On an Angel

Question 2

On an angel

Article 1

Whether the duration of an angel has before and after

Then there is a question concerning an angel, whether the duration of an angel has before and after. And it seems that it does.

Obj. 1: For in that whose duration does not have before and after, it is the same to be and to have been. If, therefore, in the duration of an angel there were not before and after, it will be the same for an angel to be and to have been. But this is impossible because God could not have made it that an angel is not, since he cannot make it that it was not. Therefore, it is unfitting to say that in the duration of an angel there is not before and after. (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 2, P. 1, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 6–7, 2:62a.)

Obj. 2: Nothing created is infinite in act. But the duration of an angel is infinite on the part of thereafter. Therefore, it is not whole simultaneously in act, and thus there is before and after there. (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 2, P. 1, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 5, 2:62a.)

Obj. 3: A measure ought to be proportionate to the thing measured. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 19.2.1, obj. 4.) But the being of an angel is finite in act. Therefore, the aevum, which is its measure, is finite; and thus the same holds as before.

Obj. 4: The account of eternity is perfected in this: that it is whole simultaneously because, according to Boethius in the fifth book of On Consolation, eternity is the whole and perfect possession of interminable life simultaneously. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 5.6 (CCSL 94:102; PL 63:858).) If, therefore, the aevum, which is the duration of an angel, does not have before and after, it does not seem to differ from eternity.

On the contrary (1): According to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Physics, on account of before and after in motion, there is before and after in time, which measures motion. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a10–25; 4.12, 220b32–221a1; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4, comm. 114.) But there is not any motion in the being of an angel, nor is that being subject to any mode of motion. Therefore, in the aevum, which is its measure, there is not before and after.

Furthermore (2): Time is nothing else than the number of before and after. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4, comm. 101.) If, therefore, in the aevum there is to number before and after, the aevum would differ nothing from time.

I answer that we can speak about anything in two ways. One way is according to how it is in the nature of things. Another way is according to how it is in our consideration. In the first way a substance of a thing is understood with all its dispositions and activities, because without these a substance is not found in the nature of things. But in the second way a substance can be understood without its dispositions, because the consideration of a substance does not depend upon the consideration of its dispositions.

Therefore, by attributing the measure of the duration of a thing according to the first way, thus duration which is whole simultaneously applies to God alone, yet not to any creature, by this: that God alone is immutable as regards essence and as regards all things which can be considered around essence. Yet every creature is variable either according to substance or according to some disposition or activity of it. And according to this, Augustine, in the twenty-first question to Orosius, posits that all creatures are in time, even angels. (Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 21 (PL 40:740); qq. 40–41 (PL 40:746–47).)

But by attributing the measure of duration to an angel in the second way, namely, such that its substance is considered absolutely, thus its measure is posited as the aevum and not time.

Concerning this aevum there is a twofold opinion.

For certain men say that in the aevum there is before and after, but not just as in time: (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 2, P. 1, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 5, 2:62a.) for in time there is before and after with innovation, yet in the aevum without innovation.

But this is not intelligible. For it is impossible for two parts of some duration to be simultaneously, one of which does not include the other, for example, as month includes day. Hence simultaneously something is in a day and in a month, but two days and two months cannot be simultaneously. Hence whenever there are posited two parts in some duration, one of which is before and the other after, it is necessary that with the one passing, the other newly arrives. And thus, it is necessary for there to be innovation in every duration in which there is before and after. Yet the measure of a duration cannot have innovation; only that which is measured through the duration can receive innovation. Yet the being of an angel is without all innovation because that out of which it begins to be perseveres immutable, since in it neither is there motion nor is there the subject of any motion, just as the being of corruptible things is the subject of celestial motion.

Thus, therefore, if the measure of “duration” is attributed to an angel as regards substance only, that does not have before and after, for thus their being is measured by the aevum. And the same goes if the measure of duration is attributed to them as regards the essential activity of beatitude, for thus they are participants of eternity. Whereas if the measure of duration is attributed to them by reason of other activities or affections, (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 2, P. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl., ad 1, 2:56–57a; ST I.10.5, ad 1.) thus their measure has before and after: for thus they are measured by time, according to what Augustine says in the eighth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that God moves a spiritual creature through time. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.20–26 (CSEL 28:258–65; PL 34:388–94).)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that something can be attributed to an eternal or aeviternal thing in two ways. One way is by reason of itself. And in this way, there is not attributed to it either to have been nor to be in the future, but only to be, because before and after is implied in the past and the future, yet not in the present. Another way is by reason of what lies beside or beneath it, that is, by reason of time. And thus, there is attributed to it to have been through concomitance unto past time, and to be in the future through concomitance unto future time: for this very moment of eternity (Cf. Book of Causes, prop. 30 [31].) is present to the whole of time. Hence Augustine says of God that he was, because he never was lacking, he shall be, because he never shall be lacking. (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 99, para. 5 (CCSL 36:585; PL 35:1888).) Thus, therefore, God cannot make an angel not to have been because he cannot make it except that past time was simultaneously with the being of an angel; yet he can make an angel not to be because he can make it for the being of an angel to not be simultaneously with the time which is present now or will be in the future. And thus, that diversity depends rather on the way of speaking than on the nature of the thing.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that something is called infinite in two ways.

One way is privatively, and thus it is only attributed to things which have extension or quantity: for only this has an end by nature. And thus, the aevum in no way has infinity, because it does not have any extension, except insofar as extension in it is considered by comparison with the measure of what lies beneath it, namely, with time. And thus, no created thing is actually infinite.

In another way, it is called infinite negatively, that is, because it does not have an end; and thus, even indivisible things are called infinite, such as a point and unity, because they are not ended. And in this way the aevum is infinite, namely, because it is not ended. Yet thus nothing prohibits some created thing to be actually infinite in some respect.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that there is the infinite being of an angel and the aevum in the same manner.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that between eternity and the aevum a threefold difference can be assigned. One of these differences can be understood from what has been said above: for eternity measures the very substance of the eternal thing insofar as it is in the nature of things, that is, with all things which are attributed to it, yet not the aevum, as was said. Another is understood from this: that eternity measures being standing on its own, hence eternity is the same as the substance of an eternal thing. Yet the aevum measures created being, which is not standing on its own, because it is something from the substance of a created being. The third can be understood from this: that the aevum, although it may be interminable on the part of the end, nevertheless is not on the part of the principle, whereas eternity is on the part of both.