On Angels

Question 3

On angels

Then there were questions concerning angels. And there were three questions about this:

first, whether in any way an angel is the cause of the rational soul;

second, whether an angel influences the human soul;

third, whether an evil angel, that is, a devil, inhabits a man substantially in every mortal sin.

Article 1

Whether in any way an angel is the cause of the rational soul

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that an angel is the cause of the rational soul.

Obj. 1: For among any things that are made equal in nature, (Book of Causes, prop. 2; Aquinas, In II Sent. 2.1.1, obj. 1; Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 5.6, 38 (CCSL 94:103; PL 63:859–62).) but such that one of them is prior to the other in the order of nature, the one which is prior is the cause of the one which is posterior. Yet soul and angel are made equal in nature: for men and angels are equal by nature, but unequal by office. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, a. 2, obj. 11; Augustine, On Free Will 3.11, 32 (CCSL 29:294; PL 32:1287).) Nevertheless, in the order of nature, an angel is prior to the human soul because it is simpler. Therefore, an angel is the cause of the rational soul.

On the contrary: The rational soul is brought into being through creation. Yet to create, since it is of infinite power, belongs to God alone. Therefore, an angel cannot be the cause of the rational soul.

I answer that it is impossible for something produced through creation to be caused by another rather than by the first cause of all things.

The reason for this, according to the Platonists, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 2, n. 296; ST II-II.45.3, ad 1.) is that as much as a cause is superior, so much does its causality extend itself unto many things. Hence effects that are common to many things must be traced to a superior cause. Yet it is clear that, in the order of essential beginnings, as much as some form is posterior, so much more is it contracted and extends itself to fewer things. Yet as much as a form is prior and nearer to the first subject, so much more is it necessary that it extends itself to many things. Therefore, it follows that posterior forms are from inferior agents, whereas prior and more common forms from superior agents; and thus, it remains that that which is the first subsisting thing in each thing is from the first cause of all things. Therefore, it is necessary for any other cause besides the first to act with a subject presupposed, which is the effect of the first cause. Therefore, no other cause can create except the first cause, which is God: for to create is to produce something with no subject presupposed. Whatever, therefore, cannot be produced into being except through creation is caused by God alone.

Yet since these are subsisting things, they either are not composed of matter and form but are forms subsisting in their own being, just as are the angels, or they are things which, although they are composed of matter and form, nevertheless their matter is not in potency except for one form, such as with the heavenly bodies: for neither of these is produced without the production of the first thing supporting them. Yet those things composed of matter and form, whose matter is potentially diverse forms, can be produced into act without the production of a first subject. Thus, in the same matter there can succeed diverse forms, and so also forms which are not things subsisting in their own being—which indeed are not said to be because they have being, but because subjects somehow have being according to them. Hence neither according to themselves are they said to be made or to be corrupted, but inasmuch as subjects are made beings in act or non-beings according to them.

Yet the rational soul is a thing subsisting in its own being, otherwise it could not have activity without the communion of its matter. Hence it remains that the rational soul can only be produced into being through creation. And thus, it is clear that an angel in no way is its cause, but God alone.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the first proposition introduced seems to include opposites: for if the soul and an angel are made equal in nature, an angel is not prior to the soul according to the order of nature, unless they are said to be made equal in nature because they accord in nature, not indeed of species, but of genus.

Yet it is not necessary, of all things which accord in the nature of genus or of species, for something which is prior to be the cause of all other things. And indeed, in the same species there cannot be one prior to another, properly speaking, by the order of nature, because species is predicated equally of all individuals, as is said in the third book of the Metaphysics. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.3, 999a12–13.) Yet in genera it is not so: for amongst species of one genus one is naturally prior and more perfect than another. Yet in individuals of one species, one is prior to another in time. But even though some individual which is prior in time should be the cause of another which is posterior, such as a father is the cause of his son, and as was touched upon in the objection, nevertheless this is not universally true. For not all more ancient things are the cause of all younger things. Similarly, it also happens that that which is prior amongst species of the same genus is the principle and cause of the others, just as local motion is the principle of other motions, and binary of other numbers, and triangle of other rectilinear figures. Nevertheless, this is not universally true: for man, who is the most perfect animal species, is not the active cause of the other species. Hence it is not necessary for an angel to be the producing cause of the soul.

Yet this reasoning proceeds according to the opinion of certain men (Aquinas, In I Sent. 43.2.1; Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 2.20.) who posit that God acts through necessity of nature, such that by one simple thing there is only one thing which is immediately the cause of the other, and thus even to the last of things. Yet we posit that God does all things through his wisdom whereby he disposes the order of things. Thus, from him the diverse grades of things are produced immediately through creation.

Article 2

Whether an angel influences the human soul

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that an angel cannot influence the human soul. (Cf. Book of Causes, prop. 4.)

Obj. 1: For of two distant things, one does not influence the other unless through some medium. But an angel and the soul are distant from one another. Since, therefore, there is not any medium available through which the angel could exert influence upon the soul, it seems that an angel cannot influence the soul.

On the contrary is that, as Dionysius says in the eighth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, men are purged, illumined, and perfected by angels. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 8.1 (PG 3:239).) But this is not done except through a certain influence. Therefore, an angel can influence a human soul.

I answer that each agent acts according to the mode of its nature. And for this reason, where the mode of the nature of a thing is unknown, it is necessary also for its mode of action to be unknown. Yet the mode of an angelic nature is unknown to us according as it is in itself: for in this life we cannot know of them what they are, but we can have some knowledge of them through the likeness of sensible things, as Dionysius says in the first and second chapters of the Celestial Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 1.3, 2 (PG 3:134–46).) Hence also we cannot know the mode of their action except through the likeness of sensible agents. Yet we find in sensible agents that that which is in act acts upon that which is in potency, and that it is necessary for the agent to be conjoined to the patient according to location through bodily contact. (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 7, a. 1.) Yet an intellectual nature is superior so much the more as it is actual, since it is more similar to God, who is pure act. Hence superior angels can act upon inferior angels and upon our souls, just as that which is in act acts upon that which is in potency; and an action of this kind is called influence. Yet what is location in bodily things is order in spiritual things: (Cf. below: Quodlibet IX, q. 4, a. 5, ad 2.) for even location is a certain order of bodily parts according to place. (Cf. Anonymous, Liber sex principiorum, 6.60, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and Bernard G. Dod, Aristoteles Latinus 1 (Bruges-Paris, 1966), 1.6–7, 48.) And for this reason, the order itself of spiritual substances to one another suffices for one to influence another. Nor is there required a bodily or local medium, because actions of this sort are beyond place and time, which are in bodily things.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Article 3

Whether an evil angel, that is, the devil, inhabits man substantially in every mortal sin

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that the devil always substantially inhabits a man whenever he sins mortally.

Obj. 1: For mortal fault opposes grace. But the Holy Spirit always inhabits a man with grace, according to 1 Corinthians 3:16: you are the temple of God, and the Spirit of God dwells in you. Therefore, an unclean spirit also always inhabits a man with mortal fault.

On the contrary is that the devil through sin inhabits a man through his own effect. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 8, ch. 5, pp. 369–70 (PL 192:669).) But not every mortal sin is from the devil, but sometimes from the flesh or the world. (Cf. Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 49 [82] (PL 42:1221; 58:999, 1051; CPG 5984).) Therefore, the devil does not always inhabit a man with mortal fault.

I answer that the devil can be understood to inhabit a man in two ways: in one way, regarding the soul; in another way, regarding the body.

Regarding the soul, the devil cannot inhabit a man substantially, because God alone can penetrate the mind; (Cf. Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 50 [83] (PL 42:1221; 58:999, 1052; CPG 5984).) nor does the devil so cause fault just as the Spirit causes grace: for the Holy Spirit works interiorly, but the devil suggests exteriorly, regarding either sense or imagination. Nevertheless, he is said to inhabit the affect of a man through the effect of evil, not only when from his suggestion sin is perpetrated, but also through every mortal sin, because by every mortal sin man is enslaved to the servitude of the devil.

But regarding the body the devil can inhabit a man substantially, just as is clear in the possessed. But this rather pertains to the character of punishment than to the character of fault. Yet the bodily punishments of this life do not always follow upon the fault of him who is punished, but sometimes upon sinners they are not inflicted and sometimes upon non-sinners they are inflicted, as is said in John 9 concerning the man born blind, (John 9:1–3.) and this is according to the incomprehensible height of the judgments of God. Hence not with every mortal fault does the devil inhabit a man substantially, even as regards the body.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.