On Christ

Question 1

On Christ

There were questions about Christ, (Q. 1.) angels, (Qq. 2–3.) and men. (Qq. 4–8.)

About Christ there were two questions concerning his suffering:

first, whether during the three days of death he was the same man in number;

second, whether any suffering of Christ would have sufficed for the redemption of the human race without death.

Article 1

Whether during the three days of death he was numerically the same man

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that Christ was the same man during the three days.

Obj. 1: For it is said in Matthew 12:40: just as there was Jonah in the belly of the whale for three days and three nights, so also the Son of man in the heart of the earth. (Cf. Aquinas, In III Sent. 21.2.2, obj. 5; ST III.51.4, obj. 1.) But there was not another Son of man in the heart of the earth except the Son of man who was speaking upon the earth, otherwise Christ would have been two sons. Therefore, he was the same man during the three days of death.

Obj. 2: Jonah was the same man in the belly of the whale who he had been before. But just as Jonah was in the belly of the whale, so was Christ in the heart of the earth. Therefore, Christ also was the same man.

On the contrary: With the form of a part removed, the form of the whole is removed, which results from the composition of form and matter. But in the three days of death, the soul was separated from the body of Christ. Therefore, the humanity ceased to be. Therefore, there was not the same man in number in the three days of death.

I answer that in Christ three substances were united, namely, the body, the soul, and the divinity. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 6, ch. 3, p. 52 (PL 192:768–69).) But the body and the soul were united not only into one person, but also into one nature. Yet the divinity indeed could not be united in nature either to the soul or to the body because, since it is the most perfect nature, it cannot be a part of any nature. But it was united both to the soul and to the body in person. Yet in death the soul was separated from the body, otherwise there would not have been of Christ a true death, where by definition the soul is separated from the body, which is vivified through the soul. But the divinity was not separated either from the soul or from the body, which is clear from the symbol of faith, (Apostles’ Creed, aa. 4–5; cf. Aquinas, On the Apostles’ Creed.) in which it is said of the Son of God that he was buried and descended into hell. Yet with the body lying in the sepulcher and the soul descending into hell, those would not be attributed to the Son of God unless these two were coupled to him in the unity of hypostasis or person.

For this reason, during the three days of death we can speak of Christ in two ways.

In one way, we can speak regarding the hypostasis or person, and thus he is the same in number absolutely as he was.

Or, we can speak regarding the human nature, and this in two ways.

In one way, we can speak regarding the whole nature, which is called humanity, and thus Christ was not a man during the three days of death; hence he was neither the same man nor another man, but the same hypostasis.

Or we can speak regarding the parts of human nature, and thus the soul indeed was altogether the same in number since it was not transmuted according to substance, whereas the body was the same in number according to matter, but not according to substantial form, which is the soul. Hence it cannot be said that he was absolutely the same in number, because any substantial difference excludes absolute identity. However, being animate is a substantial difference, and for this reason, to die is to be corrupted, not just to be altered. Nor again can it be said that he is absolutely not the same or other, because he is not non-identical or other according to the whole substance. It must be said, therefore, that in one respect he is the same, and in another respect not the same: for according to matter he is the same, whereas according to form not the same.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that “man” is the name of a nature, but “son” is the name of a hypostasis. For this reason, Christ can be called the Son of man rather than man during the three days of death.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that likeness is not understood there with regard to all things, but only with regard to occupation. For Christ was dead in the heart of the earth, yet not Jonah in the belly of the whale.

Article 2

Whether any suffering of Christ would have sufficed for the redemption of the human race without death

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that another suffering of Christ would not have sufficed for the redemption of the human race without death.

Obj. 1: For the Apostle says: if out of the law there is justice, therefore Christ died gratuitously (Gal 2:21), (ST III.62.6; 70.4, obj. 1.) that is, uselessly and without cause. (Jerome, Against the Pelagians 2.9, 16–17 (CCSL 80:66; PL 23:544); Peter Lombard, On the Letter to the Galatians 2.21 (PL 192:117).) But if another suffering would have sufficed, Christ would have died gratuitously. But the Apostle considers this something unfitting. Therefore, another suffering of Christ would not have sufficed for the redemption of the human race.

Obj. 2: Something is said to be bought which is procured at a just price. But a just price for the sin of the first parent, by which the human race was sold into servitude, could not be other than the life of Christ, which is worth the lives of all men which are deprived through that sin (for through the sin of the first man death entered into all, as is said in Romans 5:12). Therefore, the human race could not have been redeemed through another suffering of Christ without death.

Obj. 3: Gregory says in the third book of the Morals on the Book of Job that unless Christ had received undue death, in no way would he have freed us from due death. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 3.14 [16], para. 27 (CCSL 143:132; PL 75:613).) Therefore, another suffering would not have sufficed for the liberation of the human race without death.

Obj. 4: The Apostle says that Christ by one oblation consummated those sanctified unto eternity (Heb 10:14), (ST III.80.10, ad 1.) and for this reason, there is no place for a second oblation when he was spit upon and scourged. If, therefore, those sufferings would have sufficed, he would not have offered himself unto death; yet he offered his very self as a host to God for our sins (Eph 5:2), (Cf. Hebrews 9:14.) and this through death. Therefore, the suffering of Christ without death would not have sufficed.

On the contrary (1): Injury or suffering of someone is measured from the dignity of the person: (Aristotle, Ethics 5.5, 1132b28–30.) for a king suffers a greater injury if he is struck on the face than some private person. But the dignity of the person of Christ is infinite because he is a divine person. Therefore, any suffering of his, however tiny it be, is infinite. Therefore, any suffering of his would have sufficed for the redemption of the human race, even without death.

Furthermore (2): Bernard says that the smallest drop of the blood of Christ would have sufficed for the redemption of the human race. (The quote seems to be originally from Nicholas of Clairvoux but was expounded by Bernard. Cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermons on the Song of Songs, sermon 22, para. 7 (PL 183:881); Nicholas of Clairvoux, Sermon on the Feast of the Exaltation of the Cross (PL 144:762).) Yet any drop of the blood of Christ could have been poured out without death. Therefore, even without death he could have redeemed the human race through some suffering.

I answer that two things are required for a purchase, namely, quantity of price and its allotment for buying something. (Aquinas, Compendium theologiae, bk. 1, ch. 231.) For if someone gives a price not equal to something to be acquired, it is not said to be purchase simply speaking, but partly purchase, partly donation. For example, if someone buys a book which is worth twenty pounds for ten pounds, partly he would buy the book and partly it would be given to him; again, if he were to give an even greater price and not allot it for buying, he is not said to buy the book.

If, therefore, we speak concerning the redemption of the human race in regard to quantity of price, thus any suffering of Christ, even without death, would have sufficed for the redemption of the human race on account of the infinite dignity of his person. And thus, the last two objections hold.

Yet if we speak about allotment of price, thus it must be said that other passions of Christ have not been allotted without death for the redemption of the human race by God the Father and Christ. And this is for a threefold reason. The first, indeed, is so that the price of the redemption of the human race not only would be infinite in strength, but also would be of the same genus, namely, that it would redeem us from death through death. The second is so that the death of Christ not only would be the price of redemption, but also an example of virtue, namely, so that men would not fear to die for truth. And the Apostle assigns these two causes in Hebrews 2:14–15, saying: so that through death he would destroy him who had command of death, as regards the first, and would free those who were subject to servitude by fear of death through their whole life, as regards the second. The third is so that the death of Christ would be also a sacrament of salvation, while by the power of the death of Christ we die to sin and to carnal desires and to our own inclinations. And this cause is assigned in 1 Peter 3:18: Christ died once for our sins, the just for the unjust, so that he might offer us to God, us indeed having been made dead to the flesh, yet made alive to the spirit. (Cf. Aquinas, Compendium theologiae I.227.) And for this reason, the human race was not redeemed through another suffering without the death of Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that not without cause was the death of Christ allotted for the redemption of the human race, even though a lesser suffering could have sufficed, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that if a lesser suffering had been divinely allotted, Christ, not only by releasing his life, but even by suffering anything, would have paid a sufficient price for the redemption of the human race. This is because of the infinite dignity of the person of Christ, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 3–4: The other two objections proceed from the fact that the other sufferings of Christ had not been allotted such that through them the human race would be redeemed without the death of Christ.