On God

Question 1

On God

There were questions concerning God, (Q. 1.) angels, (Q. 2.) and the soul. (Qq. 3–8.)

Concerning God, there were three questions:

first, concerning his unity;

second, concerning his judgment;

third, concerning his sacrament.

Article 1

On his unity

To the first we proceed thus. As the Master says, it seems that unity names something positive, not only negative, in divine matters. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 24, ch. 1 (101), para. 2, p. 187 (PL 192:586); cf. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 24, a. 1, q. 1, 1:421a.)

Obj. 1: For nothing is constituted out of privations. But out of unities (Cf. below: response; Euclid, Elements, bk. 7, def. 2; Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.13, 1039a12–13.) is constituted number, which is something since it is a species of quantity. (Aristotle, Categories 6, 4b23.) Therefore, unity is not said only of privation.

Obj. 2: Number follows distinction. If, therefore, unity and number in divine matters were not to name anything, there would not be real distinction in divine matters, which belongs to the Sabellian heresy. (Cf. ST I.28.1, s.c.; I.28.3, s.c.; In I Sent. 2.1.5.)

Obj. 3: If unity and number in divine matters were said only negatively, yet through unity nothing else seems to be removed than number, nor through number anything else than unity, it follows that both of those in divine matters are said according to the negation of a negation. But the negation of a negation only exists in the mind. Therefore, unity and number would not be really in divine matters, which is unfitting. And thus, one and number name something positive in divine matters.

On the contrary (1): Everything which is predicated of something is predicated of it with its own meaning; but the meaning of one consists in negation: for one is that which is not divided, according to the Philosopher. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b15–16; 10.3, 1054a23; 5.6, 1016a6–7, 1016b3–6; Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 3.3, p. 114.) Therefore, of God it is predicated through removal only.

Furthermore (2): According to the Philosopher in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, one and many are opposed just as privation and having. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054a20–26; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 10, comm. 9.) Yet privation is only through removal. Therefore, one, which between the aforesaid two holds the place of privation, is only through removal.

Furthermore (3): One does not add over being anything according to the thing, because thus the thing would not be one through its essence. Therefore, it adds something according to the mind only. But that which is according to the mind only is either a negation or a relation. Since, therefore, one does not add some relation over being, because it is not said unto something, it seems that it adds negation.

I answer that the “one” which is a principle of number necessarily says something positively about that to which it is attributed, because, since number is constituted out of unities, unless unity were something, number could not be a thing, and thus it could not be put in any genus as a species.

Therefore, if the one which is interchangeable with being is the same as the one which is a principle of number, it is necessary also for the one which is interchangeable with being to add something positively over being. And Avicenna concedes this; hence he says that the one which is interchangeable with being adds over being something which pertains to the genus of measure. (Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 3.2–6, pp. 107–49; cf. Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 4, comm. 3.) But this cannot be, because, since the one which is interchangeable with being is said of whatever thing, it is necessary also for the thing which adds one over being to be one. And thus, either it will be one through some added unity, and thus there will be a progression into the infinite, or it will be one through its essence, which if it is, must stand in the first place, namely, so that we call being itself one through its essence, not through something added. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 4, comm. 3.)

Thus, therefore, it must be understood, according to the opinion of Aristotle and his Commentator, (As stated above.) that the one which is interchangeable with being does not add anything over being, but only a negation of division, and thus a one of this sort both posits something inasmuch as it includes being in its understanding, and is said negatively only, as regards that which it adds over being. Whereas the one which is a principle of number, which adds over being something from the genus of measure, and similarly the number of which it is a principle, are found only in things having dimension, because such number is caused from the division of a continuous thing; (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b18–24; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 10, comm. 2.) and this number, that which is caused from the division of a continuous thing, is the subject of arithmetic, according to Avicenna.

Yet no proper condition of a bodily thing can be said of God or of any spiritual substance. Hence, according to this, the one and number which are contained in the genus of quantity are not said of God and other incorporeal substances, but only the one which is interchangeable with being and the multitude opposed to it. And for this reason, unity in divine matters is only said negatively, as regards that which it adds over being, although it posits something insofar as it includes being: for one is being undivided.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that objection proceeds from the one which is a principle of number.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that objection would proceed if in no way one and number were to posit something really in divine matters. Yet they do posit a thing distinct or indistinct as far as this: that being is included in the meaning of one, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the meaning of multitude includes the negation of a thing, but the meaning of one includes the negation of a negation and of a thing simultaneously. The following makes this clear. For one is that which is not divided. Yet it is necessary for the division which is negated through the one which is interchangeable with being to be such that it is saved in every division; yet this is division through affirmation and negation. And for this reason, a negation of this division constitutes the meaning of one: for one is that which is not divided by such a division that there can be in it to receive this and not this. And thus one, inasmuch as it denies that an affirmation and a negation simultaneously exist, is a negation of a thing and of a negation simultaneously. Whereas the aforesaid division is included in the meaning of multitude, and thus the negation of a thing is included there because “many” are those which are so divided that one of them is not another. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 24.1.3.)

Article 2

On his judgment

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that Christ will not descend to the earth at the judgment.

Obj. 1: Because on that line of the Psalm: the Lord in his holy temple (Ps 11:4 [10:5]), the Gloss says that God sitting in heaven judges concerning good men and bad. (Peter Lombard, Gloss on the Psalms 10:5 (PL 191:150).) Therefore, judgment will not be on earth, but in heaven.

Obj. 2: It pertains to the dignity of a judge for those to be judged to approach unto him and not conversely. But Christ is the worthiest judge, whose place is heaven. Therefore, men will ascend into heaven to be judged there, and he will not descend to the earth to judge men.

Obj. 3: If judgment will be on earth, it especially seems that it will be in the valley of Josaphat, as is said in Joel 3:2. But that place could not hold so great a multitude of men, (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 48, dub., 4:995a.) and thus judgment will not be there. Therefore, it will be in no place of earth.

On the contrary (1): It is said in 1 Thessalonians 4:16: the Lord himself at the command and at the voice of an archangel and at the trumpet of God shall descend from heaven. And thus, it seems that judgment will be on earth, not in heaven.

Furthermore (2): In judgment there will be compared not only the elect, but also the reprobate, who will have gross and heavy bodies, and thus a heavenly place would not be fit for them, but an earthly one. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 48, dub., 4:995a.) Therefore, judgment will not be in heaven, but on earth.

I answer that judgment is ordered to the retribution of rewards. Hence there is a twofold judgment of God according to a twofold reward, namely, of soul and of body. One is that by which he beatifies or damns men in regard to the soul, and this judgment is done through the whole of time. The other is the judgment by which men will be rewarded or punished even as regards their bodies, and that judgment will be made after the resurrection at the end of time. The first judgment befits Christ by reason of divinity, but the second by reason of humanity, because, just as Augustine says in his commentary on John, the Word of God vivifies souls, but the Word made flesh vivifies bodies; (Aquinas is citing Augustine here through the medium of Peter Lombard (who himself quotes several passages of Augustine more freely): Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4. d. 48, ch. 3, para. 2, p. 544; cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 19, para. 15 (CCSL 36:198; PL 35:1552–53); ST III.59.2, resp.) hence also in John 5:27 it is said: he gave power to him to make judgment, because he is the Son of man. Thus, therefore, the last judgment will be in the place which fits Christ by reason of his humanity, namely, around that land where he was born and suffered and completed the rest of the offices of humanity. On account of this it is said that the judgment will be in the valley of Josaphat, because that valley lies under Mount Olivet, where Christ ascended into heaven, so that it thus will be shown that he who ascended to reign is the same as he who will descend to judge, according to Acts 1:11: in which way you have seen him ascending into heaven, so he shall come. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 48.1.4, qa. 6; ST III.57.6, obj. 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the Gloss speaks about the first judgment, which applies to Christ by reason of divinity, by reason of which heaven also is assigned to it for a place. It is not that the divinity is enclosed by place, but that in heaven especially among the other bodily creatures there will appear the judgments of divine majesty. Hence heaven is called the place of God and of the saints who enjoy God.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that approach to the place of the judge, that is, ascent into heaven, is a reward which is obtained from judgment, hence it ought to follow judgment, not to precede. Yet approach to the place of the judge is not a reward in the case of human judgment, and for this reason, it is not similar.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that in judgment neither Christ nor the elect will be on earth, but only the reprobate. For Christ and the elect will be in the air, according to 1 Thessalonians 4:17: we shall be snatched in the clouds to meet Christ in the air. Yet the reprobate will be not only in that valley, but in the region all around, hence they will be able to see Christ and the elect, both by reason of altitude and by reason of clarity. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 48, dub. 1, 4:995.)

Article 3

On his sacrament

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that the appearance of wine, which remains in the sacrament after consecration, cannot be mixed with another liquid.

Obj. 1: Because, according to the Philosopher in the first book of On Generation, mixable things are in a mixture potentially, not actually. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.24, 327b27–29.) If, therefore, that appearance of wine is mixed with another liquid, after the mixing that appearance will not remain in act. But, with the appearance ceasing, the body and blood of Christ ceases to be in the sacrament. Therefore, the blood of Christ will not remain there after the mixing.

But this is unfitting because, according to the Philosopher, those things which are mixable are also separable, and thus that appearance mixed with another liquid will be able to be separated again, and with that separation having been made, the body of Christ or the blood will be there again, since the body or blood of Christ is under the appearance for as long as the appearance is, and thus the blood of Christ newly will begin to be under the appearance of wine in a way other than through consecration, which is unfitting. Therefore, that also from which it follows is unfitting, namely, for the appearance of wine after consecration to be mixed with another liquid.

On the contrary (2): The form of a mixture is an accidental form. But a supervening accident does not corrupt a subject. Therefore, after the mixing of the appearance with another liquid, the appearance itself still remains there. And thus, the aforesaid unfitting thing does not follow.

I answer that certain men say that in no way can any liquid be mixed with those appearances without the blood of Christ immediately ceasing to be under the whole of those appearances, (This opinion was rejected by Aquinas: In IV Sent. 12.1.2, ad 6; cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, q. 10, membr. 7, a. 2, 4:192rb.) for with the species changed the truth of the blood of Christ does not remain there. Yet through the addition of any liquid another quantity is made, which stands under the other accidents in that sacrament: for there is made a greater quantity. And thus, the blood of Christ does not remain there.

But this does not seem true, because the appearances which remain in the sacrament after consecration are corrupted in the same way and not otherwise than would have happened with the preexisting substances whose appearances remain, just as it is clear to the senses that they are incinerated and otherwise changed precisely as it would have happened for the substances of bread and wine before consecration. Yet it is agreed that through the admixture of one drop of water the whole of the wine would not be destroyed. (Cf. ST III.77.8.) Hence neither on account of this is the whole appearance of wine corrupted after consecration. Nor is it necessary, if quantity is increased, that on account of this there should be another appearance there: for addition itself does not remove the essence of dimension, but varies its termination, which indeed is varied not only through addition, but also through division. Hence, if such a variation would suffice such that the body or blood of Christ would cease to be under the appearance, it would follow that similarly it would cease to be through division of the appearance, which is clearly false.

And for this reason, it must be said that sometimes a mixing of another liquid makes it that the blood of Christ totally ceases to be under all the appearances, and sometimes not, but only under part of the appearances. For if the substance of wine were there, if another liquid were to be admixed in great quantity, that wine would corrupt totally so that it would cease to be wine, if the admixed liquid were of different appearances; or there would cease to be this wine, if it were of the same appearances. Yet if another liquid were to be admixed in small quantity, the mixing of that liquid could not arrive to the whole of the wine, but to some part of it, which would change either according to the appearances, if it were of different appearances which it would not lose totally through the mixing, or according to number, if it were of the same species. Or it would lose its appearances totally through the mixing, just as a drop of water cast into a pitcher of wine. (Cf. ST III.77.8; Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.14, 321a33–b2; 1.22, 326a26–28.)

Thus, therefore, if so great a mixing of a foreign liquid is made after the consecration which would suffice for corrupting the whole substance of wine, if it were there, there would cease to be the blood of Christ under the whole of the appearances. Yet if there is not so great a mixing, it would cease to be under a part: for given that that liquid mixed into the appearances of wine would be changed, nevertheless it would not be changed into the blood of Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, with a mixing of appearance made with another liquid, the same appearance does not remain either according to appearance or according to number, whether according to the whole or according to a part. And thus, under the whole or under a part the blood of Christ will not remain, but the substance of wine. Nor also with a separation made will the blood of Christ newly be there, because mixable things, when they are separated from a mixture, do not return the same in number, but the same in appearances.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the form of a mixture can be understood in two ways. One way is the form through which a mixed body is established in appearances, and thus it is substantial form, for through this way the form of a stone is called the form of a mixture. In another way, the form of a mixture can be called a certain middle quality resulting from the qualities mixed together.

When, therefore, it is said that accidental form does not destroy a subject, it could be said that this is true, nevertheless it destroys accidents. And thus, the sacramental appearances, which are accidents, do not remain after the mixing together.

But this solution is not true: for the form of a mixture, since it is a certain middle quality, can only replace the simple qualities from which it is composed. Yet the sacramental appearances are not destroyed by any varied qualities, because, if the odor of wine or its color were changed, not on account of this would the blood of Christ cease to be there, unless the dimensions, which stand under the other accidents, taking the place of substance, were to be destroyed according to essence, which cannot happen otherwise than would happen concerning the substance of wine, if it were there.

And for this reason, it must be said rather that an accident does not corrupt a subject as an efficient cause, but as a disposing cause. For the form of air is removed when there is posited a quality which is a necessary disposition for the form of fire, namely, heat in the highest degree. And similarly, the form of a simple body is removed when there is posited a middle quality which is necessary for the form of a mixture. (Cf. above: Quodlibet VII, 4.2, resp.)