On Man

On the parts of human nature

Question 5

On the soul

Then there were questions concerning man. And about man it was asked:

concerning the parts of human nature, (Qq. 5–6.)

concerning the sacraments of grace, (Qq. 7–9.)

and concerning the intercourse of human life. (Qq. 10–11.)

About the first, there were two questions:

first, concerning the soul, (Q. 5.)

second, concerning the body. (Q. 6.)

Article 1

Whether sensitive and intellective souls are of the same substance

Concerning the soul, there was a question whether sensitive and intellective souls are of the same substance. And it was shown that they are not.

Obj. 1: For the sensitive soul is drawn out of the potency of matter, whereas the intellective is through creation. Therefore, there is not the same substance of each.

Obj. 2: In no substance which is one and the same is there at the same time motion unto opposites. But sense and reason are moved unto opposites at the same time, just as the Apostle says: I see another law in my members repugnant (Rom 7:23). Therefore, the sensitive and the rational are not of one substance.

Obj. 3: It is agreed that the corruptible and the incorruptible are not of the same genus. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b28–29.) Therefore, neither are they of the same number. But the sensitive soul is corruptible, whereas the intellective incorruptible. Therefore, the sensitive and the intellective are not the same in number, and thus neither of the same substance.

Obj. 4: The sensitive soul is common to us and to brutes. But in brutes it is drawn from the potency of matter. Therefore, the same happens in us. Therefore, it is not the same as the intellective, which is through creation.

On the contrary: Of one perfectible there is one perfection. (Cf. Albert the Great, Summa de homine, q. 7, a. 1, obj. 1, 35:89a; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 8, P. 2, a. 1, q. 1, ad 3–4, 2:225b.) But the body of men is one perfectible thing. Therefore, the soul, which is its perfection, is not but one.

I answer that about the order of forms there is a twofold opinion.

One is that of Avicebron and certain of his followers, (Above all, Dominic Gundissalini, who was followed by few teachers before the thirteenth century.) who say that according to the order of genera and species there are diverse substantial forms coming (Cf. SCG IV.81.) upon one another, just as there is substance, and there is body, and there is animate body, and there is animal. (Avicebron, The Fountain of Life 3.48; 4.3; 5.34.) Therefore, they say that a certain substantial form is that through which it is substance only, and afterwards there is another certain one through which it is body, then there is also another through which it is animate, and another through which it is animal, similarly also another through which it is man. They say the same for other substantial forms of things.

But this position cannot stand, because, since the substantial form is that which makes this something, (Cf. above: Quodlibet VII, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 3, text. 58 (Venice: Apud Junctas, 1562, vol. 4, f. 112ra C); 1, text. 69 (f. 40va); 4, text. 59 (f. 151va); Boethius, Categories 3b10.) and gives to a thing substantial existence, then only the first form would be substantial, since this alone would give to a thing substantial existence and would make this something. Yet all the others after the first would be accidentally coming upon it, nor would they give to a thing existence absolutely, but existence in such and such a way. And thus, in the loss or in the acquisition of these there would not be generation and corruption, but only alteration. Hence it is clear that this is not true. It would be similar also in the powers of the soul: for only the first, namely, the vegetative, would be a substantial form and would make this something, whereas the others would be coming upon this, which is entirely false.

And for this reason, it must be said that forms of this sort differ according to the perfect and the imperfect: for there is one form which only makes a body exist, one which is more perfect and gives both existence and life in whatever mode of living, and one which gives these and also sense. Hence it is clear that the last always is more perfect than the first ones, and relates to the prior ones just as the most perfect to the most imperfect, and for this reason, whatever is contained in those, the whole is in the last by power. Hence it must be said that one and the same essence is of the sensitive soul and the intellective, but the intellective relates to the sensitive just as the perfect to the imperfect. Yet a sign of the fact that the sensitive soul and the intellective specifically are of one essence is that, if the powers of the soul were not rooted in one essence, never would one be impeded by another, nor also would the power of one redound unto another. Likewise, since the intellect does not have a determinate organ in the body by whose mediation it exercises its activities, why would it be united to the body unless it were of the same essence with the sensitive soul?

Thus, therefore, it is clear that one essence is of the sensitive soul and of the intellective, but they differ according to the perfect and the imperfect, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the sensitive soul is drawn from the potency of matter in brutes, whereas in us it is not, but it is through creation, since its essence is the essence of the rational soul, which is through creation.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that it is not unfitting for the same existing something, according to diverse powers or parts to be moved unto opposites. And for this reason, granted that the substance of the human soul is the same for the sensitive and for the intellective, nevertheless according to diverse parts or powers it can be moved unto opposites, namely, such that sense is moved unto those things which are proper to it and reason unto those unto which it is ordered.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, granted that the incorruptible is not the same as the corruptible, nevertheless there is found something incorruptible which has some propriety common to the corruptible. And thus, it is in the rational soul: for the very substance of the soul is incorruptible. Still, nevertheless, it has something in itself, namely, the sensitive, which is common also to the corruptible.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that, granted that the sensitive is common to us and to brutes as regards the nature of genus, nevertheless as regards the nature of species it is one thing in sensitive man and another in brutes. Similarly, it is one thing in an ass and another in a horse and in an ox, because according as animals differ by species, so also the sensitive differs in them. And for this reason, it does not follow that, if in brutes it is drawn from the potency of matter, it is also drawn in man, because in man it is of a higher species and through creation, as has been said.

Question 6

On the body

Article 1

Whether the body rises the same in number

Then concerning the body there was a question whether it rises the same in number. And it was shown that it does not.

Obj. 1: Because, according to the Philosopher in the Topics, something is called the same in number which is the same in property, in accident, and in definition. (Aristotle, Topics 1.7, 103a23–31.) But of bodies in the resurrection there will not be the same properties, because they are now risible, then not; nor the same accidents, because now they are white, curled, (Cf. above: Quodlibet VII, q. 1, a. 3, resp.) musical, (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4, 1006b16, 1007b4–14; 5.2, 1014a5.) and things of this sort, which then shall not be; and nor even the same definition, because now a body is defined as being mortal, then it will not be mortal. Therefore, it seems that it does not rise the same in number.

Obj. 2: Identity of matter makes the same in number. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016b32–33.) But the matter of a body rising will not be the same as the body which now is, since many forms are reiterated in it. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.12, 338b12–17.) Therefore, the body will not rise the same in number.

Obj. 3: The Philosopher says in the book On the Soul that it is not the same statue in number which is destroyed and refashioned from the same bronze. (This example is not found in the De anima; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.1.1, qa. 2, obj. 4; Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 193a9–b21; Averroes, On the Soul 2, comm. 8.) For the same reason, therefore, the body which now is corrupted will not be the same in number as that which will rise.

Obj. 4: It is agreed that man by humanity is man and by one humanity is one man. But in the body which now is and which will rise there will be two humanities, because through death there is destroyed the form of the whole. (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; In IV Sent., d. 44.1.1, qa. 2, s.c.; Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 7, lect. 9, nn. 1467–72; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, comm. 34 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 7, ff. 184r–185r).) Therefore, there will be two men, and thus it seems that bodies will not rise the same in number. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.1.1, qa. 2, obj. 2.)

On the contrary: Whom I myself shall have seen (Job 19:27). (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.1.1, qa. 2, s.c.)

I answer that, for something to be the same in number, identity of essential principles is required. Hence, whatever of essential principles is varied in an individual thing, it is necessary for identity to be also varied. Yet the essential thing of an individual is of the nature of that individual, just as matter and form are essentials of a thing. Hence, if accidents are varied and changed, with the essential principles of an individual remaining, the individual itself remains the same. Since, therefore, the essential principles of man are soul and body, and both these remain, because the same soul and the same body will rise, it must be said that the bodies of men will rise the same in number.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that objection proceeds from a false understanding of the letter. (Cf. Aristotle, Topics 1.7, 103a23–31.) For something is not called the same in number which has the same accident now and afterwards and the same property. But something is the same in number which is the same with accident and the same with property, just as when a subject is the same with accident, property, and definition, and not those things which have the same accident, the same property, and one definition. Hence it is clear that the objection understood the text falsely.

Yet given that the objection proceeds according to that understanding, it must be said that it is understood concerning individuating accidents, namely, concerning dimensions, and these will be in glorified bodies. Likewise, there will be there the same property, namely, laughter: your mouth shall be filled with laughter and your lips with a joyful cry (Job 8:21). Whereas concerning definition it must be said that, granted it may rise immortal, nevertheless the nature of mortality will not be removed from it because human nature will be there, which from itself is mortal.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, granted that the same matter makes the same in number, nevertheless it is not naked matter nor that which makes the principle in number, (The Leonine edition suggests there may be a corruption of the text here. Cf. In I Sent. 8.5.2.) but one matter, according as it is under the dimensions terminating it, that makes one in number. Hence, granted that many forms are reiterated in the matter of a rising body, nevertheless the body will rise under the same dimensions and with the same essential principles.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that Augustine says the contrary: (Augustine, Enchiridion 1.89, para. 23 (CCSL 46:96; PL 40:273); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 44, ch. 2, para. 3, p. 518 (PL 192:946).) for he says, if a statue is refashioned out of the same bronze, then it is the same in number. Still, nevertheless, it must be said that all artificial things are placed in a genus or species in two ways, because this is either through their matter or through their form. Yet natural things are placed in a genus or species only through their form; yet artificial forms, because they are accidents, are necessarily collected in a genus or species through matter, whereas natural things not, because they are substantial. Therefore, I say that if a statue were considered as it is placed in a genus or species through its matter, thus there is refashioned the same statue. Whereas if it were considered as placed in a genus or species through form, thus I say that there is not refashioned the same, but another, because other is the form of this and of that. Yet in a body it is not thus, because in a body there will be the same form.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that there are not two humanities in a body which is corrupted and which shall rise, but one, because essential principles are not changed, but remain the same.

On the sacraments of grace

Question 7

On the sacrament of confirmation

Concerning the sacraments of grace there were three questions:

first, concerning the sacrament of confirmation; (Q. 7.)

second, concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist; (Q. 8.)

third, concerning the sacrament of matrimony. (Q. 9.)

Article 1

Whether only a bishop ought to confer the sacrament of confirmation, or also another person

About the first there was a question whether only a bishop ought to confer the sacrament of confirmation, or also another person. And it seems that not only a bishop can confer this sacrament, but also any priest.

Obj. 1: For it is agreed that spiritual grace is conferred in confirmation. But the bestowal of grace of this sort is ordered such that it cannot be impeded. Yet it is agreed that it is impeded often through the absence of bishops because they are not present everywhere. Therefore, it ought to be conferred through the ministry of priests, who are present everywhere.

Obj. 2: The sacraments were instituted on account of utility. (Cf. Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 19.13 (CSEL 25:510; PL 42:355).) Therefore, they ought to be conferred in a way which applies to the utility of all. Yet it would not apply to the utility of all if only a bishop conferred this sacrament in which there is given the strength of the Holy Spirit, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 7, ch. 3, p. 278 (PL 192:855).) because not all have access to a bishop. Therefore, it ought to be done through priests, through whom all can obtain utility of this sort.

Obj. 3: It is agreed that the sacrament of baptism is greater than the sacrament of confirmation. But baptism can be conferred through any priests; therefore, much more can confirmation. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, tract. 6, ch. 3, 4:134.)

On the contrary: There is the custom of the Church.

I answer that the proper minister of the sacrament of confirmation is a bishop. And this is proven by reason and by authority.

It is proved by reason, indeed, because confirmation is done so that man might be constituted in a certain perfection, since he is given unto the strength of the Holy Spirit, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 7, ch. 3, p. 278 (PL 192:855).) namely, so that man out of this might be made strong and robust unto confessing and proposing the faith before kings and princes. (Cf. Acts 9:15.) Hence, for this reason, it is done on the forehead, so that he might not be terrified nor confounded to propose the faith before all and to defend it. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, tract. 6, ch. 1, 4:129–30; bk. 4, tract. 6, ch. 3, 4:137.) Yet, as Dionysius says, there are three actions of the hierarchy, namely, to purge, to illumine, and to perfect: to purge is proper to deacons, whereas to illumine to priests (and this especially consists in the Eucharist), whereas to perfect belongs to bishops. (Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 5.3 (PG 3:503–4); Aquinas, In IV Sent. 2.1.2.) And for this reason, all the sacraments which are conferred for perfection pertain to the bestowal of the bishop, which are the bestowal of orders, the consecration of virgins and vessels, and the sacrament of confirmation. Therefore, someone other than a bishop cannot confer the sacrament of confirmation.

This also is clear by the authority of Sacred Scripture. For confirmation takes the place of the imposition of hands. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 7.1.2, qa. 1, obj. 3.) Yet this could only be done by the Apostles. Hence hands were not imposed by Philip, who had preached the word of the Lord in Samaria, but the Apostles, who were in Jerusalem, since it had been heard that Samaria received the word of the Lord*, they sent unto them Peter and John* (Acts 8:14); and afterwards there follows: then they imposed hands upon them (Acts 8:17). Hence, since bishops take the place of the Apostles, to bishops alone is due the bestowal of the sacrament of confirmation. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 7, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 3, 4:167b; Glossa ordinaria, at Acts 8:17, 6.1067 (PL 114:446); Bede, Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles 8.14 (CCSL 121:39; PL 92:961).)

Nevertheless, we find that some things, which bestow a certain perfection, are committed to simple priests out of dispensation, such as the bestowal of the minor orders and things of this sort. This also could be done for confirmation with a dispensation. Whereas without a dispensation only a bishop should confer a sacrament of this sort.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a priest cannot confer all the sacraments in which spiritual grace is conferred. Hence, granted that in the sacrament of confirmation spiritual grace is conferred, nevertheless it does not apply to the priest, because spiritual grace is conferred in the same way as in the sacrament of order, which is reserved to bishops only, on account of the perfection in which it is constituted; and in the same way confirmation. Nor does impediment hinder this, because they can have recourse to cities in which bishops are present.

Reply Obj. 2: And through this the solution to the second is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the sacrament of baptism is greater by necessity, not by perfection. And for this reason, on account of its necessity, not only priests, but any Christian can baptize in a case of necessity and where there is not had an abundance of priests, but still with the form of the sacrament preserved. Whereas confirmation, because it is not necessary to such a degree and was constituted in a certain perfection, as has been said, is reserved to the greater, namely, to bishops. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 7, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1, 4:168a.)

Question 8

On the sacrament of the Eucharist

About the sacrament of the Eucharist there were two questions:

first, concerning those who are excluded from consecration through fornications;

second, concerning those who are excluded from participation of this sacrament through excommunication.

Article 1

Whether someone can hear the Mass of a fornicator priest without sinning mortally

About the first there was a question whether someone can hear the Mass of a fornicator priest without sinning mortally. And it seems that he cannot.

Obj. 1: For the Church has commanded under anathema that no one should hear Mass by a fornicator priest. (Gratian, Decretum, Part 1, Distinction 32, canon 5, 1:117; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 13.1.3, qa. 3, s.c.) But to act against a mandate of the Church of this sort is to sin mortally. Therefore, whoever hears Mass by such a priest sins mortally.

On the contrary: In many places throughout the world, this is endured.

I answer that about this one must consider that something is essentially evil as regards natural law, and something is evil as regards positive law. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 5, lect. 12, nn. 1016–23.)

For any priest who celebrates while in mortal sin, sins mortally. Hence, if it were certain to me that he was in mortal sin, I would sin mortally if I were to induce him to celebrate. And this is on account of the natural law itself, because this is to provoke him to mortal sin.

Yet positive law adds more: that not only if I were to lead him to celebrate, but also if I hear his Mass, I sin mortally. This indeed has been instituted for the punishment of the fornicator priest. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 13, a. 1, q. 4, 4:307b.) Nevertheless, it must be noted that this is not understood concerning any fornicator priest, but concerning public fornicators. And they are said properly to be public who by the judgment of the Church through her sentence (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 3, tit. 2, c. 10, 2:457.) are called public.

Hence, whenever someone by the judgment of the Church is called a public fornicator, no one ought to hear his Mass, otherwise he sins mortally.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if it is endured by prelates, it is not excused on account of this, because this is either on account of negligence, or on account of the wretchedness and defect of those prelates, who do not dare to correct others even though they commit many deeds needing to be corrected, or even sometimes on account of fear. Hence they are not excused on account of this.

Article 2

Whether someone sins mortally by speaking, eating, or standing with excommunicated persons

Concerning the second there was a question whether someone sins mortally by speaking, eating, or standing (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 11, q. 3, c. 26, 1:652.) with excommunicated persons. And it seems that he does.

Obj. 1: Because many masters of the decretals and great men say this. (Cf. Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de penitentia, bk. 3, tit. 33, 780–81.)

Obj. 2: To act against a precept of the Church is mortal sin. But the Church mandates that no one should speak nor eat with excommunicates. Therefore, he who does this sins mortally. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 18 H, a. 21, obj. 2, 29:798b.)

Obj. 3: A certain decretal says, where the supreme pontiff was consulted as to whether one could participate with excommunicates, that he ought not to do this even for avoiding the evil of death. And he assigns a cause of this sort: that it is mortal sin. Therefore, it seems that whoever participates with them in anything sins mortally. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 18 H, a. 21, 29:799b; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 18, p. 2, a. 1, q. 5, ad 4, 4:492–93.)

On the contrary: We see many perfect men doing this, who in no way would do this if it were mortal sin.

I answer that someone through excommunication is separated from the communion of the faithful, yet not of men, unless incidentally. For he is separated from the communion of men inasmuch as he happens to be separated from the communion of the faithful. Therefore, I say that someone can communicate or participate with an excommunicate directly and indirectly.

One communicates directly in things which belong to the faithful. He who communicates with him in this way sins mortally. And this happens in three ways: one way is if I communicate with him in divine things, such as if I pray for him or I hear Mass with him, and in other spiritual things; another way is from contempt, namely, when someone sins mortally by communicating anywhere with him in contempt of the mandate of the Church; another way is when someone participates with him in crime and cause.

Someone communicates indirectly with him in these things which belong to man, such as in word, in food, and in these things which belong simply to human intercourse. And according to this he does not sin mortally, but venially, unless he acts out of contempt, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the opinion of the decretalists is not true, because in these matters they assent and follow more the human law than the divine, although the divine law is more to be assented to than the human. And for this reason, the opinion of those who say the contrary is better. (Henry of Segusio (Hostiensis), Summa aurea, bk. 5, “De sententia excommunicationis,” para. 15, 1933.)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that to communicate directly with excommunicates is contrary to the precept of the Church and is mortal sin. But if indirectly, it is not contrary but beyond the precept of the Church, and this is not mortal sin, but venial. Hence it must be known that certain things are evil essentially, and these cannot be done without sin, such as to communicate with an excommunicate in these things which are of an excommunicate, and for this reason, it cannot be done without sin. Whereas certain things are occasions of evils only, and those can be done without mortal sin, such as to speak or to eat with excommunicates.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that not only ought someone to undergo death before sinning mortally, but even before sinning venially, because sin, inasmuch as it is sin, is never desirable. For if it were desirable, it would never be sin, and thus I would not sin if I were to do it. And for this reason, it is not concluded on account of this that we must not participate with them because it is mortal sin and that he who does this sins mortally. For even if it were venial, we must not participate with them, and, nevertheless, he would not sin mortally if he were to participate.

Or it must be said that that decretal is understood concerning those who communicate directly with excommunicates. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 18.2.4, qa. 3, ad 1.)

Question 9

On the sacrament of matrimony

About the sacrament of matrimony there were two questions:

first, concerning those rendered impotent by spells;

second, concerning the feeble.

Article 1

On those rendered impotent by spells

About the first there was a question whether being rendered impotent by spells impedes matrimony. And it was shown that it does not.

Obj. 1: Because the work of God is stronger than the work of the devil. But matrimony is a work of God, whereas bewitchment a work of the devil. Therefore, matrimony is stronger than bewitchment. Therefore, marriage is not impeded through it. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 34 C, a. 8, obj. 4, 30:336b.)

On the contrary: Greater is the power of a demon than the power of man. (Aquinas, In IV Sent. 34.1.3, s.c. 2; Commentary on Job, ch. 41, lect. 2, n. 565.) But man can impede matrimony. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 2, fund. 5, 4:772a; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 34.1.3, s.c. 2.) Therefore, so too can a demon.

I answer that matrimony is as it were a certain pact, (Augustine, On the Good of Marriage 4 (PL 40:376; CSEL 41:192); Gratian, Decretum, C. 32, q. 5, c. 14, 1:1136.) for through matrimony one hands over the power of his body to another unto carnal union. Yet it is agreed that a pact concerning the impossible is null, since no one can obligate himself unto the impossible. For this reason, when someone obligates himself through matrimony unto carnal union, the matrimony is null if this is impossible for him. But it must be noted that impossibility of carnal union arising from some impediment can be considered in two ways, because either that impediment is supervening on a matrimony already consummated, or preceding. If, indeed, it is supervening, then an already consummated matrimony is never dissolved. Whereas if the impediment precedes, then a matrimony not yet consummated is dissolved. Likewise, note that impediments of this sort are either perpetual or for a time. If, indeed, they are perpetual, then that matrimony is impeded absolutely; whereas if they are temporary, then the matrimony is not impeded absolutely, but for a time, provided that the impediment of either person preceded.

Yet concerning bewitchment it must be known that certain men say that bewitchment is nothing. (Al-Kindi, De radiis, ed. M. T. D’Alverny, and F. Hudry, Middle Ages Doctrinal and Literary History Archives 41 (1974): cc. 7–9, pp. 139–260; cf. SCG III.104; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 2, 4:772b.) But this is because of their infidelity, since these men believe that demons are only in the imagination of men, namely, inasmuch as men imagined them, they were struck, terrified by this imagination. (Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 34, a. 2, q. 2, 4:772b; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 34.1.3; Al-Kindi, De radiis, ch. 9, p. 257.) Yet the Catholic faith believes that demons are something and can harm their activities and impede carnal union.

And for this reason, impediments of this sort, if they precede and are perpetual, as has been said, impede matrimony absolutely.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that even the devil is a work of God, not only matrimony, and among the works of God one is stronger than another and one is impeded through another more strong. Hence, since the devil is stronger than matrimony, nothing prohibits matrimony from being impeded through him.

Article 2

On the feeble

About the second there was a question whether feebleness impedes matrimony. And it seems that not.

Obj. 1: Because the elderly are feeble, and, nevertheless, they contract matrimony. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 34 B, a. 4, obj. 2, 30:331a; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 34.1.2, obj. 3.)

On the contrary: No one obligates himself to the impossible. But it is impossible for the feeble to unite carnally with someone. Therefore, if they obligate themselves to this, a pact of this sort is null. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 34.1.2, s.c. 2.)

I answer that feebleness impedes matrimony for the same reason as bewitchment, since there is the same impossibility in each. Still, nevertheless, the feeble and those rendered impotent by spells differ: the feeble person is completely impotent and as regards all persons, whereas the one rendered impotent by spells is indeed impotent, nevertheless not as regards all, but as regards one woman only. For bewitchment consists in the imagination of a man with respect to one woman, namely, inasmuch as from the activity of a demon there is made for him the horror and abomination of some woman, whom on account of horror he flees and rejects.

And for this reason, feebleness impedes in one way and bewitchment in another way. For feebleness impedes someone such that it is necessary for him to remain without any hope of contracting, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 34.1.2; Gratian, Decretum, C. 17, q. 4, c. 24; C. 31, q. 1, c. 6, 1:821; 1110.) if he is impeded from one (hence, if at some time he is made potent, it is necessary to reintegrate the first matrimony). (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 15, c. 5, 2:706; William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, tract. 17, ch. 5, q. 3, 4:443.) Hence feebleness dissolves what has been contracted and destroys what may yet be contracted. Whereas the one rendered impotent by spells is impeded as regards this woman only (hence he has permission to marry another, and similarly does the woman). Hence bewitchment dissolves what has been contracted, but does not destroy what may yet be contracted, (Cf. Hostiensis, Summa aurea, bk. 4, “De frigidis et maleficiatis,” para. 9, 1368–69.) as has been said above. (Cf. above: q. 9, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the elderly are feeble not indeed unto the act of generation, but unto the generation of offspring, and for this reason, since they can be united carnally, the matrimony is not dissolved. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 34 B, a. 4, ad 2, 30:332a; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 34.1.2, ad 3.) Whereas the feebleness which entirely impedes carnal union dissolves the matrimony, as has been said.

About the manner of human life

Question 10

Regarding the relationship to a neighbor

About the manner of human life there were asked:

certain things about the relationship to a neighbor; (Q. 10.)

certain things about the relationship to the things that men use. (Q. 11.)

Yet about the relationship to a neighbor, there was an inquiry concerning fraternal correction. About this, there were two questions.

Article 1

Whether someone ought to correct his neighbor or brother in public or in private

First, should someone correct his neighbor or his brother in public or in private? And it seems that he should do so secretly.

Obj. 1: Matthew 18:15: if your brother has sinned against you, go and correct him between you and him only. Therefore, it seems that a delinquent brother must be corrected secretly.

On the contrary (2): Accuse the one sinning before all (1 Tim 5:20). (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 53, ch. 2, 3:1040.)

Furthermore (3): Some constitutions require them to be corrected publicly. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 19.2.3, qa. 1, obj. 3; ST II-II.33.7, obj. 4.)

I answer that correction of this sort ought to proceed out of charity, (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Questiones antequam esset Frater, q. 28, 1:499; Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 19 E, a. 17, 29:821b.) and hence it is called fraternal correction. For this reason, it is necessary to assume the order of fraternal correction according to the order of charity. Yet the order of charity is for someone to prefer the common good to the good of his neighbor, likewise for him to will the good of his neighbor both of conscience and of reputation, and in these he wills more the good of conscience when both cannot be had.

And for this reason, with these things considered, I believe that, if there were some sin, whether carnal or spiritual, which would incline to the detriment of the multitude, it must be revealed at once, since in the order of charity, as has been said, the common good outweighs the good of a neighbor, whether it be of reputation or of conscience. Whereas when the detriment of the multitude is not feared, then someone ought to guard both, namely, the good of reputation and of conscience, by correcting secretly between himself and him. Yet if correction does not follow from this, then according to the order of the Gospel he ought to bring with himself another or even refer it to the Church. Still, nevertheless, even in this the order must be preserved, such that if the sin be public, it may be corrected publicly, whereas if secret, secretly. And for this reason, it is said: (Matthew 18:15.) if your brother has sinned against you, that is, with only you knowing, (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 53, ch. 2, 3:1040; Augustine, Sermon 82, 7.10 (PL 38:510; CCSL 41Ab:338); Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 18:15, 5.305–6 (PL 114:146–47).) namely, as regards a secret sin. Whereas regarding a public sin, it is said: accuse the one sinning, namely, publicly, before all.

Replies 1–2: And thus, the solution to the first of both parts is clear.

Reply 3: Whereas to the other it must be said that what is from the constitutions is ordered and ought to be preserved in these things which incline to the danger and detriment of the society and company. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 19.2.3, qa. 1, ad 3.)

Article 2

Whether, if someone knows a sin of his neighbor, he sins mortally by referring that at once to his prelate

Second there was a question whether, if someone knows a sin of his neighbor, he sins mortally by referring that at once to his prelate. And it seems that he does.

Obj. 1: Because to act against the order of the Gospel is mortal sin. (Matthew 18:15–17.) But to refer at once to a prelate is against the order of the Gospel. Therefore, he sins mortally.

On the contrary (2): Many perfect men do this who in no way would do this if it were mortal sin.

Furthermore (3): Prelates can exercise caution not only concerning past things, but also concerning the future. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, on Matthew 18:15, ch. 18, lect. 2, n. 1515.) And for this reason, if it is referred to them, it does not seem that it is mortal sin.

I answer that the words of the Lord which he says in Matthew 18:15–17 concerning fraternal correction must be understood just as the other words which he says pertaining to human acts, and should be preserved according to how they depend upon charity. And for this reason, I say that they must be understood always with their due circumstances, just as others.

Yet it must be known that in crimes there are three ways of proceeding according to the laws: through inquisition, and this is for public sins, and this sort of thing ought not to be done unless the clamor of the congregation should precede; (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 1, c. 21, 2:742; Genesis 18:21.) likewise, there is through denunciation and through accusation, and this is in private matters. Yet if it proceeds through accusation, then a record ought to be made by which the one accusing is obligated to make recompense. (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 1, cc. 16, 24, 2:737–38, 746; Gratian, Decretum, C. 2, q. 8, 1:503–4; C. 3, q. 9, c. 8, 1:531.) And the good of the republic is intended as the end, hence this can be done, according to will, either publicly or privately. Yet if it proceeds through denunciation, then fraternal admonition ought to precede, because the end of this is the amendment of a neighbor, and for this reason, the order of fraternal correction ought to be preserved. (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 1, cc. 16, 24, 2:737–38, 746.)

Yet whether, when someone knows that his brother has sinned, he ought to denounce him to the prelate at once, I say that in these things a distinction must be made about the conditions of the subject and of the prelate. For if I know that a brother may be corrected through me, then I ought not to denounce this to the prelate. Yet if I see that this would be done better through the prelate and that the prelate, moreover, is pious, discrete, and spiritual, not having rancor (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 19 E, a. 20, 29:825a.) or hatred against that subject, then licitly can he denounce this to him. Then he does not tell it to the Church, because he does not tell it to him as prelate, but as a person proficient for the correction and amendment of a neighbor. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 19 E, a. 20, 29:826a.)

But, because on account of diverse conditions both of the prelate and of subjects, a general judgment in this matter cannot be given, because sometimes either a prelate is moved to hatred against a subject or a subject does not bear well the words of a prelate. For this reason, this must be held as a rule: that in all these matters charity must be preserved, and that which seems to be better and more expedient. And, if he intends this, namely, the amendment of his neighbor, and he preserves as much as he can the good of charity, then by denouncing he does not sin. Whereas if he denounces this to any person out of malice, and so that his neighbor might be confounded or oppressed, then the one denouncing or accusing sins mortally.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if someone at once refers it to a prelate, applying due circumstances and considering this to be more expedient, he does not act against a precept of the Gospel, because he does not say this to the Church but to a proficient person, as has been said. And for this reason, he does not sin mortally.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that even perfect men would sin mortally if by denouncing to the prelate or to any person they would intend something which is against the intention of a precept.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, if someone refers the fault of his neighbor to the prelate, intending either caution unto the future or something of this sort which he sees to be expedient for the amending of his neighbor, (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 19 E, a. 20, 29:826a.) he does not sin. Yet if he says this, whether to the prelate or to some friend of his, out of malice, then he sins mortally. But if he says this out of some incaution, nevertheless such that there might not come forth from thence something either of infamy or of blame for his delinquent neighbor, then he does not sin mortally, although he acts incautiously.

Question 11

Regarding the relationship to things men use <*missing text*>

<Question 11, regarding the relationship to the things which men use, *is missing*.>