God established natural causes by his will. Therefore, he neither does nor can do anything contrary to them, inasmuch as he cannot change; for to do anything contrary to that which one has deliberately decided would seem to point to a change in one’s will.

Obj. 7: The good of the universe is a good of order, and to this the course of nature belongs. But God cannot act against the good of the universe, since it is due to his sovereign goodness that all things are good in relation to the order of the universe. Therefore, God cannot do anything contrary to the order of nature.

Obj. 8: God cannot be the cause of evil. Now, according to Augustine, evil is the privation of measure, form, and order. (Augustine, On the Nature of Good 1.4 (PL 42:553).) Therefore, God cannot do anything contrary to the course of nature, which belongs to the order of the universe.

Obj. 9: It is written that on the seventh day God rested from all the work which he had done (Gen 2:2), and this because, as the ordinary Gloss observes, (Glossa ordinaria 1, 55–58, at Genesis 2:2 (PL 113:82–84).) he ceased to produce new works. Now, in the works of the six days, he did nothing contrary to the course of nature; therefore, Augustine says that in discussing the works of the six days, we do not ask what God might have done miraculously, but what was compatible with nature, which he established then. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.1 (PL 34:263–64).) Therefore, neither did God afterwards do anything contrary to the course of nature.

Obj. 10: According to the Philosopher, nature causes order in all things. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.7, 1032a15–25; 7.17, 1041b8–33.) Now, God cannot do anything that is not in order, since according to Romans 13:1, those that are of God are well ordered. Therefore, he cannot do anything contrary to nature.

Obj. 11: Nature no less than human reason is from God. But God cannot act against the principles of reason, for instance, that the genus be not predicated of its species, or that the side of a square be not proportionate to the diameter. Neither, therefore, can he act against the principles of nature.

Obj. 12: The entire course of nature derives from divine wisdom, even as the products of art proceed from art, according to Augustine in his commentary on John 1:3–4: that which was made, was life in him. (Cf. q. 3, a. 15.) Now, a craftsman does nothing against the principles of his art except by mistake, and this cannot happen to God. Therefore, God does nothing contrary to the course of nature.

Obj. 13: The Philosopher says that the manner in which a thing is done follows its natural aptitude to be done in that way. (Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 199a3–33.) Now, what has a natural aptitude to be done as it is done, is not done against nature. Therefore, nothing is done contrary to nature.

Obj. 14: Anselm says in Cur Deus homo that God cannot do what is in the least way unbecoming. (Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus homo 1.20 (PL 158:392–93).) Now, it is unbecoming for the course of nature to be changed, while it is becoming for it to be observed. Therefore, it is impossible that God act against the course of nature.

Obj. 15: Knowledge is to falsehood as power to the impossible. Now, God cannot know what is naturally false. Therefore, he cannot do what is contrary to the course of nature, since this is naturally impossible.

Obj. 16: That which is impossible of itself is more impossible than that which is impossible accidentally, since that which is such of itself is more such a thing than others. Now, it is impossible accidentally for that which has been not to have been; and yet, God cannot do this, according to Jerome and even the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a35–b13.) Therefore, neither can God do things that are contrary to the course of nature and impossible in themselves, for instance, that a blind man see.

Obj. 17: According to the Philosopher, an action is compulsory when its principle is external, and the person compelled contributes nothing to it. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b1–4.) Now, nature cannot contribute to things that are done against the course of nature; and thus, if they are done by God, they will be compulsory and will not last. But this cannot be admitted, since the blind retain their sight after having it restored by God.

Obj. 18: Every genus is divided by potency and act, as is clear in Physics 3, (Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 200b26–31, 201a3–26.) and passive potency comes under potency, while active potency comes under act; therefore, nature has no passive potency without a corresponding active potency, since they come under the same genus, as again the Commentator states on Metaphysics 9. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 9, comm. 11, 17.) Now, there is no natural active potency directed to things contrary to the course of nature; and consequently, neither is there a natural passive potency. But when a creature has no passive potency in respect of a thing, this is said to be impossible, although by virtue of his omnipotence God can do all things. Therefore, things that are contrary to the course of nature are impossible on account of something lacking to the created, although not on account of a defect in God’s powers.

Obj. 19: Whatsoever God has done once would not be unbecoming if he did it always. Yet it would be unbecoming were he to produce all natural effects independently of their natural causes, because in that case, natural things would be deprived of their activities. Therefore, it is unbecoming for him to produce at times an effect in this lower world without the agency of natural causes; and if he acts by their means, he does nothing against the course of nature. Therefore, God does nothing contrary to the course of nature.

Obj. 20: A cause is by itself ordained to its effect essentially, and vice versa. Now, God cannot deprive a thing of that which is essential to it, so long as the thing remains; for instance, that a man would not be an animal. Therefore, he cannot produce an effect without the natural cause that is essentially ordained to that effect; for instance, he cannot give sight without the natural causes whence sight is produced.

Obj. 21: It is unfitting for a greater good to be neglected for a lesser good. Now, the good of the universe is greater than any particular good of any thing whatsoever; therefore, Augustine says that God made every single thing good, and all things together very good, for the order of the universe. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.10 (PL 40:236).) Therefore, it is unfitting that God for the spiritual good of an individual man or of a nation change the course of nature, which belongs to the order of the universe, wherein its good consists. Therefore, God never does anything contrary to the course of nature.

On the contrary (1), nature cannot restore a habit to one who is deprived of it, yet this can be done by God; thus, it is written: the blind see, the deaf hear (Matt 11:5), etc. Therefore, God does something contrary to the order of nature.

Furthermore (2), the power of a higher being is not dependent on or limited by the power of a lower being. Now, God is above nature. Therefore, his power is not limited by that of nature, so that nothing prevents him from acting against the order of nature.

I answer that, without any doubt, God can work in created things independently of created causes, just as he works in all created causes, as shown elsewhere, and by working independently of created causes, he can produce the same effects and in the same order as he produces them by their means—or even other effects and in a different order, so that he is able to do something contrary to the common and customary course of nature. We shall realize how true this is if we consider the views that have been held in opposition to this truth. These are three in number.

The first is that of some early philosophers, who contended that these corporeal things do not derive their existence from any higher cause; thus, some of them, such as Anaxagoras, said that an intelligence was the cause of some kind of movement in them, for instance, a movement of segregation. According to this opinion, natural forms, which are the principles of natural actions, cannot be influenced nor their actions hindered by any supernatural cause, so that nothing can happen contrary to the course of nature, which is unchangeably regulated by these corporeal causes. Now, this opinion is false, because the supreme being must be the cause of being in all things, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994b9–32.) just as that which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in all other things, as is said in Metaphysics 2. We have treated this point more fully elsewhere when we proved that nothing can exist unless it be made by God. (ST I.44.1.)

A second opinion in opposition to this truth was held by other philosophers, who asserted that God is the cause of all beings by his intellect. They maintained, however, that God has a universal knowledge of things inasmuch as he knows himself, and that he himself is the source of being for all that things that exist, but that he has no proper knowledge of each individual thing. But from common and universal knowledge individual effects do not follow except by means of particular knowledge. Thus, if I know that all fornication is to be avoided, I shall not avoid this particular action unless I know that it is fornication. Accordingly, they said that particular effects do not proceed from God except in a certain order by means of other causes, of which the higher are more universal, and the lower more particular; and according to this view, God is unable to do anything contrary to the order of nature. But this opinion is false; for, since God knows himself perfectly, he must know all that is in him in any way whatsoever. Now, in him is the likeness of every one of his effects, inasmuch as there can be nothing that does not imitate him; and thus, it follows that he has proper knowledge of all things, as we have proved elsewhere. (ST I.14.)

The third opinion opposed to the aforesaid truth is that of some philosophers who said that God produces things by natural necessity in such a way that his works are confined to the course of things appointed by nature, and thus, he is unable to act against it. But this again is evidently false, since above all those things that act of natural necessity, there must be something that determines nature to one mode of action, as elsewhere we have proved. (ST I.19.4.) It is impossible, then, that God, the first agent, act of natural necessity, and this again has been proved in several ways in another question. (Q. 3, a. 15; cf. ST I.19.3.)

These three points being established—namely, that God is the author of being in all things of nature; that he has proper knowledge and providence in respect of each individual; and that he does not act of natural necessity—it follows that he can act independently of the course of nature in the production of particular effects. And he can do this either as regards being, by producing in natural things a new form that nature is unable to produce, for instance, the form of glory; or by producing a form in a particular matter, as sight in a blind man; or as regards operation, by restraining the action of nature from doing what it would naturally do, for instance, by hindering fire from burning (Dan 3:24), or water from flowing, as happened in the Jordan (Josh 3:13).

Reply Obj. 1: Both God and natural things act against individual nature: for instance, it is against the nature of this or that particular fire that it be extinguished; therefore, the Philosopher says that corruption, decrepitude, and in general all defects are contrary to nature. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.4, 286a7–b9; cf. 2.9, 288b7–26.) But nothing in nature acts against universal nature; for “particular nature” denotes the relation of a particular cause to a particular effect, while “universal nature” denotes the relation of the first agent in nature, which is the heavens, to all agents in the lower world. And, seeing that none of the lower bodies acts save through the power of the heavenly body, it is impossible for any natural body to act against universal nature, while the very fact that anything acts against a particular nature is in accord with universal nature.

Now, just as the heaven is the universal cause in respect of lower bodies, so God is the universal cause in respect of all beings, and in comparison with him, even the heaven is a particular cause. For nothing prevents one and the same cause from being universal in relation to things below it and particular in relation to those above it; thus, if we take the predicables, animal is universal in relation to man and particular in relation to substance. Accordingly, just as by the power of the heavens something can happen that is contrary to this or that particular nature, and yet not contrary to nature simply—since it is in accord with universal nature—so too by the power of God something can occur that is contrary to universal nature (which is dependent on the power of the heavens) without being contrary to nature simply; for it will be in accord with the supremely universal nature, which is considered from the order of God as regards all created things. It is in this sense that Augustine in the Gloss quoted says that God does nothing contrary to nature; therefore, he goes on to say, because the nature of each thing is what God does in it. (Glossa ordinaria 6, 150, at Romans 11:24 (PL 114:508).)

Reply Obj. 2: The reply is evident from what has just been said, because in that Gloss, Augustine refers to the supreme law of nature, which is God’s ordinance with regard to all created things.

Reply Obj. 3: As we have already explained, although God can do something contrary to the relation between one created thing and another, he cannot do anything contrary to a created thing’s relation to himself. Now, the justice of a man consists chiefly in his being duly ordered to God; whence God cannot do anything contrary to the order of justice. On the other hand, the course of nature is dependent on the relation of one created thing to another; therefore, God can act against the course of nature.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as God can produce effects in nature without employing natural causes, so also can he without the ministry of the angels, but the reason for his doing so is not the same in both cases. He acts independently of natural causes in order that, being unable to ascribe the effect to visible causes, we may be compelled to attribute it to some higher cause, and that thus a visible miracle may be a manifestation of the divine power. But the activities of the angels are not visible; therefore, their ministrations do not hinder us from ascribing something to the divine power. For this reason, Augustine does not say that God is unable to work without the ministry of the angels, but that he does not do so.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as God cannot make “yes” and “no” to be true at the same time, so neither can he do what is impossible in nature insofar as it includes the former impossibility. Thus, for a dead man to return to life clearly involves a contradiction, if we suppose that his return to life is the natural effect of an intrinsic principle, since a dead man is essentially one who lacks the principle of life. Therefore, God does not do this, but he makes a dead man to regain life from an extrinsic principle, and this involves no contradiction. The same applies to other things that are impossible to nature, and which God is able to do.

Reply Obj. 6: God does not change his will when he does anything contrary to natural causes, because from eternity he foresaw and decreed that he would do what he does in time. Therefore, he so ordered the course of nature that by his eternal decree he preordained whatsoever he would at some time do independently of that course.

Reply Obj. 7: When God does anything outside the course of nature, he does not put aside the entire order of the universe, wherein its good consists, but the order of some particular cause to its effect.

Reply Obj. 8: Penal evil is contrary to the order between one part of the universe and another part; and in like manner, every evil that is a natural defect. But sinful evil is contrary to the order between the whole universe and its last end, inasmuch as the will in which sinful evil resides is deprived by sin of its order in relation to the last end of the universe. Therefore, God cannot be the cause of this evil, since he cannot act against the latter order, although he can act against the former.

Reply Obj. 9: God does not work miracles except in created things that already exist, which latter in a different way preexisted within the works of the six days. Hence, miraculous works existed already materially in the works of the six days, although at that time it was not necessary that anything should occur miraculously contrary to the course of nature when nature itself was being established.

Reply Obj. 10: Nature is the cause of order in all natural things, but not in all things simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 11: The logician and the mathematician consider things only in their formal principles; whence in logic and mathematics nothing is impossible except what is contrary to the formal account of a thing. Such an impossibility contains contradiction within itself, and thus is an impossibility through itself. Such impossibilities God cannot do. On the other hand, the physicist applies [these principles] to determinate matter; therefore, he reckons as an impossibility also what is impossible for this [determinate matter]. But nothing prevents God from being able to do what is impossible to lower agents.

Reply Obj. 12: The divine art is not fully extended in producing created things, and therefore God can, by his own art, do something otherwise than the course of nature requires. Therefore, although he can do something contrary to the course of nature, it does not follow that he can act against his own art; for even a human craftsman can, by his art, produce another work in a different way to that in which he produced a previous work.

Reply Obj. 13: The Philosopher refers to things that are done in nature, for such things are so done as they have a natural aptitude to be done.

Reply Obj. 14: It is fitting that the course of nature be observed according to the way that it is ordained by divine providence; therefore, if it be in the order of divine providence that something be done otherwise, this is not unfitting.

Reply Obj. 15: Something is not called false simply and for a certain thing, the way something is called impossible simply and for a certain thing; rather, a thing is called false simply. Therefore, God cannot know something to be false, just as he cannot do something impossible that is simply impossible. And yet, just as he can do something that is impossible for a certain thing, so is he able to do something unknown to a certain one.

Reply Obj. 16: Everything that is accidental is traced back to something essential; therefore, nothing prevents what is impossible accidentally from being more impossible when traced back to what is impossible in itself. Thus, snow by its own whiteness dazzles the eyes more than the whiteness of a wall does, because the whiteness of snow is greater than that of the wall. In like manner, that Socrates did not run is an impossibility, because it is traced back to what is impossible through itself, namely, that the past has not been, which involves a contradiction. Consequently, nothing prevents the latter from being more impossible than the former, which is impossible relatively, although it is not impossible accidentally.

Reply Obj. 17: In every natural thing, there is natural order and relationship to all higher causes; and therefore, things that happen to lower bodies through the influence of the heavenly bodies are not violent, although they may seem contrary to the natural movements of these lower bodies, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the sea consequent upon the movement of the moon. And much less violent is what God does in this lower world.

Reply Obj. 18: A higher active power can produce a higher effect with the same material; thus, nature can produce gold out of earth and a mixture of other elements, which art cannot do. This is why the same thing has a potency for various effects, according to its relation to various agents. Therefore, nothing prevents a created nature from being in potency to certain effects that can be produced by the power of God, which effects cannot be produced by a lower power; and such potency is called obediential insofar as everything created obeys its Creator.

Reply Obj. 19: Every created thing is ordered to its own operation by God; and thus, it is not unfitting if by divine providence a certain effect is produced without the cooperation of natural things.

Reply Obj. 20: Although God produces some effect outside the action of its natural cause, he does not destroy the relation between cause and effect. Thus, even the fiery furnace retained its relation to burning, although it burned not the three children in the furnace.

Reply Obj. 21: When God does anything contrary to the course of nature, the whole order of the universe is not subverted, but the course resulting from the relation between one particular thing and another. Therefore, it is not unfitting if at times something is done contrary to the course of nature for man’s spiritual welfare, which consists in his being ordered to the last end of the universe.