On Angels

Question 4

On angels

Article 1

Whether Lucifer is the subject of the aevum

Then about angels there was asked one thing, namely, whether Lucifer is the subject of the aevum. And it seems that he is.

Obj. 1: For just as the subject of time is the first simplest temporal thing, so the subject of the aevum seems to be the simplest aeviternal thing. Yet this is Lucifer, who amongst the angels was created supreme according to his nature. Yet the aevum does not respond to grace but to nature; otherwise, the celestial bodies, which are not receptive of grace, could not be measured by the aevum. Since, therefore, natural gifts remained intact in demons after sin, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4.23 (PG 3:723–26); Aquinas, Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 19.) it seems that the aevum is in Lucifer just as in a subject.

On the contrary: The aevum is a certain participation of eternity. But the blessed angels participate more of eternity than Lucifer, who is deprived of beatitude. Therefore, not Lucifer, but rather the supreme of the good angels, is the subject of the aevum. (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 2.1.2, ad 5.)

I answer that from ignorance of the Greek language it commonly happens among many that the aevum is distinguished from eternity, as if “anthropos” were to be distinguished from “homo” (“man”). For that which is called “aevon” in Greek, in Latin is called “aeternitas” (“eternity”). (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, prop. 2, para. 50.) And thus, even Dionysius in the tenth chapter of On the Divine Names uses “eternity“ and “aevum” for the same thing. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 19.2.1, ad 1; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names*, ch. 10, lect. 3, n. 866.)* But because names must be used as many, (Aristotle, Topics 2.2, 110a14–22.) if we distinguish one from the other, aevum will be nothing other than the participation of eternity, in order that essential eternity might of course be attributed to God himself, but aevum will be as participated eternity to spiritual substances, which are above time. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 8.2.2, resp.; 19.2.1, ad 1.) Whereas because that which is said through its essence is always a measure of what is said through participation, it can be said that the first measure of all aeviternal things is the very eternity of God, just as also the substance of God is the measure of every substance, as the Commentator says on the tenth book of the Metaphysics. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 10, comm. 7.)

Nevertheless, if anyone desires to receive a homogenous measure, that is, of the same genus, certain men say that there is not a common measure, but that every aeviternal thing has its own aevum. (Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, ed. Quaracchi, 1:102–3a.) But these men are ignorant of their own words: (Cf. below: Quodlibet IX, q. 1, a. 1, reply s.c.) for what they say would be true if all aeviternal things were equal: for thus one of them would not be the measure of another. Yet this is not true, because in angels there is understood a first, a middle, and a last, not only according to diverse hierarchies and orders, but also according to diverse angels in the same order, as is clear through Dionysius in the tenth chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Celestial Hierarchy 10.3 (PG 3:274).) And because that which is simplest is always the measure in any genus, just as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b33–35.) for this reason, it is necessary for the duration of the simplest aeviternal thing to be the aevum of all aeviternal things; and thus, the simplest aeviternal thing is the subject of the aevum.

But it must be noted that spiritual substances are measured by the aevum not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their own activity. Hence in the Book of Causes it is said that they are in the moment of eternity (Book of Causes, prop. 30 [31].) according to substance and activity. And thus, it is necessary for that angel who is the subject of the aevum to be simplest not only as regards his essence, but also as regards his activity. Yet such is the supreme of the good angels, whose activity most of all is united in one, which is God. Hence the supreme of the good angels is the subject of the aevum, and not Lucifer.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that some men have posited that Lucifer was not the supreme of the angels, but, just as Damascene says, was first of those who were over the earthly order. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.4 (PG 94:874–75).) Whereas if we should concede, according to Gregory, that he was the supreme of all, then it must be said that his activity was averted from the first one and converted to the multitude of inferior things, whose primacy he desires. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 32.23.47–48 (CCSL 143B:1666; PL 76:664–66); Gregory the Great, On the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 34, para. 7 (PL 76:1250).) And according to this, demons are cut off from the highest simplicity of the aevum. Hence Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names that demons are called evil on account of this: that they are weakened about their natural activity. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4.23 (PG 3:726, 797).)