On God

Question 1

Regarding the divine nature

There were questions about God, (Qq. 1–2.) angels, (Q. 3.) and man. (Qq. 4–10.)

Concerning God, there were questions regarding both the divine nature (Q. 1.) and the assumed human nature. (Q. 2.)

Article 1

Whether blessed Benedict saw the divine essence in the vision by which he saw the whole world

Regarding the divine nature, there was a question whether blessed Benedict saw the divine essence in the vision by which he saw the whole world. (Cf. Gregory the Great, Dialogues 2.35 (Patrologia Latina [Migne], 66:198; Sources Chrétiennes [SC] 260:238).) And it was shown that he did.

Obj. 1: For Gregory says when speaking of this vision: for the soul seeing God, every creature is made narrow. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues 2.35 (PL 66:200; SC 260:240).) But to see God is to see the divine essence. Therefore, blessed Benedict saw the divine essence.

Obj. 2: In the same place Gregory adds that he saw the whole world in the divine light. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues 2.35 (PL 66:200; SC 260:240).) But there is no other light or clarity of God than God himself, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 18, ch. 54, para. 90 (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [CCSL] 143A:953; PL 76:93–94).) as the same Gregory says, and as the Gloss says on Exodus 33:20: man shall not see me, and live. (Glossa ordinaria, in Bibliorum Sacrorum cum Glossa ordinaria iam ante quidem a Strabo Fulgensi, collecta: nunc autem novis patrum, cum Graecorum, tum Latinorum expositionibus locupletata cum postilla Nicolai Lyrani (Venice: 1603), at Exodus 33:20, vol. 1, pp. 851–52; see also PL 113:290.) Therefore, blessed Benedict saw God through his essence.

On the contrary, it is said in John 1:18: no one ever has seen God. The Gloss there says that no one living in mortal flesh can see the essence of God. (Glossa ordinaria, at John 1:18, 5.1035–36; see also PL 114:358; Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 18.54.88 (CCSL 143A:952; PL 76:92).)

I answer that a corruptible body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). Yet the highest elevation of the human mind is to come to see the divine essence. Hence it is impossible for the human mind to see the essence of God, as Augustine says: unless man utterly be dead to this mortal life, or be so alienated from the senses that he knows not whether he is in the body or outside the body, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12.27 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [CSEL] 28:422; PL 34:477–78).) which is read to have happened with Paul (2 Cor 12:2–3). Yet blessed Benedict, when he saw that vision, was neither utterly dead for this life nor alienated from bodily senses, which is clear through this: (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 18.54.89 (CCSL 143A:952; PL 76:93).) that, while remaining in the same vision, he called another person to see the same, as Gregory relates. Hence it is clear that he did not see the essence of God. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues 2.35 (PL 66:198; SC 260:238).)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that Gregory intended in those words to argue from a certain analogy: for if those seeing the essence of God consider all of creation a small thing to see in comparison with him, it is no wonder if blessed Benedict could see something greater through the divine light than men commonly see.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the light of God sometimes means God himself, but sometimes it means the light derived from him, according to Psalm 36:9 [35:10]: in your light we shall see light. Yet here it is understood for light derived from God.

Question 2

Regarding the assumed human nature

Then there were two questions about the human nature in Christ:

first, whether in Christ there is one sonship or two by which he is related to his Father and his mother;

second, concerning his death, whether he died on the cross.

Article 1

Whether in Christ there is one sonship by which he is related to his Father and his mother, or two

To the first we proceed thus. It seems there are two sonships in Christ.

Obj. 1: When the causes of relations are multiplied, the relations are multiplied. But generation is the cause of sonship. Therefore, since the generation by which Christ is born eternally from his Father is one thing, and the generation by which he is born temporally from his mother is another, there will likewise be one sonship by which he is related to his Father, and another by which he is related to his mother.

Obj. 2: What receives in time some absolute property without changing, even more can receive in time some relative property without changing. But the Son of God receives in time an absolute property without changing, for on Luke 1:32: he shall be great and shall be called the son of the Most High, Ambrose says: not for this reason shall he be great, namely, that before the birth of the Virgin he was not great, but rather, because the power which the Son of God naturally has, man was about to receive in time. (This sentence is attributed to Saint Bede the Venerable. Bede, On Luke, homily 1.3 (CCSL 122:16–17; PL 94:11); Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 1:32, 5.684 (PL 114:246); cf. Ambrose, On Luke (CCSL 14:34–35; PL 15:1555–56).) Therefore, even more could the Son of God receive in time a new sonship without changing. Thus, two sonships are appropriate for him: one eternal and the other temporal.

On the contrary: The unity which causes something to be such a thing, also causes it to be one such thing. But by sonship someone is a son. Therefore, by one sonship he is one son. But Christ is one son, and not two. Therefore, in Christ there are not two sonships but one only.

I answer that relations differ in this from all other genera of things. For things which belong to other genera are, from the very character of their genus, things of nature, such as quantities from the account of quantity and qualities from the account of quality. But relations are not things of nature from the character of a relation to another thing. For there are certain relations which are not real but only of the mind, just as something knowable is related to knowledge not by some real relation that exists in the knowable thing, but rather because the knowledge is related to the knowable thing, according to the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a26–b3.) Yet a relation is a thing of nature from its cause, whereby one thing has a natural order to another thing, and this natural and real order is, indeed, the relation itself. Hence right and left in an animal are real relations because they follow certain natural powers, but in a column (This example, taken from Averroes, is often used by Aquinas; cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 6, comm. 32 (ed. Venice, 1562, vol. 4, f. 266r D).) they are relations of the mind only, according to the animal’s position in relation to the column.

Yet something has being and unity from the same thing, and thus it happens that there is only one real relation because of the unity of the cause. This is clear in the case of equality: for since there is only one quantity in one body, there is only one equality, even though there are many references according to which it is said to be equal to different bodies. But if real relations in one body were multiplied according to all those references, it would follow that there would be infinite or indeterminate accidents in one thing. Similarly, a teacher is by a single relation the teacher of everyone he teaches even though there are many references. So also, one man is the son of his father and his mother according to a single real relation, because by one birth he received one nature from both.

By following this reasoning, it seems we must say there is a real sonship in Christ by which he is related to his Father, and another by which he is related to his mother, for he is born from each by a different generation, and the nature which he has from his Father is one thing while that from his mother is something else.

But another reason alters this determination.

For it must be held universally that there is no relation between God and a creature that really exists in God. Rather, it is a relation only of the mind, since God is above every order of creatures and is the measure of every creature. Every creature depends on this relation but not conversely. Even more does this apply to a knowable thing in relation to knowledge, since in the knowable thing there is no real relation to knowledge because of these reasons.

Nevertheless, we must consider that the subject of sonship is not a nature or some part of a nature: for we do not say that humanity is a daughter or a head or an eye. Yet in Christ we say there is only one supposit and one hypostasis, just as also only one person—which is the eternal supposit—in which there cannot be any real relation to a creature, as has been said already. And thus, it stands that the sonship by which Christ is related to his mother is a relation only of the mind. Nor on account of this does it follow that Christ is not really the son of the Virgin: for just as God really is Lord on account of the real power by which he sustains a creature, so he is really the son of the Virgin on account of the real nature which he received from his mother. If there were many supposits in Christ, however, it would be necessary to say there were two sonships in Christ, but I consider this erroneous, and it is found condemned in the councils.

Hence I say that in Christ there is only one real sonship, that by which he is related to his Father.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that we do not deny that a real sonship is in Christ by which he is related to his mother because the cause of the relation fails, but rather because the subject of such a relation fails, since there is not in Christ any created supposit or hypostasis.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that in the same way that man received in time the power of God, so too he received eternal sonship, namely, inasmuch as this was done in order that there would be one person of God and of man, as Ambrose adds in the same place. (Rather: Bede, in Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 1:32, 5.684 (PL 114:246).) Yet this was not done through something really absolute or relative inhering temporally in the Son of God but through the union alone which exists really in created nature, yet not really in the person assuming it.

Reply Sed Contra: What is objected to the contrary does not hold necessarily. For sometimes a thing is said to be one such thing on account of the substantial unity of the subject even though there are many qualities, such as color and taste in an apple.

Article 2

On the death of Christ

To the second we proceed thus. It seems Christ did not die on the cross.

Obj. 1: For if he died, this was either because he himself separated soul from body, or on account of his wounds. But he did not die in the first way: for then it would follow that the Jews had not killed Christ, but that he was the murderer of his own self, which is unbefitting. And similarly, he did not die in the second way, because death from wounds comes about when man reaches the greatest weakness, which was not the case with Christ, since crying out he expired (Luke 23:46). Therefore, Christ in no way died on the cross.

Obj. 2: Human nature was not weaker in Christ than in other men. But no other man would die so quickly from wounds of hands and feet (the wound of the side was inflicted upon him after death). Therefore, Christ did not die on the cross since there seems to be no cause of his death.

On the contrary, it is said in John 19:30 that also (Christ hanging on the cross) with his head inclined handed over his spirit. Yet death is through the separation of soul from body. Therefore, Christ died on the cross.

I answer that we must confess without any doubt that Christ truly died on the cross.

But to see the cause of his death, we must consider that, since Christ was God and man, whatever pertains to human nature in him was under his power, which is not the case for others who are purely men, since things which are natural are not subject to their will. Hence this is the cause assigned as to why the soul of Christ simultaneously suffered and rejoiced, namely, because with him willing, death happened in such a way that an overflow was not made from the higher powers unto the lower ones, nor were the higher powers impeded from their act on account of the suffering of the lower ones. In other men this cannot happen due to the natural conjunction of powers with one another.

This also must be said to apply to the question at hand: for violent death happens because nature gives way to the inflicted harm, and as long as nature can resist, so long is death delayed. Hence, for the same reason, those in whom nature is stronger die more slowly. Yet it was subject to the will of Christ how much nature would resist when harm was inflicted and when it would give way. Hence with him willing, nature resisted the inflicted harm even unto the end more than can be in other men, such that in the end, after much shedding of blood, as though whole in his powers, he cried out with a great voice, (Matthew 27:50; Mark 15:37; Luke 23:46.) and immediately, with him willing, nature gave way and he handed over his spirit so that he would show himself the lord of nature and of life and of death. Hence, marveling at this, the centurion said: truly this man was the Son of God (Mark 15:39).

Thus, both the Jews inflicting deadly harm killed Christ, and, nevertheless, he laid down his own soul and handed over his spirit (Cf. John 10:15, 10:17–18.) because when he willed, nature totally gave way to the harm inflicted. Nevertheless, he must not be blamed as a murderer of himself: for the body exists for the sake of the soul and not conversely. Hence injury is done to the soul when on account of a harm inflicted on the body it is expelled from the body against the natural appetite of the soul, although perhaps not against the depraved will of one killing himself. But, if the soul were to have its own power to recede from the body when it willed and to return again, it would not be of greater fault if it deserted the body (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 1.3, 406b3–5; Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, a. 1, obj. 6.) than if a dweller left his house. Nevertheless, it is a matter of fault for the soul to be expelled from there unwilling.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.