Article 6 — Whether angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them

The sixth point of inquiry is whether angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. (Parallel texts: ST I.51.1; SCG II.91; In II Sent. 8.1; De malo, q. 16, a. 1; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 5; On Separated Substances, ch. 18.)

Obj. 1: And, it would seem that they have. For every animal is composed of a body naturally united to a soul. Now, angels and demons are animals; for Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany that as the Jews were rational beings it was fitting that the message should be brought to them by a rational animal, that is, an angel; (Gregory the Great, On the Gospels, bk. 1, Homily 10.1 (PL 76:1110).) and of the demons, Augustine says: the demons are animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 3.10 (PL 34:284).) Therefore, angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 2: Origen says in On First Principles that, of all spiritual creatures, God alone has no body. (Origen, On First Principles 1.6.) Since, then, angels and demons are spiritual creatures, it would seem that they have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 3: The imagination and the irascible and concupiscible faculties are powers employing organs. Now, these powers are in demons and, for the same reason, in angels; thus, Dionysius says that the wickedness of the devil is anger in the irascible, lust in the concupiscible, and license in the imagination. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.23 (PG 3:723–26).) Therefore, they have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 4: Angels are either composed of matter and form, or they are not. If they are, they must have bodies; for because matter considered in itself is one, since it is not differentiated save by forms, it follows that in all diverse things composed of matter, there must be diverse forms received into diverse parts of matter, for the same matter cannot receive diverse forms. Now, diversity of parts in matter is inconceivable without division of matter; likewise, neither is there division without dimension, since without quantity, substance is indivisible, as is said in Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.2, 185a21–b5.) Consequently, all things composed of matter must have dimensions and therefore bodies. On the other hand, if angels are not composed of matter and form, they are either self-subsistent forms or forms united to bodies. If they are self-subsistent forms, it follows that they do not derive their being from another; for since form as such is the principle of being, that which is a pure form does not have a caused being, but is only a cause of being for other things. And, if they are forms united to bodies, these bodies must be united to them naturally, because the union of form and matter is natural. It remains, then, that we must admit one of these three: namely, that angels are bodies, or are uncreated substances, or have bodies naturally united to them. But, the first two are impossible. Therefore, we must admit the third.

Obj. 5: A form as such is that whereby something is informed. Therefore, a pure form informs without being in any way informed, and this belongs to God alone, who is the supreme beauty whence all things are beautiful, as Augustine says in City of God 8. (Augustine, City of God 8.6 (PL 41:231–32); cf. Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 23 (PL 40:16–17).) Therefore, angels are not pure forms and, consequently, are forms united to bodies.

Obj. 6: Just as the soul is unable to produce an effect in external bodies except by means of corporeal instruments, so neither can an angel without corporeal powers, which he uses as instruments. Now, the soul for the purpose of its activities has bodily organs naturally united to it. Therefore, angels have also.

Obj. 7: The first movement in bodies is that whereby a body is moved by an incorporeal substance. Now, the first movement belongs to what moves its very self, as is said in Physics 8, because what is through itself comes before what is through another. (Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 256a13–b1.) Therefore, that which is moved immediately by an incorporeal substance moves as being moved of itself. But this is impossible unless the incorporeal substance that causes movement be united to the body naturally. Since, then, angels and demons move bodies immediately, it would seem that they have bodies naturally united to them. (Q. 6, a. 2.)

Obj. 8: It is better to live and give life than only to live, just as light is more perfectly in what shines and illuminates than in what merely shines. Now, the human soul lives and gives life to the body naturally united to it. Therefore, the angel also does not live in a less noble way than does the soul.

Obj. 9: The movement of a body that has various movements is the movement of a thing that moves itself, because that which has only one movement does not seem to be moving its very self, as is said in Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 254b10–255a18.) Now, the celestial body moves with various movements; thus, according to astronomers the planets are said at times to move forwards, at other times backwards, and sometimes to be stationary. Therefore, the movement of the higher bodies is of things that move themselves, and thus they are composed of corporeal and spiritual substance. But this spiritual substance is not a human soul, nor is it God. Therefore, it is an angel; and consequently, an angel has a body naturally united to him.

Obj. 10: Nothing acts beyond its species. Now, the heavenly bodies cause life in the world below, as instanced in animals engendered of decomposing matter by the power of the celestial bodies. Since, then, a living substance excels one that is not living, as Augustine says, it would seem that the heavenly bodies have life and thus have spiritual substances naturally united to them; and thus we come to the same conclusion as before. (Augustine, On True Religion 29, 55 (PL 34: 145, 169–72).)

Obj. 11: The first mobile thing is the heavenly body. Now, the Philosopher proves that all moved things are traced back to the first mobile that is moved of itself. (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 254b12–21; 8.5, 257b16, 257a25–33.) Therefore, the heaven is moved of itself; and thus, it is composed of a body that is moved and an immovable mover, which is a spiritual substance, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 12: According to Dionysius, divine wisdom has so ordained that the highest point of the lower nature is in contact with the lowest point of the higher nature. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 7 (PG 3:865–74).) Now, the highest point in corporeal nature is the heavenly body, since it transcends all other bodies. Therefore, it is in contact with the spiritual nature and is united to it; and thus, the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 13: The body of the heavens is more excellent than the human body, just as the everlasting surpasses the corruptible. Now, the human body is naturally united to a spiritual substance. Therefore, a fortiori, the heavenly body is so united, since the nobler body has the nobler form; and thus, we come to the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 14: We find that certain animals have been formed from the earth (for instance, men and beasts), and some from water (as fish and birds), according to Genesis 1. Therefore, there must be some formed from air, some from fire, and some from celestial matter. Now, the latter cannot be other than angels and demons, for seeing that these are the more noble bodies, they must have the more noble souls. Therefore, angels and demons are animals and have bodies naturally united to them.

Obj. 15: Plato also seems to favor this view; thus, in the Timaeus, he says that there are animals solid as the earth, others akin to liquid, others subtle as the air, others akin to the gods, and these must be the angels. (Plato, Timaeus 39e–40b.) Consequently, the angel is an animal, and the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 16: Nothing moves except a body, as is proved in Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics 6.5, 235b6–236b19.) Now, an angel moves. Therefore, he is either a body or naturally united to a body.

Obj. 17: The Word of God is above the angels, and he is united to a body. Therefore, it is not beneath the dignity of an angel to be united to a body naturally.

Obj. 18: Concerning the predicables, Porphyry (Porphyry of Tyre (ca. 233–305 AD), student of Plotinus, who arranged the writings of his teacher and wrote many works of his own, the Isagoge among them.) says that the word “mortal” in the definition of a man distinguishes us from the “gods,” by which only the angels can be meant. (Porphyry, Isagoge 3.) Therefore, the angels are animals, and thus, have bodies naturally united to them.

On the contrary (1), Damascene says that an angel is an intellectual substance, ever mobile, free, and incorporeal. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.3 (PG 94:866–67).)

Furthermore (2), it is stated in The Book of Causes that an intelligence is a simple substance, (The Book of Causes, Proposition 7.) and the Commentator says there that it is neither a magnitude nor spread over a magnitude. Now, an angel is an intelligence, as is clearly indicated by Dionysius, who calls the angels “divine minds” and “intelligences.” (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 7.2 (PG 3:867–70).) Therefore, an angel is neither a body nor united to a body.

Furthermore (3), angels and souls differ in the point of capacity and incapacity for union to a body. Therefore if an angel were united to a body, he would nowise differ from a soul, which cannot be admitted.

Furthermore (4), there is a spiritual substance that is dependent on a body as regards both its beginning and its end, for instance, the vegetative and sensitive soul. There is also a spiritual substance dependent on a body as regards its beginning and not as regards its end, as the human soul. Therefore, there will be a spiritual substance that needs not a body, either as to its beginning or as to its end, and this can be no other than an angel or a demon. (However, that there might be one which needs a body as to its end and not as to its beginning is impossible.)

Furthermore (5), there is a form that is neither a soul nor a spirit (for example, of a stone), a form that is a soul but not a spirit (for example, of a dumb animal), and a form that is both soul and spirit (for example, the form of a man). Therefore, there will be a form that is a spirit but not a soul, and such is an angel. Hence, an angel is not united to a body naturally, since this enters into the definition of a soul.

I answer that the ancients were divided in opinion concerning incorporeal substances.

For some of the philosophers of old contended that there was no such thing as an incorporeal substance, and that all substances are bodies; and Augustine confesses that at one time, he fell into this error. (Augustine, Confessions 4.15–16, 5.10, 5.14 (PL 32:703–6, 715–16, 718).) This opinion, however, was refuted by the philosophers. Aristotle disproves it in this way: there must be some infinite moving power, since otherwise it would not produce a perpetual movement. (Aristotle, Physics 8.10, 266a22–24, 266b5.) Further, he shows that every power in a magnitude must be finite, whence it follows that there must be a power that is wholly incorporeal, in order to produce a continual movement.

Again, he proves the same conclusion in another way. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.6–7, 1071b12–1072a26.) Act precedes potency both by nature and in time, simply speaking, although in this or that individual that passes from potency to act, potency precedes act in time. But because it must be brought into actuality by something that is already actual, it follows that, simply speaking, act precedes potency even in time. Therefore, since every body is in potency, as its very mutability shows, there must be an everlasting unchangeable substance that precedes all bodies.

A third argument in support of the same conclusion may be taken from the principles of the Platonists. For determined and partial being must be preceded by something non-partial; thus, if we find the fiery nature in iron in a partial and in a way participated manner, we must expect to find the fiery nature in something that is fire essentially. Therefore, seeing that being and all other perfections and forms are found in bodies in an, as it were, partial way, in that they are received into matter, there must preexist an incorporeal substance holding within itself the perfection of being, not in a partial manner but with a certain universal fullness.

But the reason why they were led into the error of maintaining that all substance is corporeal was that they were not able, by way of intellect, to rise above imagination, whose object is wholly corporeal, to the point of knowing incorporeal substances, which are grasped by intellect alone.

Others admitted the existence of incorporeal substances, but they supposed them to be united to bodies, and they denied that any incorporeal substance could be found that is not the form of a body. Therefore, they contended that God himself is the world-soul; thus Augustine states, in The City of God 7, that Varro held God was a soul that governs the world by movement and reason. (Augustine, City of God 4.31 (PL 41:138).) Therefore, he said that the whole world is God on account of its soul and not by reason of its body, just as a man is said to be wise in respect of his soul and not of his body. For this reason, gentiles worshipped the whole world and all its parts.

This opinion also was refuted by the philosophers for several reasons.

First, because a power united to a body as its form has a determined action through being united to such a body; therefore, since there must be a universal agent exercising its influence on all bodies—inasmuch as the first mover cannot be a body, as we have proved—it follows that there must be some incorporeal being that is not united to any body. Therefore, Anaxagoras posited an intellect that is “unmixed,” so that it might be able to command (as is said in Physics 8), because to command belongs to one who is above those who are commanded and who is neither subject nor bound to them in any way. (Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 256b24–26.)

Second, because if every incorporeal substance is united to a body as its form, it would follow that the first thing moving would be moving itself, in the way an animal does, as composed of a corporeal and a spiritual substance. Now, that which moves itself does so by its will, inasmuch as it desires something, for appetite is a moved mover, while the desirable object is not a moved mover. Consequently, above the incorporeal substance united to a body there must be something higher to move it as a desirable object moves an appetite; and this must be an intelligible good, since this is desirable because it is good simply speaking, whereas the desirable object of sense is desired because it is a good here and now.

Now, an intelligible good must be incorporeal, since were it not devoid of matter, it could not be understood; therefore, it itself must be intelligent, for every substance is intelligent through being untouched by matter. Therefore, above the substance that is united to a body, there must be another higher substance that is incorporeal or intellectual and not united to a body. And this is the proof given by Aristotle in Metaphysics 11, for it cannot be said that a thing moving itself desires nothing outside itself, since then it would never be in motion; for a motion is for the sake of obtaining something in some way extrinsic. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 11.10, 1066b22–1067a37; 11.11, 1067b7–20.)

Third, because what moves itself is capable of being moved or not moved, as is said in Physics 7; therefore, if something that is moved by itself be continually in motion, the stable continuance of its motion must be due to something outside it, and that is wholly immovable. (Aristotle, Physics 7.1, 242a15–20, 242b24–33; cf. 8.5, 257a33–b28.) Now, we observe that the heaven, whose soul they held to be God, is in continual motion; therefore, above the substance that is the soul of the world—if there is such a substance—there must be a yet higher substance that is not united to a body, and this is self-subsistent.

Now, those who contended that every substance is united to a body were apparently led astray through thinking that matter is the cause of subsistence and individuation in all beings, as it is in corporeal things; therefore, they thought that incorporeal substances cannot subsist outside a body, as suggested by way of objection in the Commentary on The Book of Causes. (Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, Proposition 7.)

Accordingly, Plato and Aristotle rejected these opinions and held that some substances are incorporeal, some united to bodies, and some not united to any body. For Plato, according to Macrobius, posited two separate substances, namely, God the father of the whole universe and occupying the highest place, and beneath him the mind of God, which he called the paternal intelligence containing the accounts or ideas of all things. (Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio 1.2.) He also held that many incorporeal substances are united to bodies: some united to heavenly bodies, and these the Platonists called “gods”; and some united to aerial bodies, whom they called demons. Hence, in The City of God 8, Augustine quotes the following definition of the demons as given by Apuleius: demons are animals with a rational mind, a passive soul, an aerial body, an eternal time. (Augustine, City of God 8.16 (PL 41:241).) Moreover, the gentile Platonists held that divine worship was to be given to all these incorporeal substances on account of their eternality. Further, they believed that incorporeal substances are united to grosser terrestrial bodies, namely, those that are earthy and watery, and these are the souls of men and of other animals.

Now, Aristotle agrees with Plato on two points and differs from him in two. He agrees with him in asserting that there is a supreme substance neither corporeal nor united to a body, and in holding the heavenly bodies to be ensouled. But he differs from him by asserting the existence of several incorporeal substances not united to a body, ones corresponding to the various heavenly movements, and also in the fact that he did not assert the existence of any aerial animals. And this he did with good reason.

This is made clear from three arguments.

First, because a mixed body is superior to an elemental body, especially as regards form, since the elements are the matter of mixed bodies. Therefore, incorporeal substances, which are the highest of all forms, ought to be united to mixed bodies and not to pure elements. Now, there can be no mixed body in which there is not a preponderance of earth and water as regards the quantity of its matter, since even the higher elements have a more active power through being more formal, and if these latter were to preponderate, the proportion owed to a mixture would not be preserved, since the higher would altogether subdue the lower. Consequently, it is not possible that incorporeal substances be united as forms to aerial bodies, but to mixed bodies in which earth and water materially preponderate.

Second, because a homogeneous and uniform body must have the same form in the whole and in its parts. Now, we see that the entire body of the air is of one nature, so that if any spiritual substances be united to any parts of the air, they must also be united to the whole; and thus, the whole air will be an animal, which seems to say something unreasonable, although this too some of the ancients asserted, holding that the whole of the air is full of gods. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2, 404a16–405b28.)

Third, because if a spiritual substance has no other powers besides intellect and will, it would be useless for it to be united to a body, since these activities are completed without the body; for every form of a body executes some of its actions through the body. If, however, a spiritual substance has other powers (as apparently the Platonists held to be the case with the demons, for they said that these are patients by way of their soul, and a passion occurs only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physics 7), (Aristotle, Physics 7.2, 244a27–245a25; cf. 7.3, 248a26–28.) it needs to be united to an organic body, so as to be able to perform the actions of such powers by means of determinate organs. But an aerial body cannot satisfy this condition, since it is shapeless. It follows, then, that spiritual substances cannot be naturally united to aerial bodies.

As to whether some incorporeal substances are united as forms to the heavenly bodies, Augustine leaves the question unsolved, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.18 (PL 34:279–80).) while Jerome would seem to assert it as a fact in his commentary on Ecclesiastes 1:6, the Spirit goes forward surveying all places round about, (Jerome, Commentary on Ecclesiastes 1.6 (PL 23:1016–17).) as does also Origen. (Origen, On First Principles 1.7.) Several modern writers consider this to be disproved by the fact that, since according to Scripture the number of the blessed is composed exclusively of men and angels, these spiritual substances would not be reckoned either among human souls or among the angels, who are incorporeal. However, Augustine considers this also doubtful: it is by no means certain whether the sun, moon, and stars belong to the same company, namely, of the angels: although some are of the opinion that they are bodies of light without sense or intelligence. Yet without any doubt, the teaching of both Plato and Aristotle differs from the doctrine of faith inasmuch as we hold that there are many substances not united to bodies, many more indeed than any of these admit. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.58 (PL 40:259–60).)

And this would seem the more probable view, for three reasons.

First, because just as the bodies above are higher in dignity than those below, so too incorporeal substances are also of higher dignity than bodies; but the higher bodies excel those below inasmuch as the earth compared to the heavens is as a point in comparison with a sphere, as is proved by astronomers. Therefore, incorporeal substances according to Dionysius surpass the entire multitude of material species; (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 14 (PG 3:321–22).) and this is indicated in Daniel: thousands of thousands ministered to him and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him (Dan 7:10). Moreover, it is in keeping with the outpouring of the divine goodness that it should bring into existence in greater profusion those things that are the noblest in nature. And because higher things do not depend on lower, nor are their powers confined to the things here below, we must not limit their activities to effects manifested through lower things.

Second, because in the order of natural things, we find many degrees intervening between natures that are distant from each other; thus, between animals and plants, there are certain imperfect animals that both have something in common with plants, in being fixed in place, and something in common with animals, in having sensation. Since, then, the supreme substance, which is God, is farthest removed from corporeal nature, it seems reasonable that there should be many intervening degrees of nature and not only those substances that are principles of movement.

Third, this is because God exercises not only a universal providence over corporeal beings, but also a particular providence over individuals, in which (as stated above) at times he works independently of the order of universal causes; and therefore we must posit the existence, not only of incorporeal substances who serve God in the universal causes of nature, namely, the movements of heavenly bodies, but also of others who administer to God’s particular works in individuals, especially as regards man, whose mind is not subject to the heavenly movements. (Q. 6, a. 1.) Accordingly, following the truth of faith, we assert that angels and demons do not have bodies naturally united to them, but are wholly incorporeal, as Dionysius says.

Reply Obj. 1: In several passages of his works, Augustine makes use of the Platonic view about angels and demons having bodies without actually agreeing with it. Hence, treating of the punishment of the demons in The City of God 21, he follows up both the opinion of those who said that demons have aerial bodies, and the view of those who say that they are wholly incorporeal. (Augustine, City of God 21.10 (PL 41:724–25).) Gregory describes an angel as being an “animal,” in the broad sense of the term, namely, as indicating any living being.

Reply Obj. 2: On many points, Origen adopts the views of the Platonists; thus, he seems to have been of the opinion that all created incorporeal substances are united to bodies; and yet, he does not state this positively; rather, he suggests it as by no means certain, and at the same time mentions the other view.

Reply Obj. 3: Without doubt, Dionysius maintained that angels and demons are incorporeal. He employs the terms “anger” and “concupiscence” metaphorically for an inordinate will, and “fantasy” as signifying the erring choice of their intelligence, inasmuch as every wrongdoer is ignorant, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b24–1111a24.) and they err who work evil (Prov 14:22).

Reply Obj. 4: Even if angels were composed of matter and form, this argument does not prove that they would be corporeal unless we suppose that angels and bodies have the same matter. It might be said indeed that the matter of bodies would be distinct not by dimensional division but by order to forms of different kinds, since potency is proportionate to act. Yet we rather believe that angels are not composed of matter and form but are self-subsistent forms only. Nor does it follow from this that they were not created; for form is a principle of existence as that by which a something exists, although the existence both of form and matter in the composite proceeds from the one agent. Therefore, if there be a created substance that is pure form, it can have an efficient but not a formal principle of existence.

Reply Obj. 5: According to the Philosopher, there is found an order of precedence even in formal causes; (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 194b23–195a3, 195a28–b20.) whence nothing prevents a form being formed through a participation in another form. And thus, God, who is pure being, is in a way the species of all subsistent forms that participate in being and are not their own being.

Reply Obj. 6: In the natural order, an angel’s power is higher and therefore more universal than the power of a human soul; thus, it could not have a corporeal organ that would adequately correspond to the action that it exercises on eternal bodies; and consequently, it was not fitting for it to be bound to any corporeal organs, as the soul is by union with the body.

Reply Obj. 7: What moves its very self is the first among things moved, by reason of an immovable mover; therefore, if the immovable mover moves either a body naturally united to it or one that is not, the account of priority remains the same.

Reply Obj. 8: The soul united to the body vivifies the body not only effectively but also formally; but to vivify the body in this way is less than to be alive through itself, simply speaking. For the soul is able to vivify the body inasmuch as it has the lowest degree of being, which can be common to itself and the body in the composite of the two. But because the being of an angel is higher in degree, it cannot be thus communicated to a body. Thus, it lives only and does not vivify formally.

Reply Obj. 9: That the planets seem to have a backward and forward movement and sometimes to be stationary is not due to a variable movement of one and the same movable; rather, it is due to the various movements of different movables, whether we put it down to eccentrics and epicycles, according to Ptolemy, (In bk. 3, c. 3 of his Almagest, Claudius Ptolemy (ca. 100–178 AD) shows how these two hypotheses can explain the sun’s apparent irregular movement, and he returns to these two hypotheses to explain (in part) the more complex anomalies found in the motion of the planets.) or to a difference of movements in the poles, as others have maintained. And yet, even if the heavenly bodies did vary in their movements, this would not prove that their movement is caused by a voluntary mover conjoined to them rather than from a separated mover.

Reply Obj. 10: Even if the heavenly bodies are not ensouled, they are moved by a living separate substance by whose power they act, even as an instrument does by the power of its principal agent; and thus, they cause life in things below them.

Reply Obj. 11: The Philosopher brings his arguments to two alternative conclusions, namely, that movable things must be traced back either immediately to an immovable mover or to a self-mover part of which is an immovable mover, although he himself seems to prefer the latter alternative. If, however, anyone give preference to the former, nothing problematic is implied in the Philosopher’s demonstrations.

Reply Obj. 12: That which is highest in bodies reaches the lowest degree of the spiritual nature by a certain participation in its properties, for instance, by being incorruptible, but not by being united to it.

Reply Obj. 13: The human body is less noble than the heavenly body as regards matter, yet it has a more noble form, if heavenly bodies are without soul. Yet I call it more noble in itself, but not insofar as it forms the body, because the form of the heavens perfects its matter in a more perfect way, by making it incorruptible, than the rational soul perfects the body. The reason is because the spiritual substance that moves the heavens is of too high a dignity to be united to a body.

Reply Obj. 14: Their bodies cannot be aerial for reasons already given.

Reply Obj. 15: This suffices for the reply to the fifteenth objection, which proceeds on the lines of Plato’s opinion.

Reply Obj. 16: An angel’s movements are not by making itself commensurate with a space, the way bodies move, and the term “motion” is used equivocally when we speak of the movements of angels and of bodies.

Reply Obj. 17: The Word of God is not united to a body as forming it, for in that case, the Word and the flesh would become one nature, and this is heretical.

Reply Obj. 18: Porphyry follows the opinion of Plato when he gives the name of “gods” to the demons, whom he held to be animals, as well as to the heavenly bodies.