On Men
Certain things pertaining to certain men of more excellent state
Regarding teachers
Question 4
Regarding teachers
Then there were questions concerning men;
and first, there were questions about certain things pertaining to certain men of more excellent state, namely, to teachers and religious; (Qq. 4–6.)
second, about certain things pertaining to men of inferior state, namely, laymen; (Q. 7.)
third, about certain things pertaining commonly to all men. (Qq. 8–13.)
Concerning teachers of Sacred Scripture, there were two questions:
first, whether it is licit for someone to seek for himself a license of teaching in theology;
second, whether those who hear diverse masters of theology holding contrary opinions are excused from sin if they follow the false opinions of their masters.
Article 1
Whether it is licit for someone to seek for himself a license of teaching in theology
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is licit for no one to seek for himself a license of teaching in theology.
Obj. 1: For teachers of Sacred Scripture exercise the ministry of the word of God just as prelates do. But it is not licit for someone to seek the prelacy; nay, rather, as Gregory says in his Register, ecclesiastical dignities must be conferred upon those refusing, yet must be denied to those seeking. (Gregory the Great, Register of the Epistles 7.5 (CCSL 140:448; PL 77:858–59).) Therefore, neither is it licit for someone to seek the magisterial chair to teach Sacred Scripture.
Obj. 2: Augustine says in On the City of God 19: the superior place, without which the people cannot be ruled, although it be administered as is becoming, nevertheless is desired unfittingly. (Augustine, City of God 19.19 (CCSL 48:687; PL 41:647); cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 6, a. 1, resp.) Therefore, it is also unfittingly sought. The same reason, therefore, applies to the magisterial chair, which is also a superior place.
On the contrary (3) is that Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule that the position of masters is more dangerous, yet the position of disciples is secure. (It is actually Augustine, Sermons on the Old Testament, sermon 23.1 (CCSL 41:309; PL 38:155).) But it seems to pertain to perfection for someone on account of some good to expose himself to dangers. Therefore, it seems laudable for someone to desire the magisterial chair and seek it for himself.
I answer that to answer this question it is necessary to consider a threefold difference between the magisterial chair and the pontifical chair. The first is that he who receives the magisterial chair does not receive any eminence which he did not have before, but only the opportunity of communicating the knowledge which he already had. For someone who licenses another does not give knowledge to him but the authority of teaching; whereas a man who receives the episcopal chair receives the eminence of power which before he did not have, but in no way did he differ from others in lacking it.
The second difference is that the eminence of knowledge which is required for the magisterial chair is the perfection of man according to himself. But the eminence of power which pertains to the pontifical chair belongs to a man through comparison with another.
The third difference is that a man is made fit for the pontifical chair through excellent charity. Hence the Lord, before he committed to Peter the care of his sheep, asked of him: Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these? (John 21:15). Yet a man is rendered fit for the magisterial chair from having sufficient knowledge.
With these things considered, therefore, it is clear that to desire something which pertains to the perfection of one’s own self is laudable. Hence the desire for wisdom is laudable: for it is said in Wisdom 6:21 that the desire of wisdom leads unto the perpetual kingdom. Yet the desire of power over others is vicious because, as Gregory says: to be proud is against nature, for a man to wish (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 21.15, para. 23 (CCSL 143A:1082; PL 76:203–4).) to dominate a man. Hence, if that man who gives license for the magisterial chair could give the eminence of wisdom, just as that man who promotes unto the pontifical chair gives eminence of power, then such a license would be worth seeking, even though it is, nevertheless, indecent to seek the excellence of power. Yet since a man who receives a license for the magisterial chair receives only the opportunity of communicating what he has, to seek a license of this sort, in and of itself, seems to contain no turpitude because to communicate to others knowledge which someone has is laudable and pertains to charity, according to Wisdom 7:13: which without fiction I taught and without envy I communicate; and 1 Peter 4:10: each one, just as he has received grace, administering it one to another.
Nevertheless, it can contain turpitude by reason of presumption, which would be the case if a man who is not fit for teaching were to seek the office of teaching. But this presumption is not equally in those seeking a license for teaching and in those seeking the pontificate; for someone can know with certitude that he has the knowledge whereby he is fit for teaching. Yet someone cannot know with certitude that he has the charity through which he is fit for the pastoral office. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 17.1.4; In III Sent. 23.1.2, ad 1.) And for this reason, it is always vicious to seek the pontificate, yet not always vicious to seek a license of teaching, even though it be more honorable for it to be sought through another, unless perhaps at some time for some special cause.
Reply Obj. 1–2: Through this, therefore, the response to the first two arguments is clear.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that whoever does not fear dangers seems to spurn that whose detriment the dangers can induce. And because it is laudable for a man to spurn bodily goods on account of spiritual goods, it is laudable for someone to expose himself to bodily dangers on account of spiritual goods. But to spurn spiritual goods is greatly vicious, and for this reason, for someone to expose himself to spiritual dangers must be greatly reproached. Yet spiritual dangers threaten these men who have the place of master. But a pastoral man avoids the dangers of the magisterial chair through knowledge with charity, which a man does not know himself with certitude to have; yet a magisterial man avoids the dangers of the magisterial chair through knowledge, which a man can know himself to have. Hence there is not a similar reason concerning each.
Article 2
Whether those who hear diverse masters of theology holding contrary opinions are excused from sin if they follow the false opinions of their masters
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that those who hear diverse masters holding diverse opinions are excused from the sin of error if they follow the opinions of their masters.
Obj. 1: For the Lord says: upon the seat of Moses sat the scribes and pharisees; observe and do all the things which they say to you (Matt 23:2). Much more, therefore, must those things be observed which are handed on by teachers of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, those who follow their opinions do not sin.
On the contrary is what is said in Matthew 15:14: a blind man if he should give lead to a blind man, both fall into the pit. But whoever errs is blind inasmuch as he errs. Therefore, whoever follows the opinion of an erring master falls into the pit of sin.
I answer that if indeed the diverse opinions of the teachers of Sacred Scriptures do not pertain to faith and good customs, the hearers can follow either opinion without danger. For this relates to what the Apostle says: let each one abound in his own sense (Rom 14:5).
Whereas in these things which pertain to faith and good customs, no one is excused if he follows an erroneous opinion of some master. For in such things, ignorance does not excuse, otherwise those who followed the opinion of Arius, of Nestorius, and of other heresiarchs would have been immune from sin. Nor can a hearer have an excuse on account of simplicity if in such things he follows an erroneous opinion: for in doubtful matters one must not give assent easily; nay, rather, as Augustine says in the third book of On Christian Doctrine, anyone should consult the rule of faith, which he perceived through the plainer places of the Scriptures and through the authority of the Church. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 3.2, para. 2 (CSEL 32:78; PL 34:65).) Therefore, he who assents to the opinion of some master against the clear testimony of Scripture or against that which is publicly held according to the authority of the Church cannot be excused from the vice of error.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that for this reason, it says first: upon the seat of Moses sat the scribes and Pharisees, (Matthew 23:2.) such that afterwards it adds: observe and do all the things which they say to you; (Matthew 23:3.) this should be understood concerning what pertains to the seat, and to this seat what is against faith or good customs does not pertain.
Regarding religious
Question 5
Regarding the entrance of religion
Then there were questions concerning what pertain to religious;
and first, regarding the entrance of religion; (Q. 5.)
second, regarding what befits those already living in religion. (Q. 6.)
About the first, there were four questions:
first, whether it is licit to induce youths to enter religion through the obligation of a vow or oath;
second, whether those thus obligated by vow or oath can remain in the world without sin;
third, whether it is licit to induce sinners to religion;
fourth, whether they sin who make someone swear that he will not enter religion.
Article 1
Whether it is licit to induce youths to enter religion through the obligation of a vow or oath
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is not licit to induce youths into religion by vow or oath.
Obj. 1: For it is illicit to act against a prohibition of the Church. But Innocent IV prohibited, in certain letters directed to religious, the undertaking of vows of this sort. Therefore, they sin who by vow or oath presume to obligate others to religion. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” in Antonianum 22 (1938): q. 1, 195; John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” Archivum Franciscanum historicum (AFH) 8 (1915): arg. 1, 414.)
Obj. 2: In the Liber extravagantium, “On the Regulars and Those Transferring unto Religion,” ch. 1, it is said: let no one be tonsured unless of legitimate age and free will. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 3, tit. 31, c. 1, 2:569. The Decretals of Pope Gregory IX were compiled by his Dominican chaplain, St. Raymond of Peñafort.) But when adolescents obligated by vow or oath are received into religion, they are tonsured not at a legitimate age nor by their proper will, but by necessity of the obligation of their vow or oath. Therefore, this seems to be illicit.
Obj. 3: It is more necessary for some men to be led to the Christian faith than to some religion. But no men should be induced to the Christian faith by necessity, but by will: it is said in the Decretum that not by force, but by the free will and faculty of the soul must they be persuaded that they should be converted (D. 45, canon “On the Jews”). (Gratian, Decretum, Part 1, Distinction 45, canon 5, 1:161–162; the Decretum is the collection of canon law compiled by Gratian in the 12th century. Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 1, 195; John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): arg. 35, 419.) Therefore, much less must there be imposed the necessity of a vow or oath in order for some men to be led into religion.
Obj. 4: This seems to be against the honor of religion. For the entrance of adolescents into religion is just as easy, as also their exit is easy. But religion seems to be dishonored from this: that they receive easily those who leave easily. Therefore, it seems unfitting to receive adolescents into religion. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 1, 195–96; John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): resp., 425.)
Obj. 5: Good things must not be done that evil things may come. (Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” qq. 1–2, 196, 198.) But from that good thing, that youths are induced to religion, there follow many evil things, because they apostatize and contract illegitimate nuptials and commit many other illicit things. Therefore, they must not be called into religion.
Obj. 6: In Matthew 23:15 the Lord says: woe to you scribes and Pharisees, who wander around sea and dry land in order that you may make one proselyte, and when you should have made one, you make him twice as much a son of Gehenna as yourselves. This seems to apply to the question at hand since those entering are made thus doubly sons of Gehenna: (Jerome, On Matthew 4, on Matthew 23:15 (CCSL 77:214; PL 26:170).) first, because they enter badly, namely, against the prohibition of the Church; second, because they leave badly by apostatizing. Therefore, those who induce them incur the woe of the divine curse.
Obj. 7: This seems to be against the necessity of probation. For it is said in 1 John 4:1: do not believe every spirit, but prove the spirits if they are from God. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 1, 197; ST II-II.88.9, obj. 3.) Yet it does not seem to be from God for such people to enter religion, since frequently they leave after entrance. For it is said in Acts 5:38: if this counsel and work is of men, it shall be dissolved; whereas if the counsel is of God, you shall not be able to dissolve them. Therefore, it seems that those who induce them act against God. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 2, 200; Acts 5:39; John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): arg. 14, 416–17.)
On the contrary (1): Whoever can obligate himself to the devil also can obligate himself to God. But boys can obligate themselves to the devil by sinning, as is said in the Liber extravagantium, “On the Delicts of Boys,” canon “Boys.” Therefore, they also can obligate themselves by vow or oath to serve God in religion. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 23, “De delictis puerorum,” c. 1, 2:824; cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): s.c., 420; Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 10.13 (CSEL 28:311–12; PL 34:417–18).)
Furthermore (2): In the Decretum, it is said that firm shall be the profession of virginity, out of which adult age already shall have begun to be, and those things which it is customary to be deputed unto nuptials (C. 20, q. 1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 1, c. 1, 1:843; below: Quodlibet IV, q. 12, a. 1, obj. 3.) Therefore, anyone in such an age also can be obligated to religion by vow or oath.
I answer that human acts cannot have a uniform judgment on account of the diversity of cases; nor, nevertheless, must it be judged absolutely illicit if something happens to be evil in a certain case.
Therefore, some case could happen in which to obligate or even to receive some adolescent in religion would be illicit: for example, if his inconstancy was agreed upon or believed probable, or if there were anything else of this sort which is diligently considered in well instituted religions.
Yet to say that to receive adolescents into religion is illicit is diabolical (Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 2, 200.) because in Origen’s gloss on Exodus 5:4: why do Moses and Aaron disturb the people from their works?, it says: today also, if Moses and Aaron, that is, the prophetic and priestly word, should disturb a soul unto the service of God, to go out from the world, to renounce all things which he possesses, to attend to reading and the word of God continuously, you shall hear the intimates and friends of Pharaoh saying: see how men are seduced and adolescents are perverted, and afterwards: these then were the words of Pharaoh, these also his friends speak now. (Glossa ordinaria, at Exodus 5:4, 1.530 (PL 113:199); cf. Origen, On Exodus, homily 3.3.)
It is also against the precept of Christ; for it is said in Matthew 19:13 that the little ones were offered to him in order that he would impose hands upon them and pray; yet the disciples rebuked them; yet Jesus said to them: allow the little ones and do not prohibit them to come unto me. Expounding on this, Origen says in his commentary on Matthew that the disciples of Jesus, before they learned the reasoning of justice . . . , blamed those who . . . offer children and infants to Christ; yet the Lord exhorts his disciples . . . to condescend to the utilities of the children. . . . Therefore, we ought to attend to these things lest we, as though great men . . . spurn by the estimation of more excellent wisdom, the little ones of the Church . . . , prohibiting children to come unto Jesus. (Origen, On Matthew, tract. 15, paras. 7–8 (PG 13:1270–75); cf. Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 19:14, ch. 19, lect. 4.)
If, nevertheless, the boys were so young that they did not yet have the use of reason, it would be illicit to attract them into religion without the consent of their parents. This is not because boys below the years of puberty cannot be received in religion from the consent of their parents, since, even boys in the years of infancy can be handed over by their parents to a monastery, as is said in the Decretum, Cause 20, question 1, in the canons “You added,” “Monk,” and “Whoever.” (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 1, cc. 2–4, 1:843–44.) But this dictum is because boys, as long as they have not arrived at the years of discretion, are according to natural right in the power of their parents. Hence, just as the sons of infidels must not be seized for baptism with their parents unwilling, so also they must not be given to religion. Whereas then, after they have the use of reason, they have power over themselves through free will in what concerns the salvation of their soul. Hence with their parents unwilling they can be induced both to baptism and to religion. (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 2, resp.) Yet even in infancy they are received to baptism by the will of parents from the ordination of the Apostles, as Dionysius says in the last chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, so that boys are nourished in divine things and do not have another life except contemplating divine things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 7 (PG 3:567); Dionysiaca: Recueil donnant l’ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l’Aréopage, ed. Philippe Chevallier, trans. John Sarraceno (Paris-Bruges: Desclée, de Brouwer & Cie, 1937–1951), ch. 7, 2:1473.) And for the same reason boys are offered to monasteries in the years of infancy by their parents, as has been said.
But, because this question also involves the obligation of oath and vow, it should be considered, lest this remain undiscussed, that one must proceed in such things according to the diverse condition of youths. For if they were so firm that they were not feared to recoil from the way of religious life, it would not be necessary to obligate them by oath or vow; and so too if they were so volatile that they would not be believed even to be able to be strengthened by oath or vow. But for the most part it happens that they change a simple intention easily while they observe entirely the obligation of vow or oath. Hence, when they are obligated by vow or oath to the fruits of a better life, a great benefit is provided to them. Hence Augustine says in an epistle to Armentarius and Paulinus: let it not displease you to have been vowed, nay, rather rejoice that already that is not licit for you, which would have been licit with your detriment. . . . Happy is the necessity which compels unto better things. (Augustine, Letter to Armentarius and Paulina, epistle 127.8 (CSEL 44:28; PL 33:487); cf. P. Glorieux, “Une offensive de Nicolas de Lisieux contre saint Thomas d’Aquin,” in Bulletin de litterature eclesiastique 39 (1938): 123–27; Nicolas of Lisieux, De perfectione excellencia status clericorum 1.6 (Ms. Paris Sorbonne 228, f. 222vb).)
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that Innocent, in certain letters directed to religious which begin: not only in favor, thus says: to you from the counsel of our brothers, in the power of obedience under pain of excommunication by the authority of those present we restrain most strictly lest before the year of probation has elapsed, which is especially instituted regularly unto the help of human fragility, you should presume to receive anyone unto the profession of your order or unto the renunciation of the world. (Innocent IV, Letter, “Non solum in favorem” (June 17, 1244); cf. Carlo Molari, Teologia e diritto canonico insan Tommaso d’Aquino (Rome: Facultas Theologica Pontificiae Universitatis Lateranensis, 1961), 77–80.) Yet that youths should not be received into a probationary period, or that they should not be obligated to enter by vow or oath, without prejudice to the time of probation, is never found prohibited. (Nicolas of Lisieux, De perfectione excellencia status clericorum 1.6 (Ms. Paris Sorbonne 228, f. 222ra–rb); cf. P. Glorieux, “Une offensive de Nicolas de Lisieux contre saint Thomas d’Aquin,” 123–27.)
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that legitimate age is judged by the time of puberty, as is clear through the introduced chapter: (Cf. above: s.c. 2.) for then especially man begins to have the free use of reason concerning what pertains to his salvation. Yet it must be known that there is a twofold necessity: one which excludes the will, namely, necessity of coercion, and another which is caused by a voluntary obligation and does not exclude the will, and of this sort is the obligation of an oath or vow. Hence men must not be drawn through coercion either to faith or to religion; but nothing prohibits obligating them to this by vow or oath. And concerning this necessity, Augustine speaks: happy the necessity which compels unto better things. (Augustine, Letter to Armentarius and Paulina, epistle 127.8 (CSEL 44:28; PL 33:487).)
Reply Obj. 3: And through this the solution to the third is clear.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that, in voluntary matters just as in natural things, what happens in fewer cases must not be judged easily, but rather that which happens in most cases. Yet it happens in fewer cases that those entering religion leave: for many more of those entering remain than leave, as is proven by experience.
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that, when it is said, “good things must not be done that evil things may come,” if the “that” is held causally, it is altogether true. For anyone would sin if he were to induce someone to enter religion in order that he would apostatize afterwards. Whereas if the “that” is held consecutively, thus one would have to abstain from all good things because scarcely are there any human goods from which occasionally there cannot follow some evils. Hence it is said: he who observes the wind, does not sow, and he who considers the clouds, never reaps (Eccl 11:4). Yet some good would have to be omitted on account of a consequent evil only when the consequent evil would be much more than the good and would happen as frequently. (Cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915), s.c., 420–21.) Yet the Lord did not omit to elect twelve disciples from which one was to be a devil (John 6:71), nor did the Apostles omit to elect seven deacons on account of Nicholas, who perished from them. Much less, therefore, should religious omit the salvation of many on account of a few who are found to apostatize. (Cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915), ad 14, 433.)
Reply Obj. 6: It must be said that those who enter religion obligated by oath or vow do not act against a prohibition of the Church, as has been shown. (Above: resp. ad 1–3.) Hence they are not made sons of Gehenna by entering, but sons of eternal life, which the Lord promises in Matthew 19 (Matthew 19:29.) to those forsaking temporal things on account of him. But that they are made sons of Gehenna by leaving after profession does not prejudice those receiving them, unless they were perverted by their evil examples. Hence the Lord significantly says: you make him a son of Gehenna twice as much as yourselves, (Matthew 23:15.) because, as Chrysostom says, provoked by the example of evil masters, he was made worse than his masters. (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, homily 44, on Matthew 23:15 (PG 56:883); cf. Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 23:15, ch. 23, lect. 5.)
Reply Obj. 7: It must be said that that objection tastes of the heresy of the Manichees, who lead this objection to two erroneous conclusions. First, indeed, it leads to this: that all corruptible bodies are not from God; for if, they say, they were from God, they would not be dissolved. Second, it leads to this: that charity once had is never lost, such that he who sins mortally never had grace. For if, they say, they had had grace, this would have been the work of God, and thus it would not have been dissolved. This is what the objection also intends, namely, that if anyone does not persevere in religion, that the intention concerning entering religion was not from God. (Cf. Aquinas, Sermo in sexagesima, “Exiit qui seminat” 2.2.2.) It must be known, therefore, that those words are not said to show that those things which are from God remain unto perpetuity and cannot be corrupted, but unto showing the infallibility of divine providence. For it cannot be that divine providence is deceived. Hence significantly he does not say that the “work” of God is indissoluble, but the “counsel.” Therefore, to certain men there is given a gift of grace unto present justice according to divine providence, and nevertheless there is not given to them the gift of perseverance. Yet to certain men there is given also the gift of perseverance, as is clear through Augustine in the book On the Gift of Perseverance. (Augustine, On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 22, para. 58 (PL 45:1029).)
Article 2
Whether those thus obligated by vow or oath can remain in the world without sin
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that those obligated by vow or oath to enter religion are not held to enter.
Obj. 1: For every action of Christ is our instruction. But the Lord did not impose necessity upon men, but left this to their free will. Hence he said to a certain man, as contained in Matthew 19:17, if you will to enter into life, observe the mandates; and again, if you will to be perfect, go and sell all things which you have and give to the poor; (Matthew 19:21.) and the Apostle says: yet concerning virgins I have no precept of the Lord, yet I give counsel (1 Cor 7:25). Therefore, it seems that no men are held by necessity to enter religion on account of oath or vow. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 2, 198; Bernard of Clairvaux, Instructio sacerdotis, ch. 6 (PL 184:778); Innocent III, Sermones de tempore, homily 22, “On the Solemnity of the Ascension” (PL 217:411).)
Obj. 2: No one can be obligated by oath or vow to something which causes the detriment of perfection. But such people are impeded by the observance of religion from visiting the infirm and gathering alms and other works of piety, (Cf. Thomas of York, “Manus quae contra Omnipotentem,” in Bettelorden und Weltgeistlichkeit an der Universität Paris (1920), ch. 1, 40–41.) in which the height of the Christian religion consists, as Ambrose says on 1 Timothy 4:8: piety is useful unto all things. (Ambrosiaster, Commentary on the Pauline Epistles, on 1 Timothy 4:8 (CSEL 81:275; PL 17:474); Peter Lombard, Gloss on the Letter to 1 Timothy 4:8 (PL 192:348).) Therefore, those who have sworn an oath or vowed to enter religion are not held.
Obj. 3: Prosper says in the second book of On the Contemplative Life: we ought so to abstain or to fast that we do not place ourselves under the necessity of fasting or abstaining. (Julianus Pomerius, The Contemplative Life, bk. 2, ch. 24, para. 1 (PL 59:470).) But those who are in religion abstain or fast from the necessity of a vow or obedience. Therefore, they merit less. Therefore, no one can be obligated to the state of religion by swearing an oath or by vowing.
Obj. 4: Virtue is about the difficult and the good. (Aristotle, Ethics 2.3, 1105a9–10; cf. Albert the Great, Summa theologiae 2, q. 103, membr. 1, def. 2.) But it is more difficult to live well in the world than in religion. Therefore, it is more virtuous. Therefore, someone cannot be held to the state of religion by swearing an oath or by vow.
Obj. 5: The common utility must be preferred to the private good. (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 7, q. 1, c. 35, “Scias frater,” 1:580.) But by some men entering religion, the common utility is harmed. For if all were to enter religion there would not be any to take care of the people, and so the people would remain without rectors. Therefore, they do better if they do not enter religion than if they enter.
On the contrary (1) is that which is said in Psalm 76:11 [75:12]: vow and render to the Lord your God, where the Gloss says that to vow refers to the will, but after the promise of a vow, rendering is necessarily required. (Peter Lombard, Gloss on the Psalms 75:12 (PL 191:709).) Likewise, it is said: if you have vowed anything to God, may you not delay to render; for an unfaithful and stupid promise displeases him (Eccl 5:3).
Furthermore (2): Augustine says in an epistle to Armentarius and Paulinus: because you already have vowed, you already obliged yourself; it is not licit for you to do something else; before you were liable to a vow, it was free because you were inferior, although the liberty by which it happens that that which is rendered with gain is not due must not be congratulated. (Augustine, Letter to Armentarius and Paulina, epistle 127.8 (CSEL 44:27; PL 33:487).)
I answer that it is clearly heretical to say that those who are obligated by vow or oath to enter religion are not held to enter. For whoever says something is not a sin which is against a precept of God is judged a heretic, just as whoever would say that simple fornication is not a mortal sin would be judged a heretic, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 33.1.3, qa. 2; Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 3.50.) for it is against this precept: thou shalt not commit adultery, (Exodus 20:14.) as the holy ones expound. (Augustine, Questions on the Heptateuch, bk. 2, “Questions on Exodus,” q. 71, para. 4 (CCSL 33:104–5; PL 34:421–22); Glossa ordinaria, at Exodus 20:14, 1.673–74 (PL 113:255).) Yet the precepts of the first tablet, which are ordered to the love of God, are more excellent than the precepts of the second tablet, which are ordered to the love of neighbor. Hence whoever says that something pertaining to a precept of the first tablet can be disregarded without sin is clearly a heretic. Yet since the fulfillment of a vow pertains to latria, it is clear that whoever says that a vow need not be fulfilled speaks against the first precept of the first tablet, which concerns the cult of latria having to be offered to God alone. Whereas he who says that an oath need not be fulfilled speaks against the second precept of the first tablet, which is: thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain. (Exodus 20:7.) Hence whoever says this is clearly a heretic.
This holds unless, perhaps, he says that to enter religion is illicit: for oaths or vows made about illicit things are not obligatory, according to that saying of Isidore: in evil promises rescind faith. (Isidore of Seville, Synonyms 2.58 (PL 83:858; CCSL 111B).) But this, again, is heretical, namely, to say that it is not licit to enter religion, for it is expressly against the counsels of Christ.
Hence whoever says that a man obligated by vow or oath to enter religion can remain in the world without sin is clearly a heretic if, moreover, he obstinately perseveres in this.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that necessity of vow or oath does not exclude the will, as was said above. (Above: q. 5, a. 1, ad 2.) For just as anyone is obligated by common law to observe the precepts of God, which, nevertheless, he observes voluntarily (hence also the Lord says: if you will to enter unto life, observe the mandates), (Matthew 19:17.) thus that man who has uttered an oath or a vow is obligated by a certain private obligation, and he fulfills the oath and the vow voluntarily, but such that before the oath or the vow it is licit for him to make it or not to make it (hence also the Lord said: if you will to be perfect, (Matthew 19:21.) and Paul gives counsel concerning virginity). But after the oath or vow, it is illicit not to fulfill it.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that reason contains a condemned heresy, namely, that it is better to remain in the world and to be at leisure for works of piety than to enter religion. For this is contained amongst the errors of Vigilantius, against which Jerome in his writing says that man attempts to ally the venoms of treachery to the Catholic faith, to impugn virginity, to hate purity, to declaim in the assembly of secular men against the fasting of the saints. (Jerome, Against Vigilantius, para. 1 (PL 23:340; CCSL 79C); Aquinas, An Apology for the Religious Orders, ch. 6, resp.) And afterwards disputing against the particular articles proposed by Vigilantius, he comes to that article, saying: yet that which he asserts, that they do better who use their things and gradually divide the fruits of their possessions to the poor, than those who, with their possessions sold, lavish all their things all at once, not to them by me, but by God it shall be responded: if you will to be perfect, go and sell all things which you have and give to the poor, and come, follow me. . . . He whom you praise is the second or third grade, whom we also receive, provided that we know that the first things must be preferred to the seconds and thirds. (Jerome, Against Vigilantius, para. 14 (PL 23:350–51; CCSL 79C); cf. Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 19:21, ch. 19, lect. 5; Thomas of York, “Manus quae contra Omnipotentem,” ch. 3, 48–49; Gerard of Abbeville, “Contra adversarium perfectionis christianae,” AFH 32 (1939), 2.1, 90.) And for this reason, in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, that one also is condemned with other errors when it is said: it is good to expend faculties to the poor with dispensation; it is better for the intention of following the Lord together to give and, absolved of solicitude, to be needy with Christ. (Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 3 (PL 42:1214; 58:982; CPG 5984); Thomas of York, “Manus quae contra Omnipotentem,” ch. 3, 50.) Not only is the state of religion preferred to the alms which anyone gives in the world, but also to virginity observed in the world. For Augustine says in the book On Virginity: no one, as far as I think, would be bold to prefer virginity (Augustine, On Holy Virginity 46.47 (CSEL 41:292: PL 40:424).) to a monastery.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the same work done out of a vow is more laudable and more meritorious than if it is done without a vow. This is clear since every act in itself is so much more laudable and meritorious as it proceeds from a worthier virtue, just as a work of justice, if it is done out of charity, will be more laudable. Yet it is clear that, when someone fasts without a vow, he does an act of the virtue which is abstinence, yet when he fasts fulfilling a vow, he does an act of abstinence and of latria which, since it orders us unto God, is a nobler virtue than abstinence or whatever other virtue which orders us in regard to created goods. On account of this Augustine says in the book On Virginity that nor is virginity, because it is virginity, honored, but because it is dedicated to God . . . , which he vows and observes by the continence of piety. (Augustine, On Holy Virginity 8.8 (CSEL 41:241–42; PL 40:400).) Therefore, that which Prosper says: we ought so to abstain or to fast that we do not place ourselves under the necessity of fasting or abstaining, (Julianus Pomerius, The Contemplative Life, bk. 2, ch. 24, para. 1 (PL 59:470).) must be understood concerning the necessity of coercion, which excludes the will. Hence he adds: lest already not devoted, but reluctant, we should do a voluntary thing. Yet the necessity of vow and oath does not exclude the will, as has been said. (Above: ad 1.) Yet it must be said further that, if fasting does not please that man who fasts out of a vow, but, nevertheless, the fulfillment of the vow pleases him, he merits more, other things being equal, than that man fasting whom fasting pleases according to itself, since it is more meritorious to delight in an act of latria than in an act of abstinence.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that difficulty is twofold: there is one which is from the arduousness of the work, for example to observe virginity and things of this sort, and such difficulty makes for an increase of virtue; another difficulty is from threatening impediments and dangers < . . . >, (Cf. ST II-II.184.8, ad 6.) and such a difficulty does not make for an increase of virtue, but for its diminution, since he does not seem to be prudent nor to love the good of virtue much who does not fear dangers. And such a difficulty to living well threatens those remaining in the world.
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that that was the reason of the heretic Vigilantius, as is clear through Jerome, who says in the book Against Vigilantius: monks must not be deterred from their zeal, although by you they suffer the most savage bites of viperous tongues, against whom you argue, and you say: if all should enclose themselves and should be in solitude, who shall celebrate in the churches? Who shall profit secular men? Who shall be able to exhort sinners unto virtues? For in this way if all should be fools with you, who shall be able to be wise? And virginity must not be approved. For if all should be virgins, nuptials shall not be, the human race shall perish. . . . Rare is virtue nor is it desired by many. (Jerome, Against Vigilantius, para. 15 (PL 23:351; CCSL 79C).) Therefore, fear of this sort is stupid since the good of religion is so difficult and arduous that scarcely a few enter religion in comparison of the multitude remaining in the world, just as if someone were to fear to draw water lest the river be dried up.
Article 3
Whether it is licit to induce sinners to religion
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that those who are sinners in the world must not be drawn to religion.
Obj. 1: For it is necessary to be exercised in the works of the precepts before transferring to the fulfillment of the counsels, since from the lesser one comes to the greater. (Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 2, a. 2, 200; cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915), arg. 17, ad 17, 417, 436.) But those who are sinners in the world are not exercised in the works of the precepts. Therefore, they must not be drawn or received in religion where it is necessary for the counsels to be observed.
On the contrary is that the Lord called the publican Matthew to the state of perfection (Matt 9:9); (Cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915), ad. 17, 435.) yet every action of Christ is our instruction. (Cf. above: q. 5, a. 2, obj. 1.) Therefore, we too should call and receive unto religion sinners who are in the world.
I answer that it is especially useful to sinners for them to enter religion.
For two things are necessary to sinners for salvation: first, indeed, that they should do penance concerning past sins; second, that henceforth they should abstain from sins. Yet to both of these religion labors especially.
First, the state of religion is the state of perfect penitence, such that no satisfaction can be equaled to the penitence of religious, who give both themselves and their things totally to God. Hence for no sin can a penance be imposed on a man that he should enter religion. Nevertheless, in however grave a commutation of satisfaction there is counseled the entrance of religion, as is clear where Pope Stephen induces a certain man who had killed his wife that he should enter a monastery and humbled under the hand of the abbot, should observe all things which are commanded to him, otherwise he enjoins a most grave penance upon him if he chooses to remain in the world (C. 33, q. 2, canon “To admonish”) . (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 33, q. 2, c. 8, 1:1152–54.)
Similarly, the state of religion prevails greatly unto avoiding sins. (Cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915), s.c., 421.) For it is difficult that those dwelling in the world should not be allured by things of the world. On account of which in Matthew 19, according to the exposition of Chrysostom, the Lord says that it is impossible that a rich man, namely, he who clings to his riches through love, should enter into the kingdom of heaven, but that a rich man who has riches should enter is very difficult. (Matthew 19:23–24; John Chrysostom, On Matthew, homily 63 (PG 58:605).) Hence also in Sirach 31:8 it is said: blessed the rich man who is found without stain, and he exposes a difficulty of this sort, saying: who is this? And we shall praise him. (Sirach 31:9.) On account of this Gregory also says that holy men, in order that they might abstain from illicit things, also omit licit ones. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues 4.11 (PL 77:336; SC 265:48–50).)
Hence it is manifest that they do not sin, but must be praised, who draw sinners to religion. For the Lord also says concerning himself: I have not come to call the just, but sinners, unto penance. (Luke 5:32.)
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that argument proceeds both against the character of evangelical doctrine and against the character of philosophy. Against evangelical doctrine indeed, because the evangelical counsels are given so that through them man might attain salvation more easily; hence the state of seculars is said to be more dangerous than the state of religion. Yet it is stupid to say that anyone who is weaker on account of sins which he has committed must not flee to the more secure way. It is also against philosophical doctrine, which teaches that those who are prone to vice ought to turn back to the contrary, just as those do who direct tortuous wooden beams. (Aristotle, Ethics 2.9, 1109b4–7.)
Article 4
Whether they sin who make someone swear that he will not enter religion
To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that someone without sin can bind another by swearing an oath that he will not enter religion.
Obj. 1: For that which is licit to be done is licit to swear. But it is licit for some secular man that he should never enter religion. Therefore, licitly he can swear this. Therefore, he who binds someone by such an oath does not sin, because he does not make him swear something illicit.
On the contrary: The intention of entering religion is from the Holy Spirit, as is said in the Decretum (C. 19, q. 2, canon “Two”) (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 19, q. 2, c. 2, 1:840; cf. below: q. 6, a. 3, s.c.) But to resist an instinct of the Holy Spirit is a grave sin, which Stephen reprehends the Jews in Acts 7:51, saying: you always resist the Holy Spirit. Therefore, that man who binds someone by oath to not enter religion sins gravely.
I answer that, as has been said above, (Cf. above: q. 5, a. 1, resp.) in human acts something must not be judged absolutely licit or illicit based on what happens in some particular case, but on what is for the most part, (Aristotle, Topics 2.6, 112b1–20.) just as also in natural things there is considered what is for the most part.
Yet it happens in some cases that someone without sin can bind another by oath to not enter religion: for example, if the other were bound by matrimony and wanted to enter religion without the consent of his wife, or in similar cases.
Yet speaking absolutely, to induce someone to swear an oath to not enter religion is a grave sin. For if someone were to desire to enter religion and the opportunity of time were imminent, and all other circumstances allowed, someone would sin gravely in prohibiting him from entering religion. Hence the Lord, in Matthew 23:13, threatens woe to the pharisees, who neither themselves enter into the kingdom of heaven nor allow others to enter. Yet when anyone makes someone swear an oath to not enter religion, he impedes him, inasmuch as is in him, from the entrance of religion according to whatever time and according to whatever opportune circumstance, because in the universal are included all particulars. Hence it is clear that he sins gravely.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, although it is licit to abstain from some good work, nevertheless it is illicit to place an impediment either for oneself or for another that prevents someone from proceeding in that good work, just as it is licit not to give alms to this pauper, but, nevertheless, it is illicit to bind oneself or another by an oath to not give alms to anyone.
The reason for this is that someone can omit an act of virtue without sin, since affirmative precepts which concern the acts of virtues do not always obligate. But an impediment to a good work is directly contrary to virtue, and for this reason, it falls under the prohibition of a negative precept, which always obligates. Hence all such oaths are illicit, nor must they be observed. But those who swear these are made perjurers by swearing because an oath cannot obligate a man against charity of God and neighbor.
Hence, although it is licit for someone not to enter religion, nevertheless it is illicit to place an impediment of an oath for oneself or another. For it is against perfection of life and against the counsel of Christ.
Question 6
Regarding what befits those already living in religion
Then there were three questions concerning what applies to those living in religion.
First, whether a religious, who should have nothing individually or in common, can give alms from those things given to him as alms by others;
second, whether someone living in religion, knowing that his father is oppressed by grave necessity, can leave without the license of his prelate in order to help his father;
third, whether the state of religion is more perfect than the state of parish priests and archdeacons.
Article 1
Whether a religious, who should have nothing as his own or in common, can give alms from these things given to him as alms by others
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that religious, who have nothing individually or in common, cannot give alms which profit them.
Obj. 1: For alms do not profit the giver unless they are given in the proper way. But such religious cannot give alms in the proper way: for alms should be given from one’s property, according to Tobit 4:9: if there should be much for you, bestow abundantly; yet if a little, strive that that itself should be imparted freely. Therefore, such religious, who have nothing of their own either individually or in common, cannot give alms which profit them. And if they give any alms from alms given to them, this profits those from whom they received the alms.
On the contrary: Amongst other works, the lavishing of alms is found to be especially fruitful, for it is said in Daniel 4:24: redeem your sins by alms. If, therefore, religious cannot give alms which profit them, they seem to be of worse condition than other men even in spiritual goods.
I answer that religious, although they cannot have property, can still distribute some things, whether from the fruits of common possessions or even from alms particularly gathered for them. Nor does it matter, as far as pertains to the question at hand, whether they distribute such things by the authority of their own order or by the authority of some superior prelate. Therefore, men to whom such distributions have been committed can give alms meritoriously from the goods which are committed to them, insofar as this is committed to them. And alms of this sort are meritorious both to the men who mercifully carry out the ministry, and to those for whose uses things of this sort are found to be deputed. Whereas if he is a religious to whom such distributions have not been committed, it is not licit for him to give alms.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
Article 2
Whether someone living in religion, knowing that his father is gravely oppressed by necessity, can leave without the license of his prelate to help his father
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a religious, if he sees that his father is in necessity, can leave the cloister to help his father even without the license of his prelate.
Obj. 1: For the commandment of God must not be omitted on account of the traditions of men, whence the Lord says against certain men: you have made the commandment of God ineffective on account of your traditions (Matt 15:6). But a man is bound to help his parents by this divine precept: honor thy father and thy mother (Exod 20:12), in which indeed by honor there is understood the rendering of necessities. Therefore, it seems that with the observances of religion notwithstanding, which are statutes of men, any religious should leave the cloister to help his parents according to the precept of God.
On the contrary: Spiritual things must always be preferred to carnal things. But religious obligate themselves to obey a spiritual Father, namely, God, to whom we are held more, according to Hebrews 12:9: how much more shall we obey the Father of spirits, and we shall live. Therefore, they should not dismiss the observances of their order in order to minister to their carnal parents.
I answer that it must be said differently for a man who has not yet entered religion and a man who already is professed in religion.
For a man who has not yet entered religion, if he sees his father in great necessity, who cannot be helped by another, he should not enter religion, but he is held to support his parents, especially if he can remain in the world without danger of mortal sin. Whereas if his parents can be supported by another, he can if he wills enter religion. Hence Chrysostom, expounding that line: dismiss the dead to bury their dead (Matt 8:22), says that it is evil to lead a man away from spiritual things, and especially when there should be those who should complete the ministry of his parents; for there were some who could have completed the burial of that funeral. (John Chrysostom, On Matthew, homily 27 (PG 57:347–48); Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 8:22, ch. 8, lect. 6.)
Whereas someone has already died to the world after he is professed in religion. Hence through spiritual death he is de-obligated from caring for his parents, just as also he is de-obligated by bodily death. For this reason, he does not sin, nor does he act against a precept of God, if he remains in the cloister under the precept of the prelate while omitting the ministry of his parents: for he is made impotent unto rendering the due ministry without proper fault. Nevertheless, he should, as far as he can with the obedience of his order preserved, take care to help his parents himself or through another, if they are constituted in necessity.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a religious is held to fulfill that which pertains to religion, not only by human tradition, but also by divine precept: for he is obligated by the vow uttered to the obedience of his prelate, yet the fulfillment of a vow falls under divine precept.
Article 3
Whether the state of religion is more perfect than the state of parish priests or of archdeacons
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that parish priests and deacons (Yves M.-J. Congar, “Saint Thomas et les archidiacres,” in Revue thomiste 57 (1957): 657–71.) are of greater perfection than religious.
Obj. 1: For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue: if you should lead to me some such monk as, so that I might speak according to exaggeration, was Elijah . . . , nevertheless he must not be compared to that man who, handed over to the peoples and compelled to bear the sins of the many, persevered unmoved and strong. (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.7 (PG 48:683–84; SC 272:324).)
Obj. 2: And a little later he says: if anyone were to propose to me the option whereby I would prefer to please in the priestly office or in the solitude of monks, without comparison I would choose that which I said first; nor have I ceased praising and pronouncing blessed those who were able to administer the office of the Church well; and that which I praised with such great zeal and pronounced blessed, certainly I would not have fled, if I would have seen myself fit unto the governance of this. (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.7 (PG 48:683–84; SC 272:326).)
Obj. 3: And in the following chapter afterwards he says: well, I say, have you admonished, my sweetest one. For neither is it necessary to call to mind those—namely, seculars—when a question is made concerning the priesthood. Truly, if anyone placed in the company of the many can observe that unperturbed brightness of full sanctity, and the splendor of continence, and the other goods of monks, incorrupt and unshaken, this must be preferred to all. (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.8 (PG 48:684; SC 272:330).) From all this it seems that parish priests and archdeacons, if they live well in the ministry of the Church, must be preferred to all, even to religious.
Obj. 4: Chrysostom in the same book says: if anyone, with the priesthood administered well, should in hard labor expend his way of life—namely, the monastic way of life—so much shall you find them to stand apart, as among ordinary citizens, a king also stands apart. (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.5 (PG 48:682; SC 272:320).) But much more is it well to exercise the office of a king than of any private person. Therefore, much more is it that a parish priest or archdeacon performs well in his office than a religious in his.
Obj. 5: Bishops are in a more perfect state than religious, otherwise it would not be licit to cross over from religion to the episcopacy. But parish priests and archdeacons are more similar to bishops than religious because, just as a bishop has the care of souls in his episcopacy, so a priest in his parish and an archdeacon in his archidiaconate. Therefore, archdeacons and parish priests are more in the state of perfection than religious. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, Quodlibet XIV, a. 1; Aquinas, On the Perfection of Spiritual Life, ch. 24, obj. 9; ch. 27, ad 9.)
Obj. 6: The public good must be preferred to the private good, (Cf. Theodore Eschmann, “A Thomistic Glossary on the Principle of the Preeminence of a Common Good,” in Mediaeval Studies 5 (1943): 123–65.) and the active life is more fruitful than the contemplative, (Cf. Cicero, On Duties 1.21, para. 70; Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 1, tit. 9, c. 10, para. 11, 2:111.) and nothing more acceptable is sacrificed to God than the zeal of souls. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 1, homily 12, para. 30 (CCSL 142:200; PL 76:932).) But archdeacons and parish priests intend the utility of the common multitude, bearing fruit with the zeal of the salvation of souls in the active life. Therefore, they must be preferred to religious, who strive for their own proper salvation in the contemplative life serving God. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, Quodlibet XIV, a. 1; Aquinas, On the Perfection of Spiritual Life, ch. 24, obj. 5; ch. 27, ad 5.)
Obj. 7: To whom more is committed by God, more is merited, if he administers well. But to a priest or archdeacon seems more committed because more is required from him in judgment. Therefore, by administering well, more is merited.
On the contrary is what is said in the Decretum (C. 19, q. 2, canon “Two”): if anyone in his own church under the bishop preserves the people and lives secularly, if blown by the Holy Spirit into some monastery or regular canonry he wills to save himself, because he is led by private law, no reason demands that he be restrained by public law. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 19, q. 2, c. 2, 1:840.) But private law, which is the law of the Holy Spirit, as is added in the same place, never leads a man from a more perfect state unto a less perfect state, but makes a man to dispose ascents in his heart (Ps 84:5 [83:6]). Therefore, the state of religious is more perfect than the state of parish priests.
I answer that the perfection of the spiritual life must be weighed out of charity, which he who lacks is spiritually nothing (1 Cor 13:2), yet by his perfection someone is said to be perfect absolutely. Hence it is said in Colossians 3:14: over all things . . . have charity, which is the chain of perfection.
Yet love has a transformative power, by which the lover in a certain mode is transferred into the beloved. Hence, Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names: yet there is divine love making ecstasy, not allowing them to be lovers of their own selves, but of the beloveds. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4, para. 13 (PG 3:711).) Because, therefore, the whole and the perfect are the same, as is said in the third book of the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207a13–14.) that man has charity perfectly who is transferred totally unto God through love, entirely disregarding himself and his own things on account of God. Hence Augustine says, in the fourteenth book of On the City of God, that just as love of self makes the city of Babylon even unto the contempt of God, (Augustine, City of God 14.28 (CCSL 48:451; PL 41:436).) so love of God makes the city of God even unto the contempt of self; and in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions, that the perfection of charity is no cupidity, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 36, para. 1 (PL 40:25; CCSL 44A:54).) and Gregory also, in his commentary on Ezekiel, says that when anyone vows something of his to God, and does not vow something, it is a sacrifice; whereas when all which he has, all which he lives, all which he understands, he should vow to the omnipotent God, it is a holocaust, which in the Latin language means all incense. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 2, homily 8, para. 16 (CCSL 142:348; PL 76:1037).)
Therefore, the mind of anyone so affected interiorly that he spurns himself and all his own things on account of God, according to that line of the Apostle in Philippians 3:7–8: those things which sometimes were gain to me, I reckon . . . as dung, in order that I might gain Christ, that man is perfect, whether he is religious or secular, whether cleric or even a lay person bound by matrimony: for Abraham was bound by matrimony and rich, to whom the Lord says: walk before me and be perfect (Gen 17:1); and in Sirach 31:8 it is said: blessed the rich man who is found without stain and does not go off after gold; and a little after there is added: who is proven in that and is found perfect. (Sirach 31:10.)
But one must be aware that it is one thing to be perfect and another to be in the state of perfection: for there are some in the state of perfection who are not yet perfect, but sometimes even sinners; there are also some perfect men who are not in the state of perfection.
And although state signifies many things, both rectitude and firmness, and if there are any other things of this sort, nevertheless when we say that some are in the state of perfection, state is understood as their condition, just as liberty or servitude are called states. So too it is customarily said that error of person or of condition or of state impedes matrimony, yet not error of fortune or of quality. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 29, q. 1, 1:1091–92.) And in this way is state understood: if when in a capital cause or a cause of state it should be interrupted, not through explorers—that is, procurators,—but through themselves must this be done (C. 2, q. 6). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 2, q. 6, c. 40, 1:481.)
Therefore, by understanding state thus, those properly are said to be in the state of perfection who subject themselves to servitude to fulfill the works of perfection. Yet it is clear that servitude is opposed to liberty. Yet the liberty of doing anything is removed through a vow because to vow is of the will, and to render it is of necessity, as has been said above. (Above: q. 5, a. 2, s.c. 1.) Hence he who obligates himself to something by a vow, inasmuch as he subjects himself to necessity, in a certain way constitutes himself as a slave, depriving himself of liberty.
If, therefore, someone obligates himself by a vow to fulfill some particular work, he constitutes himself in a certain way as a slave, not absolutely, but according to something, namely, with regard to what he has obligated himself. Whereas if he dedicates his whole life to God absolutely through a vow to fulfill the works of perfection on account of God, he constitutes his very self absolutely as a slave, and through this he is placed in the state of perfection. Hence he is also said to offer holocaust by vowing his whole self to God, as Gregory says. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 2, homily 8, para. 16 (CCSL 142:348; PL 76:1037).)
Yet in this way they obligate their whole life to those things which are of the perfection of a bishop, making a certain profession in their consecration by which they are obligated to the care of the flock received, according to 1 Timothy 6:12: fight the good fight of faith, apprehend eternal life, into which you also have been called, having confessed a good confession before many witnesses—either in ordination or in preaching, (Peter Lombard, Gloss on the Letter to 1 Timothy 6:11 (PL 192:360); cf. Nicolas of Lisieux, De perfectione et excellencia status clericorum, bk. 2, ch. 27.) as the Gloss says. Religious in their profession also obligate their whole life to God unto those things which are of perfection. Hence also both are called slaves: for it is said in 2 Corinthians 4:5: for we do not preach our own selves, but Jesus Christ . . . , yet we are your slaves on account of Jesus, which pertains to bishops. Religious also are named slaves or familiars, as Dionysius says in the sixth chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy; (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 6 (PG 3:529–38).) and for this reason, both religious and bishops are in the state of perfection. Hence also a solemn benediction is applied to both in the assumption of this state, as is clear through Dionysius in the sixth and fifth chapters of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 5–6 (PG 3:499–538); cf. Nicolas of Lisieux, De perfectione et excellencia status clericorum, bk. 2, ch. 28.)
Yet archdeacons or parish priests do not obligate their whole life by a vow to that which the care of the flock requires, hence neither is any benediction given to them are their institution, (Aquinas, On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life, cc. 23, 28.) but one is given to monks on account of their assumed perfection, as is said in the sixth and fifth chapters of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 5–6 (PG 3:499–538); Aquinas, On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life, ch. 28.) And for this reason, there is committed to them the care of the parish or of the archidiaconate, and they are constituted, indeed, in some office, yet they are not assumed unto the state of perfection; otherwise, they would be apostates by dismissing their parishes and by receiving prebends without the care of souls in cathedral churches. For no one can depart from the state of perfection except by mortally sinning and by apostatizing.
And hence it is that Dionysius in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy attributed perfection only to bishops as to the perfectors and to monks as to the perfected. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 5–6 (PG 3:499–538); Aquinas, On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life, ch. 27.) Whereas he attributed illumination to priests as illuminators through the administration of the sacraments and to the holy people as needing to be illumined; whereas he attributed purgation to deacons as purgators and to the order of the unclean as needing to be purged.
Reply Obj. 1–3: It must be said, therefore, that all those authorities of Chrysostom could be answered briefly by saying he does not speak about a parish priest, but a bishop, who is called a priest by antonomasia, as high priest, and this manner of speaking is generally customary, namely, that bishops are called priests. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, Quodlibet XIV, a. 1; Aquinas, On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life, cc. 24, 27.) This response seems to harmonize according to the intention of the work, in which Chrysostom consoles Basil concerning his promotion: for both were elected to the episcopacy. (ST II-II.184.8, ad 1; cf. John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 1.3 (PG 48:623–24; SC 272:72).)
So that, nevertheless, we might respond particularly to all the individual points:
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if anyone were to consider the circumstances of the words, they do not apply to the question at hand. For he says before: if those who dwell in secret places are not moved by the sermons of the many, worthy of praise indeed is their patience, nevertheless not a suitable argument of true art. Whereas since he was in the midst of waves and he was able to free the ship from the storm, then justly did he deserve the testimony of the perfect helmsman from all; (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.6 (PG 48:682–83; SC 272:324).) and then he concludes: thus, therefore, also now if you should lead to me some such monk as, in order that I might speak according to exaggeration, was Elijah, nevertheless inasmuch as he is alone if he was not perturbed nor sins gravely, who surely does not have any by whom he is incited or exasperated, nevertheless he must not be compared to that man who, handed over to the peoples and compelled to bear the sins of the many, persevered unmoved and strong, because just as in tranquility, so in a storm did he steer his very self. (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.7 (PG 48:683–84; SC 272:324–26); Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, on Matthew 19:21, ch. 19, lect. 1.) It is clear that he does not compare state to state, but impeccability to impeccability: for that a monk dwelling in a cloister does not sin is not such an evident argument of virtue as if a priest or bishop or any rector of the people abstains from sin in the midst of perturbations, just as it is not an argument of such great industry if a helmsman navigates without danger in a tranquil sea, as if he were to navigate in a tempestuous sea—nevertheless, it pertains to the industry of a sailor to avoid a tempestuous sea. Thus, therefore, from the aforesaid words nothing else can be shown except that the state of one having the care of souls is more dangerous than that of the monk, and to preserve himself innocent in greater danger is an argument of greater virtue. Hence greater virtue is required for someone to preserve himself from sin immune amongst the people than in religion. But it is of greater virtue to avoid the dangers by entering religion than not to avoid the dangers: for as much as someone more loves his own salvation, so much more does he avoid the dangers of his salvation.
Reply Obj. 2: And through this the response to the second is also clear. For he does not say that he would prefer to be in the priestly office rather than in the solitude of monks, (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.7 (PG 48:683–84; SC 272:324–26).) but that he would prefer to please in this than in that. For what wise man would wish more to have such great virtue through which he could even exist secure amongst dangers than such virtue by which he could be saved outside of dangers? But, because it is presumptuous for someone to presume himself to have such virtue through which he would be safe even amongst dangers, it is virtuous that he place himself outside of dangers. Hence he adds: that which I was praising with such great zeal and was pronouncing blessed, namely, the office of the administration of the Church, certainly I would not flee, if I were to see myself suitable unto its governance. (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.7 (PG 48:683–84; SC 272:324–26).) Prudently, therefore, did he take refuge, because he did not proudly ascribe to himself such great virtue through which he would be suitable.
Reply Obj. 3: Similarly, the response to the third is also clear. For if someone placed in the company of the many can preserve unperturbed that brightness of full sanctity, and the splendor of continence, and other monastic good things, incorrupt and unshaken, he must be preferred to all. (John Chrysostom, On the Priesthood 6.8 (PG 48:684; SC 272:330).) For it is an indication of greater virtue for someone to preserve perfect purity even amongst dangers of purity than if he were to preserve it outside of dangers. But nevertheless, he is convicted of loving his purity little who does not avoid the dangers of purity, amongst which it is difficult and most rare to preserve every sort of purity. Just as the greatest purity was that of blessed Agnes, who even when placed in a brothel preserved her virginal purity, and nevertheless, because she was a lover of purity, never did she choose to show her virtue in the brothel, but as much more as she had a pure mind, so much more did she avoid the brothel by her own will. *(The story of Agnes was included in the Liturgy of the Order of Preachers on January 21; cf. Aquinas, *Sermon 4, “Osanna filio David.”) And it is similar in all such persons.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that that authority does not pertain to perfection of life but to difference of dignity, for a private person is distant from a king in the same way as a person not having a prelature from one having one. Yet it is not considered in the question whether whoever has the care of souls is greater by dignity of the prelature than a religious who does not have the care of souls.
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that the reason is different for bishops and for parish priests. For bishops have the principal care of the people, yet parish priests and archdeacons are their sub-ministers and coadjutors. Hence it is said (C. 16, q. 1): all priests and deacons and the rest of clerics must take care that they should do nothing without the license of their proper bishop; certainly let none of the priests have masses without his command in their parish, let none baptize, nor do whatever without his permission. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, c. 41, 1:773–74.) And on 1 Corinthians 7 it is said in the Gloss that assistants are those who bear help to those greater than them, as Titus to the Apostle or archdeacons to bishops, (Peter Lombard, Gloss on 1 Corinthians 12:28 (PL 191:1657C–D).) whereas governors are governors of lesser persons, as are priests. Hence, if anyone rightly were to consider, in this way archdeacons and parish priests are compared to the bishop in the government of the Church just as in a temporal government commanders and bailiffs are compared to the king. The reason is that just as a king is crowned and anointed in his kingship, yet not commanders and bailiffs, so also the bishop in the Church, yet not archdeacons and parish priests. And on account of this, the episcopacy is an order in comparison to the mystical body, yet not the parish priesthood or the archidiaconate, which are an office only. Therefore, archdeacons and parish priests are similar to bishops just as coadjutors and ministers, but religious are similar to bishops in perpetual obligation, which makes a state of perfection.
Reply Obj. 6: It must be said that any two works either in good or in evil can be compared to one another in many ways.
One way is according to their genus, just as we say that virginal continence is preeminent over the good of a widow’s continence, whereas in evil, homicide over theft. And in this way, the active life is more fruitful than the contemplative, but the contemplative justly is greater than the active, as Gregory says in the seventh book of the Morals on the Book of Job. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 6.37, para. 61 (CCSL 143:330; PL 75:764).) Even zeal of souls is a most acceptable sacrifice to God, (See obj. 6.) if, nevertheless, it is done ordinately, namely, so that first man might have the care of his own salvation, and afterwards that of others. Otherwise, nothing benefits a man, if he should gain the whole world, but suffer the detriment of his own soul (Matt 16:26).
In another way, work can be compared to work in good or in evil not according to itself, but in order unto another act, just as abstinence is preferred in the good of the taking of food, nevertheless to consume food with another on account of charity is preferred to abstinence. And in evil, adultery is preferred to theft; nevertheless, to steal a sword unto murdering is graver than adultery.
Third, work is preferred to work in good or evil out of the will of the one doing it. For that which is done with a more prompt will is judged better or worse.
If, therefore, we compare the works of a parish priest or archdeacon to the works of religious in the third mode of comparison, namely, according to promptness of will, then it is an uncertain indication because that man who works out of more fervent charity has more meritorious works.
Whereas if they are compared by the second comparison, through order unto some other work, thus the works of a religious are incomparably more eminent than the works of an archdeacon or a parish priest. For those things which religious do are referred unto that root by which they have devoted their whole life to God. Hence what they do must not be weighed, but more so that they have devoted themselves to do whatever works. And thus, in a certain way they are compared to those who do some singular good work just as the infinite to the finite. For he who gives himself to someone unto doing all which he commands, gives himself to him unto infinite things more than that man who gives himself to him unto doing some work. Hence, it being supposed that a religious according to the demand of his religion does some work which is little according to itself, nevertheless it receives great extension out of the order unto the first obligation by which he gave his whole self to God.
Whereas if these very works are compared according to themselves, according to the first mode of comparison, thus any particular works which parish priests or archdeacons do are greater than any particular works which religious do, just as it is greater to intend the salvation of souls than to fast or to keep silence or any things of this sort. Nevertheless, if all are compared to all, the works of religious are much more. For although to procure the salvation of others is greater than to attend only to oneself, speaking in general, nevertheless, not in every mode is intending the salvation of others preferred to that which in every mode intends one’s own salvation. For if someone totally and perfectly intends his own salvation, this is much more than if someone does many particular works for the salvation of others, if he intends his own proper salvation, even if sufficiently but not perfectly.
Reply Obj. 7: It must be said that to administer something well is both more and less. Hence, if the administration of that one to whom more is committed is as much greater as that which is committed to him is greater, without doubt he merits more. Whereas if that one to whom less is committed does much more than that one to whom more is committed, nevertheless the former merits more, even if the latter should do it well. This also is apparent in human matters: he who receives less benefit, if he serves more, should be accepted more. Yet although to one having the care of souls there is committed more as regards dignity, nevertheless, because a religious does more works, as has been said, he merits more.
Certain things pertaining to men of inferior state, namely, laymen
Question 7
Certain things pertaining to men of inferior state, namely, laymen
Then there were questions concerning what pertains to laymen.
And first, concerning matrimony, namely, whether a woman who contracted matrimony in the face of the Church after uttering a vow of continence can without sin be united carnally to her husband;
second, concerning usury, whether someone licitly can retain what he acquires by licit goods from usurious money.
Article 1
On matrimony
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a woman who contracted matrimony with someone in the face of the Church after uttering a vow of continence can afterwards be united carnally to him without sin.
Obj. 1: For that which is done by the authority of the Church lacks sin since it is done by the authority of Christ, according to that line of the Apostle: for what I have given, if I have given anything, on account of you have I given it in the person of Christ (2 Cor 2:10). But the abovementioned woman by the very fact that she has contracted matrimony in the face of the Church, has received by the authority of the Church power for the act of matrimony, which is carnal union. Therefore, she does not sin if she unites to her husband carnally.
On the contrary (2): A vow of continence is more excellent than a vow of abstinence, because there is no worthy weight of the continent soul (Sir 26:20). But he who acts against a vow of abstinence sins mortally: for example, if someone were to break the fast of Friday who had vowed that he always would fast on Friday. Therefore, much more does a person always sin mortally who is united carnally to another person against an uttered vow of continence.
I answer that a vow of continence is twofold: namely, simple and solemn. Yet a solemn vow of continence impedes the contracting of matrimony and breaks that already contracted, (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 6, cc. 3–7, 2:685–87; below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 5, a. 3, s.c.; Quodlibet X, q. 5, a. 3, resp.) that is, it makes it that there is not matrimony which is contracted after the solemn vow. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 1, ch. 3, q. 3, 3:982.) Hence it is clear that someone is not excused from sin if after a solemn vow he contracts matrimony in the face of the Church and enjoys carnal union.
Whereas a simple vow indeed impedes the contracting of matrimony, but does not break that already contracted: (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 6, cc. 3–7, 2:685–87.) for it does not make it that there is no matrimony following, but only that one contracting matrimony sins mortally. Yet with matrimony existing, a woman does not have the power of her own body, but the man, and similarly conversely. (Cf. 1 Corinthians 7:4.) Yet no one can deny another that which is his, and for this reason, a woman joined in matrimony, even if a simple vow preceded, cannot deny her husband the use of her body, especially after the matrimony has been consummated through carnal union. Yet no one doing that which he ought, sins. Hence it is said commonly by all that a woman who after a simple vow of continence already has consummated a matrimony contracted by carnal union does not sin by rendering the debt to her husband. But whether she sins by demanding the debt seems doubtful, with certain men saying that even without sin she can demand it lest the burden of matrimony be intolerable for her. But it seems more truly said that she does not sin by rendering, (Cf. below: Quodlibet X, q. 5, a. 3, resp.) because this is of necessity, yet she sins by demanding, because this is of the will, which is held bound through the obligation of the preceding vow.
Yet the reason for this diversity is that a solemn vow has a promise with a certain handing over (hence a vow of continence is not solemnized except either through the reception of sacred orders, through which a man actually is surrendered to the divine cult, or through profession unto a fixed rule and the reception of the habit of profession, because thus also a man actually is surrendered unto serving God in religion). Yet a simple vow has a promise without a handing over. (Cf. below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 5, a. 3, resp.) Yet it is clear that, after someone not only promises to someone a thing which is of his power, but even hands it over, he cannot further give it to another, for example a horse or garment or similar things, and if afterwards he desires to give it to another, the second giving does not prevail. Hence, after someone through a solemn vow of continence not only has promised his body to God, but even has handed it over unto living a celibate life, he cannot further hand it over to a wife such that he is held to render the debt out of necessity. Whereas he who promises something to someone and nevertheless does not yet hand it over, if afterwards he actually does hand it over to another, the second donation nevertheless prevails even though he breaks the faith of the promise, such that the one to whom it is given can use the thing given as he wills. Thus, therefore, a person who through a simple vow has promised his body to God unto leading a celibate life, if afterwards he actually hands over the power of his body to a wife through the consummation of matrimony, he sins indeed by breaking the faith of the vow. Nevertheless, the giving holds and his wife has the power over his body. Hence he does not sin rendering the debt.
Hence it is necessary to respond to both.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that a woman who has uttered a vow of continence, when she contracts in the face of the Church does not receive from the authority of the Church the power that she should enjoy carnal union, because if the uttered vow were known to the Church, the Church would impede the matrimony. Yet if the Church were to know and were to dispense by apostolic authority the simple vow of continence, the woman would not sin after the dispensation either by demanding or by rendering the debt.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the same reason applies to a vow of continence and to a vow of abstinence. For just as a person who, after uttering a simple vow of continence, hands over the power of himself to a spouse, he enjoys carnal union without sin when rendering the debt. Thus, if after a vow of abstinence, he hands over the power of himself to another by entering religion, he can break the fast without sin according to the obedience of the prelate and the observance of religion, through which solemnized vow he is absolved from other vows.
Article 2
On usury
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone is held to return whatever he gains from usurious money.
Obj. 1: For the Apostle says in Romans 11:16: if the root is holy, also the branch. Therefore, conversely, if the root is infected, so too is the branch; but the branch of this gain is infected and usurious. Therefore, the whole is infected and usurious. Therefore, he cannot licitly retain gain of this sort. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 48, ch. 4, 3:935–37.)
On the contrary: Anyone licitly can retain what he has acquired legitimately. But that which is acquired from usurious money is sometimes acquired legitimately. Therefore, licitly it can be retained.
I answer that the truth of this question could be apparent if the reason why usury is a sin were to be considered. For it is not only a sin because it is prohibited, but because it is against the natural order, as even the Philosopher says in the first book of the Politics. (Aristotle, Politics 1.8, 1258a38–b8.)
For the proof of this, it must be considered that certain things coming into the use of man are those whose use is not the consumption of the thing itself, and it is incidental if the thing is deteriorated or consumed through use, for example a house, a garment, a horse, a book, and things of this sort. For to use a book is not to blot it out, nor is to use a house to destroy it. And in such things to give the use of the thing is one thing and to give the substance of the thing is another. On account of this, when through accommodation the use of such a thing is granted to another, the ownership of the thing is not transferred because of this. On account of this, the use of the thing also can be sold, with the ownership of the thing remaining with the lord, just as is clear in renting and letting, which are licit contracts.
Whereas certain things are those whose use is nothing else than the consumption of the things themselves, such as money which we use by spending, wine which we use by drinking, and other things of this sort, in which to use a thing is nothing else than to consume it. And for this reason, in such things, when the use of the thing mutually is conceded, there is transferred also the ownership of the thing. Therefore, because the use of the thing is not separable from the thing itself, whoever sells the use of such things by retaining an obligation to himself unto returning the capital, it is clear that the same man is selling both, which is against natural justice, and for this reason, to demand usury is according to itself unjust. (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, homily 38, on Matthew 21:12 (PG 56:840); cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 48, ch. 1, q. 2, 3:912–13.)
Therefore, someone must be held to return what he receives beyond the capital, because he receives it unjustly, and consequently also to take part in the losses. But since there is not another use of his usurious money than its very substance, by the reasoning already explained it is clear consequently that from the fact that he returns the usurious money, he is not held to return anything for the use of the money. Yet someone would be held to return what he gained from another’s home or horse or something of this sort, even after he had returned things of this sort, because in such things the thing and the use of the thing is valued.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that usurious money does not exist in the way of a root for the gain made from it, but only through the way of a material. For a root somehow has the power of an active cause, inasmuch as it ministers nourishment to the whole plant. Hence in human acts the will and intention are compared to the root, by which, if it is perverse, the work will be perverse. Yet this is not necessary in that which is material: for sometimes someone can use evil well.
Certain things pertaining commonly to all men
Regarding the soul
Question 8
Regarding the substance of the soul
Then there were questions that pertain commonly to all men:
and first, regarding the soul; (Qq. 8–10.)
second, regarding the body; (Q. 11.)
third, regarding the act of man. (Qq. 12–13.)
About the soul there were three questions:
first, regarding its substance, (Q. 8.) whether it is composed of matter and form;
second, regarding its knowledge; (Q. 9.)
third, regarding its punishment. (Q. 10.)
Article 1
Whether the soul is composed of matter and form
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul is composed of matter and form.
Obj. 1: For the human intellect is compared to superior intellectual substances by its distance from simplicity. But everything distant from the simple has some composition, and the first composition is of matter and form. Therefore, the human soul is composed of matter and form.
On the contrary is that the Philosopher says in the third book of On the Soul that the species of material things as they are in things themselves are not intelligible actually because they are in matter. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 430a5–7.) But as they are in the intellective human soul, they are intelligible actually. Therefore, they are not in matter. Therefore, the human soul is not composed of matter and form.
I answer that, if matter is anything which is in any way potential, and every act is called form, it is necessary to posit that the human soul and any created substance is composed of matter and form, since every created substance is composed of potency and act. For it is clear that only God is his own being as essentially existing, namely, inasmuch as his being is his substance, which can be said concerning no other. For subsistent being cannot be unless it is one, just as subsisting whiteness could not be unless it is one. Therefore, it is necessary that every other thing is a being by participation, such that the one thing in that substance is participating being and the other is participated being itself. Yet everything participating relates to the thing participated just as potency to act. Hence the substance of any created thing relates to its being just as potency to act. Thus, therefore, every composed created substance is out of potency and act, that is, out of that which is and being, as Boethius says in the book Hebdomads, (Boethius, Hebdomads, rule 2, line 28; rules 7–8, lines 45–47 (PL 64:1311); On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) just as a white thing is composed out of that which is white and whiteness.
Whereas if matter is understood properly as that which is only potency, in this way it is impossible for the human soul to be composed of matter and form. And this can be shown in two ways.
First, indeed, it can be shown from this: that it is intellectual substance. For it is clear that the intellect in act is the thing understood in act. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 430a3–4.) Yet something is understood in act inasmuch as it is immaterial: for it is something perfectly knowable inasmuch as it is in act, yet not inasmuch as it is in potency, as is said in the ninth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.9, 1051a29–33.) Hence, since matter is being in potency, form existing in matter cannot be perfectly known as understood in act. Hence it follows that no intellective substance, the perfection of which is the thing itself understood in act, is material, by this: that it is necessary that perfection be proportioned to the perfectible. (Albert the Great, Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 2; Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 8, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, fund. 5, 1:170b.)
Second, the same is clear from this: that the soul is form. For since form is act, and that which is potency cannot be act, it is impossible for something composed of matter and form, according to itself as a whole, to be form. Therefore, if the soul, which is posited to be composed of matter and form, is form according to some part of itself, which is an act and no part of which is matter, it follows that a part of the soul is not matter: for we call the soul that which is the act of an animate body.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that potency and act are first principles in the genus of substance, yet matter and form are first principles in the genus of mobile substance. Hence it is not necessary for every composition in the genus of substance to be out of matter and form. Rather, this is necessary only in mobile substances.
Question 9
Regarding the knowledge of the soul
Then there were questions about the soul as regards its knowledge. And about this there were two questions:
first, whether a soul separated from the body knows another separated soul;
second, whether it is licit to demand from someone dying that he announce his state after death.
Article 1
Whether a soul separated from the body knows another separated soul
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a soul separated from the body does not know another soul of a man that it knew in this life.
Obj. 1: For all knowledge is made through some likeness. But in one soul there was not an express likeness of another soul in this life which could remain in it after death. Therefore, one separated soul cannot know another.
Obj. 2: The Philosopher says in the first book of the De Anima that with the body having corrupted, the soul does not recollect. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4, 408b27–28.) Therefore, it does not recognize the soul of a man which it knew in this life.
On the contrary is that, as is said in Luke 16:23, the soul of the rich man placed in hell recognized the soul of Lazarus living in the bosom of Abraham.
I answer that, since no substance is left without its proper activity, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.23 [or ch. 37] (PG 94:950).) it is necessary to posit, since the intellective soul remains after death, that it understands in some way. Yet it is necessary to attribute one of three ways of understanding to this, namely, that it understands either by abstracting intelligible species from things, just as now it understands when united to the body, or through intelligible species in the body acquired and conserved in it after death, or even through other species created together with it or however else poured in from above.
Therefore, certain men say that separated souls understand by abstracting intelligible species from things. (Aquinas, In IV Sent. 50.1.1.)
But this cannot be. For the abstraction of intelligible species from sensible things is done with sense and imagination mediating, whose activities, since they are through bodily organs, cannot be attributed to a separated soul.
Hence others, denying this, say rather that the separated soul does not understand even through species acquired from sensible things while it was in the body. (Aquinas, In IV Sent. 50.1.2.) For they posit, following Avicenna, (Avicenna, Book on the Soul, ed. Simone Van Reit (Leiden: Brill, 1972), bk. 5, ch. 6, pp. 147–48.) that intelligible species are not conserved in the potential intellect except while it actually understands, but the particular species of sensible things are conserved only in the imaginative power or the memory, unto which while the potential intellect converts itself, there newly flow into it intelligible species from the agent intelligence. Therefore, since the memory and the imaginative power are corrupted when the body has corrupted, since they are the power of a bodily organ, it follows that the soul after death in no way can understand through any species received from sensible things. (Dominic Gundisalvi (Gundissalinus), “De anima,” ch. 10, in Mediaeval Studies 2 (1940): 97–98.) Hence it remains, according to them, that the separated soul understands through species created together with it, just as also do angels. (Dominic Gundisalvi, “De anima,” ch. 10, in Mediaeval Studies 2 (1940): 99–103; Albert the Great, Secunda Pars Summae de Creaturis, “Summa de homine,” ed. Stephen Borgnet, Opera Omnia, vol. 35, q. 56, a. 5, p. 486a.)
But this position seems irrational indeed as regards both of the things said.
For intelligible species to be not conserved in the potential intellect is against reason: for that which is received in anything is in it through the mode of the receiver. Hence, since the potential intellect is stable and immobile, it is necessary for intelligible species to be received in it stably and immovably. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 50.1.2, s.c. 3.) It is also against Aristotle, who says in the third book of On the Soul that the potential intellect, since it becomes singulars, that is, receiving the species of singulars, as knowing, that is, just as happens in him who has knowledge, then it is called second act. Yet this happens immediately since it works through its very self. It is indeed therefore also then in some way a potency, nevertheless not similarly to before learning and finding. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b5–9.) From these words it is apparent that intelligible species sometimes are in habit in the potential intellect even though they are not working actually.
What they say, namely, that the human soul has intelligible species created together with it, is said irrationally. For if it can use them while it is united to the body, it follows that man can understand those things whose sense he does not receive, as for example for a blind man to understand colors, which is clearly false. Yet if through the union of the body the human soul is totally impeded so that it cannot use intelligible species created together with it, it follows that the union of body and soul is not natural, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 50.1.1.) for that which is in the nature of a thing is not totally impeded through something which is natural to the thing, otherwise nature would have made one of those in vain.
Thus, it must be said that a separated soul can understand certain things through intelligible species which it acquired through sense from things while it was in the body. But that mode of knowing does not suffice, because a separated soul knows many things which we do not know in this life. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth q. 19, a. 1, resp.) This is especially so because it seems unfitting for the souls of those who died in maternal wombs, which perhaps had no use of understanding and consequently neither any acquired intelligible species, to understand nothing after death. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 50.1.1, obj. 6, resp., ad 6.) Hence it is necessary to add that a soul, in its separation from the body, receives an influx of intelligible species from a superior nature, namely, the divine, according to the natural order by which we experience that the human soul; (Aristotle, On Divination in Sleep 2, 463b12–464b5, 464a16–19.) as much more as it is drawn away from bodily senses, so much more can it be a sharer in superior influxes, just as is clear in those sleeping and those alienated from their senses, who even foresee certain future things.
Thus, therefore, a separated soul can know another soul through the acquaintance with it acquired in this life through some likeness of its effect, which is the life of man, or through some likeness flowed into it by God by a natural influx.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the Philosopher speaks of remembering and reminiscing, which is an act of a certain sensitive power using a bodily organ, at whose corruption such an act of power ceases.
Article 2
Whether it is licit to demand from someone dying that he announce his state after death
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that it is not licit to require from someone dying that he reveal his state after death.
Obj. 1: For it is not licit to inquire into what God wills to be hidden, according to Sirach 3:22: you should not seek things higher than yourself. But God wills the state of a soul after death to be hidden, which is clear from this: that to the rich man asking that Lazarus be sent to his living brothers, this is denied, as is said in Luke 16:17. Therefore, it is not licit to require this from those dying.
On the contrary is that it is said in 2 Maccabees 12:46: holy and saving is the thought to pray for the dead. But man is moved to this by knowing their necessity after death. Therefore, it is licit and holy to require this of the dying.
I answer that, since sin is against nature, as is clear through Damascene in the second book, to require the fulfillment of a natural desire is not a sin unless some disorder is joined to it, just as is clear in the taking of food and drink. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.4 [or ch. 18] (PG 94:875); Cf. also 2.30 [ch. 44] (PG 94:975).) Yet man naturally desires to know; (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 980a21.) hence it is not a sin if he requires the announcing of something, unless perhaps incidentally through some disorder added: for example, if through the study and searching out of some knowledge someone is impeded from that to which he is held to extend himself: for example, if a preacher is impeded from the office of due preaching on account of the study of geometry; or even if someone inquires to know something, proudly and presumptuously relying on his own faculty; or if any other disorder of this sort occurs. Yet no disorder is seen in this questioning if someone requires from a dying man to know his state after death, with this divine judgment, nevertheless, having to be supposed. Hence there seems to be no reason why it should be said that this is sin, unless perhaps out of doubt of faith concerning the future state, as though he is inquiring by tempting.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that God wills many things to be thus hidden for us, as we cannot acquire the knowledge of them by our own powers or justly, which, nevertheless, he wills to be revealed to those seeking humbly and piously, according to Matthew 11:25: you have hidden these things from the wise and prudent and have revealed them to little ones. Hence it is no marvel if to the proud brothers of the proud rich man God refused for some things to be revealed, which, nevertheless, he willed to be revealed to the faithful piously and humbly seeking them. (This is perhaps a reference to Aquinas’s own experience in 1259. Cf. Gerardi de Fracheto, Vitae fratrum, ed. B. M. Reichert, Monumenta Ordinis Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica 1 (Louvain: Typis E. Charpentier and J. Schoonjans, 1896), ch. 24, para. 7, 215.)
Question 10
Regarding the punishment of the soul
Then there were questions concerning the soul as regards its punishment. And about this there were two questions:
first, whether a soul can suffer from bodily fire;
second, whether the damned in hell rejoice over the punishments of their enemies whom they see are punished with them.
Article 1
Whether a soul can suffer from bodily fire
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a separated soul cannot suffer from bodily fire.
Obj. 1: For the action of an agent is proportionate to the effect it has on the patient. But the action of fire, since it is a physical body, is a natural action which consists in moving. Therefore, nothing suffers from bodily fire except that which is moved. But the soul is not moved, since it is indivisible, and nothing indivisible is moved, as is proved in the sixth book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 6.4, 234b10–20.) Therefore, the soul does not suffer from bodily fire. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul, q. 21, obj. 6.)
On the contrary is that the rich man living in hell according to his soul says: I am tortured in this flame (Luke 16:24).
I answer that the soul suffers punishment from bodily fire, just as the Catholic faith teaches. Yet that bodily fire acts upon a separated soul, this it does not have from its nature, but inasmuch as it is an instrument of divine justice, as commonly is said. (Above: Quodlibet II, q. 7, a. 1.)
Nevertheless, it must be noted that no instrument acts in virtue of a superior agent except by exercising some action connatural to itself, otherwise it would be applied to the effect in vain, such as a saw, inasmuch as it is an instrument of art, makes an arch by cutting, and baptismal water washes the soul as an instrument of divine mercy, by washing bodily. If, therefore, bodily fire acts upon the soul as an instrument of punishing divine justice, it is necessary for this to be done through some action connatural to bodily fire. Yet it cannot be said that fire alters the soul by heating or by drying or by igniting it. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.3.3, sol. 3.) Hence there remains the mode which Augustine posits in the twenty-first book of On the City of God, namely, that the separated soul or spirit of a demon suffers punishment through a certain bondage to bodily fire. (Augustine, City of God 21.10 (CCSL 48:776; PL 41:724–25).) For we see that a spirit is bound to a body sometimes indeed naturally, just as the soul is bound to the body, yet sometimes by a certain superior power, just as through the power of the superior demons the lesser demons are bound by necromantic art to images or rings or other things of this sort. (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul, q. 21, resp.; ST II-II.95.3, resp.; On Lots, cc. 2, 5.) Much more, therefore, by divine power can demons or even souls be bound to bodily fire, so that by it they might receive punishment.
Reply Obj. 1: Hence the response is clear to that objected to the contrary, which concerns the action of fire through alteration.
Article 2
Whether the damned in hell rejoice over the punishments of their enemies whom they see are punished with them
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the damned in hell rejoice over and are consoled by the punishments of their enemies whom they see are punished with them in hell.
Obj. 1: Because, on Isaiah 14:9: all the princes of the earth have arisen from their thrones, the Gloss of Jerome says that solace for evil men is to have their enemies as allies of punishments. (Jerome, On Isaiah, bk. 5, 14:9 (CCSL 73:168; PL 24:165); Glossa ordinaria, at Isaiah 14:9, 4.162 (PL 113:1253).)
On the contrary: Every joy diminishes pain, as is clear through the Philosopher in the seventh book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 7.14, 1154a26–31.) But the pain of the damned is intensively finite. Therefore, the enemies of some damned man in hell could be multiplied so much that his pain totally would be removed, which is against divine justice.
I answer that nothing prohibits the same thing to be delightful and sad according to diverse reasons; nevertheless, it is called something absolutely from that which is preeminent, whereas from that which is less it is said to be according to something. Therefore, it must be said that the punishment of an enemy seen by someone in hell has in a certain way the character of something delightful and in a certain way the character of something painful. It has the character of something delightful inasmuch as the will of the damned is fulfilled concerning the evil of his enemy: for the damned descend into hell with their arms, that is, with depraved affections (Ezek 32:27). (Cf. below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 7, a. 2, resp.)
But in another way, it has the character of something painful on account of two things.
First, indeed, this is inasmuch as in the punishment of an enemy divine justice is fulfilled, which the damned in hell hate and blaspheme, according to Revelation 16:9: men have seethed with great agitation and have blasphemed the name of the Lord.
The second is on account of the worm of conscience: for thus depraved affections remain in them, which, nevertheless, hurt them as a punishment, not for purgation, according to Wisdom 5:3: doing penance and groaning before the straits of the spirit. Hence, just as those repenting in this life hurt and rejoice over the pain, so the damned in hell rejoice over the punishments of their enemies, and, nevertheless, concerning the joy itself they hurt more, especially if for them it surpasses the cause of damnation.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
Regarding the body
Question 11
Regarding the body
Article 1
Regarding the sex of the body
Then there was a question concerning man as regards the sex of the body, namely, whether if the first man had not sinned, as many males would have been born as females. And it seems that it would have been so.
Obj. 1: For in paradise where, according to Augustine, there had been an immaculate marriage bed and honorable nuptials, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 9.3, para. 6 (CSEL 28:271; PL 34:395).) no one was continent and all used marriage to fulfill the precept of the Lord given to the first men: increase and be multiplied and fill the earth (Gen 1:28). But in the state of innocence no man had many wives nor any woman many husbands, nor had any man or woman undergone death. Therefore, it follows that as many males would have been born as females.
On the contrary is that Gregory, in the fourth book of the Morals on the Book of Job, commenting on Job 3:13: for now sleeping I would be silent, says: if no rottenness of sin would have corrupted the first parent, by no means out of himself would he have generated sons of Gehenna; but these who now must be saved through redemption would have been born only elect from him. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 4.31, para. 62 (CCSL 143:206; PL 75:671).) But these who now must be saved are not equally males and females. Therefore, neither in the state of innocence would there have been born equally males and females.
I answer that, if Adam had not sinned nor anyone from his stock, it would seem necessary enough to concede that as many males would have been born as females, as the objection proves. (Cf. ST I.99.2, ad 3.)
Reply Obj. 1: It can be said that, since to God alone is the number of the elect certain, it is uncertain whether unequal males and females are saved, or equally as many males as females. But, if it is supposed that by a not unequal number males and females are saved, it can be said that, when it is said: these who now through redemption must be saved, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 4.31, para. 62 (CCSL 143:206; PL 75:671).) the pronoun does not make a personal demonstration, but a simple one, just as when it is said: these herbs grow in my garden, (Cf. William of Shireswood, “Introductiones in logicam,” 5.1.11, q. 3, in Traditio 39 (1983): 269; Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 8 C, a. 6, q. 1, obj. 3, obj. 4, and ad 4, 29:185, 189.) so that nothing else may be understood as signified except that only those to be saved would be born from him, because no one by being born from him would draw the cause of damnation. Yet it cannot be said that the same men in number would be born who now are born: for it is clear that there cannot be the same man in number if he should be born from another father or from another mother. Yet since there are many who receive from multiple wives sons who are saved, if in a state of innocence there had not been a plurality of wives, it would be impossible that the same men in number then would have been born who now are saved.
Regarding the act of man
Question 12
On conscience
Then there were questions concerning acts common to all men:
and first, concerning conscience; (Q. 12.)
second, concerning penance. (Q. 13.)
About the first there were two questions:
first, whether conscience can err;
second, whether an erroneous conscience binds.
Article 1
Whether conscience can err
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that conscience cannot err.
Obj. 1: Because the Gloss on Romans 2 says that conscience is the law of our intellect, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 4.22 [or ch. 95] (PG 94:1199) Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 2:14–15, 6.37 (PL 191:1345B; 114:476).) which is the law of nature. But the natural law cannot err; therefore, neither can conscience err.
Obj. 2: Basil says that conscience is the natural court of justice. (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Beginning of Proverbs, homily 5, para. 9 (CCSL 20A; PG 31:1772B, 405C).) But the natural court of justice cannot err, as is clear in the first indemonstrable principles, concerning which man naturally judges. Therefore, conscience cannot err.
On the contrary is that the Lord says, speaking to the disciples: the hour is coming when everyone who will have killed you should reckon that he is rendering obedience to God (John 16:2). But this cannot be except with conscience erring. Therefore, conscience can err.
I answer that conscience, just as the name itself signifies, involves an application of knowledge or of human notion to some proper act. Yet every notion which a man has, he can apply to his own activity, whether that be memory, just as a man is said to have a conscience testifying that he has done something or not done it, or also universal or particular knowledge, through which a man can know whether something must be done or must not be done. Thus is conscience said to urge or impede.
Yet it is clear that, if we understand the diverse thoughts of man, in some there can be an error and in some not. For no one can err in naturally known first principles, which are either speculative or active, such as in “every whole is greater than its part” or that “injury must be done to no one.” Yet in other more particular human thoughts, whether they pertain to the sensitive part or to inferior reason, which considers human things, or to superior reason, which considers divine things, error can befall in manifold ways.
Yet it is clear that in the application of many notions to an act an error occurs if any of the notions is erroneous, just as it is clear that falsity befalls in a conclusion if any of the premises is false. Thus, therefore, although there is not error in the knowledge of first principles of the natural law, nevertheless, because in other principles of human or divine law error can befall, for this reason, the conscience of man can err, just as it is clear that a heretic who has a conscience of never swearing an oath has an erroneous conscience due to believing that every oath is against a precept of God, even though he does not err in reckoning that nothing must be done against a divine precept.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that particular principles have the power of concluding out of the first universal premises. Hence a conclusion principally is attributed to the first principles just as an effect to the first cause. And by the same reason, because the power of conscience principally depends upon the principles of the natural law just as upon things known first and through themselves, principally conscience is called the natural law or even the natural court of justice.
Reply Obj. 2: Hence the solution to the second is clear.
Article 2
Whether an erroneous conscience binds
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that an erroneous conscience does not bind unto sin.
Obj. 1: For as Augustine says in the twenty-second book of Against Faustus, every sin is against the eternal law, (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 22.27 (CSEL 25:621; PL 42:418).) which is the law of God. But sometimes erring conscience prohibits that which is not against the law of God, just as is clear in heretics who, with an erroneous conscience prohibiting, refuse to swear an oath or to eat meat or to drink wine. Therefore, it is not sin for them if they do this against conscience. And thus, an erroneous conscience does not oblige unto sin.
Obj. 2: An erroneous conscience sometimes dictates to man that he should do what is against the law of God, just as to a heretic his erring conscience dictates that he should preach against the Catholic faith. Yet he sins mortally by acting against the law of God. If, therefore, he would sin mortally also by acting against an erroneous conscience, it would follow that there would be sin in both cases. for either he would preach against the law of God or not, and thus he would be perplexed, which seems to be unfitting, because it would follow that the way of salvation would not be open to him, even though, nevertheless, it is open to all men through repentance in this life. Therefore, an erroneous conscience does not bind.
On the contrary is that the Gloss on Romans 14:23: everything which is not out of faith, is sin, says that he who acts against conscience, builds unto Gehenna. (It is actually Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 28, q. 1, c. 14, 1:1088; Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 2, tit. 13, c. 13, 2:287.)
I answer that, since an act receives its species from its object, it does not receive its species according to the matter of the object, but according to the nature of the object as such, just as the vision of a stone does not receive its species from the stone, but from the coloration, which is through itself an object of sight. Yet every human act has the nature of sin or of merit inasmuch as it is voluntary. Yet the object of the voluntary according to its proper nature is the apprehended good. For this reason, a human act is judged virtuous or vicious according to the apprehended good, to which the will is borne through itself, and not according to the material object of the act. Just as someone incurs the sin of parricide if, believing to kill his father, he kills a slave, (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1111a11–12.) and conversely, some hunter is immune from the crime of parricide if, thinking to kill a deer, with due diligence applied, he accidentally kills his father. (Jerome, Epistle 36.4 (CSEL 54:272; PL 22:455); Peter Comestor, Historia Scholastica, Genesis 28 (PL 198:1079).)
If, therefore, something which, according to itself is not against the law of God, such as to lift straw from the earth, (Cf. below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 6, a. 3, resp.; John of La Rochelle (John of Rupella), Summa on Vices and Sins (Ms. Assisi Com. 587, f. 35rb10–12).) or to swear an oath, should be thought, with conscience erring, as being against the law of God, and thus the will is borne to it, it is clear that the will is borne, speaking of itself and formally, to that which is against the law of God, while materially it is borne to that which is not against the law of God, nay, rather, perhaps to that which is according to the law of God. And for this reason, it is clear that contempt of the law of God is there, and for this reason, it is necessary that sin be there.
And for this reason, it must be said that every conscience, whether right or erroneous, whether in things evil in themselves or in things indifferent, is obligatory, such that he who acts against conscience sins.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, although a heretic who swears an oath, with an erring conscience contradicting, materially speaking does not act against the law of God, nevertheless formally speaking he acts against the law of God, as has been shown.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, if conscience dictates to anyone that he should do what is against the law of God, he sins if he does not do it, and similarly he sins if he does it, because ignorance of the law does not excuse from sin unless, perhaps, it is invincible ignorance, just as with the mad and insane, which altogether excuses. Nor, nevertheless, does it follow that he is perplexed absolutely, but in a certain way, for he can put aside his erroneous conscience, and then he does not sin in acting according to the law of God. Yet it is not unfitting that, with something posited, some man should be perplexed, such as a priest who is held to sing, sins by singing and by not singing if he is in sin; nor, nevertheless, is he perplexed absolutely, because he can repent and sing without sin, just as also in syllogistics, with one unfitting thing given, the others follow, as is said in the first book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 1.2, 185a11–12.)
Question 13
On penance
Then there were questions concerning penance. And about this there were two questions:
first, whether if some priest says to a penitent: whatever of good you do, may it be for you unto the remission of sins, there is sacramental satisfaction;
second, whether, upon him who has omitted to say the divine office when held to it, other penances can be imposed for such an omission, or must it be imposed upon him that he repeat what he omitted.
Article 1
Whether there is sacramental satisfaction if some priest says to a penitent: may whatever good you do be for the remission of your sins
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the aforesaid satisfaction is not sacramental.
Obj. 1: For sacramental satisfaction binds unto something. But that man to whom the abovementioned mode of satisfaction is declared is bound unto nothing. Therefore, it seems that there is not sacramental satisfaction.
On the contrary: That seems to be sacramental satisfaction whereby, with it accomplished, a man is held unto nothing else. But a penitent upon whom satisfaction is enjoined thus by a priest is held to fulfill nothing else, since nothing else is mandated for him. Therefore, satisfaction of this sort is sacramental.
I answer that here a fourfold distinction must be used. For first it must be considered that a sinner is a debtor of some satisfaction in two ways: in one way, from the injunction of a priest; in another way, from the sin committed. Hence, if it happens that a priest imposes a lesser satisfaction upon a penitent than that to which he is obligated from the quantity of his sin, having subtracted that which is remitted by virtue of the keys and preceding contrition, nonetheless the penitent is obligated to something more, which if in this life he does not complete, he will pay in purgatory. And conversely, if a priest imposes a greater penance than the penitent is held to do, with the remission weighed which was made through the power of the keys and with contrition preceding, nonetheless the penitent is held to do that which has been enjoined upon him if the faculty is present.
Second, it must be considered that a work which anyone does out of the injunction of a priest prevails for a penitent in two ways: in one way, from the nature of the work; in another way, from the power of the keys. For since satisfaction enjoined by the absolving priest is a part of penance, it is clear that in it the power of the keys is working, such that it prevails more unto expiating sin than if a man were to do the same work by his own choice.
Third, it must be considered that satisfaction prevails unto two things: (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 15.1, a. 4, sol. 1.) for it prevails unto the expiation of past fault, and it prevails also unto the caution of future fault, just as when a man fasts there is granted to him a remedy against future desires of the flesh.
Fourth, it likewise must be considered that a priest can enjoin satisfaction upon a penitent either out of his own judgment or also out of another’s counsel.
Therefore, it must be considered that, just as a priest can enjoin satisfaction upon a penitent out of another’s judgment, so also out of the judgment of the penitent himself, such as if he says: may you do this, if you are able; and if you are not able, may you do this. And it seems similar when a priest says: whatever of good you should do, may it be for you unto the remission of sins. (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri (Venice: Franciscum Franciscium, 1575), 4:353vb.) Yet it seems fitting enough for a priest not to burden a penitent with a grave weight of satisfaction because, just as a small fire is extinguished easily by many pieces of wood put upon it, so it could happen that a small affect of contrition in a penitent recently excited on account of a grave burden of satisfaction would be extinguished, with the sinner totally despairing. Hence it is better for a priest to declare to a penitent how great a penance would have to be enjoined upon him for sins, but, nevertheless, should enjoin upon him something which the penitent can bear tolerably, and from whose fulfillment the penitent will become accustomed to fulfilling greater things, which even the priest had not attempted to enjoin upon him. And these things which he does beyond the expressed injunction receive greater power for the expiation of past fault from that general injunction by which the priest says: whatever of good you should do, may it be for you unto the remission of sins (hence laudably is this accustomed to be said by many priests), even though they do not have greater power unto granting a remedy against future fault. And regarding this such satisfaction is sacramental, inasmuch as by virtue of the keys it is expiative of committed fault.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
Article 2
Whether, upon him who has omitted to say the divine office when held to it, there can be imposed another penance for such an omission, or must it be imposed upon him that he repeat what he omitted
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that upon him who has omitted to say the divine office it must be enjoined that he say it again.
Obj. 1: For he who is held to fulfill some special debt cannot be freed unless he pay the same debt. If, therefore, someone was held to some special debt, namely, to say the divine office, it seems that he could not be absolved unless he paid this debt.
On the contrary is that penances are arbitrary. (Cf. Gerald of Wales, Gemma Ecclesiastica 1.46.) Therefore, for a sin of such an omission, any punishment can be imposed according to the judgment of the priest.
I answer that in every divine office there is this common thing: that it pertains to the praise of God and to the suffrage of the faithful, yet one office is distinguished from another according to the diversity of times and places. For rationally was it instituted for God to be praised in diverse ways according to the congruity of times and places.
And for this reason, just as in saying divine offices there must be observed congruity of place, so also congruity of time, which indeed could not be observed if it were necessary to enjoin upon one omitting that he say the hours which he omitted: for perhaps in Compline he would say: iam lucis orto sidere, (Hymn “Now that the Daylight Fills the Sky,” in Office of Prime.) and in Paschaltide he would say the office of the Lord’s Passion, (Passion Sunday is the fifth Sunday of Lent.) which would be absurd. And for this reason, it does not seem that it must be enjoined upon him who omitted the divine office that he repeat the same hours, but rather something pertaining to divine praise: for example, that he say the seven Psalms, (Penitential Psalms: 6, 31, 37, 50, 101, 129, 142.) or one psalter, or something more according to the quantity of the delict.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that with the due time of the office passing by, he is now incapable of resolving at the due time, and for this reason, because he cannot do this, another penance must be enjoined upon him.
Chapter 9 of 37