Chapter 14 — In which it is shown that God has knowledge of everything

And because the things which have been said above are opposed to the common opinion of mankind and this not only of men in general but also of the wise, we must show by certain arguments that the above positions have no truth and that the above arguments do not establish the conclusion they intend. This applies first to the knowledge of God, and second to his providence.

Now we must, of necessity, hold firmly this point: namely, that God has a most certain knowledge of all things that are knowable at any time or by any knower whatsoever. For, as we have maintained above, (Cf. above, Cap. VIII; Cap. IX; Cap. X.) the substance of God is his very act of being. Furthermore, his being and his understanding are one and the same; otherwise, he would not be a perfectly simple being nor the absolutely prime being. Therefore, just as his substance is his act of being, so is his substance his understanding or his intelligence, as likewise the Philosopher concludes in Metaphysics XII. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 7 (1072b 26–30).) Therefore, just as his substance is his separate act of being, so likewise is his substance his separate understanding. But if there should be some separate form, nothing that could belong to the nature of that form would be lacking to it, just as if there were a separate whiteness, nothing understood under the nature of whiteness would be lacking to it. Now, the knowledge of any knowable is included under the universal nature of knowing. Therefore, God cannot be lacking in the knowledge of any knowable. But the knowledge of any knower is according to the mode of his substance, just as any operation is according to the mode of the one operating. All the more so, divine knowledge (which is God’s substance) is according to the mode of his being. Now his being is one, simple, abiding, and eternal. It follows, therefore, that God has an eternal and fixed knowledge of all things by one simple glance.

Further, that which is abstract (“Abstract” as “separate” or “separate from matter.”) can be only one in each nature. For if whiteness could exist as abstracted, the only whiteness would be the one that is separate and all the others would be white by participation. Now, just as the sole substance of God is his separate existence, so his substance is his absolutely separate understanding. All other things consequently understand or know by participation, just as they exist by participation. But that which befits a being by participation is found more perfectly in that in which it is essentially and from which it is derived to others. (Cf. above, Cap. VI; Cap. VIII.) Therefore, God must have a knowledge of all things which are known by any being whatsoever. And therefore the Philosopher considers it unfitting that something which is known by us should be unknown to God, as is clear in On the Soul I (Aristotle, De Anima, 1, 5 (410b 4–7); St. Thomas, In De Anima, I, lect. 12, ed. Pirotta, no. 186 (AACTA, 146–147).) and in Metaphysics III. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, II, 4 (1000b 4–6).)

Likewise, if God knows himself, he must know himself perfectly, for if his understanding is his substance, then whatever is in his substance must be included in his knowledge. But when the substance of anything is known perfectly, its power must likewise be known perfectly. God therefore knows his power perfectly, and consequently he must know all the things to which his power extends. But his power extends to everything that in any way is in reality or can be—whether it be proper or common, immediately produced by him or through the mediation of second causes—since the power of the first cause acts on the effect more than does the power of a second cause. (St. Thomas, In Librum de Causis, Prop. 1, ed. H. d. Saffrey, (pp. 4–10).) Therefore, God must have a knowledge of all things that in any way are found in things.

Furthermore, just as the cause is in a manner present in its effect through a participated likeness of itself, so every effect is in its cause in a more excellent way according to the power of the cause. Therefore, all things must exist more eminently in their first cause, which is God, than in themselves. But whatever is in a thing must be in it according to the substance of that thing. But the substance of God is his understanding. Therefore, however things may be in reality, they must exist in God in an intelligible way according to the eminence of his substance. Therefore, God must know all things most perfectly.

But because they (I.e., the Averroists.) have found an occasion to err in the demonstration of Aristotle in Metaphysics XII, (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 7 (1072b 22–23); 9 (1074b 15–1075a 10).) we must show that they do not attain to the Philosopher’s intention. Therefore, it must be known that, according to the Platonists, an order of intelligibles existed prior to the order of intellect, so that an intellect became actually understanding by participating in an intelligible, as we have already said. (Cf. above, Cap. I.) And in the same way Aristotle showed earlier in the same book that above the intellect and the intellectual appetite by which the heavens are moved, there is a certain intelligible, participated by the intellect moving the heavens. His words are: The receiver of the intelligible substance and of the intellect acts as possessing them; (Aristotle, Metaphysics, X1, 7 (1072b 22).) as if to say it actually understands as it already possesses its participated intelligible from above. And from this, he further concludes that this intelligible is more divine.

And after he has interposed certain matters, he raises the question concerning the intellect of this most divine being by participation in which the mover of the heavens is actually understanding. (S. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 9 (1074b 1S).) For if that most divine being does not understand, he will not be something outstanding but will act as one who is asleep.

But if he understands, the first query will then be how he understands. For if he understands by participating in something else above him—just as a lower intellect understands by participating in him—it will follow that there will be something else which will be a principle with respect to it, because by the fact that he understands by participating in another, he is not understanding through his own essence; so that his substance is not his understanding, but rather, his substance will be in potency in relation to understanding. (Ibid. (1074b 18).) For this is the condition of the substance of any participating being in relation to what it obtains by participation. And thus, it further follows that that divine being will not be the most excellent substance—which is contrary to the position.

As a result, he advances another query concerning that which is understood about the noblest substance. Whether it be granted that the first substance is its very understanding or whether its substance is an intellect that is compared as potency to understanding, there will be a question as to what it is that the first substance understands. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 9 (1074b 20).) For it understands either itself or something other than itself. If it be granted that it understands something other than itself, there will arise the further query whether it always understands the same thing, or at one time one thing and at another time another.

And because some one could say that it makes no difference what it understands, Aristotle raises on this point the query whether it makes some difference or none in any being to understand something good or to understand something contingent. (Ibid., (1074b 25).) And he answers in reply to this query that to know certain things is trivial. The meaning of this statement can be twofold: either that it is trivial to know concerning certain things whether to understand them is as good as to understand certain other things, whether much lesser or much greater. The other meaning is that in our own case it seems trivial for us to have an actual understanding of certain things. Whence another reading has or it is unfitting to meditate about certain things.

Having determined that it is better to understand something good than to understand something less good, he concludes that what the first substance understands is the best; and that in understanding, it is not changed so that it understands now one thing and now another. He proves this in a twofold way. First, since it understands that which is noblest, it would follow, as has been said, (Cf. above, Cap. XIII.) that if it were changed to some intelligible object, then there would be change to something less noble. Second, because such a change of intelligibles is already a certain motion. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 9 (1074b 28–30).) The first being, however, must be in every way immobile.

He then returns to the resolution of the first question: namely, whether God’s substance is his understanding. This he proves in a twofold way as follows. First, because if his substance is not his understanding but is as potency to it, it is probable that to understand without stop would be laborious to him. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 9 (1074b 28).) He says that it is probable because that is how it happens in our own case. But since this can happen in our case not because of the nature of the intellect but because of the lower powers that we use in understanding, he therefore did not say that this is necessary in all cases. If, however, this probability is accepted as true, it will follow that it might be laborious for the first substance to understand without stop and therefore it will not be able to understand everlastingly, which is contrary to what has been accepted.

Second, he proves it by the fact that if his substance were not his understanding, it would follow that something else would be nobler than his intellect, namely, the known thing, through participation in which it becomes understanding. (Ibid., (1074b 30).) For whenever a substance is not its own understanding, the substance of the intellect must be ennobled and perfected by the fact that it understands some intelligible actually, even if this object be a most humble one. For every thing by which some thing becomes actual is more noble than it. Hence it would follow that some most humble intelligible is nobler than the intellect which is not understanding through its essence. Hence this must be denied, namely, that something else understood by him is the perfection of the divine intellect, because the nobility of the thing itself understood belongs to the perfection of his act of understanding. This point is manifest from the fact that in our case, among whom the substance of the knower differs from actual knowledge, it is more worthy for certain things not to be seen than to be seen. And so, if in the case of God his intellect is not his understanding, and he understands something else, then his understanding will not be the best, because it will not have the best intelligible object. (Ibid., (1074b 30); cf. St. Thomas, SCG, 1, 45 (OTCF, 1, 173).) It remains, therefore, since he is the noblest of things, that he understands himself.

It is therefore apparent to anyone who considers carefully the above words of the Philosopher that it is not his intention to exclude absolutely from God a knowledge of other things, but rather that God does not understand other things through themselves as participating in them, in order that he then may become understanding through them; as happens in the case of any intellect whose substance is not its understanding. He rather understands all things other than himself by understanding himself, inasmuch as his being is the universal and fontal source of all being, and his understanding is the universal root of understanding encompassing all understanding. (Cf. St. Thomas, ST, I, 14, 6, 8 (BW, 1, 143, 147).)

The lower separate intellects, however, that we call angels, understand themselves in each case through their essence, but according to the Platonists’ position, they understand other things by participating in the separate intelligible forms that they call gods, as we have said. (Cf. above, Cap. I; Proclus, Elem, Prop. 117 (pp. 103–105).) According to Aristotle’s principles, they understand other things partly through their essence and partly through a participation in the first intelligible, who is God, from whom they participate in both being and understanding.