Chapter 20 — On the distinction of angelic spirits

Furthermore, we consequently consider next what we must hold according to sacred doctrine concerning the distinction of spirits. Our first consideration is the difference between good and evil. For it has been accepted among many thinkers that certain spirits are good and certain others evil. This is likewise proved by the authority of sacred Scripture. For it is said about the good spirits in Hebrews 1:14: Are they not all ministering spirits sent forth to serve for the sake of those who are to obtain salvation? About the evil spirits, however, it is said in Matthew 12:43: When the unclean spirit has gone out of a man, he passes through waterless places seeking rest, but he finds none. And afterwards it is added, Then he goes and brings with him seven other spirits more evil than himself (Matt 12:45). And although, as Augustine narrates in the ninth book of On the City of God, (St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, IX, 1 ff. (PL 41, 255).) certain thinkers posited both good and evil spirits to be gods, and likewise good and evil spirits to be called demons, nevertheless, others more correctly assert only the good spirits to be gods. These we call ‘angels,’ whereas according to the received manner of speaking, ‘demons’ are accepted only as evil. This distinction, as he says, is reasonable. (Ibid., IX, 20 (PL 41, 273).) For the demons are named from the word ‘science’ in Greek, which, without charity, according to the opinion of the Apostle, puffs up through pride.

But the cause of the wickedness of the demons is not assigned by all thinkers in the same way. For some of them assert that demons are naturally evil as having been produced by an evil principle, and thus their nature must be evil—which is part and parcel of the error of the Manicheans, as is clear from what has been said. (Cf. above, Caps. XVI.) But Dionysius refutes this error most effectively in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names (Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, IV, 23 (PG 3, 724C); Dionysiaca, I, c. IV, sec. 20 (pp. 271–272).) when he says: But neither are the demons evil by nature. He proves this first because if they were naturally evil, it would be necessary to say at one and the same time that neither had they been produced by a good principle nor should they be numbered among existing beings, since evil is not something existing, nor if there existed an evil nature, was it caused by a good principle.

In the second place, because if they are evil by nature, they are evil to themselves or to others: if to themselves, they would destroy themselves (for evil has the nature of something corruptive), which is impossible. But if they are evil to others, then they would have to destroy those things to which they are evil. However, what is such by nature must be completely such with respect to all. It would follow therefore that they would destroy all things, and this completely. This is impossible, both because certain beings are incorruptible and cannot be destroyed, and also because those which are destroyed are not destroyed completely. Therefore, the nature itself of the demons is not evil.

In the third place, if they were naturally evil, they would not have been made by God because good produces good effects and makes them subsist. (Dionysius, de Divinis Nominibus, IV.) This is impossible according to that which has been proved above, (Cf. above, Cap. IX; Cap. X.) namely, that God must be the source of all things.

In the fourth place, because if the demons are always disposed in the same way, they are not evil, for that which is always the same belongs to the good. If, however, they are not always evil, they are not evil by nature.

In the fifth place, they are not completely devoid of good, for according as they are and live and have understanding, they desire some good.

Now there were others who held that the demons were naturally evil, not because their nature is evil, but because they have a certain natural inclination to evil, as Augustine advances in the tenth book of On the City of God (St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, X, 11 (PL 41, 289).) through Porphyry, who says in the Epistle to Anebontes that some men thought that there is a certain class of spirits which it is proper to obey and which is deceitful by nature in all forms and in many ways, imitating the gods and demons and the very souls of the dead.

This opinion cannot have any truth if it be posited that demons are incorporeal and certain separate intellects. For, since every nature is good, it is impossible that some nature should have an inclination to evil, except under the character of some particular good. For nothing prevents some thing which is good in a particular manner to be called ‘bad’ with respect to a certain nature, insofar as it is opposed to the perfection of a higher nature; just as to be raging is a certain good with respect to a dog, is nevertheless an evil with respect to man, who has reason. Yet it is possible that there should be in man, according to his sensible and corporeal nature which he shares with brutes, a certain inclination to raging, which is evil for man. But this cannot be said of an intellectual nature because the intellect has an order to the good in general. Accordingly, it is impossible for a natural inclination to evil to be found in demons, if they are purely intellectual (As in the case of Cap. I, there seems to be no palaeographical justification for the reading which we give. Eleven manuscripts used in the preparation of this text (METZ, Bibl. de la Ville 1158 comprises only folios 12v and 13r, i.e., Cap. I to Cap. II, read “essent.” We have preferred the reading “sunt” which is found in the 1488 Soncinas, the 1490, 1498, and 1508 Pizzamanus printed editions. Concerning the value of these incunabula with respect to the establishing of a truly critical text, cf. above, Introduction, and F. Lescoe, op. cit., Introduction: Literary Problems).) and have no admixture of a corporeal nature.

It must be known, therefore, that the Platonists posited, as has likewise been said above, (Cf. above, Cap. I.) that the demons are certain corporeal animals which have an intellect. And inasmuch as they have a corporeal and sensible nature, they are subject to various passions of the soul, just as men are subject to passions which incline them towards evil. Accordingly, when Apuleius was defining the demons in the book, On the god of Socrates, (Cf. St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, IX, 8 (PL 41, 263).) he said that they are animals in genus, passible in soul, rational in mind, airy in body, eternal in time. And just as he himself says, the mind of the demons is subject to the passions of lusts, fears, and angers and all other such things. Therefore, the demons are likewise locally separated from the gods—whom we call angels—attributing the airy places to the demons but the ethereal ones to the angels or gods.

Certain of the doctors of the Church follow this position in some respect. For in the third book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis, (St. Augustine, De Gen. ad Litt., II, 10 (PL 34, 284).) Augustine seems to say or to leave unsettled that the demons are airy animals because they have the nature of airy bodies; and, for that reason, they are not destroyed by death, because there prevails in them an element, namely air, which is quite suitable both for acting as well as being acted upon—and he says the same thing in several other places. And Dionysius seems to posit in demons those attributes which belong to a sensible soul; for he says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names (Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, IV, 23, (PG 3, 725C); Dionysiaca, I, c. IV, sec. 20 (p. 280).) that there is in demons an evil—an irrational rage, a mad concupiscence, and wanton fancy. And it is clear that fancy and concupiscence and anger or rage pertain not to the intellect but to a part of the sensitive soul. And with respect to place, certain doctors agreed with these thinkers because they did not consider the demons to be either celestial or super-celestial angels, as Augustine relates in the third book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis. (St. Augustine, De Gen. ad Litt., III, 10 (PL 34, 285).) And Damascene says in the second book (St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 4 (PG 94, 873C–876A).) that the demons were among the angelic powers which were in command of the earthly order. And the Apostle in Ephesians 2:2 calls the devil the prince of the power of the air.

But something presents itself here which is worthy of consideration. For, since matter is attributed to each species according to the suitability of its form, it does not seem possible that there should be in a whole of a given species a natural inclination to that which is evil for that species according to the nature of its proper form; just as there is not present in all men a natural inclination to the immoderation of concupiscence or anger. Therefore, it is not possible that all demons should have a natural inclination to deception and to other evils, even if they were all of one species. Much less, therefore, if there should be individuals in individual species—although if they are corporeal, nothing seems to prevent many of them from being contained under one species, for a diversity of individuals of one species could be caused according to a diversity of matter. Therefore, we shall have to say that the demons were not always evil but some of them began to be evil when, by their own choice, they followed the inclination of the passions.

And accordingly, Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names (Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, IV, 23 (PG 3, 735B) Dionysiaca, I, c. IV, sec. 20 (p. 279).) that aversion, namely, from God, is an evil for the demons themselves, and it is a forsaking of those things which are fitting to them because they were carried away by pride beyond themselves. And later on, he adds certain remarks pertaining to punishment as not reaching the ultimate end*, and imperfection*, through a lack of a due perfection, and impotence of pursuing that which they desire by nature, and an infirmity of the power conserving in them a natural order, calling them back from evil. Augustine likewise says in the third book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis (St. Augustine, De Gen. ad Litt., III, 10 (PL 34, 285).) that the transgressing angels were before their transgression, along with their leader, now a devil and formerly an archangel, in the higher part of the air near the heaven. He gives us clearly to understand that some of the angels were made evil through their transgression. And Damascene says in the second book (St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 4 (PG 94, 876A).) that the devil was not created evil in nature but, existing as good and begotten in the good, he used the election of his own choice.

In addition, both Origen in I Peri Archon (Origen, Peri Archon, I, 5 (PG 11, 160C ff., 163A-C).) and Augustine in Book XI of On the City of God (St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XI, 15 (PL 41, 330).) confirm this with texts of the sacred Scriptures, when they introduce what is contained in Isaiah 14:12 about the devil under the likeness of the king of Babylon: How have you fallen, O Lucifer, who rose in the morning? And in Ezechiel 28:12–13 it is said to him in the person of the king of Tyre: You were the signet of perfection, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty; you were in Eden, the garden of God. And afterwards, it is added: You were blameless in your ways from the day you were created, till iniquity was found in you (Ezek 28:15). In the same place, Augustine (St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XI, 14–15 (PL 41, 330–331).) resolves what is said in John 8:44: He was a murderer from the beginning, and did not stand in the truth, and what is said in 1 John 3:8, that the devil has sinned from the beginning, referring this to the beginning when he began to sin, or to the beginning of the human state when he killed man spiritually after having deceived him.

Furthermore, the opinion of the Platonists, who say that certain demons are good and others are evil—as if having been made good or evil by their own free choice—seems to agree with this opinion. (St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei, IX, 1–2 (PL 41, 255–257).) Accordingly, Plotinus, proceeding further, says that the souls of men become demons and the lares are made of men if the latter are of good merit; the lemures or larvae, however, if they are of evil merit; and they are called manes if it is uncertain whether they are of good or evil merit, as Augustine sets forth in On the City of God. (Ibid., IX, 11 (PL 41, 265).) This opinion agrees with the aforementioned position (Cf. above, Cap. XIX; Cap. I.) of the saints in this, that the latter assert some demons to be good and others evil because of good or evil merits, although it is not customary for us to call the good spirits ‘demons’ but rather ‘angels.’

As to what he says (namely, that the souls of the dead become demons), his position is in error. Accordingly, Chrysostom, (St. John Chrysostom, Homilia in Matt., XXVIII (PG 57, 353).) expounding on what is contained in Matthew 8:28, that two men possessed with devils came out of the sepulchres, says: Through this fact, namely that they were going out of the sepulchres, they wanted to impose a pernicious doctrine, that the souls of the dying become demons. Accordingly, many soothsayers killed children so that they might have their cooperating soul. And because of this, many demoniacs shout: I am that one’s soul. However, it is not the dead person’s soul which shouts, but the demon pretends so that he might deceive the hearers. For if it were possible for the soul of one dead to enter the body of another, it would be much more possible for it to enter its own body. Nor is it reasonable for a soul suffering iniquities to cooperate with the one that brings iniquities on it. Nor likewise is it reasonable that a soul separated from the body should still be wandering here. For the souls of the just are in the hand of God. (Wis 3:1.) But those which are of sinners are led away from here at once, as is evident from Lazarus and Dives.

Nevertheless, we must not think that in this respect, Plotinus deviated from the opinion of the Platonists who posited the demons to be airy bodies—namely, because Plotinus thought that the souls of men become demons after death—for according to the Platonists’ opinion, even the souls of men have, over and above these corruptible bodies, certain ethereal bodies to which they are always joined as to something incorruptible, even after the dissolution of these sensible bodies. Accordingly, Proclus says in the Book of the Divine Elementations: (Proclus, Elem, Prop. 196 (p. 171).) Every soul capable of participating uses the first and perpetual body and one having an ungenerated and incorruptible hypostasis. And thus, according to them, the souls separated from the bodies do not cease to be airy animals.

But, according to the opinion of other saints, the demons (whom we call evil angels) not only came from a lower order of angels but also from the higher orders, whom we have shown to be incorporeal and immaterial, (Cf. above, Cap. VII.) so that among them, there was one who was the highest of all. Accordingly, Gregory (St. Gregory the Great, Moral. in Job, XXXII, 23 (PL 76, 665C).) explaining in a certain homily the words of Ezechiel 28:13, Every precious stone was his covering, says that the leader of the evil angels was, in comparison with the other angels, more brilliant than the rest. And in this respect, he seems to agree with those who asserted some demons to be good and others to be evil, according to which demons are called angels. And therefore it is said in Job 4:18: Behold, they who serve him are not steadfast, and in his angels he found wickedness.

But this presents many difficulties. For in an incorporeal and intellectual substance, there seems to be no appetite except the intellectual, which is of that which is absolutely good, as appears through the Philosopher in XII Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI, 7 (1072b 18–19); 9 (1074b 23–24).) Now no one is made evil from the fact that his intellect tends toward that which is good absolutely, but from the fact that it tends toward a qualifiedly good thing as though it were absolutely good. Therefore, it does not seem possible that an incorporeal and intellectual substance should be made evil by its own appetite.

Again, appetite can be only of the good or of the seeming good, for the good is that which all beings seek, and one is not rendered evil because he seeks the true good. Therefore, every individual who is made evil through his own appetite must seek a seeming good as though it were truly good. This, however, cannot be unless he is deceived in his judgment, which does not seem capable of happening in an incorporeal and intellectual substance, which, as it seems, cannot have a false apprehension. For even in our case, insofar as we understand something, there can be no falsity. Accordingly, Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions, (St. Augustine, Liber LXXXIII Quaestionum, q. 32 (PL 40, 22).) that everyone who is deceived, that, indeed, in which he is deceived, he does not understand. And accordingly, no one can be deceived concerning those things which we grasp properly by our intellect, as well as concerning the first principles. Therefore, it seems impossible that some incorporeal and intellectual substance should become evil through its own appetite.

Furthermore, a substance which is of an intellectual nature and separate from a body must be absolutely free of time. For the nature of a thing is grasped from its operation, while the character of an operation is known from its object. However, the intelligible, precisely as such, is neither here nor now; but it is rather something abstracted both from the dimensions of place as well as from the succession of time. Therefore, the intellectual operation itself, if it be considered by itself, must likewise rise above all temporal succession, just as it is abstracted from all corporeal dimension. And if a magnitude or time be joined to any intellectual operation, this happens only accidentally, just as it happens in our case insofar as our intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms which it likewise considers in them—which can have no place in an incorporeal and intellectual substance. It remains, therefore, that the operation of such a substance (and consequently the substance itself) should be altogether outside all temporal succession. And Proclus says accordingly that every intellect has substance, and power, and operation, in eternity. (Proclus, Elem, Prop. 169 (pp. 147–149).) And in the Book on Causes (Liber de Causis, II, ed. O. Bardenhewer, 165, 14.) it is said that understanding is on a par with eternity. Therefore, whatever befits those incorporeal and intellectual substances befits them always and without succession. Therefore, either they were always evil—which is against what has been set down—or they could in no way have been made evil.

Moreover, since God is the very essence of goodness, as Dionysius says in the first chapter of On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, I, 5 (PG 3, 593D); Dionysiaca, I, c. 1, sec. 4 (pp. 39–41).) it is necessary that the closer they are to God, the more firmly are certain beings strengthened in the participation of goodness. But it is evident that intellectual, incorporeal substances are above all bodies. If, therefore, the highest bodies, (namely, the heavenly bodies) are not receptive of any disorder or evil, much less could those super-celestial substances be capable of disorder and evil. Accordingly, Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, De Coelesti Hierarchia, IV, 2 (PG 3, 180A); Dionysiaca, II, c. 4 sec. 60 (pp. 803–805).) that the holy ornaments of the celestial substances participated in the divine teaching in greater measure than those beings that only exist, those that live with an irrational life, and those that we call rational; and they have more abundant communications with God, with their minds fixed and, as is befitting, stretched towards what is above them in the power of a love that is divine and unswerving. The order of things then seems to have this: that just as the lower bodies can be subject to disorder and evil, but not the heavenly bodies, so likewise the intellects joined to the lower bodies can be subject to evil, but not those super-celestial substances. And this view those thinkers seemed to follow who posited that the demons, who for us are the bad angels, are from a lower order and corporeal.