On Man
Regarding the good of nature
Question 4
Regarding the good of nature
Then there were questions concerning man.
And first, regarding the good of nature; (Q. 4.)
second, regarding the good of grace; (Qq. 5–9.)
third, regarding the good of glory. (Q. 10.)
About the first, there were three questions:
first, concerning the union of soul to body, namely, whether, with a soul coming into a body, all forms which were in it before are corrupted, both substantial and accidental;
second, concerning the power of free will, namely, whether man without grace can prepare himself for grace;
third, concerning natural love, namely, whether man in the state of innocence loved God more than all things and above himself.
Article 1
On the union of soul to body
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that through the arrival of a soul not all forms which were in it before are eliminated.
Obj. 1: For it is said in Genesis 2:7: God formed man from the mud of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life. Yet in vain would he have formed the body if, by breathing in a soul, the form which he had introduced when forming it were eliminated. Therefore, when a soul comes not all preceding forms are removed.
Obj. 2: It is necessary for a soul to be in a body formed and disposed by many dispositions. If, therefore, a soul removes all preceding forms and dispositions upon arriving, it follows that a soul forms the whole body in an instant, which seems to belong to God alone.
Obj. 3: A soul exists only in a mixed body. But a mixture of elements is not made only according to matter, but also according to forms, otherwise there would be corruption. Therefore, a soul does not eliminate all forms found in matter.
Obj. 4: The soul is a perfection. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a27–28, 412b5–6.) Yet it does not belong to a perfection to corrupt, but to perfect. Therefore, it does not corrupt the preexisting forms upon coming to a body.
On the contrary: Every form coming to a thing existing in act is an accidental form, for a substantial form makes a being actual absolutely. But if a soul coming were not to destroy the preexisting forms but were to be superadded to them, it would follow that it would come to a thing existing in act, because any form, since it is an act, makes it to be actual. Therefore, a soul arriving eliminates preexisting forms.
I answer that it is impossible in one and the same thing for there to be many substantial forms. This is because a thing has being and unity from the same source. Yet it is clear that a thing has being through form; hence also through form a thing has unity. And on account of this, wherever there is a multitude of forms, it is not one absolutely. For example, white man is not one absolutely, nor would biped animal be one absolutely, if from one thing it were an animal and from another a biped, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.12, 1037b10–27.)
But it must be said that substantial forms relate to one another just as numbers do, as is said in the eighth book of the Metaphysics, (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043a32–1044a2.) or also just as figures do, as the Philosopher says concerning the parts of the soul in the second book of the De Anima. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.3, 414b19–31.) For the greater number or figure virtually contains in itself the lesser, just as the quintuple contains the quadruple and a pentagon a quadrangle. Similarly, the more perfect form virtually contains in itself the more imperfect, as is clear especially in animals: for the intellective soul has the power to confer on the human body whatever the sensitive confers in brutes, and similarly the sensitive makes in animals whatever the nutritive makes in plants, and still more.
In vain, therefore, would there be in man another sensitive soul besides the intellective, since the intellective soul virtually contains the sensitive, and still more, just as in vain would there be added the quadruple with the quintuple posited. The same reasoning holds concerning all substantial forms even unto prime matter, such that there are not to be found diverse substantial forms in man. These are only according to our reasoning, just as we consider him as living through a nutritive soul and as sentient through a sensitive soul, and thus concerning the others.
Yet it is clear that, with the perfect form arriving, the imperfect form is always removed, just as also with the figure of a pentagon arriving, the figure of a square is removed. Hence I say that, with the human soul arriving, the substantial form which was in it before is removed. Otherwise, the generation of one would be without the corruption of another, which is impossible. But the accidental forms which were in it before, disposing it for the soul, are not indeed corrupted through itself, but accidentally unto the corruption of the subject. Hence they remain the same in species, but not the same in number, just as also happens with the dispositions of the elementary forms, which seem to come to matter first.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that according to Basil the breath of life is said there for the grace of the Holy Spirit, and thus the objection ceases. (Rather, according to Cyril of Alexandria, this opinion is taken from Nicholas of Croton, although Basil seems to hold the same interpretation: Basil the Great, Homily on Psalm 48, para. 8 (Patrologia Graeca [Migne] 29:449); Pseudo-Basil (Didymus of Alexandria), Against Eunomius 5 (PG 29:728–729); Cyril of Alexandria, On the Gospel of John 1.14 (PG 73:159 B). See Aquinas, On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum) 1.27.) Yet if, as Augustine says, (Augustine, City of God 13.24 (CCSL 48; PL 41:398–404); On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 7.1–2 (CSEL 28; PL 34:355–57).) the breath of life is the soul itself, it is not necessary to say that the body of man is formed from the mud of the earth by another form than the very breath of life divinely inspired. For that formation did not precede inspiration in time, unless, perhaps, we say that that formation refers to accidental dispositions: for example, figure and other things of this sort, which by a certain order of reason are pre-understood to be in the body before the intellective soul, just as material dispositions. By these dispositions, nevertheless, the intellective soul itself is pre-understood, not inasmuch as it is intellective, but inasmuch as it contains in itself by power something from more imperfect forms.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the soul, when it comes to a body, does not make the body exist as its efficient cause, but only as its formal cause. Yet that which makes the body exist as its efficient cause, gives to the body form as perfecting it, while that which disposing it, prepares the body for form by inducing matter little by little and in a certain order to a nearer form or disposition. For as much as a form or disposition is nearer, so much less is the resistance to the introduction of the form and of the complete disposition: for fire is made more easily out of air than out of water, although both forms are immediately present to matter.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that Avicenna posited that the forms of the elements remain in act in a mixture, (Avicenna, Liber de philosophia prima (Metaphysics of The Healing), ed. Simone Van Riet (Leiden: Brill, 1977), bk. 8, ch. 2, pp. 383, 386, 388; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 12.1.4.) which cannot be, because the forms of the elements cannot be in one part of matter simultaneously, and thus it is necessary for them to be in diverse parts of matter, which are distinguished according to the division of dimensive quantity. And thus, it is necessary that either many bodies exist simultaneously, or that there is not a true mixture of a whole unto a whole, but a mixture unto the senses because of the smallest parts being placed beside one another.
Yet Averroes in the third book of the De caelo says that the forms of the elements are middles between accidental and substantial forms, and that they receive more and less. And thus, with the forms of the elements remitted and in a certain way reduced to equilibrium, there is made a mixture in a certain way. (Averroes, On the Heavens 3.67 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 5, ff. 226r–227v).) But this is even less possible than the first: for substantial form is a certain terminus of specific being, hence in an indivisible thing there is the idea of form just as the idea of number and of figure. Nor is it possible for it to be increased or lessened; rather, every addition or subtraction makes another species.
And for this reason, it must be said otherwise, according to the Philosopher in the first book of On Generation, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.10, 319b6–320a7; 1.24–25, 327a30–328b22.) that the forms of mixable things do not remain in the mixture in act, but in power, namely, just as the power of substantial form remains in the elemental quality although remitted and, as it were, reduced unto the middle: for elemental quality acts in virtue of substantial form, otherwise the action which is through the heat of fire would not be terminated in a substantial form.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that the soul, since it is a form, is indeed a certain perfection of a particular, yet not of a universal. And for this reason, when it arrives something is perfected such that, nevertheless, something else is corrupted.
Article 2
On the power of free will
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that man without grace can prepare himself for grace through the natural liberty of will alone.
Obj. 1: Because, as is said in Proverbs 16:1: it belongs to man to prepare the mind. Yet what is said to belong to something is constituted in its power. Therefore, it is constituted in the power of man that he can prepare himself for grace. Therefore, he does not need the help of grace.
Obj. 2: Anselm says in the book On the Fall of the Devil (Anselm of Canterbury, The Fall of the Devil 3 (PL 158:328–332); cf. On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination and the Grace of God with Free Choice (De concordia), q. 3, ch. 5 (PL 158:526).) that someone does not lack grace because God does not will to give it, but because he himself does not will to receive. If, therefore, he wishes to receive, he would be able to receive. He can, therefore, if he wills, prepare himself for grace without exterior help.
Obj. 3: But he said that man needs in this the help of grace as regards an exterior mover.
On the contrary: man can be moved to conversion not only by good things, but also by sins, such as if someone sees another sinning enormously and from the horror of sin is converted to God. But sin is not from God. Therefore, man can prepare himself for grace without the activity of God.
On the contrary (1): We are prepared for grace through being converted to God; but for this we need the help of divine grace. It is said in Lamentations 5:21: convert us, O Lord, unto you, and we shall be converted. Therefore, man needs the help of divine grace to prepare himself for grace.
Furthermore (2), man can prepare himself for nothing unless by thinking. But for this very thing man needs the help of grace: for it is said in 2 Corinthians 3:5: we are not sufficing to think something from ourselves as though out of us. Therefore, we need the help of divine grace to prepare for grace.
I answer that in this question the error of Pelagius must be avoided, (Cf. Augustine, On Heresies 88.1–3 (CCSL 46:340–41; PL 42:47–50); Peter Lombard, Sentences, ed. Ignatius Brady, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, 1971–1981), bk. 2, d. 28, ch. 2, p. 488 (PL 192:717–18).) who posited that through free will man could have fulfilled the precepts of the law and merited eternal life, nor did he need divine help except in order to know what he ought to do, according to Psalm 143 [142]:10: teach me to do your will. But because it seemed too little that we would have only knowledge from God, yet we would have charity from ourselves, by which the precepts of the law are fulfilled, for this reason, the Pelagians afterwards posited that man has the beginning of good work from himself while he consents to faith through free will, but man has the consummation from God. Yet preparation pertains to the beginning of good work. Hence it is of the Pelagian error to say that man can prepare himself for grace without the help of divine grace. And this is against the Apostle, who says in Philippians 1:6: he who has begun in you the good work, himself perfects it.
Therefore, it must be said that man needs the help of grace not only to merit, but even to prepare himself for grace, nevertheless in different ways. For man merits through the act of virtue when he not only does good, but well, for which a habit is required, as is said in the second book of the Ethics. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 2.4, 1105a17–b12.) And for this reason, habitual grace is required to merit. But a man does not need another habit to prepare himself to attain a habit, because this would in that way proceed to infinity. Yet he needs divine help not only regarding exterior movements, namely, just as the occasions of salvation are procured for man from divine providence, for example preaching, examples, and sometimes sicknesses and scourges, but also regarding interior motion, just as God moves the interior heart of man to good, according to Proverbs 21:1: the heart of kings in the hand of God, and wherever he should will, he turns it.
And the Philosopher proves this is necessary in a certain chapter of Concerning Good Fortune: (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 8.2, 1248a15–29.) for man acts by will. Yet the principle of will is choice, and of choice counsel. If it were asked why he begins to take counsel, it cannot be said that from counsel he will have begun to take counsel, because thus it would proceed unto the infinite. Hence it is necessary for there to be some exterior principle which moves the human mind to taking counsel concerning things to be done. Yet it is necessary for this to be something better than the human mind. Therefore, it is not a heavenly body, which is below intellectual power, but God, as the Philosopher concludes in the same place. Therefore, just as the principle of every motion of inferior bodies which are not always moved is the motion of heaven, so the principle of every motion of inferior minds is by God moving.
Thus, no one can prepare himself for grace nor do anything good except through divine help.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that the necessity of divine help is not excluded by the fact that it belongs to man to prepare himself for grace through free will, just as the necessity of heavenly motion is not excluded by the fact that to heat belongs to fire.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that God moves all things according to their mode, and for this reason, certain things participate in the divine motion by necessity, while rational nature participates with liberty, on account of this: that the rational power has itself unto opposites. And for this reason, God moves the human mind to good in such a way that man can still resist this motion, and thus from God is that whereby man can prepare himself for grace. But for man to lack grace does not have its cause from God, but from man, according to Hosea 13:9: perdition is yours, O Israel, only out of me your help. (Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I-II, q. 112, a. 3, ad 2.)
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, although sin is not from God, nevertheless God arranges sin to be an occasion of salvation to someone.
Article 3
On natural love
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that the first man in the state of innocence would not have loved God above all things and more than himself.
Obj. 1: For to love God thus is most meritorious. But the first man in that state did not have that whereby he could accomplish through merit, as is said in the twenty-fourth distinction of the second book of the Sentences. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 1, pp. 450–51 (PL 192:701).) Therefore, the first man in that state did not love God more than himself and over all things.
Obj. 2: To love God thus is the greatest preparation of the human mind to attain grace. Yet the first man in that state is posited to have not had grace, but only natural things. Therefore, he did not love God more than himself and over all things. (Bonaventure, Commentary on the Sentences, Opera Omnia 10 (Quaracchi: College of St. Bonaventure, 1882–1902), bk. 2, d. 29, a. 2, q. 2, 2:702–4.)
Obj. 3: Nature is bent back on itself, (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon on the Song of Songs, sermon 24.6 (PL 183:897); Sermones de diversis, sermon 12.1, sermon 80 (PL 183:571, 698–99); cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 3, P. 2, a. 3, q. 1, opp. 1, 2:124a.) namely, because all things which love twist back upon themselves; but that on account of which each thing is so, is itself more so. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a29.) Therefore, by natural love, he loved himself more than God. Therefore, he did not love God over all things.
On the contrary: If he did not love God more than himself, then he loved God either less than himself or equally to himself. But either way, it follows that man enjoyed himself while he did not refer himself unto God. Yet to enjoy himself induces the perversity of sin, as Augustine teaches. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1.22, para. 21 (CCSL 32:17–25; PL 34:26–27); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 1, cc. 1–3, pp. 450–51 (PL 192:521–23).) Therefore, the first man in the state of innocence was already perverse through sin, which is impossible. It follows, therefore, that he loved God over all things.
I answer that, if man was made in grace, as can be understood from the words of Basil and Augustine, (Basil the Great, Homily on Psalm 48, para. 8 (PG 29:449); Pseudo-Basil, Against Eunomius 5 (PG 29:728–729); Augustine, City of God 13.24 (PL 41:398–404; CCSL 48); Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 7.1–2 (PL 34:355–57; CSEL 28); Albert the Great, Commentary on the Sentences, ed. Stephen Borgnet, Opera Omnia 38 (Paris: Vives, 1890–99), bk. 2, d. 3 H, a. 12, 27:82–85.) this question does not apply. For it is clear that one existing in grace through charity loves God above himself.
But because it was possible for God to make man in pure natural conditions, it is useful to consider how far natural love can extend itself.
Certain men have said, therefore, that a man or an angel existing in pure natural conditions loves God more than himself by natural love according to the love of concupiscence, (William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, 7 vols., ed. J. Ribaillier (Paris: Edition du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1980–1987), bk. 2, tract. 2, ch. 4, p. 43; Aristotle, Ethics 8.2, 1155b27–31; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 6, n. 54; Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 3 K, a. 18, 27:98a.) namely, because he desires more to enjoy the divine good as greater and more pleasant. But according to the love of friendship, man naturally loves himself more than God: for the love of concupiscence is that by which we are said to love what we want to use or enjoy, such as wine or something of this sort. Yet the love of friendship is that by which we are said to love a friend to whom we will good.
But that position cannot stand. For natural love is a certain natural inclination put into nature by God. Yet (by God) nothing is perverse. Therefore, it is impossible for some natural inclination or love to be perverse. Yet it is a perverse love for someone by the love of friendship to love himself more than God. Therefore, it cannot be that such a love is natural.
Therefore, it must be said that to love God over all things, more than one’s own self, is natural not only to an angel and to man, but even to any creature, according to how it loves either sensitively or naturally. For natural inclinations especially can be known in these things which are done naturally without the deliberation of reason: for thus each thing is done in nature just as it was naturally apt to be done. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 199a10; ST I.60.5; I-II.109.3.) Yet we see that each part works by a certain natural inclination for the good of the whole, (William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 2, ch. 4, pp. 42, 55–57; Aquinas, In III Sent. 29.1.3, resp.; On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life, ch. 13; Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, on Matthew 10:16.) even with danger or detriment to itself, as is clear when someone exposes his hand to the sword for the defense of the head, upon which depends the health of the whole body. Hence it is natural for every part in its own way to love the whole more than itself. Hence, according to natural inclination and political virtue, the good citizen exposes himself to the danger of death for the common good. Yet it is clear that God is the common good of the whole universe and of all its parts. Hence any creature in its own way naturally loves God more than itself: insensible things indeed naturally, whereas brute animals sensitively, whereas the rational creature through intellectual love, which is called delight.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that to love God as he is the principle of the whole of being pertains to natural love; but to love God as he is the object of beatitude is of love bestowed by grace, in which merit consists. Nor, nevertheless, is it necessary for us to maintain here the opinion of the Master, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 1, pp. 450–51 (PL 192:701).) who says that man in the first state did not have grace through which he could merit.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, by the natural love whereby God is loved over all things naturally, someone can enjoy more and less, and when this is in the highest degree, then it is the highest preparation for having grace.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the inclination of a natural thing is to two things, namely, to being moved and to acting. Yet that inclination of nature to being moved is bent back upon itself, just as fire is moved up to conserve itself. But that inclination of nature which is to acting is not bent back upon itself: for fire does not act to generate fire on account of itself, but on account of the good of the generated, which is its form, and further on account of the common good, which is the conservation of the species. Hence it is clear that it is not universally true that every natural love is bent back upon itself.
Regarding the good of grace
On what pertains to the good of grace itself
On things pertaining to everyone
Question 5
On contrition
Then there were questions concerning what pertains to the good of grace:
and first, concerning what pertains to the good of grace itself; (Qq. 5–8.)
second, concerning what pertains to the evil of fault, which is opposed to it. (Q. 9.)
About the good of grace it was asked:
first, concerning what pertains to everyone; (Qq. 5–6.)
second, concerning what pertains to clerics; (Q. 7.)
third, concerning what pertains to religious. (Q. 8.)
But concerning what pertains to all people, there were questions about the two parts of penance:
first, about contrition, namely, whether a contrite man is bound to prefer to be in hell than to sin; (Q. 5.)
second, about confession. (Q. 6.)
Article 1
Whether a contrite man is bound to prefer to be in hell than to sin
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a contrite man should not prefer to be in hell than to sin.
Obj. 1: For the punishment of hell is eternal and irremediable; yet he can be freed from sin through penance. Therefore, he should prefer to sin than to be in hell.
Obj. 2: The punishment of hell includes fault: for one of the punishments of hell is the worm, that is, remorse of conscience over fault. Yet fault does not include the punishment of hell. Therefore, fault is more to be chosen than the punishment of hell.
On the contrary is what Anselm says in the book On Similitudes, that someone should prefer being in hell without fault than in paradise with fault, because an innocent man in hell would not feel punishment and a sinner in paradise would not rejoice over glory. (Anselm of Canterbury, On Similitudes 191 (PL 159:701); Eadmer, The Life of Anselm 2.2, para. 22 (PL 158:89–90).)
I answer that the contrite man is held in general to prefer to suffer any punishment than to sin. This is because contrition cannot be without charity, through which all sins are remitted; for out of charity man loves God more than himself. Yet to sin is to act against God, and to be punished is to suffer something against himself. Hence charity requires the contrite man to prefer any punishment to fault.
But he is not held in particular to descend unto this or that punishment. Nay, rather stupidly would he act (would he be), if someone were to worry himself or another over particular punishments of this sort: for it is clear that, just as delectable things move one more when considered in particular than in common, so terrible things frighten more if they are considered in particular. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.12, 1119a27–33.) And there are some men who do not fall by a lesser temptation who perhaps would fall by a greater one, just as someone hearing adultery is not incited unto lust, but if through consideration he descends unto the singular allurements, he would be moved more. And similarly, someone would not flee from suffering death for Christ, but, if he were to descend to considering the individual punishments, he would be drawn away more. And for this reason, to descend in such things unto singulars is to induce man into temptation and to present an occasion of sinning.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that even mortal fault is perpetual of itself, but only out of the mercy of God does it have a remedy. Besides, the divine good, against which fault acts, more outweighs the good of created nature, to which punishment is opposed, than the perpetuity of punishment outweighs the temporality of fault.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that remorse of conscience is not fault but consequent upon fault. And it could be without fault, as with someone who has an erring conscience concerning a past act committed, such as if someone believes that something he himself committed previously to be illicit which, nevertheless, was licit, and while he was doing it, he thought it licit.
Question 6
On confession
Then there were three questions about confession:
first, whether it suffices for someone to confess by writing, or is it necessary to confess by word;
second, whether someone is held to confess at once when the opportunity is had, or can he wait until Lent;
third, whether or not a parish priest should believe his parishioner who says he confessed to another and give him the Eucharist.
Article 1
Whether it suffices for someone to confess by writing, or is it necessary to confess by word
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it suffices if someone confesses by writing.
Obj. 1: For confession is required for the manifestation of sin, but sin can be manifested by writing just as also by word. Therefore, it suffices to confess by writing.
On the contrary is what is said in Romans 10:10: confession by the mouth is made unto salvation.
I answer that confession is something sacramental: for just as in baptism something is required on the part of the minister, namely, to wash and speak words, and something on the part of the one receiving the sacrament, namely, to intend and be washed, so in the sacrament of penance it is required on the part of the priest to absolve under some form of words, whereas on the part of the penitent it is required to subject himself to the keys of the Church, manifesting his sins through confession. It is, therefore, necessary to the sacrament to manifest his sins, and against this no one can dispense, just as neither against baptism.
But it is not necessary to the sacrament for the manifestation to be made by word. Otherwise, by no necessity could someone receive the effect of this sacrament unless by confessing with the mouth, which is clearly false: since for mutes or whoever cannot confess by word, it suffices to confess by writing or nods. Yet by no necessity can someone be baptized unless by water, since water is necessary to the sacrament.
But from the institution of the Church, (Fourth Lateran Council, canon 21, in Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta, ed. J. Alberigo, J.A. Dossetti, P.P. Joannou, C. Leonardi, P. Prodi, H. Jedin (Centro di Documentazione, Instituto per le Scienze Religiose: Bologna, 1962), 221; Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), ed. Emil Friedberg, Corpus Iuris Canonici 2 (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1881), bk. 5, tit. 38, c. 12, 2:887.) a man who can is held to confess by word, not only because the one confessing by the mouth might be, by confessing, more ashamed (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, homily 3 (PG 56:650); Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 3:6, 5.72 (PL 114:80); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 17, ch. 4, p. 355 (PL 192:882).) (so that he who has sinned by the mouth might be purged by the mouth), (Aquinas, In IV Sent. 17.3.4, qa. 3; Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance 10.25 (PL 40:1122).) but also because in all the sacraments there is always used that whose use is more common, just as, in the sacramental washing of baptism, water, which men use commonly for washing, is used; and in the Eucharist, bread, which is a more common food, is used. Hence also, in the sacramental manifestation of sins, it is fitting to use words, by which men more commonly and more expressly are accustomed to signify their concepts.
And it must be observed that in this sacrament there is not imprinted an indelible mark as in baptism, but only grace is conferred for the remission of sin, which remission no one obtains by sinning. Yet someone sins who omits an ordinance of the Church. Hence, in baptism, he who observes those things which are necessary to the sacrament, omitting the statutes of the Church, obtains the indelible mark of the sacrament, but not the effect of the sacrament; yet here, nothing follows.
Replies: The arguments made on both sides do not force much: for manifestation cannot be made so expressly by writing as by word, nor is that which is said: confession by the mouth is made unto salvation, understood concerning the confession of sins, but concerning the confession of faith.
Article 2
Whether someone is held to confess at once when the opportunity is had, or can he wait until Lent
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone can defer confession even until Lent.
Obj. 1: For whoever observes a precept of the Church (See below: q. 6, a. 1, resp.) does not go wrong, but the Church has established that once a year men should confess their sins. Therefore, if someone waits even until the end constituted by the Church, he does not sin.
Obj. 2: Baptism is a sacrament of necessity, just as also penance, but a catechumen does not sin if he defers baptism even until Holy Saturday. Therefore, by the same reasoning neither does a contrite man sin if he defers confession until Lent.
Obj. 3: Contrition is of greater necessity than confession because confession without contrition does not avail unto salvation, yet contrition without confession can in some cases avail. But he who is in sin is not held to be crushed at once by that contrition which cures sin, otherwise a sinner would sin every moment. Therefore, neither is a contrite man held to confess at once such that he would sin if he does otherwise.
On the contrary: One must be rescued more from spiritual sickness than from bodily sickness. But someone subjected to bodily sickness would commit himself to danger unless he sought the remedy of medicine as quickly as he could, and he would sin out of negligence. Much more, therefore, does someone sin who defers to apply the remedy of confession against the spiritual sickness of sin.
I answer that it is laudable for a sinner to confess his sin as quickly as he conveniently can because grace is conferred in the midst of the sacrament of penance, which renders man more firm unto resisting sin.
Yet certain men have said that he is held to confess as quickly as the opportunity presents itself, such that, if he defers, he sins. (William of Auvergne, On the Sacraments, in Opera omnia vol. 1, ed. F. Hotot (Orléans-Paris, 1674; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), “De sacramento penitenciae,” ch. 19.)
But this is against the reasoning of an affirmative precept, which, although it obliges always, nevertheless does not oblige unto always, but for a place and time: yet the time of fulfilling the precept about confession seems to be when some occasion is imminent, in which it is necessary for a man to confess. An example is if the danger of death threatens him, or the necessity of receiving the Eucharist, or a sacred order, or something of this sort for which it is necessary for man, purged through confession, to be prepared. Hence, if something of these threatens, and someone neglects to confess, he sins, provided that a due opportunity is present. And, because from a precept of the Church all the faithful are held to receive holy communion at least once a year, especially on the feast of Easter, for this reason, the Church has ordained that once a year, when the time of receiving the Eucharist is imminent, all the faithful are to confess.
Therefore, I say that to defer confession even until this time, speaking essentially, is licit. But it can become illicit incidentally: for example, if some danger threatens in which confession is required or if someone defers confession on account of contempt. And, similarly, such a delay can be incidentally meritorious, such as if he deferred in order to confess to a more prudent man or more devoutly on account of the sacred time.
Reply Obj. 1–3: Therefore, we concede the first set of arguments.
Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that bodily sickness, unless it is destroyed through the remedy of medicine, always grows worse, unless perhaps it is destroyed also by the power of nature. Yet the sickness of sin is destroyed through contrition. Hence it is not similar.
Article 3
Whether or not a parish priest should believe his parishioner who says he confessed to another and give him the Eucharist
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that a parish priest should not believe his subject who says he confessed to another so that on account of this he might give the Eucharist to him.
Obj. 1: For frequently some men are frightened by confession itself who before were not contrite. But a priest should induce his subject unto good as much as he can. Therefore, it seems he should altogether demand of him that he confess to him.
Obj. 2: In Proverbs 27:23 it is said to a pastor of the Church: diligently recognize the face of your flock. But this in no way can be better done than through confession. Therefore, he should demand of him that he confess to him.
On the contrary: If he were to confess to him, he could say what he willed, and he would be believed. Therefore, he should be believed also concerning this: that he has confessed.
I answer that in the judicial tribunal, a man is believed speaking against himself but not for himself. Yet in the tribunal of penance, a man is believed speaking both for himself and against himself. Therefore, a distinction must be made about the impediments by which someone is kept from the reception of the Eucharist. For if there is an impediment pertaining to the judicial tribunal, for example, excommunication, the priest is not held to believe a subject of his whom he knows to be excommunicated, unless the person’s absolution is evident. Yet if there is an impediment which pertains to the tribunal of penance, namely, sin, he is held to believe him, and he acts unjustly if he denies the Eucharist to someone who asserts he is confessed and absolved by someone else who could absolve either by apostolic authority or by the authority of the bishop.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that he who says that he has confessed has already obtained that good which men obtain in confession, if he speaks the truth. Yet if he speaks falsely, by the same account he could speak falsely in confessing. Nor can a man be compelled by the authority of someone to confess a sin which he has confessed to another who could absolve, since, as has been said already, (See below: q. 6, a. 1, resp.) confession of sins is something sacramental, subject to divine command, not human.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a spiritual pastor ought to recognize diligently the face of his flock by considering its life exteriorly. But he cannot scrutinize more diligently by means of confession; rather, it is necessary for him to believe what is said to him by his subject.
On things pertaining to clerics
Question 7
On things pertaining to clerics
Then there were two questions concerning what pertains to clerics:
and first, concerning the office of a church, whether he who has prebends in two churches, on a day when the office happens to be different in each church, ought to say both offices;
second, concerning the study of theology, whether someone is held to forgo the study of theology, even if he is apt to teach others, so that he might attend to the salvation of souls.
Article 1
On the office of a church
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that someone in such a case should say both offices.
Obj. 1: For the burden should correspond to the benefit. Therefore, he who has the benefit of a prebend in two churches should suffer the burden of each, namely, to say the office of both churches.
Obj. 2: It seems to be just, that if he has a greater benefit from one church, in which, perhaps, the office is sung longer, he also should suffer the greater burden by saying the longer office. Therefore, the choice is not his, but he should say both or say the office of the church in which he has the richer benefice.
On the contrary: This custom was introduced.
I answer that, with it supposed that someone licitly has a prebend in two churches, namely, from a dispensation, it must be considered that he who receives a prebend in any church is obliged to two things: namely, to God, so that he might discharge for him the due praises for his benefices, and to the church, from which he receives the expenses.
Those things which pertain to the church are subject to the dispensation of the prelates of the church, and for this reason, he should discharge this debt which is due to the church according to what was established, either through himself, if the prebend is one which requires residence, or through a vicar, if this suffices according to the statute and custom of the church.
But the debt which he owes to God he should discharge through himself. Yet it does not matter as regards God with which Psalms or hymns he praises God, for example, whether he should say at Vespers: the Lord said (Ps 110 [109]), or: praise, oh servants, the Lord (Ps 113 [112]), except as regards this: that man should follow the traditions of the elders. (Cf. 2 Thessalonians 2:15.) And because he owes praises to God as though one man, it suffices for him to say the office once according to the custom of any of the churches of which he is a cleric.
Regarding the choice of office, it seems reasonable for him say the office of the church in which he has the greater grade. For example, if in one he is dean and in another a simple canon, he should say the office of the church in which he is dean. But if in both churches he is a simple canon, he should say the office of the more worthy church, even though perhaps in the lesser church he has the more opulent prebend, since temporal things are unimportant compared to spiritual things. Whereas if both churches are of equal dignity, he can choose for himself whichever office he desires more if he is absent from both churches. Yet if he is present in either of them, he should conform himself to those with whom he dwells.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
Article 2
On the study of theology
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone who can devote care to the salvation of souls would sin if he were to occupy his time in study.
Obj. 1: For it is said in Galatians 6:10: while we have time, let us work good; also, there is no graver than the throwing away of time. (Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius, letter 1, para. 1: quaedam tempora eripiuntur nobis, quaedam subducuntur, quaedam effluunt. Turpissima tamen est iactura, quae per neglegentiam fit, “some time is snatched away from us, some is carried off, and some flows away; yet it is exceedingly wicked to throw it away, which happens through carelessness”; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 14.2.3, qa. 3, ad 1.) Therefore, someone should not spend time in study, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 3, lect. 1, n. 257: (Hierotheus) plurimum temporis terebat sive expendebat in docendo, “Hierotheus exceeded many of the holy teachers also by time spent”; Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 3, lect. 19, n. 602.) deferring to devote care to the salvation of souls.
Obj. 2: Perfect men are held to what is better, but religious are perfect. Therefore, religious especially should forgo study in order to pursue the salvation of souls.
Obj. 3: It is worse to err in the way of customs than in the way of feet, but a prelate is held to call his subject back if he sees him err in the way of feet. Therefore, much more is he held to call him back from an error which is in the way of customs. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 8.1, 1155a21–22; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 8, lect. 1, nn. 1541–42; Augustine, Enchiridion 1.17, para. 5 (CCSL 46:57; PL 40:239).) Yet it is an error if a man omits what is better. Therefore, a prelate should force a subject to attend to the salvation of souls, with study omitted.
On the contrary, the custom was introduced for a reason.
I answer that any two things can be compared to one another both absolutely and according to some case. For nothing prohibits that which is better absolutely from being in some case less to be chosen, just as to philosophize is absolutely better than to be enriched, but in time of necessity to be enriched is more to be chosen; (Cf. Aristotle, Topics 3.2, 118a10–11.) and any precious pearl is dearer than one loaf of bread. But, nevertheless, in a case of famine bread would be preferred, according to Lamentations 1:11: they gave whatever precious things for food unto reviving their souls.
Yet it must be considered that in any art, someone is better absolutely who designs the art, and is called the architect, (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 194a36–b8; Metaphysics 1.1, 981a28–b6, 981b30–982a1; Ethics 1.1, 1094a9–16; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 2, comm. 25.) than some manual worker who executes works according to how it is designed for him by another. Hence in constructing buildings he who designs the building is hired with greater pay, even though he works nothing with his hands, than the manual builders who chop the wood (Cf. ST I.1.6, resp.; Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 1, lect. 1, nn. 24–28.) and cut the stones. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 3, lect. 2, n. 143; On Kingship, bk. 1, ch. 9.) Yet in the spiritual building there are as though manual workers who particularly pursue the care of souls, for example by administering the sacraments or by doing particular things of this sort. But the bishops are as though the principal builders, who command and designate how the abovementioned men should execute their office; on account of this they are called “bishops,” that is, superintendents. (Cf. Augustine, City of God 19.19 (CCSL 48:686; PL 41:647–48); Aquinas, Commentary on 1 Timothy, ch. 3, lect. 1; ST II-II.184.6, ad 1.)
Similarly, teachers of theology are as though principal builders, who inquire and teach how others should procure the salvation of souls. Therefore, it is better absolutely to teach sacred doctrine, and it is more meritorious if it is done with a good intention, than to devote particular care for the salvation of souls. Hence the Apostle concerning himself says in 1 Corinthians 1:17: for Christ did not send me to baptize, but to evangelize, although to baptize especially is a work conducive to the salvation of souls; and in 2 Timothy 2:2, the Apostle says: commend these things to faithful men, who shall be suitable also to teach others. Reason itself also demonstrates that it is better to educate, regarding what pertains to salvation, those who can accomplish it both in themselves and in others, rather than the simple, who can only accomplish it in themselves.
Nevertheless, in some cases, with necessity looming, both bishops and teachers, although their proper duty is interrupted, should attend in a special manner to the salvation of souls.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that he suffers no loss of time who works what is better by teaching sacred doctrine, or he who disposes himself to this through study.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that someone is called perfect in two ways: (See above: q. 6, a. 3, resp.) one way is because he has perfection, another way is because he has the state of perfection. Yet the perfection of man consists in charity, which conjoins man to God. Hence as regards love of God it is said in Genesis 17:1: walk before me and be perfect; whereas as regards love of neighbor, after the Lord had said: love your enemies, he concluded, therefore be perfect (Matt 5:44, 48). Yet people are said to have the state of perfection who solemnly are obliged to something annexed to perfection. Yet something is annexed to the perfection of charity in two ways.
In one way, it is annexed as the preamble and preparation to perfection, such as poverty, chastity, and things of this sort, by which man is drawn back from the cares of secular things so that he might be more freely at leisure for these things which are of God. Hence things of this sort are more certain instruments of perfection. On account of this Jerome, expounding those words of Peter saying: behold we have left all things and have followed you (Matt 19:27), says that it does not suffice for Peter to say*: behold we have left all things*, but he adds that which is perfect: and have followed you. (Jerome, On Matthew 3, on Matthew 19:27 (CCSL 77:172; PL 26:138).) Therefore, any men who observe either voluntary poverty or chastity have indeed the preparation of perfection, but they are not said to have the state of perfection, except those who oblige themselves by a solemn profession to things of this sort: for someone is said to have a state according to something solemn and perpetual, just as is clear in the state of liberty or of matrimony and of similar things.
Whereas, in another way, something is annexed to the perfection of charity as an effect, namely, such as if someone receives the care of souls. For it belongs to perfect charity that someone for love of God would omit the sweetness of the contemplative life, which he loves more, and receive instead the occupations of the active life for the sake of procuring the salvation of his neighbors. Therefore, whoever in this way attends to the salvation of his neighbors has indeed some effect of perfection, but he does not have the state of perfection. The exception to this is a bishop, who receives the care of souls with a certain solemn consecration. Archdeacons and parish priests, however, have certain offices committed to them, but they are not placed in some state of perfection through this. Therefore, only religious and bishops are called perfect as though having the state of perfection. Hence religious become bishops, but not archdeacons or rural deans.
When, therefore, it is said that perfect men are held to what is better, this is true, if it be understood concerning these men who are called perfect on account of the perfection of charity. For men of this sort are obliged out of an interior law, which obliges by inclining. Hence they are obliged to fulfill this according to the measure of their perfection. Yet if it is understood concerning these men who are called perfect on account of their state, such as bishops and religious, it is not true: for bishops are only held to what the care of their received dominion extends itself, and religious are only held to what they are obliged by the vow of their profession. Otherwise, there would be obligation unto the infinite, although, nevertheless, both nature and art and every law has certain ends. (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 18.2.2, ad 2.)
Nevertheless, even if the perfect were always held to what is better, that would not be relevant to this question, as is clear from the things said above. (See above: response.)
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, although a prelate is held to call his subject back from every evil, nevertheless he is not held to induce him to every better thing. Even this reasoning is not relevant to the question at hand, just as neither are the others.
On things pertaining to religious
Question 8
On things pertaining to religious
Then there were two questions concerning what pertains to religious:
first, whether a religious is held to obey his prelate that he should reveal to him a secret committed to his trust;
second, whether he is held to obey him that he should reveal a brother’s hidden fault which he knows.
Article 1
Whether a religious is held to obey his prelate that he should reveal to him a secret committed to his trust
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a religious is held to reveal a secret committed to his trust to his prelate instructing him.
Obj. 1: For as a religious he obliged himself by solemn profession to obey his prelate, while he obliged himself to keep the secret by a simple promise. Therefore, he should rather obey his prelate than keep the secret.
On the contrary is that which Bernard says: what has been instituted for charity does not militate against charity. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Dispensation and Precept, in Bernardi opera, ed. J. Leclercq et H.M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), ch. 2, para. 5, 3:257 (see also PL 182:863–64); William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 50, ch. 2, q. 1, p. 973.) But the profession of obedience, which the religious makes to his prelate, has been instituted for charity. Therefore, it does not militate against charity, by which any man is held to preserve trust for his neighbor.
I answer that, just as Bernard says in the book On Dispensation and Precept, (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Dispensation and Precept, cc. 4–6, 3:259–62 (see also PL 182:865–68); Aquinas, In II Sent. 44.2.3.) it is sufficient obedience for a religious to obey his prelate concerning what pertains to the rule either directly, such as those things written in the rule, or indirectly, such as those which can be reduced to these, such as ministries to be performed for the brethren and punishment inflicted for faults and things of this sort. Yet perfect obedience is that he should obey simply in all things which are not against the rule or against God. But that someone should obey his prelate in these things which are against God or against the rule is incautious and illicit obedience. Therefore, it must be considered in the question at hand whether it is licit for a religious to reveal a secret committed to his trust.
About this a distinction must be made about secrets. For there are some secrets which are illicit to keep, according to how much they verge upon the danger of others over whom someone is held to be watchful. Hence an oath of fidelity also holds that secrets of this sort should be revealed to lords. Therefore, a religious is held at the command of his prelate to reveal such a secret even though he promised that he would not reveal it, with Isidore saying: in evil promises, faith is rescinded (Isidore, Synonyms 2.58 (PL 83:858; CCSL 111B); Gratian, Decretum, ed. Emil Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici 1 (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1879), Part 2, Cause 22, question 4, canon 5, 1:876; Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 39, ch. 9, 2, p. 225 (PL 192:838).) (unless, perhaps, he heard it in confession, because then in no way is it to be revealed).
Yet there are other secrets which of themselves can be kept without sin, and such a secret a religious should in no way reveal to a prelate commanding him if it is committed to his trust: for he would sin by breaking the faith of the trust. (Cf. Isidore, Synonyms 2.58 (PL 83:858; CCSL 111B).)
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that the obligation to preserve those things which are of faith and charity (which is from the natural law and the promise made in baptism) is more solemn than that which is from religious profession.
Article 2
Whether he is held to obey him that he should reveal a brother’s hidden fault which he knows
To the second we proceed thus. It seems a subject should reveal another brother’s hidden fault to his prelate commanding him.
Obj. 1: Because, as Jerome says, the fault of one should not be hidden to the prejudice of many. (It is actually Origen: Origen, On the Book of Joshua, homily 7, para. 6, trans. Rufino (ed. W. A. Baehrens, in GCS 30, Origenes Werke Bd. 7, Leipzig, 1921), 333 (PG 12:861–62); Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, d. 45, c. 17, 1:166; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 19.2.2, qa. 1, ad 1; 19.2.3, qa. 1, ad 2.) But it must be presumed that the prelate wishes to know the fault of one on account of the good of the multitude. Therefore, the fault of another should be revealed to the prelate commanding.
On the contrary is what Gregory says, that, although sometimes on account of obedience we should forgo some good things, nevertheless in no way on account of obedience should we perpetrate some evil. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 35.14.29 (CCSL 143:1793; PL 76:766); Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 11, q. 3, c. 99, 1:671; ST II-II.104.3, obj. 3.) But it seems to be evil to defame another by uncovering a hidden fault. Therefore, this should not be done on account of obedience.
I answer that a religious prelate is foremost in his chapter just as though he were in a judicial tribunal. Hence he can oblige his subjects by a command to reveal to him that of which an ecclesiastical judge can demand an oath in a judicial tribunal.
Therefore, it must be known that in crimes the mode of proceeding is threefold: (See below: Quodlibet XI, q. 10, a. 2, resp.) one through denunciation, another through inquisition, another through accusation.
In the way of denunciation, therefore, the correction of the delinquent is intended. And for this reason, according to the precept of the Lord in Matthew 18:15–17, fraternal correction should precede, namely, that you should rebuke him between himself and you alone; and if he should not have heard, then you should rebuke him before two or three witnesses; and lastly, it should be said to the Church. For it belongs to charity for someone to spare his brother as much as he can. Hence he should strive first to correct the conscience of his brother, with his reputation preserved, by admonishing him in private, and then before two or three, and finally his reputation must be neglected in order that his conscience may be emended, and it must be said to the Church. During this process there is regard also for the conscience: for a sinner, if he were to see himself made public from the beginning, would lose shame and would become more obstinate in sinning. (Cf. Jerome, On Matthew 3, on Matthew 18:15 (CCSL 77:161; PL 26:131); Augustine, Sermon 82 (De verbis Domini, ch. 18), ch. 4, para. 7 (PL 38:509; CSEL 101).)
An inquisition, however, should be preceded by infamy. An accusation, however, should be preceded by an inscription, through which he obliges himself unto retaliation. (See below: Quodlibet XI, q. 10, a. 2, resp.) For with inquisition and accusation the punishment of the sinner is intended for the sake of the good of the multitude.
If, therefore, an accuser who obliges himself to retaliation appears in the chapter, the prelate can demand a confession of the truth by command, just as also an ecclesiastical judge by oath. Similarly, if infamy precedes, the prelate can seek out the truth by command, and his subjects are held to obey.
Yet if it should proceed through the way of simple denunciation, a religious is not held to reveal the fault of a brother to his prelate commanding him, unless with an admonition preceding he sees him uncorrected. Nay, rather, he would sin more if he were to reveal at the precept of the prelate, since he is held more to obey the Gospel than the prelate. And much more would the prelate sin if he were to induce his subject to pervert the order of the Gospel.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that concerning a past sin, concerning which someone already has been corrected according to a secret admonition, or concerning which it can be hoped that he will be corrected, unless the contrary should be found, there cannot threaten a danger to the multitude. But concerning a future sin which would be dangerous to the multitude either spiritually or bodily, the objection proceeds: for then it would not be necessary to wait for a secret admonition, but to oppose at once the danger. Hence, also, the Lord does not say: if he should intend to sin, in the future, but: if he should have sinned, (Matthew 18:15.) in the past. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Fraternal Correction, a. 2, obj. 10, ad 10.)
Regarding fault
Question 9
Regarding fault
Then there were four questions relating to fault:
first, whether sin is some sort of nature;
second, whether perjury is a graver sin than homicide;
third, whether he sins who out of ignorance does not observe a constitution of the pope;
fourth, whether a monk sins mortally by eating meat.
Article 1
Whether sin is some nature
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that sin is not some sort of nature.
Obj. 1: For it is said in John 1:3: without him was made nothing, (Cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 1.13 (CCSL 36:7; PL 35:1385–86); Anselm of Canterbury, On the Virginal Conception 5 (PL 158:438–39).) that is, sin. But that which is some sort of nature cannot be called nothing. Therefore, sin is not some sort of nature.
On the contrary: If sin is not some sort of nature, it is necessary for it to be pure privation. But pure privation is not spoken of according to more and less, such as death (Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius, letter 66, para. 43.) and darkness. (Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 3, dub. 2, 2:111; d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, opp. 4, ad 4, 2:814, 816.) Therefore, one would not be graver than another, (Aquinas, In II Sent. 42.2.5; Summa contra Gentiles, bk. 3, ch. 139; Disputed Questions on Evil, ch. 2, a. 9; ST I-II.73.2.) which is unfitting.
I answer that sin, especially a sin of transgression, (Cf. ST I-II.71.5.) is a disordered act. On the part of the act, therefore, sin is some sort of nature; but disorder is a privation, and according to this sin is called nothing.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the solution to the objection is clear.
Article 2
Whether perjury is a graver sin than homicide
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that perjury is a graver sin than homicide.
Obj. 1: For Bernard says that against the precepts of the first tablet neither God nor man can dispense, yet against the precepts of the second tablet God can dispense, but not man. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Dispensation and Precept, ch. 3, 3:257–59 (see also PL 182:864–65).) From this it can be understood that it is graver to sin against the precepts of the first tablet than against the precepts of the second. But perjury is against a precept of the first tablet, which is: thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain (Exod 20:7), while homicide is against a precept of the second tablet: thou shalt not kill (Exod 20:13). Therefore, perjury is a graver sin than homicide.
Obj. 2: It is graver to sin against God than against man. But perjury is a sin against God, homicide against man. Therefore, perjury is a graver sin than homicide.
On the contrary: Punishment is proportioned to fault. (Deuteronomy 25:2; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 20.1.2, qa. 1, s.c. 1.) But homicide is punished more gravely than perjury. Therefore, it is the graver sin.
I answer that it is just as the Apostle says in Hebrews 6:16: men swear through someone greater than themselves, and the end of their every controversy is an oath. (Cf. ST I-II.100.5, ad 3.) Yet an oath would be a vain end of a controversy in the case of the homicide if homicide were graver than perjury: for it would be presumed that he who had committed the greater fault of homicide would not be ashamed to incur the lesser of perjury. Hence from an oath being administered in the case of any sin, it is clearly shown that perjury should be considered the greatest sin. Nor undeservedly, because to perjure the name of God seems a certain denigration of the divine name. Hence the sin of perjury holds the second place after idolatry, as appears from the order of the precepts. But also among the Gentiles swearing was most honored, as is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.3, 983b33.)
Reply Obj. 1–2: Therefore, we concede the first arguments.
Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that in human judgment the quantity of punishment does not always correspond to the quantity of fault: for sometimes a greater punishment is inflicted for a lesser fault when a graver harm threatens men from the lesser fault. But according to the judgment of God the graver fault is punished by the graver punishment. Hence, so that there might be shown the gravity of idolatry and perjury, after he had said in the first precept: thou shalt not adore those nor shalt thou worship them (Exod 20:5), there is added: I am the Lord thy God, visiting the iniquities of fathers upon sons (Exod 20:5); and, after he had said: thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain (Exod 20:7), there is added: for neither shall the Lord have as faultless him who takes the name of his Lord in vain (Exod 20:7).
Article 3
Whether he sins who out of ignorance does not observe a constitution of the pope
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that he who acts through ignorance against a constitution of the pope does not sin.
Obj. 1: For as Augustine says, sin is voluntary thus far: that if it is not voluntary, it is not sin. (Augustine, On True Religion 14.27 (CCSL 32:204; PL 34:121); On Two Souls 10.12, 10.14 (CSEL 25:68; PL 42:103–5); On Free Will 3.17–18 (CCSL 29:304; PL 32:1294–96).) But ignorance causes the involuntary, as is said in the third book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110b18–1111a21.) Therefore, that which is done through ignorance is not sin.
Obj. 2: According to the laws, (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 54, c. 20, 1:166.) a lord can demand back after a fixed time his servant who was ordained. Yet this should be computed from the time of notice, not from the time of decree. (Cf. Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de iure canonico, ed. Javier Ochoa Sanz and Luis Diez Garcia (Rome: Commentarium pro religiosis, 1975), col. 117.) Therefore, the obligation of a constitution of the pope obliges from the time of notice.
On the contrary: Ignorance of law does not excuse. But a constitution of the pope makes a law. Therefore, he who acts against a constitution of the pope through ignorance is not excused.
I answer that ignorance which is the cause of an act causes involuntariness. Hence it always excuses unless the ignorance itself is a sin. Yet ignorance is sin when anyone ignores what he can know and is held to know. Yet all are held to know a constitution of the pope in their own way. If, therefore, someone does not know through negligence, he is not excused from fault if he acts against the constitution. Whereas if someone has a sufficient impediment on account of which he could not have known, for example, if he was in jail or in foreign lands where the constitution did not arrive, or on account of something similar, such ignorance excuses such that he does not sin when acting against the constitution of the pope.
Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.
Article 4
Whether a monk sins mortally by eating meat
To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that a monk sins mortally by eating meat.
Obj. 1: For the canon “Concerning Consecration” (Gratian, Decretum, P. 3, “Concerning Consecration,” D. 5, c. 32, 1:1420.) says that monks should not eat meat and, if they act contrary, they should be imprisoned. But such a punishment is only inflicted for mortal sin. Therefore, monks eating meat sin mortally.
Obj. 2: To act against a vow is mortal sin. But monks are obliged through a vow to observe the rule of blessed Benedict, in which it is contained that monks should abstain from meat. (Benedict, The Rule of Saint Benedict 36.9 (PL 66:582; CSEL 75).) Therefore, monks sin mortally by eating meat.
On the contrary: No mortal sin is allowed for someone by reason of some infirmity. But to eat meat is allowed for a monk by reason of infirmity. Therefore, to eat meat is not mortal sin for a monk.
I answer that, speaking essentially, nothing is mortal sin for any monk or religious which is not mortal sin for another, unless it is contrary to that to which he has obliged himself by the vow of profession. Nevertheless, by the reason of scandal or something of this sort, something could be sin incidentally for him which would not be sin for another.
Therefore, it must be considered to what a religious binds himself by the vow of profession. And if, indeed, a religious by professing were to vow himself to observe a rule, it would seem that he obliges himself by vow to each of the things contained in the rule. And thus, by acting against any of them, he would sin mortally; and from this it would follow that the state of religion would be a trap of mortal sin for religious men, which they scarcely or never would be able to avoid. Therefore, the holy fathers who instituted the orders, not wanting to lay a trap of damnation for men but rather a way of salvation, ordained such a form of profession in which there could not be danger.
Just as there is in the Order of Friars Preachers a most cautious and secure form of professing by which one does not promise to observe the rule, but obedience according to the rule, (Cf. “Constitutiones antique ordinis predicatorum,” [“Die Constitutionen des Prediger-Ordens vom Jahre 1228,”] in Archiv fiir Litteratur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters, ed. H. Denifle (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1885), 1:164–227, 202–3.) hence a monk is obliged through a vow to observe those things which are placed in the rule as precepts, and those which the prelate, according to the meaning of the rule, wills to command for him. The rest of the things, however, which are not contained in the rule under precept do not fall directly under the vow, hence he does not sin mortally in omitting those things.
Blessed Benedict established that a monk should profess not, indeed, to observe the rule, but that the one professing promises a conversion of his customs (Benedict, The Rule of Saint Benedict 58.17 (CSEL 75; PL 66:805).) according to the rule, which is to say that he directs his customs according to the rule. He acts against this if either those things which are precepts in the rule are transgressed, or if he even despises the rule, altogether refusing to direct his acts according to it. Yet not all things which are contained in the rule are precepts: for certain ones are admonitions or counsels, whereas certain ones are ordinances or certain statutes, such as that after Compline no one should speak. (Benedict, The Rule of Saint Benedict 42 (CSEL 75; PL 66:669–70).) Yet statutes of this sort contained in the rule do not have the power of precept, just as neither does a prelate establishing something always intend to oblige unto mortal sin through precept. Yet the prelate is as though a certain animate rule. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 5.4, 1132a21–22.) Hence it would be stupid to think that a monk breaking silence after Compline sins mortally, unless perhaps he were to do this against a precept of the prelate or out of contempt of the rule.
Yet to abstain from meat is not placed in the rule of blessed Benedict as a precept, but as a certain statute. Hence a monk eating meat does not sin mortally by this, unless in a case of disobedience or contempt.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that that punishment is inflicted upon a monk obstinately and disobediently eating meat.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that to eat meat is not against the vow of a monk except when he eats out of disobedience or contempt.
Reply Sed Contra: That which is objected to the contrary is ineffective: for the reasoning proceeds concerning things which are evil according to themselves, such as homicide, adultery, and things of this sort, which are illicit for all, both healthy and infirm. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 2.6, 1107a9–15.) Yet it does not proceed concerning these things which are evil because they are prohibited: for something can be prohibited for a healthy man which is not prohibited for an infirm one.
Regarding the good of glory
Question 10
Regarding the good of glory
Then about the good of glory there were two questions relating to glorious bodies:
first, whether a glorious body naturally can be in the same place with another not glorious body;
second, whether this can happen by miracle.
Article 1
Whether a glorious body naturally can be in the same place with a non-glorious body
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a glorious body naturally can be in the same place with another body.
Obj. 1: For if it is prohibited to be with another body in the same place, either this is on account of bigness or corpulence, or on account of dimensions. (Albert the Great, On Resurrection, tr. 2, q. 8, a. 2.) But it is not on account of bigness or corpulence, because a glorious body shall be spiritual, according to the Apostle (1 Cor 15:44). Similarly, it is neither on account of dimensions, because, since tangents are those of which the ends are simultaneous, (Aristotle, Physics 6.1, 231a22–23.) it is necessary for a point of one natural body to be simultaneous with a point of another, and a line with a line, and a surface with a surface. Therefore, for the same reason, this also applies to a body with a body. Therefore, it is not prohibited for a glorious body naturally to be able to be in the same place simultaneously with another body.
Obj. 2: The Commentator says in the eighth book of the Physics that the parts of air and of water partly enter into one another, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 8, comm. 82 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 4, f. 430v I–K).) on account of them partly being of a spiritual nature. But glorious bodies will be altogether spiritual, as already has been said. (See above: obj. 1.) Therefore, they will be able to enter into other bodies totally and to be simultaneous with them.
On the contrary: Glorification does not remove nature. (Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 49, P. 2, sect. 2, a. 3, q. 1, ad 3, 4:1029; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.2.1, qa. 4, ad 5.) But the human body cannot naturally be simultaneous with another body in the same place in that state. Therefore, neither can it be after it will have been glorified.
I answer that it is clear that the human body in that state cannot be with another body in the same place. If, therefore, a glorious body naturally could be with another body in the same place on account of some property put therein, it would be necessary for that property put therein to remove what prohibits the human body in that state to be with another body in the same place.
And therefore, it must be considered what is the prohibiting thing of this sort.
Yet certain men say that this is bigness or a certain corpulence, (Albert the Great, On Resurrection, tr. 2, q. 8, a. 2; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 49, P. 2, sect. 2, a. 3, q. 1, concl., op. 4, 4:1028a5.) which will be removed through the dowry of glory, which they name subtlety.
But this is not intelligible. For what is corpulence or bigness of this sort is not found: for it is not some quality, because no quality can be given by the removal of which a body can be with another body in the same place. Similarly, it cannot be either form or matter, which are parts of the essence, because then the whole essence of the human body would not remain with glory, which is heretical. (Cf. SCG IV.84.)
And for this reason, it must be said that the thing prohibiting is nothing else than dimensions, under which bodily matter stands. (Aquinas, Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, q. 4, a. 3, resp.) For it is necessary for that which is of itself to be the cause in each genus. Yet distinction according to place first and of itself applies to dimensive quantity, which is defined to be quantity having position. (See below: Quodlibet VII, q. 4, a. 3, resp.) Hence also parts in a subject have distinction according to place from being subject to dimension. And just as there is distinction of diverse parts of one body according to the diverse parts of one place through dimensions, so on account of dimensions diverse bodies are distinguished according to diverse places: for an actual division of bodily matter makes two bodies, yet potential divisibility makes two parts of one body. Hence also the Philosopher says in the fourth book of the Physics that, just as with a wooden cube entering into water or air, it is necessary for a certain amount of water or air to yield there, so it would be necessary for separate dimensions to yield if a vacuum were posited. (Aristotle, Physics 4.8, 216a26–b12; Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 44 A, a. 3, s.c. 2, 28:577b.)
Therefore, since glory does not remove bodily dimensions, I say that a glorious body cannot naturally be with another body in the same place on account of some property put therein.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that, as has been said, the human body in that state is prohibited to be with another body in the same place not on account of corpulence or grossness, which is removed through glory (for the Apostle opposes spirituality to animality according to how the body needs food, as Augustine says, yet not to grossness or corpulence), but it is impeded on account of dimensions. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12.7, para. 18 (CSEL 28:389; PL 34:459–60); City of God 13.20 (CCSL 48:403; PL 41:393–94).)
Yet the reason which is objected to the contrary is posited amongst the sophistic reasons by the Philosopher in the sixth book of the Physics: (Aristotle, Physics 6.1, 231a21–b18.) for place is not due to a point and a line and a surface, but to a body. Hence it does not follow that, if the ends of tangential bodies are simultaneous to one another, on account of this many bodies can be in the same place.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, just as the Commentator expresses in the same place, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 8, comm. 82 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 4, f. 430v I–K).) entering in is made through condensation, and they are said to have spiritual power on account of rarity. Yet it would be erroneous to say that they are similar in this way to air or wind, as is clear through Gregory in the fourteenth book of the Morals on the Book of Job. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 14.56.72 (CCSL 143:743; PL 75:1077–78), on Job 19:26.)
Article 2
Whether this can be done by a miracle
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a glorious body in no way can be simultaneously in the same place with another body.
Obj. 1: For just as one body relates to one place, so two bodies to two places. Therefore, commutatively, just as one body relates to two places, so two bodies to one place. But in no way can one body be in two places. Therefore, neither can two bodies be in one place.
Obj. 2: If two bodies were in one place, there would be assumed two points in two extremities of place. Therefore, it would follow that between those two points there would be two straight lines of two bodies existing in the same place, which is impossible. (Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 5, comm. 24, on 226b33 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 4, f. 224ra BC). On the Heavens 1, comm. 27, on 271a9 (ed. Ven. 1562., vol. 5, f. 20ra B).) Therefore, it is impossible for two bodies to be in the same place.
On the contrary is that Christ entered unto the disciples when the doors were closed (John 20:19), which could not be unless his body had been simultaneously with the body of the doors in the same place. Therefore, a glorious body can be with another body in the same place.
I answer that, just as already has been said, (See above: a. 1, resp.) two bodies are prohibited from being in the same place according to dimensions because bodily matter is divided according to dimensions. Yet dimensions are distinguished according to place. Yet God, who is the first cause of all things, can preserve effects in being without proximate causes. (Book of Causes, prop. 1, paras. 1–2; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.2.2, ad 3.) Hence, just as he preserves accidents without a subject in the sacrament of the altar, so he can preserve the distinction of bodily matter, and of dimensions in it, without diversity of place. Miraculously, therefore, it can happen for two bodies to be in the same place. Hence about the body of Christ it is said by the holy ones (That is, Augustine and Gregory, according to Aquinas. Aquinas, Cantena Aurea on John, on John 20:19, ch. 20, lect. 3; Augustine, Sermon 258, para. 2 (PL 38:1157); Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 121, para. 4 (CCSL 36:667; PL 35:1953); Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 26, para. 1 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1197).) that he exited through the closed womb of the Virgin and that he entered when the doors were closed through divine power. And similarly, I say that a glorious body, which will be configured to the body of clarity (Philippians 3:21.) of Christ, will be able to be with another body in the same place, not on account of some created power put in it, but by divine power only assisting and working this. So too the body of Peter healed the infirm by its shadow (not through some created power put in it), but by divine power assisting in making miracles. (Acts 5:15; cf. ST I.105.7, obj. 2; Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, on Matthew 10:1; Commentary on the Gospel of John, on John 14:12.)
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that commuted proportion must be applied in this way: (Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 12.) just as a first relates to a second, as two to three, so a third relates to a fourth. Therefore, commutatively, just as a first relates to a third, as two to four, so a second relates to a fourth, that is, three to six. And according to this, the argument should proceed thus: just as one body relates to one place, so two bodies to two places. Therefore, just as one body relates to two bodies, so one place to two places. And thus, it does not follow that, if one body cannot be in two places, two bodies cannot be in one place: for that one body should be locally in two places involves a contradiction, because concerning the account of place it should be the term of a located thing, yet a term is that outside which there is nothing of the thing. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.17, 1022a4–5.) Hence nothing of a located thing can be in a more exterior place. But if it were posited to be in two places, it follows that it should be outside its own place, and thus it follows that it should be located and not located. Nor is there instance from the body of Christ, because it is not in the sacrament of the altar locally, but through transformation.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that for two mathematical lines to be between two points is impossible because there can be understood no other reason for distinction in them unless from place. (See below: Quodlibet VII, q. 4, a. 3, resp.) But for two natural lines to be between two points is indeed impossible through nature, (Cf. Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 5, comm. 24, on 226b33 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 4, f. 224ra BC); On the Heavens 1, comm. 27, on 271a9 (ed. Ven. 1562., vol. 5, f. 20ra B).) but possible through a miracle, because there remains another reason for distinction in two lines from the diversity of their subject bodies, which is preserved by divine power, even with diversity of place removed.
Chapter 3 of 37