On God

Regarding his divine nature

Question 1

On the knowledge of God

There were questions concerning God, (Qq. 1–3.) angels, (Q. 4.) and men. (Qq. 5–14.)

Concerning God, there were questions regarding both the divine nature (Qq. 1–2.) and the assumed nature. (Q. 3.)

Regarding the divine nature, there were questions concerning his knowledge (Q. 1.) and his power. (Q. 2.)

About the knowledge of God there were two questions:

first, whether God knows the first instant in which he could have created the world;

second, whether those foreknown by God can merit punishment.

Article 1

Whether God knows the first instant in which he could have created the world

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God knows the first instant in which he could have created the world.

Obj. 1: For God could have created the world before he created it; yet he could not have created it infinitely before, because thus it would be coeternal with him. Therefore, there must be some instant in which he could have first created the world. But God knows everything. Therefore, God knows the first instant in which he could have created the world.

On the contrary: God knows nothing which prejudices his omnipotence. Yet it would prejudice his omnipotence if there were some instant in which first he could have created the world, because thus his power would be limited to that instant. Therefore, God does not know the first instant in which he could have created the world.

I answer that something is said to be made in some measure of place or of time in two ways. One way is with the measure itself presupposed; and thus, particular effects are produced by God or by other agents in place or time. Another way is such that the measure of place or of time is simultaneously produced with that which is made. And in this way, the world is produced in being by God, not indeed as though in some preexisting place or time, but because both place and time are produced simultaneously with the world.

Hence it must be understood in one way when it is said that God could have made some particular effect, for example a horse or a man, before he made it or even elsewhere than he made it. It must be understood in a different way when this is said concerning the world. For when this is said about a man or a horse, some time or some place is signified in which a man could be made by God. But when this is said about the world, it is not signified that there is some time before the world nor some place outside of it, but it is signified that God could have made a greater measure of the place or of the time of the world.

If, therefore, it is asked whether he could have made the world infinitely before he made it, if this indeed refers to the power of making, it is clear that he could have made it infinitely before: for the power of God is eternal, to which nothing could be added such that at some time he could begin to make the world when before he could not have made it. Whereas, if it refers to the world itself, it could not be made such that it would always be, with the truth of the Catholic faith supposed, which holds that at some time the world was not: for just as God cannot make it that something which was should not have been, as will be said below, (Cf. below: q. 2, a. 1.) so he cannot make it that something which was not at some time never should have been. According to this understanding, therefore, it is said that God could not make the world infinitely before he made it.

But still, it must be understood that infinite is understood in two ways. One way is in act, and thus it is said according to the aforesaid manner that God could not have made the world infinitely before he made it: that is, for the duration of the world to have preceded infinitely before. Another way is when infinite is said according to potency, and thus God could have made the world infinitely before he made it, because however much before it is given that he made it, he could have made it still prior.

And thus, there is not necessarily a first instant in which God could have made the world, yet there is necessarily a first instant in which he made it, just as also there is necessarily a supreme up-to-where where God made the world, nevertheless there is not necessarily a supreme beyond which he could not have made it.

Reply Obj. 1: And thus, it is clear that the question ceases.

Article 2

Whether those foreknown by God can merit punishment

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that those foreknown by God cannot merit punishment.

Obj. 1: For just as some men are chosen by God from eternity to have grace, so also some men are foreknown by God to be abandoned to their nature. But by natural things we do not merit reward nor punishment. (Cf. below: Quodlibet VI, q. 4, a. 1, obj. 1.) Therefore, those foreknown by God cannot merit punishment.

On the contrary: No one is damned by God unless on account of meriting punishment since God is a just judge. But those foreknown are damned by God. Therefore, they merit punishment.

I answer that the knowledge of God is compared to created things just as art to artificial things. (Cf. ST I.14.8.) Hence, just as art not only knows, but makes those things which are done according to art, whereas it only knows those transgressions which deviate from the rules of art, so also the knowledge of God makes and knows all good things, whereas it only knows, and does not cause, those evil things or transgressions which deviate from his eternal law. And thus, it is clear that good men, who are justified through grace, not only are foreknown by God from eternity, but also are chosen to have grace. Yet sinners, who are not justified through grace, are not chosen or preordained by God unto fault, but only foreknown that they are not going to have grace, and are to be left to their nature.

Whereas, because every agent is able in that which is below himself, yet not in that which is above himself, nature left to itself is not capable of a meritorious act, which is above the ability of nature, yet it is capable of an act of sin, which merits punishment, as something existing below human nature: for man by sinning falls from the dignity of his nature. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Job, ch. 40, lect. 2, n. 534.) And thus, it is clear that those foreknown can merit punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that what is said: that by natural things we merit neither reward nor punishment, can be understood in two ways. One way is such that natural things themselves do not merit reward nor punishment; and thus it is true, because things that merit reward are above nature and things that merit punishment are against nature. It can be understood another way such that natural things are not the principles of meriting reward or punishment; and thus it is false: for natural things aided through grace are principles of meriting reward, yet left to themselves they can be principles of meriting punishment, as has been said. (Cf. above: response.)

Question 2

On the power of God

Then there were two questions about the power of God:

first, whether God can repair a corrupted virgin;

second, whether God can sin, if he wills.

Article 1

Whether God can repair a corrupted virgin

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God can repair a virgin.

Obj. 1: For to the omnipotence of God it pertains that every word should not be impossible before him (Luke 1:37). But this is a certain word: to repair a virgin after a lapse. Therefore, God can repair a virgin after a lapse.

On the contrary: Jerome says: although God otherwise is able, he is not able to repair a virgin after ruin; (Jerome, Letter 22, “To Eustochius,” para. 5 (CSEL 54:150: PL 22:397).) and this is contained in the Decretum (C. 32, q. 5). (Gratian, Decretum, Part 2, Cause 32, question 5, canon 11, “Si Paulus,” 1:1135.)

I answer that in virginity we can consider two things. One is the integrity itself of mind and body; and thus, God can repair a virgin after ruin: for he can both reintegrate the mind through grace and consolidate the body through a miracle. Yet the cause of the aforesaid integrity is another thing, namely, because a virgin woman has not been known by a man. Regarding this, God cannot repair a virgin after ruin, for he cannot make it that she who already has been known by a man was not known, just as neither concerning anything done can he make it that it was not done. For the power of God extends itself unto the whole of being. Hence there is excluded from the power of God only that which is repugnant to the character of being: and this is to be and not to be simultaneously. And that something which was and was not, is of this same character. Hence Augustine says in the twenty-sixth book of Against Faustus: someone says: if God is omnipotent, let him make it that those things which have been done, should not have been done, and he does not see that he says this: . . . let him make it that those things which are true, by this very thing by which they are true, should be false. (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 26.5 (CSEL 25:732; PL 42:481).)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that since a word is a concept of the mind, nothing which involves a contradiction can be called a word because it does not fall in a concept of the mind, (Cf. below: Quodlibet IX, q. 1, a. 1, reply s.c.) as is proven in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3, 1005b23–26.)

Article 2

Whether God can sin, if he wills

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that this is false: God can sin, if he wills.

Obj. 1: For about anything that I can say a man can do if he wills, it can also be said absolutely that a man can do that thing. If, therefore, this proposition is true: God can sin, if he wills, it follows that this is true: God can sin. But this is erroneous; therefore, the first is also erroneous.

On the contrary: Whoever wills to sin, sins. But it follows: if God sins, he can sin. Therefore, it follows: if he wills, he can sin.

I answer that this conjunction “if” implies a certain order. And for the question at hand, it can imply a twofold order.

In one way, indeed, it implies an order of cause or of principle; and in this way, the proposition is false. For the will of God is principle and cause in regard to creatures, yet not in regard to those things which pertain to the divine nature. Hence we do not say that the Father generated the Son by will, but naturally, as is clear through Hilary in the book On Synods. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 24.58 (PL 10:520).) Yet the power of God pertains to the divine nature itself. Hence the very ability to sin is not subject to the divine will. Otherwise, the will of God would be the principle of a change of the divine nature, which is impossible.

In another way, it can imply an order of consequence; and thus this speech is true: if God wills to sin, he can sin. For it follows without condition if we argue from an impossible thing posited: God wills to sin, therefore he can sin. For all things which he wills, he can do, but not conversely.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that, when it is said: if a man wills to run, he can run, the antecedent is possible, and for this reason, the consequent is possible absolutely. But when it is said thus: if God wills to sin, he can sin, the antecedent is impossible, hence nothing prohibits that the conditional should be true, with the consequent existing as impossible.

Regarding the assumed nature

Question 3

Regarding the assumed nature

Then there were two questions regarding the assumed nature:

first, whether all the blood Christ poured out in his Passion returned to his body in the Resurrection;

second, whether Christ exhibited a sign of love for us more in that he suffered for us, or in that he gave his body as food for us in the sacrament.

Article 1

Whether all the blood which Christ poured out in his Passion returned to his body in the Resurrection

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that all the blood of Christ poured out in his Passion returned to his body in the Resurrection.

Obj. 1: For our resurrection shall be conformed to the Resurrection of Christ, according to Philippians 3:21: he shall re-form the body of our humility configured to the body of his clarity, but to our body there shall return in the resurrection the whole which was truly human nature. (Cf. below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 3, a. 1.) Yet the blood of Christ poured out in his Passion was truly human nature, and it is called sacred according to that line: whom the sacred blood has anointed, fused to the body of the lamb. (Venantius Fortunatus, “Pange lingua gloriosi,” Carmina 2.2, line 30, ed. Fridericus Leo, Monumenta Germaniae historica 4 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1881), 28.) Therefore, it seems that the blood of Christ poured out in the Passion returned to his body in the Resurrection.

Obj. 2: The Word of God never laid aside that which he assumed in our nature, with the parts of human nature separated from one another in the Passion. But the Word of God assumed in our nature not only a body, but also blood. Therefore, that blood never was laid aside by the Word. Therefore, it returned unto him in the Resurrection.

On the contrary: In some churches the blood of Christ even unto today is said to be preserved. (For example: Mantua, Italy; Weingarten, Germany (1101); Bruges, Belgium (1149), Namurco (1205), Fecamp (1247).)

I answer that in the Resurrection, both Christ’s and ours, the whole which was truly human nature will be repaired, yet not those things which were not truly human nature. And although there are diverse opinions of diverse men about those things which are truly human nature, (Cf. below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 3, a. 1.) according to any opinion it is not the whole nourishing blood, that is, that which is generated out of food, that pertains to true human nature. Therefore, since Christ ate and drank before the Passion, nothing prohibits that in him there was some nourishing blood, which would not pertain to true human nature and which it is not necessary would return to his body in the Resurrection. (Cf. Robert Grosseteste, De sanguine Christi, sermon in 1247, found in: Matthew Paris, Additamenta, ed. Henry Richards Luard, Chronica maiora 6 (London: Longmen and Co., 1882), 138–44.)

But because the question is made specially about the blood poured out in the Passion for the redemption of the human race, concerning this it seems that it must rather be said that in the Resurrection the whole returned to the body of Christ for a threefold reason. The first of which can be taken from the age of the suffering Christ: for he suffered at the most perfect age, at which most of all those things which are found in man seem to pertain to true human nature, as led unto maximum perfection. The second is taken from the merit of the Passion: for if those parts of the holy martyrs in which they endured passion for Christ will have a certain privileged brilliance in the resurrection, as Augustine says in the twenty-first book of On the City of God, much more was the blood of Christ, which he poured out for the salvation of the human race, repaired unto a glorious Resurrection. (Augustine, City of God 22.19, para. 3 (CCSL 48:839; PL 41:782).) The third reason can be taken from the power itself of the Passion: for that blood poured out in the Passion sanctified the human race, according to Hebrews 13:12: Jesus, in order that he would sanctify his people through blood, suffered outside the gate. Yet the humanity of Christ had salvific virtue from the power of the Word united to it, as Damascene says in the third book. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.15 [59] (PG 94:1059).) Hence it is clear that the blood poured out in the Passion, which most of all was salvific, was united to the divinity, and for this reason, it was necessary that in the Resurrection it would be joined to the other parts of his humanity.

Yet the blood of Christ which is shown in certain churches is said miraculously to have flown out of a certain image of Christ struck, or otherwise out of the body of Christ. (Cf. ST III.54.3, ad 3; Robert Grosseteste, De sanguine Christi (Matthew Paris, Additamenta, ed. Henry Richards Luard, Chronica maiora 6 [London: Longmen and Co., 1882], 138–44); Vincent Beauvais, Speculum historiale, ed. Duaci, 23.160, 1624, col. 955; Pseudo-Athanasius, Sermon, Second Nicean Council, 787, session 4 (PG 28:795–824).)

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 2

Whether Christ exhibited a sign of love for us more in that he suffered for us or in that he gave his body as food for us in the sacrament

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that Christ showed for us a sign of greater love by handing over his body as food than by suffering for us.

Obj. 1: For the charity of the fatherland is more perfect than the charity of the journey. But the benefit which Christ conferred upon us by giving his body to us as food is better compared to the charity of the fatherland, in which we will enjoy God fully. Yet the Passion which he underwent for us is better compared to the charity of the journey, during which we are warned that we must suffer for Christ. Therefore, it is a greater sign of love that Christ handed over his body to us as food than that he suffered for us.

On the contrary: It is said in John 15:13: greater charity no one has than that he should lay down his soul for his friends.

I answer that that which is most in each genus is the measure of all of those which are of that genus, as is clear through the Philosopher in the tenth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b18–1054a19.) Yet the most in the genus of love of men is the love by which anyone loves himself. And thus, from this love it is necessary to receive the measure of every love by which anyone loves another. Hence also, in the ninth book of the Ethics the Philosopher says that amicable things which are unto another have come out of amicable things which are unto one’s own self. (Aristotle, Ethics 9.4, 1166a1–2.) Yet it pertains to the love by which anyone loves himself that he wills good to himself. Hence someone is proven to love another according to how much he omits on account of a friend the good which he wills for himself, according to Proverbs 12:26: he who disregards financial loss on account of a friend, is just. Yet a man wills for himself a threefold particular good, which are the soul, the body, and exterior things. Therefore, it is a sign of love for someone to suffer detriment in exterior things on account of another; yet it is a greater sign of love if he suffers the detriment even of his own body by sustaining either labors or lashes for a friend; yet it is the greatest sign of love if he wills to lay down even his own soul by dying for a friend.

Therefore, that Christ laid down his soul by suffering for us was the greatest sign of love. Yet that he gave his body to us as food in the sacrament pertains to no detriment of this. Hence it is clear that the first sign is of greater love. Hence also, this sacrament is a certain memorial and figure of the Passion of Christ. Yet the truth excels the figure, and the thing itself excels the memorial.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the presentation of the body of Christ in the sacrament has, indeed, a certain figure of the charity by which God loves us in the fatherland, but his Passion pertains to the very love of God, calling us back from perdition to the fatherland. Yet the love of God is not greater in the fatherland than in the present.