Chapter 13 — On the error of some concerning the knowledge and providence of spiritual substances

But not only did some thinkers err concerning the substance and the order of spiritual substances, judging of them after the manner of lower beings, but some of them also fell into error concerning the knowledge and the providence of these substances. For in wanting to judge of the intelligence and the operation of spiritual substances after the manner of human intelligence and operation, they held that God and the other immaterial substances did not have a knowledge of singulars, nor did they exercise a providence over any lower beings and especially human acts. (Very likely certain Averroists at Paris whose doctrines are given in the Condemnations of 1270 and 1277. St. Thomas follows the same order and cites almost verbatim Props. 10, 11, 12 of the Condemnation of 1270. Cf. above, Introduction; also Chartularium, I, 487; Mandonnet, op. cit., I, III; 11, 175. For Averroist doctrine of angels, cf. A. Vacant, Angélologie parmi les averroistes latins in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, Vol. I, coll. 1260–1264, esp. col. 1262.) For, since in our own case it is the sense that deals with singulars, but the intellect deals not with singulars but with universals (because of its immateriality), as a consequence they thought that the intellects of spiritual substances, which are much more simple than our intellect, could not grasp singulars. Now, since they are completely incorporeal, there is in spiritual substances no sense, whose operation cannot take place without a body. Accordingly, they thought that it was impossible for spiritual substances to have any knowledge of singulars. (Cf. Chartularium, I, Props. 76, 85, (pp. 547–548); Mandonnet, op. cit., II, 180.)

Further, proceeding to a greater folly, they thought that God knew only himself by his intellect. For thus in our own case, we see that to understand is the perfection and the act of the one understanding, for it is thus that the intellect becomes actively understanding. Now, nothing other than God is nobler than he, so that it can be his perfection. Therefore, they hold that it necessarily follows that God understands only his own essence. (Cf. Chartularium, I, Prop. 3, 544; Mandonnet, op. cit., II, 177.)

Further, that which proceeds from the providence of any one cannot be by chance. If, therefore, all things that happen in this world proceed from the divine providence, there is no fortune or chance in things. (Cf. Chartularium, I, Props. 21, 42, 545–546; Mandonnet, op. cit., II, 177–178,183.)

They likewise use an argument of Aristotle in Metaphysics VI, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 3 (1027a 29–1027b 16); cf. Siger of Brabant, De Necessitate et contingentia causarum in Mandonnet, op. cit., Part II, 111–114; A. Maurer, Siger of Brabant’s De Necessitate et Contingentia Causarum and Ms. Peterhouse 152 in Mediaeval Studies 14 (1952): 48–60; F. Van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant d’après ses oeuvres inédites, Vol. II, 606–607.) where he proves that if we posit that every effect has an essential cause and that, given any cause whatsoever, its effect must necessarily be posited, it will follow that all futures will happen of necessity, since any future effect will be reduced to some preceding cause, and that to another and so on, until we come to the cause which already is or already was. But this cause is now posited because it is in the present or it was in the past. If, therefore, to posit the cause means necessarily for the effect to be posited, then all future effects will follow of necessity. But if all things that are in the world are subject to the divine providence, the cause of all things is not only present or past but has preceded them from eternity. But it is not possible that when this cause is posited, its effect will not follow. For the divine providence, on which no defect falls, is not thwarted either through ignorance or through the impotence of the one providing. Therefore, it follows that all things come about of necessity. (Cf. Chartularium, Prop. 21, 545; Mandonnet, op. cit., II, 183.)

Further, if God is the good itself, the order of his providence must necessarily proceed according to the nature of the good. Therefore, either divine providence is inefficacious or it completely excludes evil from things. We see, however, many evils occurring among singular, generable, and corruptible things, and especially among men in whom, in addition to physical evils (which are natural defects) and corruptions common to them and to other corruptible things, there are added also the evils of vices and of disorderly happenings, as when numerous evils befall the just, and good things happen to the unjust. On this account, therefore, some people have thought that divine providence extends only to immaterial substances and the incorruptible and heavenly bodies, in which they saw no evil. But the lower beings, according to them, were subject to the providence of God in genus, but not individually, nor to other spiritual substances.