On Angels

Question 3

On angels

Then there were two questions concerning angels:

first, whether an angel depends upon a bodily place according to its essence, or is it in a place only according to action;

second, concerning the motion of an angel, whether it can be moved from place to place without a medium.

Article 1

Whether an angel depends upon a bodily place according to its essence, or is it in a place only according to its activity

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that an angel is not in a place only through action.

Obj. 1: For existing is prior to acting. (This famous adage is found in Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity 11.19 (CCSL 62A:549; PL 10:413); cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.8, 1049b24–27; Aquinas, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 1, ad 1.) Therefore, being in a place is prior to acting in a place. But the posterior is not the cause of the prior. Therefore, acting in a place is not the cause why an angel exists in a place.

Obj. 2: Two angels can act in one place. If, therefore, an angel were in a place only through action, it would follow that many angels would be simultaneously in one place, which is thought to be impossible.

On the contrary: The nobler does not depend upon the more ignoble. But the essence of an angel is nobler than a bodily place. Therefore, it does not depend upon a bodily place.

I answer that how an angel is in a bodily place can be considered from the manner in which a body is in a place. For a body is in a place through contact with the place. Yet contact with a body is through dimensive quantity, which is not found in an angel since it is incorporeal. But there is a virtual quantity in its place. Therefore, just as a body is in a place through contact of dimensive quantity, so an angel is in a place through contact of power. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.18, 322b1–323a34.)

Yet if anyone wishes to call contact of power “action,” since to act is the proper effect of a power, let it be said that an angel is in a place through action. Nevertheless, this is said such that not only is motion understood through action, but whatever unity by which it unites itself to a body by its power, whether by presiding or containing or by any other mode.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that nothing prohibits something to be absolutely prior which is not prior in a particular way. Thus, a body’s subject is absolutely prior to a surface, but not as regards this: that it is colored. (Cf. Aristotle, Topics 1.2.) And similarly, a body is absolutely prior to touch, but it is in a place through contact of dimensive quantity. The same is true for an angel through contact of power.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, if something is moved perfectly by one mover, it is not befitting for it to be moved immediately from another simultaneously. Hence the reasoning more so favors the opposite than what was proposed.

Article 2

On the motion of an angel

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that an angel cannot be moved from place to place unless it passes through a medium.

Obj. 1: For everything which is moved is in being changed prior to being in having been changed, as is proved in the sixth book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 6.6, 237a17–b9.) But if an angel is moved from place to place, for example from A to B, when it is in B it is in having been changed. Therefore, before this it was in being changed. But it was not in being changed when it was in A, because it was not yet then being moved. Therefore, it was in being changed when in C, which is a medium between A and B. And thus, it is necessary for it to pass through a medium.

Obj. 2: If an angel is moved from A to B without passing through a medium, it is necessary for it to be corrupted in A and (again) created in B. But this is impossible, because then it would not be the same angel. Therefore, it is necessary for it to pass through a medium.

On the contrary: For everything which passes through a medium, it is necessary for it to pass through something equal to itself or lesser, prior to something greater, as is said in the sixth book of the Physics, and as appears to the senses. (Aristotle, Physics 6.10, 241a8–9.) But there cannot be a space lesser than an angel, which is indivisible. Therefore, it is necessary for it to pass through an equal, which is an indivisible and punctual place. Yet there are infinite points between any two ends of motion. If, therefore, it were necessary for an angel to pass in its motion through a medium, it would be necessary for it to pass through infinite media, which is impossible.

I answer that an angel, if it wills, can be moved from one point to another without passing through a medium; and, if it wills, it can pass through all media.

The reason for this is that a body is in a place by being contained by it, and thus it is necessary that when moving it should follow the condition of the place, namely, so that it passes through media before it arrives at another place. But since an angel is in a place through contact of power, it is not subject to a place by being contained by it. Rather, it contains the place by its power, supereminent in the place. Hence it is not necessary for it to follow in its motion the conditions of the place. Rather, it is subject to its own will to apply itself through contact of power to this and that place, and, if it wills, without a medium. So too the intellect can be applied by understanding to one thing, for example to white and afterwards to black, indifferently, either thinking or not thinking about the mediating colors, even though a body subject to color cannot be moved from white to black except through media.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that the statement of the Philosopher and the proof of it applies to continuous motion. However, it is not necessary for the motion of an angel to be continuous. Rather, the very succession of abovementioned applications is called its motion. So too the succession of thoughts or affections is called the motion of a spiritual creature, according to Augustine in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.20 (CSEL 28:259; PL 34:388).)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that this does not happen through the corruption of an angel or a new creation, but because its power is supereminent over a place.

Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that an angel is not in a place through commensuration but through application of its power to a place, which, indeed, can be indifferently both unto a divisible and an indivisible place. Hence it can be moved continuously, just as something existing in a divisible place, by continuously interrupting space. Whereas, according to how it is in an indivisible place, its motion cannot be continuous, nor can it pass through all media.