On Angels

Question 2

Regarding the composition of angels

Then there were questions concerning angels.

And first, regarding their composition; (Q. 2.)

second, regarding the time of their motion. (Q. 3.)

About the first there were two questions:

first, whether an angel is substantially composed of essence and existence;

second, whether supposit and nature are different in an angel.

Article 1

Whether an angel is substantially composed of essence and existence

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that an angel is not composed substantially of essence and existence.

Obj. 1: For the essence of an angel is the angel itself, because the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing 5.5, 274; cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 26.1.1, ad 3.) If, therefore, an angel were composed of essence and existence, it would be composed of its own self and another; yet this is unfitting. Therefore, it is not substantially composed of essence and existence.

Obj. 2: No accident enters into the substantial composition of a substance. But the existence of an angel is an accident, for in the book On the Trinity, Hilary attributed, as proper to God, that existence is not an accident for him, but subsisting truth. (Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity 7.11 (CCSL 62:271; PL 10:208); cf. SCG I.22.) Therefore, an angel is not essentially composed of essence and existence.

On the contrary, the commentary on the Book of Causes says that an intelligence (which we call an angel) has essence and existence. (Book of Causes, prop. 8 (9), para. 90.)

I answer that something is predicated of something in two ways: in one way, essentially; in another way. through participation. For light is predicated of an illuminated body by participation, but, if there were some separate light, it would be predicated of it essentially. According to this, therefore, it must be said that existence is predicated essentially of God alone since to be divine is to be subsisting and absolute. Yet it is predicated of any creature through participation: for no creature is its own existence, but is a thing that has existence. So too, God is called good essentially because he is goodness itself, yet creatures are called good through participation because they have goodness. For each thing, inasmuch as it is, is good, according to that line of Augustine in the first book of On Christian Doctrine, that inasmuch as we are, we are good. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1.32, para. 35 (CCSL 32:26; PL 34:32).) Yet whenever something is predicated of another through participation, it is necessary for something to be there besides that in which it participates, and for this reason, in any creature the creature itself which has existence is one thing, and its existence itself is another. And this is what Boethius says in the book De Hebdomads, that in everything besides the First, existence is one thing and that which it is, is another. (Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, Hebdomads, axioms 7–8, lines 45–47 (PL 64:1311).)

But it must be known that there are two ways to participate in something. One way is to participate in it as something included in the substance of thing, just as a species participates in a genus. Yet a creature does not participate in existence in this way. For the substance of a thing includes that which is in its definition. But existence is not in the definition of a creature, since existence is neither genus nor difference. Hence a creature participates in existence as something not arising from the essence of a thing. And for this reason, “whether it is” is one question and “what it is” is another. Hence, since everything which is outside the essence of a thing is called an accident, existence, which pertains to the question “whether it is,” is an accident.

And for this reason, the Commentator says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics that that proposition, “Socrates is,” concerns accidental predication, according to how it indicates the entity of a thing or the truth of a proposition; but it is true that this name “being,” according to how it indicates the thing to which existence of this sort applies, thus signifies the essence of the thing, and it is divided through ten genera. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 5, comm. 14 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 8, f. 117rb).) Nevertheless, not univocally, because existence does not apply to all by the same intelligible notion, but indeed to substance through itself, while to others otherwise.

Thus, therefore, in an angel there is composition of essence and existence. Nevertheless, there is not composition as though from the parts of substance, but from substance and that which adheres to substance.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that sometimes there remains of these things which are simultaneously joined some third thing, just as humanity is constituted of soul and body, which is man, and so man is composed of soul and body. (Cf. Aquinas, On Being and Essence, ch. 2.) Yet sometimes of these things which are simultaneously joined there does not result a third thing, but there does result a certain composed intelligible notion, just as the intelligible notion of a white man resolves into the intelligible notion of man and the intelligible notion of white. In such things something is composed of itself and another thing, just as white is composed of that which is white and of whiteness. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.6, 1031a15–1032a11.)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that existence is an accident, not as though it is itself accidental, but as the actuality of any substance. Hence also God himself, who is his own actuality, is his own existence.

Article 2

Whether in an angel supposit is one thing and nature another

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that in an angel supposit and nature are the same.

Obj. 1: For in things which are composed of matter and form, supposit and nature differ because supposit, above nature, adds individual matter to species, which cannot be in an angel if an angel is not composed of matter and form. Therefore, in an angel supposit and nature do not differ.

Obj. 2: But he said that supposit in an angel differs from nature inasmuch as a supposit is understood as having existence, yet a nature is not.

On the contrary: existence, just as it is not placed in the definition of a nature, so it would not be placed in the definition of a supposit or singular if the supposit or singular were to be defined. Therefore, supposit does not differ from nature through existence. Therefore, in no way do supposit and nature differ.

On the contrary: In all creatures, nature constitutes a supposit. But nothing constitutes itself. Therefore, in no creature are supposit and nature the same.

I answer that to understand this question it is necessary to consider what supposit is and what nature is. Nature, although it is spoken of in many ways, is, nevertheless, in one way said to be the very substance of a thing, as is said in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.4, 1015a10–11.) insofar as substance signifies the essence or quiddity of a thing or that which it is. Therefore, what “nature” signifies, in the way we speak about nature here, is what the definition signifies. Hence Boethius says, in the book On Two Natures, that nature is the specific difference informing each one. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures: A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius 1 (PL 64:1342).) For specific difference completes a definition. Supposit, however, is a singular in the genus of substance, which is called hypostasis or first substance. (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 5, 2a35–b8.)

And, because sensible substances composed of matter and form are more known to us, for this reason, let us first see how essence or nature is related to supposit in them.

Certain men say that the form of a part is the same as the form of the whole, (Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 44, a. 11, 30:561; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 7, lect. 9, nn. 1468–81; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 7, comm. 34 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 8, ff. 184r–185r).) which is called essence or nature according to the thing, but that it differs by conception only. For the form of a part is said inasmuch as it makes matter to be in act, yet the form of the whole inasmuch as it constitutes species, just as the form of man is called the soul inasmuch as it perfects the body, yet inasmuch as it constitutes the human species it is called humanity. And according to this, in things composed of matter and form, nature is part of supposit: for a supposit is an individual composed of matter and form, as has been said. (See above: q. 2, a. 2, obj. 1, s.c.)

But the aforesaid position does not seem to be true (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 7, lect. 9, n. 1468; On Being and Essence, ch. 2; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 18, a. 1, q. 3, 2:441; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 1, comm. 17; Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing 5.5.) because, as has been said, (See above: resp.) something is called nature or essence, which the definition signifies; yet definition in natural things not only signifies form, but also matter, as is said in the sixth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1, 1025b28–1026a7; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 6, text. 2 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 8, f. 145va).) Nor can it be said that matter is placed in the definition of a natural thing just as a non-existing thing concerning its essence: for it is the property of an accident for it to be defined through something which is not of its essence, namely, through its subject, and for this reason, accidents have an incomplete essence, as is said in the sixth book of the Metaphysics. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.2, 1026b21; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 6, text. 4 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 8, f. 147vb, 148va G).) Therefore, it remains that in things composed of matter and form, essence or nature is not form alone, but that composed of matter and form. (Cf. Aquinas, On Being and Essence, ch. 2; In I Sent. 8.5.2.)

It remains to be considered, therefore, since a natural supposit or individual is composed of matter and form, whether it is the same as essence or nature. And the Philosopher raises this question in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, where he inquires whether each thing is the same as its what-it-is. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.6, 1031a15–16.) And he determines that in these things which are said essentially, a thing is the same as the what-it-is of the thing, yet in these things which are said incidentally, it is not the same: for man is nothing else than what is of a man, since “man” signifies nothing else than biped animal that can walk upright. (Aristotle, Topics 1.4, 101b29–33.) But a white thing is not altogether the same as that which is what-white-is, namely, that which is signified by the name of white: (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.6, 1031a16–b3.) for white signifies nothing except a quality, as is said in the Categories, (Aristotle, Categories 5, 3b19.) while a white thing is a substance having a quality.

According to this, therefore, whatever can apply to something which is not of the character of its nature, in that lies the difference between the thing and what it is, or between supposit and nature: for the signification of nature includes not only that which is of the character of the species, while a supposit not only has these things which pertain to the character of the species, but also other things which apply to it. And for this reason, supposit is signified as a whole, yet nature or quiddity as a formal part. Yet in God alone there is not found any accident beyond his essence because his existence is his essence, as has been said, (See above: q. 2, a. 1, resp.; ad 2.) and for this reason, in God supposit and nature are altogether the same. Yet in an angel they are not altogether the same, because something applies to it beyond that which is of the character of its species, because both the existence itself of an angel is beyond its essence or nature, and because certain other things apply to it, all of which pertain to the supposit, yet not to the nature. (Aquinas seems to have provided the opposite opinion in the Disputed Question on Spiritual Creatures, a. 5, ad 9; see Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.6, 1031a28–b3; 7.14, 1039a30.)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that not only in things composed of matter and form is there found some accident beyond the essence of the species, but even in spiritual substances, which are not composed of matter and form. And for this reason, in both cases supposit is not altogether the same as nature.

Nevertheless, this happens differently in each. For something is understood as an accident beyond the character of a thing in two ways. One way is because it does not fall in the definition signifying the essence of the thing, but nevertheless is designative or determinative of any of the essential principles, just as rational applies to animal, as arising beyond its definition, and nevertheless, it is determinative of the essence of animal. Hence this is made essential for man and arising from his character. Another way is that something applies to something because it is neither in its definition nor is it determinative of any of its essential principles, just as whiteness applies to man.

Therefore, for things composed of matter and form, something applies arising beyond the character of the species in each way. For although it is the character of the human species that it is composed of soul and body, the determination of body and soul is beyond the character of the species, and there it applies to a man, inasmuch as he is a man, for him to be of this particular soul and body. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1034a5–7.) But this applies essentially to this man, from whose character it would be, if it were to be defined, that he is this particular soul and body, just as it is of the character of common man for him to be of soul and body. Many other things beyond the character of the species which are not determinative of the essential principles are also accidental to things composed of matter and form.

For immaterial created substances there applies, indeed, some things beyond the character of the species which are not determinative of essential principles, as has been said. Nevertheless, there do not apply to any things which are determinative of the essence of the species, because the nature itself of the species is not individuated through matter but through itself only, from this: that such a form is not born to be received in some matter. Hence through itself only it is not able to be multiplied nor is it predicable of many. But because it is not its own existence, something applies to it beyond the character of its species, namely, existence itself, and certain other things which are attributed to the supposit and not to the nature. On account of this, supposit in them is not altogether the same as nature.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that not everything which applies to something beyond the character of its species is determinative of its very essence such that it is necessary that that should be placed in its character, as has been said. For this reason, although existence itself is not of the character of the supposit, because, nevertheless, it pertains to the supposit and is not from the character of the nature, it is clear that supposit and nature are not altogether the same in cases in which the thing is not its own existence.

Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that nature is said to constitute a supposit even in things composed of matter and form, not because nature is one thing and supposit another thing (for this would be according to the opinion of those who say the nature of a species is only formed, (Cf. above: resp.; Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 44, a. 11, 30:561; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 7, lect. 9, nn. 1468–81; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 7, comm. 34 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 8, ff. 184r–185r).) which constitutes the supposit as a whole), but because according to the mode of signifying, nature is signified as a part, for the reason said above, whereas supposit as a whole: nature is signified as constituting, and supposit as constituted.

Question 3

Regarding the time of angels

Article 1

On the time through which God moves a spiritual creature

Then there was a question concerning the time through which God moves a spiritual creature according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.20–26 (CSEL 28:258–65; PL 34:388–92).) namely, whether it is the same as the time which measures the motion of bodily things. And it seems that this is the case.

Obj. 1: Since neither Augustine (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.20–26 (CSEL 28:258–65; PL 34:388–92).) nor any philosopher distinguish these times, it seems vain to distinguish these times.

Obj. 2: Everything which is, inasmuch as it is, is one. (Cf. Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures 4 (PL 64:1346).) If, therefore, there is not one time, but diverse times, it would not be one being, which is unfitting. It is necessary, therefore, to posit one time only.

On the contrary (1): The time by which bodily motions are measured is the number of the motion of the first heaven, according to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Physics. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 4.14, 223b21–23; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4, text. 133 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 4, f. 204rb E–F).) But the time through which angels are moved does not have any relation to motion. Therefore, that time is different than the time of bodily things.

Furthermore (2): To the perpetual and the corruptible, nothing is common except according to name, as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b26–1059a14; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 10, comm. 26 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 8, f. 276va G–E, 277ra A–B).) But angels are perpetual, while bodies are corruptible. Therefore, the time of each is not the same.

I answer that, just as Augustine says in the eleventh book of On the City of God: there would not have been times unless a creature were made, which changed something by some motion, of whose change when one thing and another, which cannot be simultaneously, cede and succeed . . . there follows time. (Augustine, City of God 11.6 (CCSL 48:326; PL 41:321–22).) What the Philosopher also says in the fourth book of the Physics is understood from this, that about time it is necessary to speak according to the character of motion: for time is the number of motion according to before and after. (Aristotle, Physics 4.10–11, 218b21–219b2, particularly 219b1–2.)

Therefore, all motions which can be measured by the same measure have one time. Whereas if there are any motions which cannot be measured by the same measure, it is necessary for their time to be diverse. Yet since a measure is homogenous with the thing measured, as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1053a24–25; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 10, text. 4 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 8, f. 253va H); cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 41.1.1, obj. 1.) it is clear that all things which are of one genus can have a common measure, yet not those things which are of diverse genera. Yet all continuous motions accord in one genus inasmuch as they are commensurable, and for this reason, they can have one common measure: for all things are measured by the simplest of their genus, namely, by the fastest motion of the first heaven; (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1053a8–12.) hence there can be one common time of all continuous motions. This time might seem, because it is number, to be the numbering of discrete things according to genus. Yet, nevertheless, it is not number simply but the number of these continuous things, namely, of motions, which makes it continuous, just as ten said simply is something discrete, but ten lengths of cloth is something continuous. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a10–14; 4.14, 223a29–b12; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4, comm. 99, 132 (ed. Ven. 1562, vol. 4, f. 186va G).) Yet of discrete and continuous things there cannot be one common measure since they are of diverse genera inasmuch as they are measurables. And for this reason, it is necessary, if there are any non-continuous motions, for their time to be other than the time by which continuous motions are measured.

Yet it is clear that the motions of spiritual creatures, concerning which Augustine speaks, saying that a spiritual creature is moved through time and not through place, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.20–26 (CSEL 28:258–65; PL 34:388–92); cf. below: Quodlibet IX, q. 4, a. 4, s.c.) are not continuous motions, but certain discrete changes. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.20 (CSEL 28:259; PL 34:388); cf. above: Quodlibet I, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1.) For he says that through time a mind is moved either by recalling what it had forgotten, or by learning what it did not know, or by willing what it did not will. Hence it is clear, since time does not have continuity except from motion, that such a time is not continuous and that it is other than the time of bodily things.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that Augustine makes the difference of times understood from this difference of motions.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that something is one in the way it is also said to be: for that which is said to be according to the community of a genus is one in genus, and that which is said to be according to species is one in species, yet not one in number. Hence it does not follow, if there are many men, that man does not exist. And similarly, it does not follow, if there are many times, that time does not exist.