On God

Question 1

On the immensity of God

There were questions concerning God, (Qq. 1–3.) angels, (Q. 4.) and men. (Qq. 5–11.)

Concerning God, there were questions concerning his immensity, (Q. 1.) knowledge, (Q. 2.) and predestination. (Q. 3.)

Article 1

Whether it is proper to God alone to be everywhere

Whereas about the immensity of God there was a question whether it is proper to God alone to be everywhere. It was shown that it is not.

Obj. 1: For number is in the things numbered. But it is agreed that all the parts of the universe are numbered. Therefore, number is in all the parts of the universe, and thus it seems that it is everywhere. Therefore, it is not proper to God alone to be everywhere. (Cf. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 37, P. 1, a. 2, q. 1, obj. 2, 1:642b; Aquinas, In I Sent. 37.2.2, obj. 2.)

Obj. 2: A universal is that which is everywhere and always. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.33, 88b32–33.) But God is not a universal. Therefore, it is not proper to God alone to be everywhere and always.

Obj. 3: Spiritual substance exceeds bodily substance. But what is called “to be everywhere” pertains to bodily substance because to assign place properly is in bodily things only. Therefore, much more does “to be everywhere” pertain to spiritual substances, and thus it seems that it is not proper to God alone.

Obj. 4: For the commendation of an earthly king he needs to be able to govern the kingdom even in his absence. But God is more commendable than every king. Therefore, it seems that it also applies to him for commendation to govern the whole universe or any of its parts in his absence. And thus, it does not seem that it is proper to God to be everywhere. (Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 37 A, a. 1, s.c. 4, 26:230a; Aquinas, In I Sent. 37.1.1, obj. 2.)

Obj. 5: It is agreed that certain things are said to be near to God and certain things remote from him, and as much more as they are remote, so much more are they corruptible. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336b30–31; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 8.1.1, qa. 1, ad 1.) Yet some things could not be called near to God and some remote from him if God were everywhere. Therefore, it seems that God is not everywhere.

Obj. 6: Given that the whole worldly machine (Cf. Lucretius, On the Nature of Things 5.96; Nicholas of Clairvoux, Sermon on the Nativity of the Lord 2.1 [48] (PL 184:833B); Peter Damian, Sermon 11, “On the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin Mary” (PL 144:557C).) were one continuous body, it is agreed that that body would be everywhere. Therefore, it is not proper to God alone to be everywhere. (Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 37 A, a. 8, obj. 5, 26:239b; Aquinas, ST I.8.4, obj. 4.)

On the contrary: Ambrose proves that the Holy Spirit is God because he is everywhere. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 37, ch. 1, para. 5, p. 264 (PL 192:621–622); Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit 7.81 (CSEL 79:48–49; PL 16:723–24).) But, if to be everywhere were not proper to God alone, the argument of Ambrose would not prevail. Since, therefore, an argument of this sort does prevail, it seems that it is proper to God alone to be everywhere.

I answer that spiritual things are said to be in a place not indeed through contact of magnitude, but of power; and for this reason, according to the nature of the power of any spiritual thing, we necessarily speak concerning the place in which it is. Yet the power of God is infinite, which infinity indeed appears in regard to two things. The first is because not only does it exceed creatures which are, were, and will be, but also all things which can be imagined. Therefore, God not only is in those things which are, were, and will be, but also in those which can be imagined to be. Second, because the power of God simultaneously works once in all things, and in each thing according to the proper mode of the thing, and for this reason, to be everywhere, properly understood, applies to God alone, yet to other things, to be everywhere applies improperly.

Hence there is a distinction regarding the way God is everywhere, and the way being everywhere applies somehow to other things. For things of this sort are said to be everywhere because they are only in things which are and are present, yet God is not only in these things which are, but also in imagined things and in past and future things. Likewise, other things are not everywhere as in one place, but as in diverse places. But God is everywhere such that he is in every place and in the whole, because his power has efficacy not only in that which is common to the universe, but also in that which is proper to each particular thing. For this reason, he is in all things as in one place and as in many, which is properly to be everywhere.

Hence, since in this way God alone is everywhere, to God alone is it proper to be everywhere.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that number is not in numbered things as in a place, but as an accident in a subject. Besides, one number, granted it is in all numbered things as a single existence, (Cf. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 37, P. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1–3, 1:643a.) nevertheless is not in every part, because every part is not numbered by the same number. Likewise, number is not altogether one, but a certain multitude. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.6, 1057a3–4.) Yet God is in things through his power and he works in each thing, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a universal is said to be everywhere and always more through removal than through position: for it is not said to be everywhere and always by this: that it is in every place and in every time, but because it abstracts from these things which determine place and determinate time. And besides, universals are not subsistent things.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that spiritual substance exceeds bodily substance by excess of dignity of nature, but not in power of acting; nay, rather, we see that many spiritual substances have determinate bodies in which they act, just as the rational soul acts in the human body. And for this reason, the objection does not hold.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that to be everywhere through royal power is a defect of an earthly king, on account of the limitations of his substance. Yet God, since he is not limited, is everywhere; and nevertheless, if he were not everywhere, nonetheless he would govern all things by his justice. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 47.1.2, qa. 3, obj. 2, ad 2.) Hence in an earthly king not to be present is a defect, but to govern in his absence is commendable. Yet God both is everywhere and governs all things.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that the distance and proximity of creatures of this sort to God is not according to place, but according to likeness and unlikeness: for those things which are more assimilated to God are said to be nearer to him, whereas those which more recede from his likeness are said to be more remote from him. (Cf. Augustine, City of God 9.17 (CCSL 47:265–66; PL 41:271–72).)

Reply Obj. 6: It must be said that, given that the whole worldly machine were one continuous body, nevertheless not for this could it be imagined that it were everywhere, but in one place only, because then (Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 37 A, a. 8, ad 3, 26:240.) that in which it is would be counted as one place, and thus it would not touch any particular thing whose nature involves being everywhere.

Question 2

On the knowledge of God

Article 1

Whether God knows evil through good

Whereas about the knowledge of God there was a question whether God knows evil through good. And it seems that he does not.

Obj. 1: Because to know one thing through another pertains to a defect of knowledge. But in divine knowledge there can be no defect. Therefore, it seems that God does not know evil through good. (Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 36 B, a. 6, obj. 1, 26:215a; Aquinas, In I Sent. 36.1.2, obj. 4.)

Obj. 2: To know one thing through another is to roam in knowing. But in divine knowledge there is no roaming. Therefore, since to know evil through good is to know one thing through another, it seems that God does not know evil through good.

Obj. 3: Whatever God knows, he knows through his essence. But evil is not an effect of the divine essence; nor is it opposed to it, as Augustine says. (Augustine, City of God 12.2 (CCSL 48:357; PL 41:250).) Therefore, it seems that God does not know evil through good.

Obj. 4: The Philosopher says in the third book of On the Soul that an intellect which is always in act shall not know privation. But the divine intellect is always in act. Therefore, it seems that God does not know evil through good.

Obj. 5: Everything which is known, is known through some likeness existing in the knower himself. But evil does not have any likeness in God. Therefore, God does not know evil through something good which exists in him.

On the contrary: Augustine says that evil is known according to how it is discordant with good. (Augustine, Of Two Souls 8.10 (CSEL 25:64; PL 42:101).)

I answer that the proper knowledge of each thing is according to how it is known through its proper notion. Yet among knowable things there are certain ones which have an absolute proper notion, such as man and stone, and the proper notion of these does not depend upon something else. Whereas there are certain ones which do not have an absolute proper notion, but one that depends upon something else, such as relatives and privatives and negatives, whose notion depends upon the order which they have to other things: for the notion of blindness is not absolute, (An example found in Aristotle: Categories 10, 12a27–b19; Topics 6.9, 147b34–35.) but dependent, inasmuch as it has an order to sight, of which it is privative. Since, therefore, God knows all things according to their proper notions, I say that those things whose notion is absolute he knows absolutely and not through something else. Whereas those things whose proper notion is dependent and in an order to other things, he knows according to the order to those things upon which they depend.

Since, therefore, the notion of evil is not absolute but dependent, namely, inasmuch as it is discordant with created good, he knows evil according to the order to the good, namely, according to how it is discordant from the good itself.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that it is a defect of knowledge to know one thing through another for those things which have an absolute notion, but not in those things whose notion is unto another, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that discursive knowledge is to know one known thing through another known thing absolutely. But to know one known thing through the other known thing unto which it is ordered is not to roam in knowing. And evil is known in this way. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 36.2.1, ad 4; Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 1, n. 1.)

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, granted that evil is not opposed to the divine essence, (Cf. Augustine, City of God 12.2 (CCSL 48:357; PL 41:250).) nevertheless it is opposed to an effect of the divine essence: for uncreated good does not have evil opposed, but evil is opposed to the good effects which are caused by the uncreated good. And it is known inasmuch as it is discordant with these effects.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that that has a place in that intellect which knows things through adequation and their species, and this way of knowing is not in God, who knows all things through his essence.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that, although evil does not have any likeness in God, nevertheless the opposite of evil, namely, created good, has a likeness in God just as in its cause, and thus he knows good through himself, whereas evil through good.

Question 3

On predestination

Article 1

Whether predestination imposes necessity

About predestination there was a question whether predestination imposes necessity. And it was shown that it does.

Obj. 1: For it is agreed that someone predestined is saved entirely. But this would not be unless it were necessary for the predestined to be saved. Therefore, it seems that predestination imposes necessity.

Obj. 2: In Romans 9:16 the Apostle says: it is not of one willing nor of one running, but of God having mercy. Therefore, it seems that whatever a man has concerning salvation is from divine predestination alone and nothing else, and thus it seems to impose necessity.

On the contrary: Augustine says: he who created you without you, shall not justify you without you. (Augustine, Sermon 169 11.13 (PL 38:923; CSEL 101).)

I answer that predestination has certitude, and, nevertheless, does not impose necessity. Yet in predestination it is necessary to consider three things. Two of these predestination itself presupposes, namely, the foreknowledge of God and his love, that is, his will by which he wills to save one predestined. The third is predestination itself, which is nothing else than the direction unto the end (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Gloss on I Sent., d. 40, para. 5, 1:402; Aquinas, In I Sent. 40.2.1, obj. 7.) which God wills for the beloved thing. Yet each of these three has certitude and, nevertheless, does not impose necessity.

That divine foreknowledge has certitude is clear. For God knows things in a nobler mode than we know. For our knowledge is in time, and for this reason, our looking regards things according to the nature of time, namely, of the present, the past, and the future, namely, so that one knows past things as past, present things as present, future things as future, and naturally. Whereas divine knowledge is above time and is measured only by eternity, and for this reason, he does not know things as they are in time, but as they are in eternity, namely, as they are present to him, both necessary things and contingent ones. Hence he knows all things as though present in his own present. (Cf. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, 1:696; Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 2, a. 12, ad 4.) Since, therefore, our intellect knows present things certainly, much more does God know with certainty all things present to him. From this no necessity is induced for the things known, just as we see that someone standing in a high place sees certainly the order of some men who are going through the ways and who are not seeing anything but the things which are present to them. And, nevertheless, no necessity is imposed from this for those men: for this is not unless he, standing in a high place, looks at all things as present, which to one going on level ground are past, namely, those things which are behind; present, namely, those which are near him; and future, namely, those which are in front. (Cf. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 40, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1–3, 1:707–8; Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 4, pr. 6, para. 30 (CCSL 94:82; PL 63:818); 5, pr. 6, para. 17 (CCSL 94:103; PL 63:859).)

That the divine will has certitude and, nevertheless, does not impose necessity, is clear in this way. For the will of God is the efficacious and perfect cause of all things because all things whatsoever God has willed, he has made (Ps 115:3 [113:11]). The perfection and efficacy of which appears from the fact that he not only moves and causes things, but also gives to them such a mode of causing, inasmuch as upon whatever thing he confers a determinate mode by which it produces its own effects. Hence, because he willed for certain things in the universe to be necessary and certain things contingent, he constituted certain causes, upon which he conferred that they would cause their effects contingently, and certain ones upon which he conferred that they would cause their effects necessarily. Hence he willed this or that effect not only to be, but also to be in such a mode, namely, either contingently or necessarily, just as that he willed Peter not only to run, but also contingently to run. And similarly, he willed to save this or that man, but in a way that he would not destroy freedom of choice. Thus, that Peter or Martin should be saved has two causes: one, namely, the divine will, and this has certitude; and free choice, and this has contingency. And thus it is in other things, because for them to be contingent comes to them from the first cause. Hence the first cause of things, namely, the divine will, also has certitude concerning contingent things, out of which certitude, indeed, there is not imposed upon things themselves any necessity, because not only does he will them to be, but to be in such a mode, namely, necessarily or contingently, as has been said.

Whereas, that predestination has certitude and does not impose necessity is similarly clear. For motion or direction or intention of directing unto the end, which is predestination itself, is according to the condition and order of causes constituted by God. Yet it is agreed that, when there are two ordered causes, one of which is necessary and the other contingent, the effect is always contingent. Yet in predestination there are two causes, one of which is necessary, namely, God himself, and the other is contingent, namely, free choice, and for this reason, it is necessary for the effect of predestination to be contingent. Hence, because God knows and wills this or that will obtain such an end, predestination has certitude; whereas because God wills that according to freedom of choice it should be directed unto such an end, on account of this the certitude of this sort imposes no necessity upon predestination.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the fact that this predestined man is saved entirely is from the certitude of divine predestination. Nevertheless, there is not absolute necessity there, but conditional, because, if such a man is predestined, he is saved necessarily. Yet this is not necessary absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the saying of the Apostle is not to be understood such that it is necessary to will and to run on our part, but that the first principle of operating well is not from us, but from the divine mercy infusing grace. Still, nevertheless, it is necessary for there to be some principle on our part.