On God

Question 1

Regarding the divine nature

There were questions concerning God, (Qq. 1–2.) angels, (Q. 3.) men, (Qq. 4–13.) and purely bodily creatures. (Q. 14.)

Concerning God there were questions both regarding the divine nature, (Q. 1.) and regarding the assumed nature. (Q. 2.)

About the divine nature there were two questions concerning the power of God:

first, whether God can make matter exist without form;

second, whether he can make the same body be locally in two places simultaneously.

Article 1

Whether God can make matter exist without form

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God can make matter exist without form.

Obj. 1: Just as matter depends upon form according to its being, so an accident depends upon a subject. But God can make an accident exist without a subject, as is clear in the sacrament of the altar. Therefore, he can make matter exist without form.

On the contrary: God cannot make contradictories exist simultaneously. But for matter to exist without form implies a contradiction, since for matter to exist implies act, which is form. Therefore, God cannot make matter exist without form.

I answer that the active power of each thing must be considered according to the mode of essence, since each thing acts inasmuch as it is a being in act. (Aquinas, In I Sent. 42.1.1; In II Sent. 1.1.2, s.c. 2; 1.1.5, obj. 11.) Hence, if a form or nature is found in something that is not limited or contracted, its power will extend itself to all acts or effects befitting that nature. For example, if heat were understood to subsist through itself, or in some subject that was to receive it according to its whole ability, it would follow that it would have power to produce all the acts and effects of heat. Whereas if some subject were not to receive heat according to its whole ability, but with some contraction and limitation, it would not have active power with respect to all the acts or effects of heat. Yet since God is subsisting being itself, it is clear that the nature of being befits God infinitely without any limitation and contraction. Hence his active power extends itself infinitely to the whole of being and to everything which can have the character of being. Therefore, only that which is repugnant to the character of being could be excluded from the divine power, and this not on account of a defect of divine power, (Cf. below: Quodlibet IX, q. 1, a. 1, resp.) but because it cannot be a being, and hence it cannot be made.

Yet it is repugnant to the character of being simultaneously to exist and not exist in the same respect. Hence for something to simultaneously exist and not exist cannot be made by God, nor something that includes some contradiction. And for matter to be actually without form is of this sort: for everything which is actual is either act itself or the power participating in act. Yet to be an act is repugnant to the character of matter, which according to its proper character is being in potency. Therefore, it remains that it cannot be able to be in act except inasmuch as it participates in act. Yet act participated in by matter is nothing else than form. Hence to say that matter is in act and that matter has form is the same thing. Therefore, to say that matter is in act without form is to say that contradictories exist simultaneously. Hence this cannot be made by God.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that an accident according to its own being depends upon a subject just as upon the cause sustaining it. And because God can produce all effects of secondary causes without those secondary causes, (Book of Causes, prop. 1; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 12.1.1, qa. 1; cf. SCG IV.65.) he can conserve an accident in being without a subject. But matter according to its actual being depends upon form inasmuch as form is its very act. Hence it is not similar.

Article 2

Whether God can make the same body be locally in two places simultaneously

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that God can make one body be locally in two places simultaneously.

Obj. 1: It is more difficult for one substance to be changed into another substance than for one accident to be changed into another accident. But in the sacrament of the altar the substance of bread, with its dimensions remaining whereby it is commensurate with a place, is converted by divine power into the substance of the body of Christ. Thus, it follows that the same body of Christ is in many places simultaneously, not locally according to the commensuration of its proper dimensions, but sacramentally. Therefore, God can make it that the dimension of this body is converted into the dimension of another body. And thus, there will be the same body locally in two places simultaneously.

On the contrary: All two places are distinguished from one another according to some contrariety of place, which are up and down, in front of and behind, right and left. (Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 205b31–33, 206a5–6; 4.1, 208b12–14, 17–18; 8.8, 261b34–36.) But God cannot make two contraries exist simultaneously since this implies a contradiction. Therefore, God cannot make the same body exist locally in two places simultaneously.

I answer that for some body to be locally in some place is nothing other than for a body to be circumscribed (Cf. Aristotle’s definition of place: Aristotle, Physics, 4.4, 212a20–21; Avicenna, Sufficientia (The Book of Healing) 2.9 (ed. Venice, 1508, f. 31va E–F); John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, ed. E. M. Buytaert (New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1955), 1.13, 8:56–57 (PG 94:850–59).) and contained by a place according to the commensuration of its proper dimensions. (Cf. below: Quodlibet VII, q. 4, a. 1, resp., ad 1.) Yet that which is contained by some place is in this place such that nothing of it is outside that place. Hence to posit that it is locally in this place and, nevertheless, in another place, is to posit that contradictories exist simultaneously. Hence, according to the premises, this cannot be made by God.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that it is more difficult for one accident to be changed into another accident than for one substance to be changed into another substance. This is both because two substances share the same material subject, which is an essential part of each substance, and because a substance has individuation through its very self, whereas an accident is not able to be individual through itself but through a subject. Hence it cannot accord with it for this accident to be converted into this accident. Nevertheless, given that one dimension is converted into another dimension, it would not follow that that body would be in two places simultaneously, but in one only. For, just as after the substance of bread has been converted into the substance of the body of Christ there are now not two substances, but one only, so also if one dimension of this body is converted into another dimension of another body, now there will not be two dimensions, but one only, and thus it would not be commensurate with diverse places, but with one only.

Question 2

Regarding the assumed nature

Then there were questions concerning God in regard to the assumed human nature. And there were three questions about this:

first, regarding the soul: namely, whether the soul of Christ knows infinite things;

second, regarding the body: namely, whether the eye of Christ after death is called an eye equivocally or univocally;

third, regarding the act of union which is eating: namely, whether after the Resurrection Christ truly ate by incorporating food into himself.

Article 1

Regarding the soul

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul of Christ cannot know infinite things.

Obj. 1: For no created gift, since it is finite, can elevate a creature to that which is proper to God, since he is infinite. But the grace of union is a created gift, while to know infinite things is proper to God, of whose wisdom there is no number (Ps 147 [146]:5). Therefore, the soul of Christ through the grace of union cannot be elevated to knowing infinite things.

Obj. 2: Dionysius in the eleventh chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy posits three things proportionate to one another, which are substance, power, and activity. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 11.2 (PG 3:290).) But the substance of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite. Therefore, neither can his power nor his activity be infinite such that he can know infinite things.

On the contrary (3): The intellect of the soul of Christ is not less than his will. But the merit of Christ, which is an act of the will of his soul, is infinite because it was sufficient for the abolition of infinite sins: (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 29, a. 3, obj. 8.) for there is a propitiation for the sins of the whole world (1 John 2:2). Therefore, the act of the intellect of Christ’s soul also can be infinite such that it can know infinite things.

I answer that it must be said that this needs a manifold distinction.

First, it must be considered that something can be called infinite both according to form and according to matter. For it is called infinite from being not limited. Yet matter is limited through form, inasmuch as matter which is potentially diverse species is determined to be one species through form, and form is also limited through matter, inasmuch as the form of a species, which is born to be in many individuals, is determined to be an individual according to being received in particular matter. Therefore, just as matter without form has the character of the infinite, so also form without matter. The reason for this is because the divine essence itself is not received in anything material, nor does it have an admixture of any potency, but it is pure subsisting act, and for this reason, it is called infinite. (ST I.7.1.) And, because each thing is known through form, according to it being in act, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.9, 1051a29–33.) for this reason, the infinite according to matter is unknown according to itself, as is said in the third book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207a25–26; 1.4, 187b7–8.) Yet the infinite according to form is most known according to itself, while to us it is unknown because it exceeds the proportion of our intellect. And since quantity is a disposition of matter, and a quantity’s infinity in quantity refers to its power in assuming one thing after another, for this reason, an infinite in quantity is unknown according to itself, and no intellect can know an infinite in quantity by post-assuming, (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.12, 78a14–15; Albert the Great, Posterior Analytics 1.3.5; Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 22, n. 191; Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 206a28–29.) namely, by numbering part after part.

Likewise, it must be considered that in either way it happens that one thing is infinite absolutely and another according to something. (Cf. below: Quodlibet IX, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 29, a. 3.) For if some body is infinite according to longitude, yet not according to latitude, it is infinite according to something. But if it is infinite according to all dimensions, it will be infinite absolutely. Similarly, if the form of some species is understood to be not in matter, as the Platonists posited, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.6, 987a29–b18.) it will be infinite according to something, namely, regarding the individuals of that species. Nevertheless, it will be finite absolutely, namely, inasmuch as it is determined unto genus and species. But the divine essence is infinite absolutely because it is absolved from every circumscription of genus or species.

Likewise, it must be considered that science is twofold: one which is called the science of vision, through which are understood those things which are now, shall be, or were. The other science is of simple notion, through which are known those things which neither are now, nor shall be, nor were, but can be. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 1, tract. 9, ch. 2, 1:260; Summa fratris Alexandri, 1:264; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 4, 26:296; In III Sent., d. 14, a. 1, ad 1, 29:255b; Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, 1:691; Aquinas, In I Sent. 38.1.4.)

Therefore, it must be said that God, by knowing his own essence, since he comprehends it, knows by the science of simple notion infinite things absolutely because he knows all things which he can make. Nevertheless, he does not know them in post-assuming, (Cf. above: resp.) namely, by numbering one after another, but rather all simultaneously. Whereas the soul of Christ does not comprehend the essence of God, and consequently neither his power. Hence it cannot know all things which God can make, and for this reason, it does not know infinite things absolutely. The soul of Christ does comprehend the whole power of a creature, yet in the power of a creature there are infinite things, not absolutely, because the power of a creature does not extend itself unto all things which God can do, but according to some genus, just as the continuous is in potency unto infinite divisions. Hence the soul of Christ knows, by the knowledge of simple notion, infinite things according to something, which are in the power of a creature.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear. For the first two arguments proceed concerning the knowledge of infinite things absolutely.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the will of the soul of Christ is a finite power absolutely, just as also his intellect. Yet the merit of Christ has infinity out of dignity of person, namely, inasmuch as it is the merit of God and man. (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 29, a. 3, ad 4, ad 8.)

Article 2

Regarding the body

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the eye of Christ after death was not an eye equivocally.

Obj. 1: For the body of Christ and all of its parts is sustained (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 2, a. 5, ad 10; In III Sent., d. 6, prologue.) through the hypostasis of God the Word. But the hypostasis of the Word of God remains united to the body of Christ and to its parts after death. Therefore, there was the same body of Christ in regard to substance after death and before, both in regard to the whole and to all its parts. Therefore, the eye of Christ was not equivocally an eye after death.

Obj. 2: The philosophers did not know how to speak except as regards pure man. Yet Christ was not pure man, but man and God. Therefore, that which the Philosopher says: that the eye of a dead man is an eye equivocally, does not apply to Christ. (Cf. the beginning of this article.)

On the contrary: Christ is univocally man with other men, and his death was true, just as also the death of other men. Therefore, since the eye of every dead man is called an eye equivocally, it seems that also the eye of Christ after death is equivocally an eye.

I answer that equivocal and univocal are said according to the same definition, or not according to the same definition. The definition of any species is taken from its specific form. Yet the specific form of man is the rational soul. Hence, with the rational soul removed, there cannot remain man univocally, but only equivocally. Yet it is necessary to receive the same which is in the whole also in the parts, for, just as the soul is related to the whole body, so a part of the soul is related to a part of the body, as sight to the eye, as is said in the second book of On the Soul. Hence, with the soul separated from the body, just as there is not said man unless equivocally, so neither is there said eye unless equivocally. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b17–25; cf. the beginning of this article.)

For it does not matter whether there is presupposed another substantial form in the body before the rational soul, as certain men wish it to be, (Namely, those following Avicebron, according to Aquinas, below: Quodlibet XI, q. 5, a. 1, resp.; cf. above: Quodlibet I, q. 4, a. 1.) or not—as rather seems consonant with the truth. For whatever of the essential principles is subtracted, now there will not remain the same character of the species, hence neither will the name be said univocally. Yet with the soul receding, there would remain a human body and its parts according to the same character of species only in this way: if the soul were not united to the body as its form. But then it would follow that there would be neither substantial generation through union of soul, nor corruption through separation. This, indeed, is heretical to posit in the body of Christ: for Damascene says in the third book that the name of corruption signifies two things: for it signifies these human passions, hunger, thirst, labor, the holes of the nails, death, namely, the separation of soul from body, and whatever such things . . . ; yet corruption signifies also the perfect destruction and dissolution of the body into those elements out of which it was composed; the body of the Lord did not have experience of this, as the prophet says . . . you shall not give your Holy One to see διαφθορά, that is, destruction. Yet to call the body of the Lord incorruptible according to the foolish Julianus and Galanus according to the first meaning of corruption, before the resurrection, is impious. For if incorruptible, not ‘homoousion,’ that is, consubstantial, with us . . . and not by truth are there made those things which the Gospel says are made . . . and we are saved by opinion and not by truth. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.28 [or ch. 72] (PG 94:1099–1100).)

Therefore, just as Christ in the triduum of death, on account of the separation of soul from body (which is true corruption), is not said to have been a man univocally, but a dead man, so neither was his eye in the triduum of death an eye univocally, but equivocally, just as a dead eye. The same reasoning applies to the other parts of the body of Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, it must be said that substance is said in two ways. For sometimes it is understood as hypostasis, and thus it is true that the body of Christ remains sustained through the hypostasis of God the Word: for the union of the Word was not dissolved through death either unto the soul or unto the body. And thus, it remains absolutely the same body in number according to hypostasis or supposit, which is the person of the Word. In another way, substance is understood as essence or nature, and thus the body of Christ is sustained through the soul just as through its form, yet not through the Word since the Word is not united to the body as its form—for this is heretical, according to the heresy of Arius and Apollinaris, which posited that the Word is in Christ in place of the soul. (Cf. Augustine, On Heresies 55 (CCSL 46:325; PL 42:49); Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, cc. 2–3 (PL 42:1214; 58:981–82; CPG 5984); Aquinas, In III Sent. 2.1.3, qa. 2.) It would follow also that the union of God and man would be made in nature, which pertains to the heresy of Eutyches. (Cf. SCG IV.35; Leo the Great, Letter to Flavian (PL 54:777); Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures: A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius, ch. 5 (PL 64:1347–49).) Thus, therefore, the body of Christ after death is absolutely the same according to the substance which is hypostasis, yet not the same according to the substance which is essence or nature. Yet univocation and equivocation do not apply to the supposit but the essence or nature, which the definition entails.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, although Christ is not pure man, nevertheless, he is true man, and his death was true death. Hence whatever is true concerning man inasmuch as he is man, and concerning the death of man, the whole is true concerning Christ and concerning his death.

Article 3

Regarding the act of union which is eating

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that Christ after the Resurrection truly ate by incorporating food into himself.

Obj. 1: Because, as Augustine says in the book Book of Eighty-Three Questions: if it deceives, it is not the truth. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 14 (CCSL 46A:20; PL 40:14).) Hence no fiction befits Christ, who is the truth. Yet it would be a fiction if he were not truly to incorporate into himself the food which he seemed to eat. Therefore, he truly ate by incorporating food into himself.

On the contrary is what Damascene says in the third book, that Christ, although he tasted food after the Resurrection, but not by the law of nature . . . , but by way of dispensation, making to believe the truth of the Resurrection, because this same flesh is that which suffered and rose. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 4.1 [or ch. 74] (PG 94:1103).)

I answer that something is said to be true in two ways: (Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of John, ch. 21, lect. 2, n. 2612; Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 5.) in one way, by the truth of signification; in another way, by the truth of natural species, just as a voice is true by the truth of signification when it signifies that that which is, is. (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 5, 4b8–10; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 10, nn. 140–42.) Yet the truth of natural species depends upon the principles of the species, yet not on the effects or these things which follow in any way. Hence a voice is called true by the truth of natural species when it is formed by due instruments and out of the mouth of an animal it is proffered with a certain imagination, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.8, 420b13–32.) even if it is heard by no one, which is an effect following upon the voice.

Yet we read in the Scriptures that even angels ate without necessity, (Genesis 18:9; Tobit 11:20.) and also Christ after the Resurrection, (Luke 24:43; John 21:13, 15.) and both acts of eating were true, as Augustine says in the thirteenth book of On the City of God. (Augustine, City of God 13.22 (PL 41:395; CCSL 48:405).) Nevertheless, this was in different ways: for in angels it was true by the truth of signification because, as Augustine says in the same place, angels ate not because they had need, but because they willed and could, so that they would be congruous to men by a certain humanity of their ministry; (Augustine, City of God 13.22 (PL 41:395; CCSL 48:405).) yet in Christ it was true eating by the truth of natural species, for it was exercised by natural instruments ordered to this act; and it was also true by the truth of signification because it signified the truth of human nature in the rising body.

That food is changed into the body is something that follows eating, hence even in us if food is not changed, but at once expelled through vomit, nonetheless the eating which had preceded was true. Yet it was not fitting for food to be changed into the body of Christ, which already was outside the state of generation and corruption. Hence that food was by the power of Christ released into preexistent matter, (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 15 (PG 3:327–40); Peter Abelard, On the First Six Days (PL 178:734B); Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 11, ch. 2, p. 298 (PL 192:862); Aquinas, In II Sent. 8.1.4, qa. 1, ad 1.) and it was not changed into the body of Christ. Nevertheless, there was true eating without any fiction.

Reply Obj. 1: Hence the response to the objections is clear.