On Man

Regarding virtues

Question 4

Virtues pertaining to divine things

Then there were questions concerning man:

and first, regarding virtues; (Qq. 4–5.)

second, regarding sins; (Q. 6.)

third, regarding punishments. (Qq. 7–8.)

About virtues there were questions regarding divine things, (Q. 4.)

and regarding human things. (Q. 5.)

Regarding divine things, there were three questions:

first, about faith, whether someone is bound to believe Christ even with him not doing visible miracles;

second, about the sacrament of faith, whether the children of the Jews should be baptized with their parents unwilling;

third, about the tithes which are due to the ministers of the sacraments, whether someone by reason of custom can be excused not to pay tithes.

Article 1

About faith

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that men are not bound to believe Christ with him not doing visible miracles.

Obj. 1: For whoever does not do that to which he is held, sins. But if men were not to believe in Christ not doing miracles, they would not sin: for he himself says in John 15:24: if I would not have done the works amongst them which no other did, they would not have sin; and he speaks concerning the sin of infidelity, (Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of John, on John 5:36, ch. 5, lect. 6, n. 814; on John 15:22, ch. 15, lect. 5, nn. 2045–50.) according to Augustine. (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 89.1–4, 91.1 (CCSL 36:548–553; PL 35:1856–60).) Therefore, men would not be held to believe Christ if he were not to have done miracles.

Obj. 2: No one can change the law except the bearer of the law or one superior to him. But Christ preached certain things which seemed to pertain to the abolition of the Old Law, such as that foods did not befoul man and that it was licit to work on the sabbath. Therefore, unless he had proven himself to be the bearer of the law, he would not have had to be believed. But this could not be done except through miracles, since many miracles preceded the bearer of the Law. Therefore, Christ would not have had to be believed unless he had done miracles.

On the contrary (3): Men are more obligated to believe the first truth than to believe visible signs. But although Christ had not done miracles, nevertheless he himself existing as true God was the first truth. Therefore, even if he had not done miracles, he would still have had to be believed.

Furthermore (4): The grace of union is greater than sanctifying grace through adoption. But miracles did not sufficiently prove sanctifying grace because, as is said in Matthew 7:22, to these who say to Christ in judgment: Lord, . . . in your name we did many mighty works, the response will be made: I did not know you. Therefore, much less do miracles suffice to prove the grace of union. If, therefore, without miracles men would not have been held to believe Christ, neither even with miracles done were they held to believe him saying that he is God, which is clearly false.

I answer that no one is held to what is above his powers except through the manner made possible for him. Yet to believe is above the natural power of man; hence it comes forth from a gift of God, according to that saying of the Apostle in Ephesians 2:8: by grace you were saved through faith, and this not out of yourselves, for it is a gift of God; and in Philippians 1:29, he says: to you it has been given . . . not only that you should believe unto him, but that . . . you should suffer for him. Therefore, man is held to believe because he is helped by God to believe.

Yet someone is helped by God to believe in three ways. The first way, indeed, is through an interior calling, concerning which it is said in John 6:45: everyone who hears from the Father and learns, comes unto me; and in Romans 8:30: whom he predestined, these he called. The second way is through exterior doctrine and preaching, according to that saying of the Apostle in Romans 10:17: faith out of hearing, yet hearing through the word of Christ. The third way is through exterior miracles; hence it is said in 1 Corinthians 14:22 that the signs were given for infidels, (Aquinas, In III Sent. 21.2.3, resp.) namely, so that through them they would be provoked to faith.

Yet if Christ had not done visible miracles, still there remained other means of attracting to faith by which men would be held to acquiesce. For men were held to believe the authority of the Law and the Prophets. They were held also not to resist an interior calling, just as Isaiah said concerning himself: yet the Lord has opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back (Isa 50:5); conversely, concerning certain men it is said in Acts 7:51: you always resist the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that amongst those works which Christ did among men, the interior instinct by which he attracted certain men should also be numbered, just as Gregory says in a certain homily that Christ through mercy interiorly drew the Magdalene*, who* also through clemency received her outwardly. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels 2.33.1 (PL 76:1240; CCSL 141).) There should also be numbered his doctrine since he himself even says: if I had not come and had not spoken to them, they would not have sin (John 15:22).

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that Christ could have shown himself to be the legislator not only by doing visible miracles, but also through the authority of Scripture and through an interior instinct.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the interior instinct by which Christ could have manifested himself without exterior miracles pertains to the power of the first truth, which illumines and teaches man interiorly.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that visible miracles are made by divine power for the confirmation of the truth of faith. Hence it is said in Mark 16:20 concerning the Apostles that they preached everywhere, with the Lord cooperating and confirming their sermon by subsequent signs. Yet miracles are not done always for demonstrating the grace of him through whom the miracles are done; and for this reason, it can happen that someone not having sanctifying grace should work miracles. But it cannot happen that someone announcing false doctrine should do true miracles, which cannot be done except by divine power: for thus God would be a witness of falsehood, which is impossible. (Cf. ST II-II.178.2, ad 3.) Since, therefore, Christ said that he is the Son of God and equal to God, the miracles which he did confirmed this doctrine of his. And for this reason, Christ was shown through his miracles to be God. Yet Peter, although he did the same or greater miracles, was not proven to be God. Rather, through them it was also proven that Christ was God because Peter did not preach his own self, but Jesus Christ, to be God.

Article 2

About the sacrament of faith

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the children of the Jews should be baptized against their parents’ will.

Obj. 1: For the matrimonial chain is greater than the right of parental power since the right of parental power can be dissolved through man when a son under his father’s power is emancipated, while the matrimonial chain cannot be dissolved through man, according to Matthew 19:6: that which God has joined, let man not separate. But on account of infidelity the matrimonial chain is dissolved: for the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 7:15: but if an infidel departs, let him depart: for a brother or sister is not subject by servitude in things of this sort; and a canon says that if an unfaithful spouse does not wish to cohabitate without insult of the creator, the other of the spouses should not cohabitate with that one. Therefore, so much the more is the right of parental power removed on account of infidelity. (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, Part 2, Canon 28, question 2, canon 2, 1:1090; Gratian incorrectly ascribes to Gregory the words of Pseudo-Ambrose: Ambrosiaster, Commentary on the Letter to the Corinthians, on 1 Corinthians 7:15, para. 2 (CSEL 81, 2:77; PL 17:219).) Thus, therefore, Jewish infidels do not have the right of parental power over their children. Therefore, their children can be baptized with them unwilling.

Obj. 2: Man should more be helped against the danger of eternal death than against the danger of temporal death. But if someone were to see a man in danger of temporal death and were not to offer him help, he would sin. Since, therefore, the children of the Jews and of other infidels are in danger of eternal death if they are left to their parents who form them in their infidelity, it seems that they must be removed and baptized and instructed in the faith.

Obj. 3: The children of slaves are slaves and in the power of their lords. But the Jews are the slaves of kings and princes. (Cf. Aquinas, Letter to Margaret of Flanders, a. 1; Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, tit. 20, c. 21, 2:322; P. 5, tit. 6, c. 13, 2:775.) Therefore, they are also their children. Kings, therefore, and princes have power over the children of the Jews to do what they will. Therefore, there will be no injury if they baptize them with their parents unwilling.

Obj. 4: Every man is more of God, from whom he has his soul, than of his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore, there is no injustice if the children of the Jews are removed from their carnal parents and consecrated to God through baptism.

Obj. 5: Baptism is more efficacious for salvation than preaching, because through baptism the stain of sin and the charge of punishment is at once removed, and the gate of heaven is opened. (Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 3:21, 5.737–38 (PL 114:252–53); Bede, Commentary on the Gospel of Luke (CCSL 120:83; PL 92:358); Aquinas, In II Sent. 4.2.2, qa. 6.) But if danger follows from a defect of preaching, it is imputed to him who did not preach, as is said in Ezekiel 3 and 33 concerning him who sees the sword coming and does not sound the trumpet (33:3, 6). (Cf. Ezekiel 3:18.) Therefore, if the children of the Jews are damned on account of a defect of baptism, all the more is sin imputed to those who could have baptized and did not baptize.

On the contrary: Injury must be done to no one; (Cf. below: Quodlibet III, q. 12, a. 1, resp.; ST II-II.10.12, s.c.) yet injury would be done to the Jews if their children were to be baptized with them unwilling because they would lose the right of parental power over their now faithful children. (4th Council of Toledo, canon 61.) Therefore, they must not be baptized unwillingly.

I answer that the custom of the Church has maximal authority, which always must be emulated in all things because even the very doctrine of the Catholic teachers has authority from the Church. Hence the custom of the Church must stand more than the authority of Augustine or of Jerome or of any teacher. Yet the custom of the Church never held that the children of the Jews would be baptized with their parents unwilling, although there were in times past many most powerful Catholic princes, such as Constantine, Theodosius, and many others, to whom most holy bishops were familiar acquaintances, such as Silvester to Constantine and Ambrose to Theodosius, who in no way would have omitted to beg this of them were this consonant with reason. And for this reason, it seems dangerous to introduce the assertion anew that, beyond the custom in the Church thus far observed, the children of the Jews should be baptized with their parents unwilling. And the reason for this is twofold.

One, indeed, is on account of the danger to the faith. For if the children who do not yet have the use of reason were to receive baptism, afterwards when they would arrive unto perfect age, they could be induced easily by their parents to forsake what they received ignorantly, which would tend to the detriment the faith.

Whereas the other reason is that it is repugnant to natural justice. For a son is naturally something of the father; (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 5.6, 1134b10–11; 8.12, 1161b18.) and at first, indeed, he is not distinguished from his parent according to body as long as he is contained in the womb of his mother. Whereas afterwards, after he has gone forth from the womb, before he has the use of free will, he is contained under the care of the parents just as under a certain spiritual womb. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 8.10, 1160b25; 8.11, 1161a18–19.)

For as long as a boy does not have the use of reason, he does not differ, regarding what he does, from an irrational animal. Hence just as an ox or a horse by the law of the nations or by civil law belongs to its possessor so that he might use it when he wants just as his proper instrument, so natural law holds that a son, (Cf. ST II-II.57.3.) before he has the use of reason, is under the care of his father. Hence it would be against natural justice if for a boy before he has the use of free will to be carried off from the care of his parents, or for something to be ordained concerning him with his parents unwilling.

Yet after he begins to have the use of free will, already he begins to be his own and can, regarding those things which are of divine or natural law, provide for himself, and then he must be induced unto faith, not by coercion, but by persuasion. And he can, even with his parents unwilling, consent to the faith and be baptized. Yet this should not be before he has the use of reason. Hence concerning the children of the ancient fathers it is said that they were saved in the faith of their parents, (Cf. below: Quodlibet VI, q. 3, a. 1, obj. 1; Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 1, ch. 8, p. 237 (PL 192:841).) through which it is understood that it pertains to parents to provide for their sons concerning their salvation, especially before they have the use of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that in the matrimonial chain each spouse has the use of free will, and each can, with the other unwilling, assent to the faith. But this does not apply for a boy before he has the use of reason. But after he has the use of reason, then the likeness holds if he chooses to convert.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that someone must not be rescued from temporal death against the order of civil law. For example, if someone is condemned by his judge unto death, no one should rescue him violently. Hence neither should someone violate an order of the natural law, by which a son is under the care of his father, in order to free him from the danger of eternal death.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the Jews are the slaves of princes by civil servitude, which does not exclude the order of the natural or divine law.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that man is ordered unto God through reason, through which he can know God. Hence a boy, before he has the use of reason, is ordered unto God by a natural order through the reason of his parents, to whose care he is naturally subject. And divine things must be done for the boy according to the parents’ disposition.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that the danger which follows from omitted preaching only threatens those to whom the office of preaching has been committed. Hence in Ezekiel, before: I have given you as a watchman, it is said, for the sons of Israel (Ezek 3:17). (Cf. Ezekiel 33:6–8.) Yet to provide for the children of infidels with the sacraments of salvation pertains to their parents. Hence danger threatens them on account of missing the sacraments if their children suffer the loss of salvation.

Article 3

About tithes which are due to the ministers of the sacraments

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that on account of custom some men are dispensed from the law of rendering tithes.

Obj. 1: For there is greater reason to receive tithes than not to give them. But on account of custom in some lands some soldiers receive tithes, (Alexander of Hales, Summa universis theologiae (Summa fratris Alexandri), ed. Quaracchi Fathers, 4 vols. (Rome: Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1924–1948), bk. 2, part 2, inq. 3, tract. 8, q. 3, tit. 2, ch. 4, a. 2, prob. 1, 3:803a.) and this is tolerated by the Church. Therefore, all the more are some men dispensed on account of custom such that they should not pay tithes, nor be held to pay.

On the contrary: Divine law is not abolished through desuetude. But tithes are due from divine law. Therefore, the law of rendering tithes is not abolished through desuetude. Therefore, men are held to render tithes, with contrary custom notwithstanding.

I answer that things which are from positive law are abolished through desuetude, whereas things which are from natural law or from divine law cannot be abolished by desuetude. For by no custom can it happen that it is licit to steal or to commit adultery. Therefore, for the proposed question it must be considered whether to give alms is from divine law or from human positive law.

The divine law is contained in the New Testament and the Old Testament. And indeed, there is not apparent in the New Testament any precept given for paying tithes, by which I mean in evangelical or apostolic doctrine: for that said in Matthew 23:23 concerning the paying of tithes: it was necessary to do these things, and not to omit those, and which the Pharisee says in Luke 18:12: I give tithes of all the things which I possess, seems to pertain more to the state of the Old Testament than to impose a form of observance of the New Testament. Yet in the Old Testament there were three kinds of precepts: for certain ones were moral precepts, certain judicial, certain ceremonial. Moral precepts are those which are implanted by natural reason, to which men are obligated in every time, such as honor thy father and mother; thou shalt not commit adultery; thou shalt not steal, (Exodus 20:12, 14–15.) and similar things.

Yet judicial precepts are those according to which judgments are exercised: for example, that if someone steals one sheep, he should render four. (Cf. Exodus 22:1.) And precepts of this sort are not implanted by natural reason: for natural reason does not hold that a man who steals a sheep should render four rather than three or five. But, nevertheless, a moral precept is determined through precepts of this sort: for natural reason holds that a man who steals should be punished. But that he should be punished by a particular punishment is determined through a judicial precept.

Yet ceremonial precepts of the Old Law are those which pertain to the observance of the divine cult, and they are established to symbolize some future thing, just as the immolation of the paschal lamb symbolized the slaughter of Christ.

It must be considered, therefore, whether the precept concerning paying tithes is moral or judicial or ceremonial. (William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 51, ch. 2, pp. 994–98.) For if it is moral, all men are held to it at every time, with contrary custom notwithstanding. But this does not seem to be, because natural reason does not dictate that man should give a tithe to the ministers of God rather than an eleventh or a ninth part of his fruits.

Yet if it is a judicial precept, not all would be held to give tithes, just as not all are held to judge according to the judgments written in the Old Law since those judicial precepts are specially given to that people with their conditions considered: for not all things are expedient for all men.

Yet if it is a ceremonial precept, not only would it not oblige, but if observed it would even induce unto sin: for anyone would sin if he were to immolate a paschal lamb, since, after the coming of the truth, the symbols ceased.

Therefore, it must be said, just as the ancient masters said, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, on Matthew 23:23, ch. 23, lect. 2, nn. 1869–72.) that certain precepts of the Law are purely moral, such as thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal; (Exodus 20:13, 15.) yet certain ones are purely ceremonial, such as the immolation of the paschal lamb and circumcision. Yet certain ones are in the middle, moral according to something and ceremonial according to something, just as the precept concerning the observation of the sabbath is moral regarding this: (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, 4:492–93, 593; Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 37 A, a. 2, ad 2, 28:684.) that some time should be assigned to rest for the sake of being at leisure for divine things, since natural reason supports this. But that the seventh day in particular should be assigned, this is from the determination of God on account of some symbol, and hence this is ceremonial. So too, therefore, the precept concerning paying tithes is indeed moral according to something, namely, so that those who for the whole people are at leisure for divine service are sustained by the stipends of the people, just as also those who serve the republic in other offices are sustained by the people. And this precept is proposed in the New Testament according to this manner, for the Lord says: the worker is worthy of his food (Matt 10:10), and the Apostle says, that the Lord ordained that those who announce the Gospel, should live from the Gospel, and those who serve the altar, should live from the altar (1 Cor 9:14). (Cf. Jerome, Commentary on Isaiah 5, on Isaiah 23:18 (CCSL 73:223; PL 24:212).) But regarding the determinate number of a tithe, it is not from natural law nor is it a moral precept, but it is ceremonial, inasmuch as it symbolizes something about Christ. Or it is even judicial, (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, 4:732b; ST II-II.87.1, resp.) according to its fittingness for that people, in which, since there were a multitude of ministers, there was need of such taxation for the sustenance of the ministers of God.

Thus, therefore, this common thing which is to provide for the ministers of God in the necessities of life is from divine law as a moral precept, and it is from natural law. Yet it pertains to any prince who can establish laws to determine the natural common law through positive law: (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 5, lect. 12, nn. 1023–25.) for positive law is nothing else than a determination of natural law. For example, natural law holds that an evildoer should be punished. But that he should be punished by a particular punishment is determined through positive law. Therefore, because the Church has the power of establishing law in things which pertain to the cult of God, through a statute of the Church a quantity could be taxed of those things which must be given to the ministers of God by the people, and, so that there would be a certain consonance of the New Testament and the Old Testament, the Church established that the taxation of the Old Testament would be observed even in the New. Hence everyone is held to tithes, whether they like it or not. Yet, if there were cause, the Church could decide either on a greater or lesser number: for example, that an eighth would be given or a twelfth, just as also that a tenth should be given.

It is clear, therefore, that no contrary custom absolves man from the obligation of rendering tithes, because this obligation is founded upon divine law and upon natural law. Hence men always are held to render tithes if the Church compels, with a contrary custom notwithstanding. And in lands in which there is a custom that tithes should be paid, the custom itself, as it were, demands the tithes. Hence he would sin who would not render. But in lands in which there is not a common custom for tithes to be given, and the Church does not ask, the Church seems to renounce them while she ignores them. (William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 2, p. 1004.) And for this reason, men in those lands do not sin by not giving tithes: for it would be hard to say that all the men of Italy and of the oriental parts would be damned (Henry of Segusio (Hostiensis), Summa aurea (Venice: Bernardo Guinta, 1574), bk. 3, “De decimis et primitiis,” 1102.) who do not pay tithes. And we can prove this from the Apostle, to whom when the necessities of food were due from these to whom he was preaching, nevertheless he did not receive; nor, nevertheless, did those men sin who did not give to him, otherwise he would have done evil with them by not receiving, especially since he himself says: for I have not evaded to announce to you every counsel of God (Acts 20:27). But for this reason, the Apostle did not compel what was due to himself lest there should be given some obstacle to the Gospel (1 Cor 9:12), as he himself says. Hence the rectors of churches would not do well if they were to compel tithes in those lands in which there is not a custom that they be given if they were to believe that scandal probably would arise from this.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that soldiers who receive tithes in some lands do not have the right of receiving tithes: for this right is a spiritual debt to the ministers of God; hence it does not fall to a layperson. But those temporal things which are compelled by right, are given to some soldiers by a concession of the Church on account of some services which they have done for the Church, just as also the Church can renounce the fruits themselves which are due for tithes, nevertheless she does not renounce the right of compelling tithes nor does she remove the debt of rendering. (Cf. Glossa ordinaria, in Decretum, P. 2, C. 1, q. 3, c. 13, 1:417.)

Question 5

Virtues pertaining to human things

Then there were questions which pertain to virtues in relation to human things. And about this two things were asked:

first, whether a son is held to obey his carnal parents in indifferent things;

second, whether a seller is held to inform a buyer of a fault in the thing sold.

Article 1

Whether a son is held to obey his carnal parents in indifferent things

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a son is held to obey his carnal parents in all things.

Obj. 1: For it is said in Deuteronomy 21:18–21: if man should beget a son proud and reckless, who does not listen to a command of his father or mother, . . . let the people of the city crush him with stones. But such punishment would not be inflicted unless he sinned gravely by not obeying. Therefore, sons are held to obey their carnal parents in all things.

Obj. 2: The Apostle says in Colossians 3:20: sons, obey your parents in all things.

Obj. 3: Affirmative moral precepts, although they do not oblige for all times, nevertheless it is never licit to do the contrary. But concerning the honoring of parents there is an affirmative moral precept. (Exodus 20:12.) Therefore, it is never licit to be irreverent to a parent, which would be the case if he were not to obey their command. Therefore, a son is held to obey his parents in all things.

On the contrary: Spiritual parents must be obeyed not less than carnal parents, but more, as the Apostle maintains (Heb 12:9). But subjects are not held to obey spiritual fathers in indifferent things: for religious, who profess obedience, are not held to obey their prelates except in those things which are according to the rule, as Bernard says in the book On Dispensation and Precept. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Dispensation and Precept, ch. 4, para. 10, 3:260–61; (see also PL 182:866–67); cf. Quodlibet I, q. 8, a. 1.) Therefore, neither are sons held to obey their carnal parents in indifferent things.

I answer that, since obedience is due to a prelate, the debt of obedience extends itself as far as the authority extends. Yet a carnal father has authority over his son first in regard to domestic living: for a head of a family is in a house just as a king in a kingdom. Hence, just as subjects of a king are held to obey the king in things which pertain to the governance of the kingdom, so also sons and other domestics are held to obey the head of a family in things which pertain to the disposition of the house. He has authority second in regard to the discipline of customs; hence the Apostle says: we had indeed fathers of our flesh as educators and we submitted to them (Heb 12:9). For a father owes his son not only nutrition, but also discipline, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Ethics 8.11, 1161a16–17; 8.12, 1162a6–7.) Therefore, in these things a son is held to obey his carnal father, and not in others.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that Moses speaks there about the paternal command which pertains to the discipline of customs. Hence in the same place it is said: he spurns to listen to our admonitions, he is at leisure for reveling and lust and banquets (Deut 21:20).

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the Apostle says that parents must be obeyed in all things, (Colossians 3:20.) to which the authority extends itself.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that he is not irreverent to the one commanding if he does not obey him in things which he is not held to obey.

Article 2

Whether a seller is held to inform a buyer of a fault in the thing sold

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a seller is not held to inform a buyer of a fault in the thing sold.

Obj. 1: Because, according to civil laws, (Hostiensis, Summa aurea, bk. 3, “De contrahenda emptione et venditione,” para. 7, 944.) a seller and a buyer can deceive one another. Yet there could be no deception if the seller of the thing sold were to be held to inform the buyer of the fault. Therefore, he is not held.

Obj. 2: But someone said that the laws speak not about the forum of conscience, which we are here addressing, but about the legal forum.

On the contrary: according to the Philosopher in the second book of the Ethics, the intention of the legislator is to make good citizens. Therefore, what is licit according to the laws is not contrary to virtue, and so also not contrary to conscience.

On the contrary (1): According to civil laws, if someone sells a diseased animal, he is liable in regard to the fault. (Hostiensis, Summa aurea, bk. 3, “De contrahenda emptione et venditione,” 945.) Therefore, he was held to inform the buyer of the fault.

Furthermore (2): Cicero says in the book On Duties that it is the duty of a good man to inform a buyer of something for which the thing would be sold for less. (Marcus Tullius Cicero, De officiis (On Duties), bk. 3, cc. 12–17.) Yet something of this sort is a fault in the thing sold. Therefore, a seller is held to inform a buyer of a fault in the thing sold.

I answer that some things pertain to a good man which, nevertheless, men are not held to do, just as it pertains to a good man to generously lavish his good things upon a friend even though he is not held to this. But some things pertain to a good man which he is held to do, namely, to render to someone what is just: for it is an act of justice to render to someone what is due to him. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 15.3.1, qa. 3, ad 1.) And for this reason, each seller is held to make a just sale, yet he is not held to make a generous sale for less than a just price. Yet justice is a certain equality, as is said in the fifth book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 5.1, 1129a34–b1; 5.2, 1131a13.) Therefore, it is a just sale when the price received by the seller is equal to the thing sold. It is unjust if it is not equal and he instead receives more. If, therefore, a fault of the thing sold would make the thing worth less than the price imposed by the seller, it is an unjust sale; hence he sins by hiding the fault. Yet if it does not make the thing worth less than the imposed price, perhaps because the seller put a lesser price on account of the fault, then he does not sin in keeping silent about the fault. For the sale is not unjust, and perhaps it would be ruinous to him to tell the fault because the buyer would will to have the thing for an ever lesser price than it is worth. Nevertheless, he would be acting generously if he were to despise his own loss in order to satisfy the will of another, even though he is not held to this.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that through that dictum of the law it is not licit for a simple seller to deceive a buyer or conversely. But something is said to be licit according to the law which is not punished through the law, just as a bill of divorce was licit according to the Old Law.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the precepts of the law are conducive to perfect virtue. Nevertheless, acts of perfect virtue do not fall under a precept of human law. Rather, certain graver things are prohibited so that, step-by-step, men, drawn back from evil, might cultivate the virtues themselves. But certain lesser sins are permitted, with the precepts not inflicting punishment for them, because one cannot find many men without them. One of these is the deception between buyers and sellers, because there are many who want to buy cheap and sell dear, as Augustine says in the book On the Trinity. (Augustine, On the Trinity 13.3, para. 6 (CCSL 50A:387; PL 42:1017); Cf. ST II-II.77.1, obj. 2, ad 2.)

Reply Sed Contra 1: It must be said that that must be understood when the illness of cattle makes the cattle worth less than that for which they are sold. (Cicero, On Duties 3.12–17.)

Reply Sed Contra 2: It must be said that Cicero says by that argument that a good man is not silent about a fault in a thing sold because it does not pertain to a man to deceive someone. (Cicero, On Duties 3.12–17.) Yet there is no deception if what is kept silent about regarding the thing sold does not make the thing worth less than the price received for it.

Regarding sins

Question 6

Regarding sins

Then there were questions concerning sins. And about this there were two questions:

first, whether it is a sin to desire rulership;

second, whether it is a sin for a preacher to have an eye on a temporal thing.

Article 1

Whether it is a sin to desire rulership

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is a sin to desire rulership.

Obj. 1: For it does not seem one can desire without sin something that was not in the state of integral nature but is only in the state of corrupt nature. But rulership was not in the state of integral nature. Rather, it began to be after sin, when it was said to the woman: you shall be under the power of the man. (Genesis 3:16; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 44.1, a. 3; Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 21.15, para. 22 (CCSL 143A:1082; PL 76:203).) Therefore, it is a sin to desire rulership.

Obj. 2: Our desire should be for what pertains to the state of future glory. But in the future every rulership shall cease, as a certain gloss on 1 Corinthians 15 says. (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Corinthians 15:24, 6.336 (PL 114:547); Peter Lombard, On the Letter to the Corinthians 15.24 (PL 191:1679).) Therefore, it is a sin to desire rulership.

On the contrary, it is said in 1 Timothy 5:17: those who rule well as priests, let them be considered worthy of a double honor. But it is not a sin to desire that to which honor is due, which is due only to virtue. (Aristotle, Ethics 4.3, 1123b35.) Therefore, it is not a sin to desire rulership.

I answer that Augustine solved this question in the nineteenth book of On the City of God, where he says that a superior place, without which the people cannot be ruled, although . . . it be administered as is becoming, nevertheless is desired indecently. (Augustine, City of God 19.19 (CCSL 48:687; PL 41:647); Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Timothy 3:1, 6.699–700 (PL 114:628).)

The reason for this is that he who desires rulership is either proud or unjust. For it is an injustice for someone to want to receive for himself more honor, power, or other good things of this sort unless he is worthy of greater things, as is said in the fifth book of the Ethics. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 5.2, 1131a25–26; 5.3, 1131b16–17.) Yet for someone to reckon himself more worthy of rulership than all those over whom he receives rulership belongs to pride and presumption. Hence it is clear that whoever desires rulership is either unjust or proud.

And for this reason, no one should acquire rulership by his own desire, but only by the judgment of God, according to that line of the Apostle in Hebrews 5:4: no one assumes honor for himself, but he who is called by God, just as Aaron. Nevertheless, someone licitly can desire to be worthy of rulership, or the works of a good ruler, (Cf. below: Quodlibet V, q. 11, a. 2, resp.) to which honor is due.

Reply Sed Contra: Hence the response to the last is clear.

Reply Obj. 1–2: The first two arguments do not truly contradict, for even things which were not in the state of innocence, nor will be in the state of glory, can still be desired licitly, such as being made subject, repentance, and other things of this sort. Nevertheless, there was rulership of some sort in the state of innocence, as there will also be in the state of glory, namely, that regarding the superiority of grade and regarding governance or rule, yet not that regarding compelled servitude.

Article 2

Whether it is a sin for a preacher to have an eye on temporal things

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that it is a sin for a preacher to have an eye on temporal things.

Obj. 1: For on Luke 12:31: seek first the kingdom of God, the Gloss says: that is, eternal good things; (Glossa interlinearis, at Luke 12:31, in Glossa ordinaria 5.771–72.) and all of these shall be added unto you; the Gloss also says: even to those not seeking. (Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 12:31, 5.771 (PL 114:297).) Therefore, it is not licit for a preacher to have an eye on earthly things. (Aquinas, In III Sent. 29.3, s.c. 3.)

On the contrary is that on 1 Corinthians 9:10: he who plows, ought to plow in hope, the Gloss says: of temporal stipends. (Glossa interlinearis, at 1 Corinthians 9:10, in Glossa ordinaria 6.267–68; Peter Lombard, On the Letter to the Corinthians 9.10 (PL 191:1609).) Therefore, it is licit for a preacher, concerning whom the Gloss there speaks, to have an eye on earthly things.

I answer that to have an eye on earthly things happens in two ways. In one way, such as for payment or reward, it is not licit for a preacher to have an eye on earthly things, because thus he would make the Gospel venal. There is another way, such as for stipends used for the necessary sustenance of life, and thus it is licit for a preacher to have an eye on earthly things. Hence the Gloss of Augustine on those who rule well as priests, says at 1 Timothy 5:17: it belongs to necessity to receive whence one may live; it belongs to charity to supply it; nevertheless, the Gospel is not venal that it should be preached for these things. For if they sold it thus, they would sell a great thing for cheap. Therefore, let them receive the sustenance of necessity from the people, the reward of dispensation from the Lord. (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Timothy 5:17, 6.716 (PL 114:630–31); Peter Lombard, On the Letter to Timothy 5.17 (PL 192:354).)

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Regarding punishments

Question 7

On punishments themselves

Then there were questions concerning the punishments of sins:

and first, concerning the punishments themselves; (Q. 7.)

second, concerning the remission of punishments. (Q. 8.)

About the first there were two questions:

first, whether a separated soul can be acted upon by bodily fire;

second, whether one of two people worthy of the same punishment tarries longer in purgatory than the other.

Article 1

Whether a separated soul can be acted upon by bodily fire

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a soul separated from the body cannot be acted upon by bodily fire.

Obj. 1: Because, according to the Philosopher, that which does not touch, does not act. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.1, 734a3–4, 734b10–735a4; On Generation and Corruption 1.18, 322b22–24.) But bodily fire does not touch a soul separated from the body since it does not have bodily ends, yet those things which touch one another have simultaneous ends. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.18, 323a10–11; Physics 6.1, 231a22–23.) Therefore, a separated soul cannot be acted upon by bodily fire.

Obj. 2: Things which are acted upon by another can be turned into one another. But a soul cannot be turned into bodily fire, nor conversely. Therefore, a soul cannot be acted upon by bodily fire.

Obj. 3: Bernard says that nothing burns in hell except one’s own will. (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon 3, On Resurrection, in Bernardi opera, ed. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1963), para. 3, 5:105.) But one’s own will, since it is something spiritual, cannot be the matter of bodily fire. Therefore, a soul separated from the body cannot be acted upon by bodily fire.

On the contrary, it is said in Isaiah 66:24: their fire shall not be extinguished.

I answer that to be acted upon is said in many ways. In the general way, to be acted upon is the same as to receive, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.11, 423b26–424a5.) inasmuch as sensing and understanding is a certain being acted upon. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.5, 410a25–26; 2.11, 423b31–424a1; 3.4, 429a13–14.) And in this way, a soul conjoined to the body is acted upon by bodily things through sensing and understanding. But whether a soul separated from the body can be acted upon in this way by bodily things is another question. Certain men say that a soul separated from the body, and even an angel, can receive knowledge from sensible things. (Cassiodorus, De anima 4, “De definitione animae” (CCSL 96:543; PL 70:1286); See below: Quodlibet X, q. 4, a. 2, obj. 1.) But nevertheless, even if this opinion were true, to be acted upon by sensing and understanding is to be perfected, not to be punished, unless perhaps incidentally, inasmuch as that which is sensed or understood is repugnant to the will. But to sense or understand, in and of itself, is not considered penal.

In another way, to be acted upon is properly said to be a contrariety of agent to patient, namely, as we are said to be acted upon when something comes to us which is contrary either to our nature or to our will. Infirmity and sadness are ways of being acted upon according to this.

And this being acted upon, indeed, can occur in two ways. In one way, it occurs through the reception of a contrary form, just as water is acted upon by fire inasmuch as it is heated, and consequently its natural quality is diminished. A separated soul cannot be acted upon by bodily fire in this way because it can be neither heated nor dried up nor changed according to form or any quality of bodily fire.

In another way, everything is said to be acted upon which is impeded in any way from its proper impetus or inclination, just as if we say that a falling stone is acted upon when it is impeded lest it arrive down below, and just as we say that a man is acted upon when he is detained or bound lest he go where he wills. And in this way, the soul is acted upon by bodily fire through the mode of a certain binding, as Augustine says in the twenty-first book of On the City of God. (Augustine, City of God 21.10 (CCSL 48:776; PL 41:724–25).)

For it is not contrary to nature for a spirit to be bound to a body, since we see that the soul naturally is bound to the body unto vivifying it; even demons through nigromancy are bound by the power of superior demons to some images or other things. (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul, q. 21, resp.; ST II-II.95.3, resp.; On Lots, cc. 2, 5.) Hence so much the more can spirits be bound by divine power to bodily fire, not in order to give it life, but in order to receive punishment, just as Augustine says. (Augustine, City of God 21.10 (CCSL 48:776; PL 41:724–25).)

But because what is of lesser power cannot by its power bind something of greater power, hence it is that no body can bind a spirit which is of greater power except by some superior power. And on account of this it is said that bodily fire acts unto the separated soul not by its proper power, but inasmuch as it is an instrument of vindicating divine justice. (Albert the Great, On Resurrection, tract. 2, q. 10, a. 5, sol.; In IV Sent., d. 44 F, a. 37, 30:592; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.3.3, qa. 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that fire touches the soul not, indeed, by the touch of magnitude, (Cf. below: Quodlibet XI, q. 1, a. 1, resp.) which applies to quantitative ends, but rather by contact of power: not its own power, but that which it has inasmuch as it is an instrument of divine justice.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that argument concerns the being acted upon which is through the reception of contrary form.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that one’s own will is said to burn in hell because it merits the burning.

Article 2

Whether one of two people worthy of the same punishment tarries longer in purgatory than the other

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that of two who are worthy of equal punishment, one cannot be liberated from purgatory more quickly than the other.

Obj. 1: Judgment after death belongs not to man but to God, who judges according to truth (Rom 2:2). But it would be against the truth of judgment if upon one of the two who are worthy of equal punishment there were inflicted a graver punishment for the senses than upon the other. Yet postponement of glory is a greater punishment than sharpness of the punishment for the senses because, just as Chrysostom says in his commentary on Matthew, to lack the divine vision is a greater punishment than any sensible punishment. (John Chrysostom, On Matthew, homily 23 (al. 24), para. 7, on Matthew 7:19 (PG 57:317); Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 7:19, ch. 7, lect. 8.) Therefore, one of those who are worthy of equal punishment will not suffer a greater postponement of glory than the other liberated more quickly.

Obj. 2: Evil, according to Augustine, means that which harms, yet it harms because it withdraws good. (Augustine, De moribus Ecclesiae 2.3, para. 5 (CSEL 90:91; PL 32:1346–47); Enchiridion 12, para. 4 (CCSL 46:54; PL 40:237).) Yet postponement of glory withdraws a greater good, namely, the uncreated good. Therefore, it is more evil; and thus, the same holds as before.

On the contrary (3): The Master says in the Sentences (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 45, ch. 4, p. 526 (PL 192:949).) that that man for whom many suffrages are made is liberated more quickly from the punishments of purgatory. Yet it happens that more suffrages are made for one of those who are worthy of equal punishment than for the other. Therefore, one will be liberated more quickly.

Furthermore (4): In the end of the world there will be found some men having certain sins that need cleansing whose postponement from glory will not be so long-lasting as that of those who presently bear sins that need cleansing to purgatory, since the delay between death and resurrection will be short, as Augustine says. (Augustine, City of God 20.20, para. 2 (CCSL 48:743; PL 41:689); cf. Sermon 277, 11 (PL 38:1263); Sermon 362, 17 (PL 39:1624–25).) Therefore, by the same reasoning, even now of those who bear equal sins that need cleansing, one can be deferred less from glory than another, having been liberated more quickly from punishments.

I answer that this question depends upon the power of suffrages, namely, whether suffrages made for someone prevail to liberate only him for whom they are made, or also others.

About this, some men have said that they prevail no more for that man than for others; (Namely, Praepositinus (Gilbert Prevostin of Cremona), ca. 1135–1210 AD. Cf. below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 5, a. 2, resp.; In IV Sent. 45.2.4, qa. 1; Peter Cantor, Summa de sacramentis et animae consiliis, ed. Jean-Albert Dugauquier (Louvain: Éditions Nauwelaerts, 1954), vol. 3, ch. 57, para. 357, 2b, p. 512).) nay, rather, perhaps they prevail more for others if they are better disposed to receiving the power of suffrages. And these men posit an example, just as if wax is set aflame in a house for some rich man, it illumines all dwelling in the house*, and perhaps* others more if they have clearer sight. And according to this opinion, of two who on account of equal faults are detained in purgatory, one cannot be liberated more quickly than the other.

But I do not think this opinion is true. The reason for this is that the suffrage of one prevails for another on account of two things: in one way, on account of unity of charity, because all who are in charity are as though one body, and so the good of one redounds unto all, just as a hand serves the whole body and similarly any member of the body, and according to this whatever good is done by another prevails for whomever exists in charity, according to Psalm 119 [118]:63: I am a partaker of all those fearing you and of those guarding your commandments.

It prevails in another way if through someone’s intention his act is transferred to another: for example, if someone pays some debt for another, since it is considered the same result as though that one were to have paid it for himself. Therefore, in the first way a good work prevails through the mode of merit, the root of which is charity. But in the second way the work of one prevails for another through the manner of satisfaction, just as one can satisfy for another, if he should intend this, and such valor is involved in suffrages, which are made so that men would be liberated through these from the debt of punishment.

And for this reason, it must be said that suffrages made in that way do not prevail except for those for whom they are made. And according to this, if many suffrages are made for someone, he is liberated more quickly from the punishment of purgatory than the others for whom they are not made, even if they have borne equal sins. Nevertheless, it must be granted that suffrages made for one prevail for all, namely, inasmuch as all who know rejoice out of charity over the good things which are done out of charity. And according to this it is true that for those for whom they are not made, suffrages prevail more if they are of greater charity.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that for venial sin, since it does not have as punishment the separation from God, the lack of the divine vision, speaking as such, is not due as punishment: neither absolutely, nor for a time. But it happens incidentally that they should be kept for a time from the divine vision, namely, because as long as they are worthy of some punishment they cannot participate in the highest felicity, which consists in the vision of God. Justice, nevertheless, considers punishment due as such to sin, yet not that which follows incidentally.

Reply Obj. 2: And through this the solution to the second is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: The third we concede.

Reply Obj. 4: And the fourth we similarly concede. Nevertheless, those who in the end of the world are found living will have less of sins needing cleansing, having been pre-purged by the preceding tribulations. It could also happen that the sharpness of punishment of a short time might recompense the long duration of punishment in the others.

Question 8

On the remission of punishments

Then there were questions concerning the remission of sins. And about this there were two questions:

first, whether the sin against the Holy Spirit is irremissible;

second, whether a crusader who dies before taking the journey across the seas has the full remission of sins.

Article 1

Whether the sin against the Holy Spirit is irremissible

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the sin against the Holy Spirit is not irremissible.

Obj. 1: For one is the dignity and majesty of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 43.1.1, obj. 5; Athanasian Creed (Quicumque vult in PL 28).) But sin against the Son is not irremissible: for it is said in Matthew 12:32: whoever should have said a word against the Son of man, it shall be remitted for him. Therefore, the sin against the Holy Spirit is not irremissible.

On the contrary is that in the same place it is said: he who should have said a word against the Holy Spirit, this shall not be remitted for him either in this age or in the future age. (Matthew 12:32.)

I answer that some men have spoken in three ways about the sin against the Holy Spirit.

For the teachers before Augustine understood the sin against the Holy Spirit to be blasphemy that is said against the Holy Spirit or his works, or even against the divinity of God the Father or the Son, because the Father and the Son are also spirit, according to how the name “spirit” is commonly taken: God is spirit (John 4:24). (Hilary, Jerome, Ambrose, John Chrysostom; Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 3, a. 14, resp.; Commentary on Romans, ch. 2, lect. 1; Catena Aurea on Luke, on Luke 12:10, ch. 12, lect. 3.) Yet they understood the sin against the Son of man as blasphemy against Christ according to his human nature. And in both ways the Jews sinned against Christ: for in the first way they sinned against him by attributing his miracles to the prince of demons, which he did through the Holy Spirit and by the power of his divinity. Yet in the second way they sinned against him by saying: behold a ravenous man, a drinker of wine, and a friend of publicans (Matt 11:19). Therefore, he calls this second blasphemy remissible because they had some excuse on account of the infirmity of the flesh which they saw in Christ. Whereas they call the other blasphemy irremissible because they had no excuse, seeing clear indications of the Holy Spirit and of divinity. And on account of this, according to Chrysostom, (John Chrysostom, On Matthew, homily 41 (al. 42), para. 3, on Matthew 12:31–32 (PG 57:449–50).) for those persevering in this blasphemy there was no remission either in this age or in the future age, because both in this age they were punished for it through the Romans, and in the future age they are tormented in hell.

Whereas according to Augustine, the remission of sins is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who is the charity of the Father and the Son. (Augustine, On the Word of the Lord 11 [Sermon 71, cc. 12–13, paras. 18–22] (PL 38:453–57); Retractions 1.19, para. 7 (CCSL 57:59; PL 32:616).) Therefore, a man sins or blasphemes or says a word against the Holy Spirit by heart, mouth, or work, who does this through impenitence all the way until the end of his life, such that there can be for him no remission of sins. And then it is plain that this sin against the Holy Spirit is not remitted either in this age or in the future age.

Whereas the modern teachers said that, because power is attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit, sin out of weakness is the sin against the Father, sin out of ignorance is the sin against the Son, sin out of a settled malice is the sin against the Holy Spirit. (Albert the Great, In II Sent., d. 43 A, a. 3, s.c.; Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 2, inq. 3, tract. 5, sect. 1, ch. 2, num. 645, 3:622.) Because, therefore, ignorance or weakness excuses sin either in whole or in part, they say that the sin against the Father or against the Son is remitted because either fault is totally lacking or fault is diminished. Yet malice does not excuse sin, but aggravates it, and for this reason, the sin against the Holy Spirit is not remitted either in whole or in part because it does not have in itself any aspect of pardon through which fault is diminished. And, if sometimes it is remitted, this is rather out of the mercy of God remitting, who cures even incurable sicknesses, than out of the remissibility of the sin.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Article 2

Whether a crusader who dies before taking the journey across the seas has the full remission of sins

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a crusader who dies before taking the journey has full indulgence of sins.

Obj. 1: In order for an indulgence to prevail for anyone, it is required that he be truly penitent and to have confessed, as is contained in the papal letter. (Urban II’s Letter, December 1095; cf. Historia Hierosolymitana: Mit Erläuterungen und einem Anhange, ed. Heinrich Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg: Winter, 1913); translation: A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem: 1095–1127, trans. Frances R. Ryan, ed. Harold S. Fink (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969).) But a crusader dying before taking the journey has all of these things which are required according to the form of the letter for receiving the full indulgence of sins. Therefore, he receives it fully.

Obj. 2: God alone remits sins in regard to their fault. When, therefore, the pope gives an indulgence of all sins, this must not be referred to the fault but to the whole of penances. Therefore, he who receives the cross according to the form of the papal letter will suffer no punishment for his sins, and thus he will fly off to heaven at once, having attained the full remission of sins.

On the contrary (3): Augustine says in the fifteenth book of On the Trinity that to remove the dart is not the same as to heal the wound, for the dart of sin is removed through the remission of sin, yet the wound is healed through the reformation of the image, which is done through works of satisfaction. (It is actually the fourteenth book: Augustine, On the Trinity 14.17, para. 23 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1054).) But the crusader dying before taking the journey endures no labor for the reformation of the image. Therefore, the wound is not yet healed, and thus he shall not be able to arrive unto glory at once before suffering purgatorial punishments.

Furthermore (4): Any priest uses such words: I absolve you from all your sins. If, therefore, a crusader dying were to fly off to heaven, by the same reasoning so too would any other man absolved by any priest, which is unfitting.

I answer that to clear up this question, just as has been said above, the work of one can be satisfactory for another for whom it is applied through the intention of the one doing it. Yet Christ poured out his blood for his Church and he did and endured many other things, the estimation of which is of infinite strength on account of the dignity of his person. Hence it is said in Wisdom 7:14 that infinite is the treasury of man in those. Similarly, all the other saints had the intention in what they suffered and did on account of God that it would be for the utility not only of themselves, but also of the whole Church. Therefore, that whole treasury is in the dispensation of him who is over the general Church. Hence the Lord committed the keys of the kingdom of heaven to Peter (Matt 16:19). When, therefore, the utility or necessity of the Church demands this, he who is over the Church can from that infinite treasury share with someone who through charity is a member of the Church however much from the abovementioned treasure seems opportune to him, either even to the total remission of punishments, or even to some set quantity, namely, such that the passion of Christ and of the other saints is imputed to him as if he were to suffer as much as would suffice for the remission of sin, just as happens when one makes satisfaction for another, as has been said.

Therefore, three things are required for an indulgence to prevail for someone: first, a cause pertaining to the honor of God or to the necessity or utility of the Church; second, the authority in him who acts: for the pope can do so principally, whereas others can do so inasmuch as they receive from him power either ordinary or else committed or delegated; third, there is required for that man who wishes to receive the indulgence to be in a state of charity. And these three things are designated in the papal letter: (Cf. Urban II’s Letter, December 1095.) for a fitting cause is designated in this: that there is mentioned concerning the relief of the Holy Land; whereas authority in this: that there is made mention of the authority of the apostles Peter and Paul and of the pope himself; yet the charity of the receiver in this: that it is said: to all truly penitent and having confessed. It does not say: “and to those satisfying,” because an indulgence does not excuse from contrition and confession, but takes the place of satisfaction.

It must be said, therefore, in the question proposed that, if according to the form of the papal letter an indulgence is granted to those receiving the cross for the relief of the Holy Land, the crusader at once has the indulgence even if he dies before taking the journey because thus the cause of the indulgence will not be the journey, but the vow of the journey. Yet if the form of the letter contains that the indulgence should be given to these men who have crossed beyond the sea, that man who dies before he crosses does not have the indulgence because he does not have the cause of the indulgence.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that in this last case the dying crusader lacks that which is more principal, namely, the cause of the indulgence.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that God alone remits fault through authority, but by ministry a priest also remits inasmuch as he offers the sacrament of the remission of sin, for example in baptism or penance. And nevertheless, an indulgence does not extend itself for the remission of fault because it is not sacramental. Hence it does not follow order, but jurisdiction: for even a non-priest can make an indulgence, if this is committed to him. And for this reason, the penalty is remitted totally if the cause is present, yet not if the cause is absent.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that satisfaction is both punitive, inasmuch as it is an act of vindictive justice, and also medicinal, inasmuch as it is a certain sacramental thing. An indulgence, therefore, supplies the place of satisfaction inasmuch as it is punitive, namely, because the punishment which another has endured is imputed to that one as though he himself had endured it, and for this reason, the guilt of punishment is removed. But it does not take the place of satisfaction inasmuch as it is medicinal, because there still remain the propensities unto sin left by earlier sin, for the healing of which the labor of satisfaction is necessary. And for this reason, crusaders, while they live, must be careful not to omit the works of satisfaction, inasmuch as they preserve one from future sins, even though the guilt of punishment is totally absolved. Nor for this is any labor required because the labor of the passion of Christ suffices. Yet for those dying, preservation of this sort is not necessary, but only liberation from the guilt of punishment.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that the word of the priest saying: I absolve you from all your sins are not about punishment but about fault, to the absolution of which he devotes his ministry. Yet someone cannot be absolved from one fault without being absolved from all. But punishment can be dissolved totally or particularly. Indeed, punishment is dissolved particularly in sacramental absolution, whereas totally whenever in the special grace of an indulgence, just as also the Lord says in John 8:11 to the adulterous woman: I shall not condemn you; go and do not sin any more.