On the Soul

On the nature of the soul

Question 3

On the substance of the soul

Then there were questions concerning the soul:

and first, regarding nature; (Qq. 3–4.)

second, regarding grace; (Q. 5.)

third, regarding fault; (Qq. 6–7.)

fourth, regarding glory. (Q. 8.)

About natural matters of the soul there was a question concerning its substance and concerning its activity. About the substance there were two questions:

first, whether the soul is its own powers;

second, whether the soul is incorruptible according to its substance.

Article 1

Whether the soul is its own powers

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul is its own powers.

Obj. 1: Because in the book On Spirit and Soul it is said that the soul is certain things of its own, namely, powers, whereas it is not certain things of its own, namely, virtues. (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 13 (PL 40:789).)

Obj. 2: Augustine says in the book On the Trinity that memory, intelligence, and will are one life, one essence. (Augustine, On the Trinity 10.11.18 (CCSL 50:330–31; PL 42:984).) But these three, according to the Master in the third distinction of the first book of the Sentences, are three abilities of the soul. Therefore, the abilities of the soul are its very essence. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 3, ch. 2, p. 73 (PL 192:529).)

On the contrary (1): Dionysius in the eleventh chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy distinguishes superior substances, namely, angels, into three, namely, substance, virtue, and activity. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy 11.2 (PG 3:283–86).) But an angel is not of less simplicity than the soul. Therefore, also in the soul its own substance is not its virtue or power.

Furthermore (2): Of those things which are the same, if one is multiplied, the rest also. If, therefore, the soul is the same as its powers, it seems that, since the powers are many, the essence of the soul could not be one.

I answer that we can speak in two ways about the soul.

One way is according to how it is a certain substance; and thus, it is impossible for the soul to be its own powers, for two reasons.

One of these is understood from that which is proper to the soul, namely, that it is impossible for the same thing to be in the same way naturally the principle of many and diverse, or rather, opposite, things. Yet the soul according to diverse powers is found to be the principle of diverse acts according to species and as though of opposites. Hence it is impossible for the very essence of the soul, which is one, to be immediately the principle of these. And for this reason, it is necessary to posit in the soul, besides its substance, natural powers, which are the immediate principles of these acts.

The other reason is understood from that which is common to the soul and to every created substance: for in no created substance are being and activity the same, since this pertains to God alone. Yet essence is the principle of being, whereas power is the principle of activity. Hence, since from one naturally there is not but one, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336a27–28; cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 9.4, pp. 479–80; Algazel, Metaphysics, ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto: St. Michael’s College, 1933), p. 119.) no substance except the divine is its own power. Nor would there be instance from the potency of matter, even given that it is its essence, because such potency is not unto activity but unto being.

In another way, we can speak concerning the soul according to how it is a certain potential whole. (Albert the Great, Summa de homine, P. 2, tract. 1, qq. 6–7, 35:87b–95b.) And thus, the diverse powers are its parts, and thus the soul is predicated of the powers or conversely, by abusive predication, just as an integral whole of its parts or conversely, although there is less abuse in a potential whole than in an integral whole because a potential whole is present to each part according to its own substance, yet not an integral whole.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 2

Whether the soul according to its substance is incorruptible

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the rational soul is corruptible.

Obj. 1: Because, according to Damascene, no substance can be without a proper activity. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.23 [or ch. 37] (PG 94:950).) Yet the proper activity of a rational soul is to understand, which requires a body, since to understand is not without phantasm, as is clear through the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a16–17.) Therefore, the substance of the rational soul does not remain when the body is destroyed.

Obj. 2: That which has the power to exist always (Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.27, 282a4–25; Averroes, On the Heavens 1, text. 122–24.) is not found at some time to be and at some time not to be (for a thing exists for as long as the power of the thing demands). (Cf. SCG II.83.) Therefore, that which is found at some time to be, at some time not to be, does not have the power to exist always. But everything which begins to be is found at some time to be and at some time not to be. Therefore, nothing which begins to be has the power to exist always. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.27, 282a4–25; Aquinas, In II Sent. 19.1.1, obj. 5.) And thus, nothing which begins to be can be incorruptible. But the rational soul begins to be. Therefore, it cannot be incorruptible.

Obj. 3: Of man composed out of soul and body there is a certain being. Therefore, either the soul has another being besides this being, or not. If it has another being, then the composition supervenes on the soul after complete being. Therefore, composition of this sort is accidental to the soul, and thus man will not be a being essentially, but a being incidentally, which is unfitting. Yet if the soul does not have another being besides the being of the composite, the soul cannot exist after the being of the composite fails. But in bodily death the being of the composite fails. Therefore, the soul does not remain after the death of the body.

Obj. 4: The soul is the form of the body; (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a20; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 1, n. 234.) therefore, this is either through its essence or through some accident. If through an accident, it will follow that the composition of soul and body is accidental, like a man with a garment. If it is through essence, since form inasmuch as it is form cannot be without matter, it seems that the soul cannot remain after the death of the body.

On the contrary (1): The Philosopher says in the second book of On the Soul that the rational is separated from other things just as the perpetual from the corruptible. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 413b26–27.)

Furthermore (2): The Philosopher in the tenth book of the Ethics shows that contemplative happiness is preeminent over civil by this: that it is more long-lasting. But the civil endures even unto death. (Aristotle, Ethics 10.7, 1177a21–22; 1177b24–26.) Therefore, the contemplative is also after death, and thus the soul also remains after the death of the body.

I answer that it is necessary to posit that the substance of the rational soul is incorruptible.

For if it is corrupted, either it is corrupted essentially or incidentally. (Cf. Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 19 A, a. 1, 27:328b; Avicenna, Book on the Soul 5.4, pp. 113–26.) Indeed, it could not be corrupted essentially unless it were composed out of matter and form having contrariety, which cannot be unless it were an element or out of elements, as the ancient philosophers posited, whose positions are disproven in the first book of On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2–5, 403b20–411b30.) Yet it cannot be corrupted incidentally unless it were posited that it does not have being essentially, but only being with another, just as it is concerning other material forms, (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 19.1.1, ad 3; Averroes, On the Soul 3, comm. 4.) which do not properly have subsisting being, but are through the being of composite substances of which they are parts, and thus they are corrupted incidentally with the composites being corrupted. Yet this cannot be said concerning the rational soul: for it is impossible for that which does not have being essentially to act essentially. Hence also other forms do not act, but composites through forms; yet the rational soul has activity essentially, which it exercises with no bodily organ mediating, namely, the activity of understanding, as the Philosopher proves in the third book of On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a18–29.) For it could not know the forms of all sensible things unless it were denuded of all sensible forms (or unless it were the act of all), since nothing receives that which it already has. Therefore, it would be necessary, if the soul were to understand through some organ, for its organ to lack every sensible form, since it is born to understand all sensible forms. So too the pupil lacks all color so that sight can know all colors. (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 17.2.1, ad 4; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 22, a. 1, obj. 8.) Yet it is impossible for any bodily organ to be lacking every sensible form.

Therefore, it remains that the substance of the intellective soul is incorruptible. Hence also the Philosopher says in the first book of On the Soul that intellect seems to be a certain substance, and not to be corrupted. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b18–19.)

Yet certain men posit that this incorruptible intellect is outside of men, positing that the soul which is part of man will be corruptible, to which they posit that the separated intellect is connected in two ways. One way is through illustration, according to those who posit an agent intellect separated and incorruptible, (Especially Alexander Aphrodisias and Avicenna; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 2, n. 702; bk. 3, lect. 7, n. 792.) whereas a potential intellect conjoined and corruptible. Another way is through continuation of the intellect unto phantasms, according to those who posit that even the potential intellect is separate and incorruptible. (Averroes and certain Ancients; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 1, n. 694.)

But the first of these cannot be, because, if in us there is not any power unless material, the light of the agent intellect could only be received in us materially, since the received is in the recipient in the manner of the recipient, and so it will not be received in an intelligible mode, and thus we will not be able to be intelligent. Similarly, the second cannot be: for phantasms are in us through our activity, which follows substantial being, and thus man would not have being specified out of this: that he is rational, since he is only rational by being conjoined to an intellect.

It remains, therefore, that the human soul itself, which is the form of the body, is an incorruptible intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the soul requires something bodily for its activity in two ways. One way is like an organ through which it acts, just as it needs an eye to see. And thus, for understanding it does not need any organ, as has been proven. Yet if it would thus need an organ for understanding, it would be corruptible, as not capable of acting by itself. In another way, the soul requires something bodily as an object for its activity, just as for seeing it requires a colored body. And thus, the rational soul requires a phantasm for understanding because phantasms are as sensible things to the intellective soul, as is said in the third book of the On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a14–15.) Yet the activity which thus requires a bodily thing cannot be without that bodily thing from the beginning, yet it can be afterwards; just as the sensitive soul can have no activity unless it is first moved by sensible things which are outside the soul, but afterwards there remains the act of the imagination, even with sensible things departing. And similarly, with phantasms being destroyed, the intellective activity can remain in the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that argument is the proof of the Philosopher in the first book in Of Heaven and Earth, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.27, 282a4–25; Aquinas, In II Sent. 19.1.1, obj. 5.) by which he shows that everything generated is corruptible, and has a place among those things which are made and corrupted naturally, which from a defect of power can neither always have been nor always be in the future. Yet it does not have a place among these things which are made through creation, which receive from God the power that they might always exist, through which they cannot exist before they receive it. (SCG II.84.)

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the soul communicates its being to the body, which thing of the soul indeed is acquired in the body such that according to this it can subsist. This is not the case concerning other forms. And thus, this being of the soul is made to be of the composite, and nevertheless remains, with the composite having been destroyed.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that the soul according to its essence is the form of the body, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a20; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 1, n. 234.) nor with the body destroyed is there destroyed in the soul that according to which it is form; it only ceases to act as a form.

Question 4

On the activity of the soul

Then there were questions concerning the activity of the soul. And about this, there were two questions:

first, whether the intellective soul knows in the first truth all the things which it knows;

second, whether a soul separated from the body has acts of the sensitive powers.

Article 1

Whether the intellective soul knows in the first truth all the things which it knows

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul understands in the first truth whatever it understands.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says, in the twelfth book of the Confessions: if we see both that what you say is true, if we see also that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see it? Not I in you nor you in me, but both in what is above us by immutable truth. (Augustine, Confessions 12.25, para. 35 (CCSL 27:235; PL 32:840).) And thus, every true thing which the soul knows, it sees in the first truth.

Obj. 2: True makes what exists manifest. Therefore, the first truth is that through which all things are manifested. (Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, ed. N. Wicki, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera philosophica mediae aetatis selecta 1 (Bern: Francke, 1985), 10; D. H. Pouillon, “Le premier traitè des proprietes trascendentales. La Summa de Bono du Chancelier Philippe,” in Rev. Neoscol. Phil. 42 (1939): 58; Aquinas, In I Sent. 19.5.1.) But it is necessary for that by which something else is manifested to be maximally manifest, just as is clear concerning demonstrative principles and concerning bodily light, (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a25–b4.) through which sight sees bodies. Therefore, the first truth is maximally manifest to all minds. And thus, not only through it, but in it all things are known.

On the contrary (1): Many have true knowledge concerning demonstrative conclusions who consider nothing concerning the first truth. Therefore, not every true thing is known in the first truth.

Furthermore (2): Augustine says in the book On Free Will that no one judges concerning the first truth and no one without it judges rightly. (Augustine, On Free Will 2.14, para. 38 (CCSL 29:263; PL 32:1262).) And thus, if the first truth is not judged, it is not known, nor other things in it.

I answer that, just as a certain gloss says on that Psalm: truths have been diminished (Ps 12:1 [11:2]), from one first truth there result many truths in the minds of men, just as from one face (Peter Lombard, Gloss on the Psalms 11:2 (PL 191:155); Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 11:2 (CCSL 38:82; PL 36:138).) of a man there result many faces in a broken mirror. Yet this manifestation of truth is in respect to two things, namely, in respect to intellectual light, concerning which in the Psalm it is said: the light of your face has been marked upon us, Lord (Ps 4:6 [7]), and in respect to the first principles naturally known, whether they be complex or simple. Yet we know nothing of truth except from first principles and from intellectual light, which cannot manifest the truth except according to how they are a likeness of that first truth, because from this they also have a certain immutability and infallibility. Thus, therefore, in the first truth according to its essence not all things are seen by us in the state of the way, since neither are those things seen through their essence by wayfarers. But in this first truth, by reason of its image, namely, of the truth that is patterned from it, every truth is known by us.

And hence it is that two men see the same truth, inasmuch as from the same first truth there results a truth patterned from it in the mind of each, and the saying of Augustine is understood in that way.

Reply Obj. 1: And thus, the solution to the first is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that to act or to move something is said in two ways. One way is as by a formal principle of activity or of motion, and thus it is not necessary for the motion of the mover or the activity of the thing acting to be terminated unto that by which it acts; for fire does not heat the heat by which it heats. Another way is as an instrument, and thus the motion of the mover is terminated unto that by which it moves, just as a hand moves a rock by a staff and moves the staff. (Cf. above: Quodlibet IX, q. 1, a. 1, resp.) Therefore, it is necessary for that by which we know as by an instrument to be first known to us, and thus we know conclusions through principles naturally known, unto which the agent intellect is compared as unto an instrument, as the Commentator says on the third book of On the Soul. (Averroes, On the Soul 3, comm. 36; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 28.1, obj. 5.) But it is not necessary for that by which we know as a form of a knower to be known, because neither does the eye see the light which is of the composition of the eye, (According to Aristotle, Plato and Empedocles taught that the composition of the eye is light; see Aristotle, On Sense and What is Sensed 1.2, 437a19–b25; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What is Sensed, tr. 1, ch. 2; Albert the Great, Summa de homine, q. 20, 35:169a.) nor the species through which it sees. And thus, also, it is not necessary for whoever understands something to understand his intellect by which he understands or the intelligible light.

Thus, therefore, the truth in our minds, which is patterned from the first truth, is known by us partly of necessity so that other things are known in it, namely, as regards the principles themselves, and it is known partly not of necessity, namely, as regards the intellectual light itself. Whereas the exemplar truth itself is not seen by us through its essence.

Article 2

Whether a soul separated from the body has acts of the sensitive powers

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a separated soul can have an act of the sensitive powers.

Obj. 1: For Cassiodorus says in the book On the Soul that a soul without a body sees, hears, touches, and thrives by the remaining senses. (Cassiodorus, De anima 4 [ch. 2, “De definitione animae”] (CCSL 96:543; PL 70:1286); Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 16 (PL 42:1216); Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 30 (PL 40:800).)

Obj. 2: In Luke 16:23–25, certain things are said concerning the rich man buried into hell which could not take place without an act of the senses. But it is agreed that only the soul of the rich man without the body was there. Therefore, a soul can have activity of the senses without a body.

Obj. 3: A power which is not reduced to act is in vain. (Averroes, On the Heavens 1.20; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 48.2.2, obj. 7.) But in a soul the sensitive powers remain after death; therefore, the acts of the senses also remain.

On the contrary: To sense is an activity of a composite. (Aristotle, On Sleep 1, 454a7–11; cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 50, P. 2, a. 1, q. 1, 4:1045.) Therefore, with the composite destroyed, to sense cannot remain in the separated soul.

I answer that it is impossible for there to be an act of any sensitive power in a separated soul.

This is clear since the activity of a sensitive power is perfected in the same way in a man as in a brute. for a man sees through an eye in the same way as a horse. Yet the act of the sensitive power in a brute is not of the sensitive soul itself essentially, but with an organ mediating. For if the sensitive soul in a brute were to have activity essentially, it would have subsistence essentially, and thus it would be incorruptible, as has been proven concerning the rational soul. (Cf. above: q. 3, a. 2.) Hence, since this is unfitting, it is impossible for the sensitive power to have some proper act in a brute or in a man, but every act of it is of the composite. Hence it cannot remain in a separated soul.

Nevertheless, certain men say that the sensitive soul has two acts: (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.3.3, qa. 2; John Cassian, Conferences (Collations of the Fathers) 1.14 (CSEL 13:22–23; PL 49:503).) one which it exercises with an organ mediating, which after death does not remain, and another which it does by itself, and this does remain after death. Yet this seems to attest to the opinion of Plato concerning the soul, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.3, 406b25–28.) who posited that the sensitive soul moves itself and thus moves the body, and thus that activity by which it moved itself was proper to it, whereas that by which it moved the body was of the composite. And on account of this Plato posited that even the souls of brutes are incorruptible: (Augustine, City of God 10.30 (CCSL 47:307; PL 41:310); cf. Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ed. G. Verbeke and J.R. Moncho (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 2, pp. 45–46; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.3.3, qa. 2.) for this necessarily follows. Nevertheless, those men do not concede this.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, just as activities of the will on account of a certain likeness are named by the names of the passions which are in the sensitive appetite, so also the activities of the intellect are named from the activities of the senses on account of likeness. And Cassiodorus speaks thus.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that it is necessary for those words about the rich man to be understood metaphorically, or according to the likenesses of things and not according to the things themselves, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12.32–33, paras. 60–64 (CSEL 28:426–29; PL 34:480–82); The Nature and Origin of the Human Soul 4.15–21, paras. 21–35 (CSEL 60:401–13; PL 44:537–44).)

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, according to certain men, sensitive powers do not remain actually in a separated soul, but only in root. If, nevertheless, they remain actually, they will not be in vain even though they lack acts: for they remain unto the integrity of nature, (Cf. Albert the Great, Quaestiones de sensibus corporis gloriosi, in Sancti Doctoris Ecclesiae Alberti Magni Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum episcopi Opera Omnia, ed. Bernhard Geyer, Wilhelm Kubel (Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 1951), a. 2, para. 4, ad 2 (Col. 25.2:123).) just as the members of generation remain in the bodies of the risen. (Cf. Augustine, City of God 22.17 (CCSL 48:835–36; PL 41:778–79).)

On grace

Question 5

Regarding grace

Then there were questions concerning what pertains to grace. And about this there were three questions:

first, concerning the precept of the honoring of parents;

second, concerning counsel regarding the vow of obedience;

third, regarding the vow of continence.

Article 1

On the precept of honoring parents

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a son, whose father cannot be supported by him unless the son by contracting marriage receives a dowry whereby he could nourish his father, is not held to contract in order to support his father.

Obj. 1: Charity is ordered, and thus someone is held to love himself more than his father. But it would be laudable if someone on account of conserving his virginity were to expose himself to death. Therefore, someone is not held to contract matrimony to conserve the life of his father.

Obj. 2: A precept does not oppose a counsel. (Cf. above: Quodlibet VII, q. 7, a. 1, s.c. 1.) But concerning the preservation of virginity there is a counsel, as is clear in 1 Corinthians 7. (1 Corinthians 7:25–40.) Therefore, unto that whereby he would lose his virginity someone is not obligated by the precept about the honoring of parents. (The fourth commandment; see Exodus 20:12.)

On the contrary: An affirmative precept obligates for a place and time. But the time of observing the precept concerning the honoring of parents is when the parents are in need. Therefore, someone is then obligated by such a precept, and thus it seems that he is held to contract matrimony if otherwise he could not help his father.

I answer that the proposed case does not seem to be easily possible: for scarcely can it happen that someone cannot sustain his parents without contracting matrimony, if only by working with his hands or by begging. If, nevertheless, this were to happen, there would be the same judgment concerning the preservation of virginity at that moment as concerning the other works of perfection, such as the entrance into religion. Certain men have different opinions about this.

For some (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 52, cc. 2, 4, 2:974–76, 1026–27; Psalm 146:9; Jerome, Letter 14.2 (CSEL 54:46; PL 22:348).) say that if someone has a father in need he ought to give to him, if he has anything, for his sustenance, and thus he can enter religion licitly, committing the care of his parents to the heavenly Father, (Cf. Matthew 6:26.) who feeds even the birds.

But because this opinion seems too harsh, for this reason, it seems better said that either he who has the intention of entering religion sees that he can live in the world without mortal sin, or not easily. If he fears for himself the danger of mortal sin, since he is held to provide for the salvation of his own soul more than for the bodily necessity of his parents, he ought not to be delayed from the entrance of religion on account of the provision of his parents. (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, 3:823a.) Yet if he sees that he can dwell in the world without sin, it seems that a distinction must be made because, if without his service his parents can in no way live, thus he is held to serve them and to pass over the other works of perfection, and he would sin in dismissing his parents. Whereas if without his service his parents can be supported somehow, yet not honorably, not on account of this is he held to dismiss the works of perfection.

Yet it is otherwise concerning him who has entered religion already, because, since he has already died to the world through profession, he is loosed from the law by which he was held in worldly services to his parents, according to the doctrine of the Apostle, in Romans 7. (Romans 7:6; William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 52, ch. 4, 2:1026; Galatians 5:18.) Yet in other spiritual matters, for example prayers and things of this sort, he is held to serve them.

What has been said concerning the entrance of religion can be said also concerning the observance of virginity and concerning the other works of perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if someone has not professed virginity, he should not die of hunger before contracting matrimony.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that for a precept to oppose a counsel hinders nothing in this case.

Article 2

On the counsel regarding the vow of obedience

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a religious who has made a vow of obedience is held to obey his prelate in all things, even in indifferent ones.

Obj. 1: Through the vow of chastity a religious renounces all sexual intercourse. Therefore, through the vow of obedience he renounces his own will as regards all things. (Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 44, a. 3, q. 2, opp. 6, 2:1013a.)

Obj. 2: Blessed Benedict says in his Rule that even if a prelate commands something impossible, it must be attempted. (Benedict, The Rule of Saint Benedict 68 (PL 66:917–18; CSEL 75:158–59); cf. Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 44 C, a. 4, obj. 8, 27:691b.) Therefore, much more is he held to obey in indifferent matters.

Obj. 3: The vow of obedience pertains to the state of perfection. Yet this would not be if he were only held to obey those things contained in the rule, for any subject, even a secular one, is held to obey his prelate in things which pertain to the right of the prelacy. Therefore, it seems that a religious is held simply to obey in all things.

On the contrary (1): A religious is not held to more things than a secular, except as far as he has obligated himself through a vow. But through the vow of profession he has not obligated himself to obey except according to the rule. Therefore, he is not held to obey in more things than those which are according to the rule.

Furthermore (2): Bernard says in the book On Dispensation and Precept: let the prelate command nothing for me of those things which I have not promised; let him prohibit nothing of those things which I have promised. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Dispensation and Precept, ch. 5, 3:261 (see also PL 182:867).)

I answer that about this all partly agree and partly dissent from one another.

For all say commonly that a religious is not held to obey his prelate in these things which are against God, or against the rule (as regards those things in which dispensation is not committed to the prelate). (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 44.2.3.) So too, in these things which are stricter than the rule, he is not held to obey. But to obey belongs to perfect obedience, as is also said by all.

But about indifferent things or those which are below the strictness of the rule or equal to the rule, there are two opinions. Certain men say that to obey in things of this sort is necessary obedience, yet others that it is not necessary obedience, but that of perfection. These two opinions, although they seem to differ much as regards the voice, nevertheless as regards the thing are found to differ little or none. For what pertains to the rule is not only those things written expressly in the rule, but also whatever somehow is led back unto the rule, such as those things which pertain to the service of fraternal society and to the punishment of faults, unto which two almost all indifferent things of this sort can be led back. If, nevertheless, there are some things which in no way are led back unto the rule, it seems to be the truer opinion that to obey in things of this sort is not necessary obedience, but for perfection, as Bernard manifestly says in the book On Dispensation and Precept. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Dispensation and Precept, ch. 6, 3:261–62 (see also PL 182:868).) This is because obedience does not extend itself beyond the power or right of the prelacy, which indeed is limited according to the rule.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the vow of continence regards a special genus of act, but the vow of obedience regards generally all acts. Hence, unless its generality were determined, there would be confusion of religious, because all would be held to the same thing.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that he speaks about the perfection of obedience.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that through the vow of obedience a religious is placed under his prelate in regard to the general disposition of his life, although not in regard to all particular acts. Yet a secular is held to obey his prelate in regard to some special acts, not in regard to the general disposition of his life.

Article 3

On the counsel regarding the vow of continence

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that after a simple vow of chastity someone contracting marriage can neither render nor demand the debt.

Obj. 1: Because before God a simple vow obliges no less than a solemn, (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 6, c. 6, 2:686; cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, opp. 2, 4:819b.) as the canon says. But after a solemn vow is made someone can neither render nor ask for the debt; therefore, neither can they after the making of a simple vow.

Obj. 2: Through sin no one is excused from sin. But that man who contracts after a simple vow sins when he first renders the debt because he still can fulfill his vow by entering religion. Therefore, after he has rendered it once, he still sins either by rendering or by demanding.

On the contrary: The Church does not force anyone to sin. Yet she forces him to render the debt even after a simple vow of chastity. Therefore, he does not sin by rendering the debt.

I answer that regarding the rendering of the debt all agree that after a simple vow of continence he is held to render the debt because a simple vow does not break a contracted matrimony, (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 6, c. 6, 2:686; cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, opp. 2, 4:819a; Gratian, Decretum, bk. 4, tit. 6, c. 5, 2:685.) and from the time matrimony was contracted, a man does not have the power of his body, but the woman (1 Cor 7:4), hence he is held to render the debt to the woman asking. But about the petition of the debt certain men say that, (Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3, 4:821b.) since as regards this he is free, he is held still to fulfill the vow, and thus he sins by asking for the debt. Whereas other men say that, if through a sign it appears that the woman wishes for the debt to be rendered to her, although she blushes to ask, that the man ought to ask, even after a simple vow, and especially if he fears his wife might fall. (Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 32 B, a. 4, 30:273b.) But this returns unto the same as the first: for this is on the part of the wife a certain interpretative petition, and thus a man renders by asking. Hence neither is the matrimony made more burdensome on the part of the wife, which would be if it were necessary that she always ask expressly.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, since the transgression of either vow induces the guilt of mortal sin, it is said that both equally obligate before God. But as regards the impediment of matrimony, both do not have equal efficacy. For through a solemn vow he transfers himself vowing as though into the bodily service of God himself through the reception of order or the entrance of religion. Yet that which someone has given once to one, he cannot afterwards give to another; and for this reason, after a solemn vow someone cannot hand himself over to the power of a wife by contracting matrimony. But in a simple vow there is only a promise. Yet he who promises something to someone can give the same to another, even though he does not preserve the faith of the promise. And for this reason, he who makes a simple vow can afterwards contract matrimony, (Cf. above: Quodlibet VIII, q. 5, a. 3, resp.) although he sins because he has made his prior faith vain. (Cf. 1 Timothy 5:12.)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the first act of sexual intercourse does not excuse the following ones, by which he renders the debt, from sin, inasmuch as it is sin, but inasmuch as it is a certain act consummative of matrimony.

On fault

Question 6

Regarding fault which is opposed to right action

Then there were questions concerning what pertains to fault:

and first, regarding fault which is opposed to right action;

second, regarding fault which is opposed to right faith.

About the first, there were three questions:

first, concerning the reception of persons, whether he who honors a rich man on account of his riches sins;

second, concerning the contempt of reputation, whether someone sins by not repelling infamy;

third, concerning the preciousness of garments, whether it always is a sin.

Article 1

On the acceptance of persons

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that he who honors a rich man on account of his riches sins.

Obj. 1: For thus the Gloss on James 2:2: if there shall enter into your assembly, says: the world rejects the pauper, cherishes the rich man, the faith of Christ does conversely. (Glossa ordinaria, at James 2:2, 6.1275 (PL 114:673).) But to act against the faith of Christ is sin. Therefore, to honor rich men on account of their riches is sin.

Obj. 2: Honor, according to the Philosopher in the first book of the Ethics, is due to divine things. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 1.12, 1101b10–1102a4.) But there is not anything divine in a rich man on account of his riches. Therefore, honor is not due to him on account of his riches.

Obj. 3: From the words of the Philosopher in the first book of the Ethics it is gathered that honor is an exhibition of reverence unto the testimony of virtue. (Cf. above: Quodlibet VIII, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 1, lect. 5, n. 65; bk. 4, lect. 8, n. 748; In III Sent. 9.2.3, obj. 1.) But sometimes a rich man is not virtuous. Since, therefore, to speak false testimony is sin, (Cf. above: Quodlibet VIII, q. 4, a. 2, resp.) which ought not be done to avoid scandal, it seems that neither to avoid scandal ought rich men to be honored for their riches. (Cf. John of La Rochelle, Summa on Vices and Sins (Ms. Troyes B.M. 1339, f. 32rb–va); Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, 3:382–83.)

On the contrary: The Gloss of Augustine on James 2:2: if there shall enter, says: if he speaks concerning everyday meetings, who does not sin here? Nevertheless, he does not sin, unless before himself inwardly he should judge him that he is so much better as he is richer. (Glossa ordinaria, at James 2:2, 6.1276 (PL 114:673); cf. Bede, Commentary on the Seven Catholic Epistles (CCSL 121:193–194; PL 92:19); Augustine, Letter 167, ch. 5, para. 18 (CSEL 44:605; PL 33:740).) But not always does someone of this sort, who honors a rich man with exterior honors, judge him better on account of this. Therefore, he does not always sin.

I answer that to receive the person is divided against to receive the cause: for to receive the cause is to form a judgment out of something which acts unto the cause, which is laudable. Whereas to receive the person is to form a judgment out of some condition of the person which does not act unto the cause, which is vicious. Hence it happens that, from the same consideration of a person’s condition, sometimes a just judgment is made, and sometimes there is receiving of persons. So too, if in some controversy there is given a sentence for someone because he is more lettered, there will be receiving of persons; yet if from this consideration he is preferred to another in licensing unto teaching, there will not be receiving of persons.

If, therefore, some honor is exhibited to a rich man on account of his riches, namely, because his riches could do something, there will not be receiving of persons. Yet there will be if there is nothing his riches could do. Yet there is a twofold honor. (Albert the Great, Lectures on the Ethics 4, lecture 11 (ed. Col. 14.1:267); cf. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 9, a. 1, q. 3, 3:208b.) One is due to someone by reason of himself on account of his proper virtue, just as is commendation, imitation, (John Chrysostom, Homily on the Martyrs (PG 50:663); cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones de diversis, sermon 16, in Bernardi opera, ed. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), 6.1:146–48 (see also PL 183:579–83).) and other things of this sort. To this honor riches do nothing, hence if such honor is exhibited to someone on account of riches, there will be receiving of persons. Hence Maximus Valerius says that honors which are due to virtue, such as triumphs and other things of this sort, among the ancient Romans could be bought by no money. (Cf. Valerius Maximus, Factorum et dictorum memorabilium, ed. C. Kempf, Bibliotheca Teubneriana (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1888), bk. 9, 4.4, para. 9, p. 191.) Another honor is due to someone according to the state which he has in the republic: for thus in his person the republic is honored, and on account of this kings and princes and persons of this sort are honored, according to 1 Peter 2:17: honor the king. And because in the earthly republic the rich obtain a higher state, for this reason, the citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem, as though pilgrimaging in Babylon, ought to follow the custom of those among whom they dwell (as Augustine says in the book On the City of God) (Augustine, City of God 19.17 (CCSL 48:684–85; PL 41:645–46).) in these things which are not against God, and thus also to honor rich men, though only by those honors which pertain to exterior society.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that in what pertains to the faith of Christ, it would be a sin to prefer the rich to the poor, such as with the administration of the sacraments and other things of this sort. But in what the society of the world requires, it is necessary to follow the custom of the world.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that even riches, inasmuch as they are a certain good, are something divine, and especially inasmuch as they grant the faculty to do many things well.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that that argument proceeds concerning the honor which is given to someone by reason of himself.

Article 2

On the contempt of reputation

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone sins by not repelling infamy.

Obj. 1: For he is said to be cruel who neglects his reputation; (Augustine, Sermon 355, ch. 1, para. 1 (PL 39:1569; CSEL 101).) but cruelty is a sin. Therefore, it is a sin not to resist infamy.

Obj. 2: In Sirach 17:12 it is said: to each man it has been mandated concerning his neighbor, namely, to benefit him by example and word. But this is impeded through infamy. Therefore, everyone is held to repel infamy.

On the contrary: To contemn infamy seems to be an act of humility, hence in the Lives of the fathers it is read concerning many holy fathers that they endured their own infamies, not repelling them. (Cf. Vita sanctae Marinae, ch. 4 (PL 73:692–93); Pseudo-Rufinus, Vitae sanctorum, bk. 3, 99 (PL 73:778–79); Verba Seniorum 5, para. 25 (PL 73:958–59).) Therefore, it is not a sin.

I answer that each, namely, both contempt of reputation and desire for it, can be laudable and vicious: for reputation is not necessary to man for himself, but for edifying his neighbor. Therefore, to desire reputation on account of his neighbor is of charity, whereas to desire it on account of himself pertains to vainglory. And conversely, contempt of reputation by reason of himself is of humility, whereas by reason of his neighbor it is of idleness and cruelty. Therefore, they sin, those upon whom it is incumbent out of their office, or out of the state of perfection, to provide for the salvation of others, if they do not repel their own infamy as they are able. Whereas others for whom rather custody of their own salvation is imminent can, providing for their humility, contemn reputation or infamy. But, since infamy is repelled in two ways, namely, by removing the occasion and by restraining the tongues of detractors, in the first way all are held to avoid infamy; otherwise, they could not be passed by without active scandal, which always is a sin. But in the second way they are only held to the extent that someone should provide for the salvation of his neighbors.

And this is what Gregory says, in his ninth homily on Ezekiel: just as we ought to excite the tongues of detractors by our zeal lest they perish, so through their malice we ought to tolerate them equally when they are excited, so that merit may increase for us; sometimes also we ought to restrain them, lest, while they disseminate evil things concerning us, they corrupt the hearts of those innocent men who could have heard us unto good things; and below: for these men whose life is placed as an example of imitation, if they are able, ought to restrain the words of their detractors, lest those who could have heard should not hear their preaching, and, remaining in their depraved customs, should contemn to live well. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 1, homily 9, paras. 17–18 (CCSL 142:132; PL 76:877–78).)

Reply Obj. 1–2: And out of these things the solution to the objections is clear.

Article 3

On the use of precious garments

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that to use precious garments is always a sin.

Obj. 1: Everything which is done for vainglory is a sin. But precious garments are only worn for vainglory, hence Gregory says in a homily on the rich feaster: surely no one seeks precious garments unless unto vainglory, namely, so that he may seem to be more honorable than the rest. For because a precious garment is sought for vainglory alone, the thing itself testifies that no one wishes to be clothed with precious garments where he cannot be seen by others. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 40, para. 3 (PL 76:1305B; CCSL 141); cf. Aquinas, An Apology for the Religious Orders, ch. 8.) Therefore, using precious garments is always a sin.

Obj. 2: The Gloss on 1 Timothy 6:8: having nourishment and things by which we are covered, let us be content with these, says: what is greater, is from evil. (Not found in the ordinary Gloss; cf. Glossa interlinearis, at 1 Timothy 6:8–9, in Glossa ordinaria 6.722 (PL 192:358 D); Aquinas, An Apology for the Religious Orders, ch. 7; Matthew 5:37; Augustine, Enchiridion 7.13 [22] (CCSL 46:62; PL 40:244); The Lord’s Sermon the Mount 1.17, para. 51 (CCSL 35:57 and 59; PL 34:1255).) But preciousness of garment is greater; therefore, it is sin.

On the contrary (1): Seneca says to a certain queen: clothe yourself delicately, not on your own account, but lest the royal dignity become vile. (William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 21, ch. 5, 3.1:408.)

Furthermore (2): The Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:9: not in braided hair or gold or pearls or a precious garment, says: beyond her mode. (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Timothy 2:9, 6.698 (PL 114:627–28).) And thus, if someone uses precious garments according to his state, he does not sin.

I answer that in this case there is a difference when speaking of a public person and of a private person.

For in a public person there is considered both the state of dignity and the condition of his own person. Regarding these, he ought to conduct himself such that the authority of dignity does not come into contempt, and lest he be carried away into pride. Therefore, both can be laudable for him: both that he use precious things for inducing the reverence of authority, and that he use cheap things by reason of his proper humility, yet only to the extent that those things which are for conserving authority do not degenerate into pride, and lest while humility is served, the authority of ruling should be broken, just as Augustine says. (Augustine, Letter 211, 14 (CSEL 57:369: PL 33:964).) And for this reason, a priest laudably uses precious vestments in the divine office for the reverence of the divine cult, and laudably is this abstained from out of humility by a man of this sort in certain religious orders. (Especially among the Cistercians.)

Yet in him who is a private person, it is virtuous if for his own humility he uses abject garments lowlier even than his own state requires. Hence Gregory says in the aforesaid homily: if the lowliness of cheap clothing were not a virtue, the Gospel of John would not vigilantly say: he had been clothed with the hair of camels. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels 2.40, para. 3 (PL 76:1305 B; CCSL 141); cf. Aquinas, An Apology for the Religious Orders, ch. 8.) Yet it is licit for anyone to use garments according to the state of his own person, yet a sin if he exceeds his own state. But, because precious is said relatively just as also great, (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 7, 6b9.) since that which is precious to one, to another is not precious, preciousness of garments always expresses the excess of one’s own state. In this way, it is always a sin to use precious garments, and Gregory is speaking in that manner.

Reply Obj. 1: Hence the solution to the first is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that in nourishment and covering are understood all things which are necessary for us according to the fittingness of our state.

Question 7

Regarding fault which is opposed to right faith

Then there were questions concerning fault which is opposed to right faith. And about this there were two questions:

first, whether we may communicate with heretics;

second, whether heretics returning to the Church should be received.

Article 1

Whether we may communicate with heretics

To the first we proceed thus. It seems we may communicate with heretics.

Obj. 1: For it is said in Matthew 13 in the parable of the tares that the master of the house said to the harvesters: allow both to grow even unto the harvest (Matt 13:30). Yet the harvest is the consummation of the age (Matt 13:39), as is said in the same place. Since, therefore, the tares are understood as heretics, it seems that heretics must not be separated from the communion of the faithful before the day of judgment.

Obj. 2: Rulers who kill heretics seem to act against this precept of the Lord.

On the contrary: It is said in 2 Corinthians 6:17: go out from their midst and be separated. And he speaks about infidels, which is clear from this: that he had said before: do not bear the yoke with infidels (2 Cor 6:14). Therefore, we may not communicate with heretics.

I answer that we may not communicate with heretics for two reasons.

The first is by reason of excommunication: for, since they have been excommunicated, we may not communicate with them, just as neither with other excommunicates.

The other is specially by reason of heresy. This is first on account of danger, lest their acquaintance corrupt us, according to 1 Corinthians 15:33: depraved conversations corrupt good customs. (Hugh of Saint-Cher, “On the Second Epistle of John,” Opera omnia in universum vetus, et novum testamentum, vol. 7 (Venice: Pezzana, 1754), 1:10, f. 358va.) The second is lest we seem to grant any consent to their perverse teaching. Hence it is said in 2 John 1:10–11: if anyone should come unto you and does not have this doctrine, do not receive him into your house, nor shall you say hello to him. For he who says hello to him, communicates in his wicked works. As a gloss says: according as the voice has been instituted, it shows that there is communion with him; otherwise, it is simulation, which ought not to be in Christians. (Glossa interlinearis, at 2 John 1:10, in Glossa ordinaria 6.1425–26.) The third is lest by our familiarity the occasion of error is given to others. Hence in the same place another gloss says: although perhaps you have not been deceived, perhaps others could be deceived through such familiarity of yours, who would believe that they are pleasing you, and thus would believe them. (Glossa ordinaria, at 2 John 1:10, 6.1425 (PL 114:706).) Hence another gloss in the same place says: the apostles and their disciples used such great caution in religion, that neither indeed did they suffer to have communion of word with anyone of those who had declined from the truth. (Glossa ordinaria, at 2 John 1:10, 6.1424 (PL 114:706); this gloss is taken from Bede, Commentary on the Seven Catholic Epistles (CCSL 121:330–31; PL 93:122).) Nevertheless, this must be understood as except when we are speaking with someone for his salvation.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that in that precept of the master of the house there is understood a twofold condition.

One is such that the precept is expounded concerning the universal separation of the evil from the good, and this is understood from the very question of the harvesters, who say: do you want us to go and collect them? (Matt 13:28); for this will not be until the day of judgment.

The second condition is such that the precept is understood when the evil cannot be extirpated without danger to the good, and this is clear from the response of the master of the house, who said: no, lest perhaps collecting the tares, you eradicate simultaneously with them also the wheat (Matt 13:29). This could happen in three ways. One way is if someone were to cut it away before its malice were determined, hence the Gloss says that the Lord admonishes us lest we should judge ambiguously. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 13:29, 5.242 (PL 114:132); cf. Jerome, On Matthew 2, on Matthew 13:37–42 (CCSL 77:112; PL 26:94).) The second is if he were not obstinate in malice, for no one is excommunicated except for contumacy. Hence the Gloss says in the same place: we are admonished not to cut away quickly, because he who errs today, perhaps tomorrow will defend the truth. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 13:29, 5.242 (PL 114:132); cf. Jerome, On Matthew 2, on Matthew 13:37–42 (CCSL 77:112; PL 26:93).) And for this reason, it is said at the end to Titus: avoid a heretical man after the first and second correction (Titus 3:10). The third is if simultaneously the good are involved with the bad, on account of which the Gloss of Augustine says there that the multitude must not be excommunicated nor the princes of the people. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 13:29, 5.242 (PL 114:132); cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 18.2.3, qa. 2, s.c.; Augustine, Letter 250 (CSEL 57:593–98: PL 33:1066–68); Augustine, Against the Letter of Parmenian, 2.7–8, paras. 14–16 (CSEL 51:115–20; PL 43:58–60).)

Yet apart from those exceptions, the evil ought to be cut away, according to 1 Corinthians 5:13: remove the evil man from yourselves.

Reply Obj. 2: And through this the solution to the second is clear.

Article 2

Whether heretics returning to the Church should be received

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that heretics returning to the Church should not be received.

Obj. 1: For they have sinned against the faith, which is the foundation of the Church, and for this reason, they should not be built upon the edifice of the Church. (The words of St. Paul: 1 Corinthians 3:12.) Therefore, they should not be received by the Church.

On the contrary: The Church should close off her bosom to no one, just as Christ who says of himself: him who comes unto me, I shall not cast away outside (John 6:37).

I answer that, as long as the state of this life endures, man cannot be totally obstinate in sin: for this will be among the damned after death. And for this reason, as long as this life continues, there is left for whatever man a place of repentance, (Cf. Hebrews 12:17; Aquinas, Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 12, lect. 3, nn. 692–94.) and anyone, as often as he fails either in customs or in faith, should be received by the Church unto repentance, and to say the contrary is the heresy of the Novatians. (SCG III.156; IV.71; cf. Augustine, On Heresies 38.1–3 (CCSL 46:306–7; PL 42:32).) But, nevertheless, it is not necessary for him to always be received unto dignity, unless there is a merciful dispensation with a particular man, especially on account of the good of peace or on account of another fruit which is hoped for thence.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, as long as he does not have the foundation of faith, he should not be received by the Church. But when he begins to have it after conversion, he should be received.

On glory

Question 8

Regarding glory

Article 1

Whether any created intellect can see God through his essence

Then there is a question concerning what pertains to glory, namely, concerning the vision of God in the fatherland, namely, whether any created intellect can see God through his essence. (Certain teachers denied this around 1240; the error was condemned on January 13, 1241.) And it seems that none can.

Obj. 1: For there is some proportion of intellect to the intelligible. But of a created intellect to the divine essence there is no proportion since they are infinitely distant. (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 8, a. 1, obj. 7.) Therefore, a created intellect cannot see the divine essence.

Obj. 2: An uncreated spirit is more distant from a created intellect than a created spirit from sense. But sense cannot know a created spirit. Therefore, neither can a created intellect know an uncreated spirit.

On the contrary: On Exodus 33:20: man shall not see me and live, the Gloss of Gregory says: there have been some who said that even in that region of beatitude God is beheld in his clarity, but seen in his nature very little. Whom no doubt a lesser subtlety of inquisition has deceived. For neither for that simple and immutable essence is clarity one thing, and nature something else, but for him nature itself is clarity, clarity itself is nature. (Glossa ordinaria, at Exodus 33:20, 1.852 (PL 113:290); Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 18.54.90 (CCSL 143A:953; PL 76:93–94).) And thus, his essence will be seen by the blessed.

I answer that it is necessary to posit that the divine essence is seen by the blessed.

For beatitude is the ultimate perfection of rational nature. Yet nothing is finally perfect unless it attains in its way unto its principle. For this reason, I say that something attains in two ways unto the principle which is God: one way is through likeness, which is common to every creature, which has of perfection as much as it obtains of divine likeness; another way is through activity (passing over that mode which is singular to Christ, that is, in unity of person), yet I say this is through activity inasmuch as a rational creature knows and loves God. And because the soul is made immediately by God, for this reason, it could not be blessed unless it sees God immediately, that is, without the medium which is a likeness of a thing known just as visible species in the pupil or in a mirror, yet not without the medium which is light strengthening the intellect, which is the light of glory, concerning which it is said in the Psalm: in your light we shall see light (Ps 36:9 [35:10]); yet this is to see God through his essence.

Hence in this we posit as the beatitude of a rational creature that it will see God through his essence, just as the philosophers who posited that our souls flow from agent intellect posited the ultimate happiness of man in the continuation of our intellect unto it. (Cf. above: q. 3, a. 2, resp.)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that proportion is said in two ways. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 4.) One way is properly, insofar as it implies a certain determinate excess. And thus, proportion is required between the intellect and the intelligible so that there may be knowledge with comprehension, in which way the divine essence never will be seen by a created intellect. In another way, it is said commonly for whatever condition. And thus, the infinite can have a proportion to the finite, if it is its perfection, or if it has another condition of this sort unto it. And such a proportion suffices for our intellect to see the divine essence, by touching, not by comprehending. (Cf. Augustine, Sermon 117 (On the Words of the Lord 38) 3.5 (PL 38:663; CSEL 101).)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that objection proceeds concerning distance according to the propriety of nature, not according to the nature of knowledge. For a created spirit is not sensible, but an uncreated spirit is intelligible.