On Men

On things which can be common to all

On things pertaining to the nature of man

Question 5

On things pertaining to the nature of man

Then there were questions concerning men.

And first, regarding what can be common to all; (Qq. 5–10.)

second, regarding what pertains to certain states of men. (Qq. 11–14.)

About common things there were four questions:

first, indeed, concerning what pertains to the nature of man; (Q. 5.)

second, concerning what pertains to the sacraments; (Qq. 6–8.)

third, concerning what pertains to the virtues; (Q. 9.)

fourth, concerning what pertains to the precepts. (Q. 10.)

About the first, there were three questions:

first, regarding the persons of men, namely, whether, if Adam had not sinned, the same men would have been saved who now are saved;

second, regarding the intellect, namely, whether a word of the heart is an intelligible species;

third, regarding the will, namely, whether those things done through fear are voluntary.

Article 1

Regarding persons

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that, if Adam had not sinned, not the same men would have been saved who now are saved.

Obj. 1: For if Adam had not sinned, only the elect would have been born. Therefore, those sinners would not have been born who are reprobated in the end, and consequently neither their sons, because, if there are not the same parents, the consequence is that neither are there the same sons. Yet many now are saved even born from reprobate parents. Therefore, if Adam had not sinned, not the same men would have been saved who now are saved.

Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, seed is the surplus of food. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.18, 724b25–29, 726a25–29; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 9, n. 344.) But man would have used other foods in Paradise if he had not sinned than those which we use now. Therefore, his seed would have been other, and consequently other sons.

On the contrary: Gregory says in the fourth book of Morals on the Book of Job: if no rot of sin had corrupted the first parent, in no way out of himself would he have generated sons of Gehenna, but only these elect who now through the Redeemer are to be saved would be born from him. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 4.31.62 (CCSL 143:206; PL 75:671).)

I answer that, since in the generation of man, just as also of other animals, the seed of the father is the agent, whereas the matter is ministered by the mother, like a patient out of which the human body is formed, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.19–21, 727a31–730a28.) it is impossible for there to be born the same son whether there is another father or another mother. So too a seal is not the same in number whether there be other wax or another body of the seal out of whose impression the wax is sealed. And although the surplus of food is seed, according to the Philosopher, (Cf. above: obj. 2.) nevertheless the diversity of foods would not suffice to diversify the sons who are born from the seed, because out of those foods there is not taken seed except inasmuch as somehow they are converted into the substance of the parents.

Yet certain men following Anselm say that if man had not sinned in the first temptation, both he himself and all born from him would have been confirmed at once, such that all who would be born would have been elect. (Anselm of Canterbury, Why God Became Man 1.18 (PL 158:387).) Hence, since now many who are saved are born from sinners, as touched upon in the objection, the consequence is that there would be other parents of those to be saved, and consequently other sons.

But this position does not seem to be true because, according to Augustine in the fourteenth book of On the City of God, the state of the body in man responds proportionally to the state of the soul: therefore, as long as man had an animal body, being able to die and not to die, lacking food, so long did he have a soul being able to sin and not to sin. (It is actually: Augustine, City of God 13.20–24 (CCSL 48:403–14; PL 41:393–404).) Yet he had an animal body as long as he was in the state of generating, which also would have been if after that first temptation he had not sinned. And for this reason, it would have been possible, if the first man had not sinned then, that still he or his posterity would have sinned afterwards, as Hugh of St. Victor says. (Hugh of Saint Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith 1.6.24 (PL 176:277–78).) Hence diversity of parents does not follow out of this: that now there are some sinners, yet then there would not have been.

But there is another reason why it is necessary to posit diversity of parents, because in the first state one man would not have had many wives nor also would any men have been born from fornication or adultery, which now happens even in these men who are saved: for many sons of one father born from many wives are saved, as is clear concerning the sons of Jacob; (Genesis 29:31–30:24, 35:16–26.) many saved are also born from fornication or adultery, otherwise to them the sacraments of salvation would be applied in vain. Hence it remains that some men now are saved who, if the first man had not sinned, would not have been born and consequently would not have been saved, nor, nevertheless, would the predestination of God have been deceived because God predestined men having knowledge of the future event.

Whereas that which Gregory says, that if the first man had not sinned, in no way out of himself would he have generated sons of Gehenna, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 4.31.62 (CCSL 143; PL 75:671).) undoubtedly is true: for original sin would not have poured from him into his sons, according to which men are born sons of wrath. (Ephesians 2:3.) Yet that which he adds, that only these who now are to be saved would have been born, must be understood such that the pronoun makes a simple demonstration, namely, because only the elect would have been born, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 4.31.62 (CCSL 143; PL 75:671).) as much as concerns the reason of origin, yet not a personal demonstration, because there would be other persons of men who would be saved. (Cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 11, a. 1, resp.)

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 2

Regarding the intellect

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a word of the heart (Cf. Augustine, Sermon 288, para. 3 (PL 38:1305); Aristotle, On the Soul 2.8, 420b22–29.) is an intelligible species.

Obj. 1: For a word of the heart is that by which the intellect sees. Yet this is an intelligible species. Therefore, a word of the heart is an intelligible species.

Obj. 2: Intellective knowledge arises from sense. But that by which sense senses is a sensible species. Therefore, a word of the heart by which the intellect understands is an intelligible species.

On the contrary: An interior word of the heart is that which is signified by an exterior word. But an exterior word does not signify an intelligible species. Therefore, an interior word is not an intelligible species itself.

I answer that according to Augustine, in the fifteenth book of On the Trinity, a word of the heart implies a certain thing proceeding from the mind or from the intellect. (Augustine, On the Trinity 15.10, para. 18 (CCSL 50A:484–85; PL 42:1070).) Yet something proceeds from the intellect inasmuch as it is constituted through its activity. Yet there is a twofold activity of the intellect, according to the Philosopher in the third book of On the Soul: one indeed which is called intelligence of indivisible things, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430a26–28.) through which the intellect forms in its very self a definition or concept of some uncomplex thing; yet another activity is of the intellect composing and dividing, according to which it forms a statement. And both of those constituted through the activity of the intellect are called a word of the heart: the first is signified through a simple term, whereas the second is signified through a statement.

Yet it is clear that every activity of the intellect proceeds from that according to which it is made in act through an intelligible species because nothing works unless according as it is in act. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 1, n. 690.) Hence it is necessary that an intelligible species, which is the principle of intellectual activity, differs from a word of the heart, which is formed through the activity of the intellect. Although that word also can be called form or intelligible species, but just as it is constituted through the intellect, as a form of art which the intellect invents, it is called a certain intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the intellect understands by something in two ways: in one way, formally, and thus it understands by the intelligible species by which it is made in act; another way is just as by an instrument which it uses to understand something, and in this way, the intellect understands by a word because it forms a word so that it should understand a thing.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the knowledge of exterior sense is perfected only through the change of sense by the sensible; hence it senses through the form which is impressed on it by the sensible. Yet the exterior sense itself does not form for itself some sensible form, but the imaginative power does this, to whose form in a certain way the word of the intellect is similar.

Article 3

Regarding the will

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that those things done out of fear are not voluntary.

Obj. 1: For necessity is contrary to will, as is said in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a26–30.) But those things done out of fear are said to be done out of necessity. Therefore, they are not voluntary.

On the contrary: Everything which anyone works on account of an end is voluntary. But those things which anyone works out of fear, he works on account of an end, namely, to avoid the evil which he fears, just as he who throws his goods in the sea avoids the submersion of the boat. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a8–19.) Therefore, things of this sort are voluntary.

I answer that, since good is the object of the will, something relates to what is voluntary in the way it relates to what is good. Yet it happens that something is considered good in the universal which, nevertheless, according to some particular circumstances is rendered evil, just as to generate sons is good, but to generate sons from a woman who is not one’s wife is evil. And similarly, it happens that something is considered evil in the universal which, nevertheless, according to some particular circumstances is made good, just as to kill a man according to itself is evil, but to kill a man pernicious to the multitude is good. And because actions are about singulars, (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110b6–7.) they are judged absolutely good or evil and consequently voluntary or involuntary with, indeed, the singular circumstances having been considered; yet they are judged relatively according as they are considered in the universal.

Whereas those things which are done out of fear, in the universal are considered evil and involuntary. But, if they were to be considered according to the singulars which stand around them, thus they are good and voluntary: just as to throw goods in the sea according to itself is considered evil and not voluntary, but in a particular case it is good and voluntary. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics that things of this sort are mixed out of the voluntary and the involuntary: there are things voluntary absolutely, and there are things involuntary relatively and done out of necessity. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.1, 1110a8–19.)

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

On things pertaining to the sacraments

Question 6

On the sacrament of the Eucharist

Then there were questions about the sacraments:

first, concerning the sacrament of the Eucharist; (Q. 6.)

second, concerning the sacrament of penance; (Q. 7.)

third, concerning the sacrament of matrimony. (Q. 8.)

About the Eucharist there were two questions:

first, whether the form of bread is annihilated;

second, whether a priest should give an unconsecrated host to a secret sinner if he seeks to receive.

Article 1

Whether the form of bread is annihilated

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the form of bread in the sacrament of the Eucharist is annihilated.

Obj. 1: For that seems to be annihilated which ceases to be and is converted into nothing. But the form of bread, with consecration having been made, ceases to be, nor is there anything to which the converted bread can belong. For it is not converted into the matter of the body of Christ, nor even into its form, which is the soul; otherwise, the soul would be there out of the power of the sacrament. Therefore, the form of bread is annihilated.

Obj. 2: Augustine says in his commentary on John 17:5, glorify me, Father, that if human nature should be converted into the Word, if we should consider diligently, man would perish in God. (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John 105.6, on John 17:5 (CCSL 36:606–7; PL 35:1906).) But what perishes is said to be annihilated. Therefore, if bread is converted into the body of Christ, it seems that it is annihilated.

On the contrary: Just as Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions, God is not the agent of tending into non-being. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 21 (CCSL 44A:26; PL 40:16).) Yet he is the agent of the sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore, in that sacrament nothing is annihilated.

I answer that annihilation implies a certain motion. Yet every motion is denominated from the terminus-to-which. Hence the term of annihilation is nothing. Yet the consecration of bread in the sacrament of the Eucharist is not terminated unto nothing, but unto the body of Christ. Otherwise, there would be no means whereby the body of Christ begins to be under the sacrament: for it does not begin to be there through a local movement, otherwise it would cease to be in heaven. It remains, therefore, that in the consecration of bread there is not any annihilation, but transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, just as in natural generation neither form nor matter is generated or corrupted, (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1033a24–b19; 8.1, 1042a29–30; 8.3, 1043b14–18.) but the composite whole, so also in the sacrament of the altar it must not be sought separately concerning form or matter into what it is converted, but the whole bread is converted into the whole body of Christ, inasmuch as it is a body. For which reason, if consecration had been made during the Triduum of the death of Christ, the soul would not have been there, but the soulless body, just as was lying in the sepulcher. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 10.1.2, resp. qa. 1; 11.3.4, qa. 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that human nature would be said to perish if it were to be converted into the Word, inasmuch as it would cease to be, which pertains to the terminus-from-which; yet it would not be annihilated, as regards the terminus-to-which.

Article 2

Whether a priest should give an unconsecrated host to a secret sinner if he attempts to receive

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to a secret sinner who attempts to receive.

Obj. 1: For the priest should not publicize secret sin. Yet he would publicize it if he were to give him an unconsecrated host, since to his other comrades he would give a consecrated one. Therefore, a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to secret sinner who seeks to receive.

Obj. 2: A consecrated host offered by the priest to any faithful is adored by those standing around. If, therefore, he presents to someone an unconsecrated host in place of a consecrated one, as much as is in him he will make the people commit idolatry, which is grave sin. Therefore, a priest should not give an unconsecrated host to secret sinner seeking to receive.

On the contrary (3): A priest is a medic of souls; (Cf. Luke 5:31; Jerome, On the Letter to Philemon, on verse 24 (PL 26:618); Augustine, The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.19, para. 57 (CCSL 35:66; PL 34:1258–59).) yet a wise medic avoids as much as he can the danger of the infirm whom he receives in his care. Yet great danger threatens a sinner whose care he has if with a conscience of mortal sin he receives the body of Christ, because he who eats and drinks unworthily, eats and drinks judgment upon himself (1 Cor 11:29). Therefore, the priest does well if he avoids this danger, offering to him an unconsecrated host.

I answer that fiction must not be joined to the truth because there is no coming together of light unto darkness, as the Apostle says in 2 Corinthians 6:14. And on account of this Augustine proves in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions that the body of Christ was not fantastic because the truth, which is Christ, could not deceive. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 14 (CCSL 44A:20; PL 40:14).) And for this reason, in the sacraments of the Church, no fiction should be made, and especially in the sacrament of the altar, in which the whole Christ is contained. Yet there would be a certain fiction if an unconsecrated host were to be given in place of a consecrated one.

And thereby also a priest, as much as is in him, would be made an occasion of idolatry for the people. Although they would not incur the sin of idolatry, reckoning probably that the host is consecrated, nevertheless the priest in giving an unconsecrated host to the people to be adored would incur the crime of idolatry.

Hence in no case must an unconsecrated host be presented to one or to many as though it were consecrated.

Therefore, the priest should first, indeed, admonish the secret sinner to do penance, and then approach the sacrament. But if he refuses to repent, the priest should prevent him secretly lest he mix himself in with the other communicants in public. But if he mixes himself in, he should give to him a consecrated host.

Reply Obj. 1–2: Hence the first two we concede.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that it would be a stupid medic who at his own greater danger would want to impede the lesser danger of the infirm: for example, if he were to want to drink poison himself lest the infirm drink wine. Yet much more does the priest sin making a fiction in the sacrament of Christ than a sinner receiving unworthily. Hence he would be a stupid priest if, in order to avoid the sin of a subject, he himself would sin more gravely, making a fiction in the sacrament of truth.

Question 7

On the sacrament of penance

Then there were two questions about the sacrament of penance:

first, whether a prelate should remove his subject from ministry on account of something he heard from him in confession;

second, whether a man who dies on the way while going beyond the sea dies in a better state than a man who dies while returning.

Article 1

Whether a prelate should remove his subject from ministry on account of something he heard from him in confession

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a prelate can remove his subject from ministry on account of something he heard from him in confession.

Obj. 1: Because that which is instituted for charity does not militate against charity. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Dispensation and Precept, ch. 2, para. 5, 3:257 (see also PL 182:863–64); William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 50, ch. 2, q. 1, 973.) But the seal of confession is instituted for charity. Therefore, it does not militate against charity, from which a prelate is held to provide for the salvation of his subjects. Yet sometimes it is against the salvation of a subject if the ministry is dismissed from him, as, for example, if he would have an occasion of falling back into sin. Therefore, with the seal of confession notwithstanding, a prelate should remove him from ministry.

On the contrary: Nothing must be done to the prejudice of confession. Yet it would be to the prejudice of confession if a subject were to be removed from ministry on account of a crime which he confessed to his prelate, because through this others would be drawn back from confessing. Therefore, a prelate should not remove a subject from ministry on account of a sin he confessed to him.

I answer that what is heard through confession in no way must be manifested, neither by word nor by sign nor by nod, (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 38, c. 12, 2:888.) nor even may something be done whence someone can come into suspicion of sin.

If, therefore, the removal of a subject from ministry might induce a manifestation of the sin heard in confession, or some probable suspicion concerning it, in no way should a prelate remove his subject from ministry. For example, if in some monastery it were the custom that priors are not removed from their priorates except for fault, the removal from ministry would manifest the sin of one confessing. Hence, if an abbot were to do this, he would sin gravely as though revealing a confession. Nevertheless, he could admonish him by a loving secret that with urgency he seek to give up the ministry, if he were to see that this was expeditious for his salvation.

Whereas if through removal from ministry the sin would in no way be manifested, for example, if in some monastery it were the custom that the abbot for his pleasure would remove any men from ministry easily, then on another occasion he could remove from ministry a subject who confessed to him; and he ought to do this, albeit with due caution, if such ministry would be dangerous to the subject in the future. Although, also, even in this case it would be better if he induced him to seek to give up the ministry.

Whereas if danger were not feared in the future, it would not be necessary that, for a past sin deleted through penance, he remove him from ministry, just as also Augustine says in the book On Adulterous Marriages: why do we still reckon adulterers those whom we believe to be healed by penance? (Augustine, De adulterinis coniugiis 2.6, para. 5 (CSEL 41:387; PL 40:474).) For sometimes penitents are better than the innocent.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 2

Whether a man who dies on the way while going beyond the sea dies in a better state than a man who dies while returning

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a man signed with the cross who dies on the way while going beyond the sea dies better than a man who dies while returning.

Obj. 1: For he who dies while going is as though pursuing his vow to expose himself to death for Christ, and thus he dies as though a martyr. Yet he who dies while returning does not die in the intention of exposing himself for Christ, and thus he dies as though a confessor. But the state of martyrs is greater than that of confessors. Therefore, he who dies while going dies in a better state than he who dies while returning.

On the contrary: He who dies while returning has consummated his vow already. Yet he who dies while going has not yet consummated it, but is as though in the beginning. Yet the perfect is better than the imperfect and the end than the beginning. Therefore, he who dies while returning dies better than he who dies while going.

I answer that as much as someone dies with more merits, so much does he die better. Yet merits remain for a man, not only those which he actually is doing, but also those which already he has done, as though deposited before the Lord, according to 2 Timothy 1:12: I know whom I have believed and I am certain that he is mighty to preserve my deposit. Yet it is clear that that man who dies while returning from beyond the sea, with other things being equal, dies with more merits than that man who dies while going; for he has merit from taking the journey and more out of its accomplishment, during which perhaps he suffered many grave things. And for this reason, with other things being equal, he dies better who dies while returning, although to go is more meritorious than to return, considering the genus of the work.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the man had the intention of exposing himself to death on account of Christ even while going, and he did not lose this merit if he kept himself safe from sin.

Question 8

On the sacrament of matrimony

Then there were two questions about matrimony:

first, if someone betroths a woman through words of the future and afterwards knows her carnally, not, indeed, as though consenting unto matrimony, but only wanting fraudulently to snatch carnal union, if afterwards he contracts with another woman through words of the present, whether the second is his wife;

second, if a man accuses his wife of a secret adultery, whether the woman is held to confess her sin in judgment.

Article 1

If someone betroths a woman through words of the future and knows her carnally, not as consenting unto matrimony, if afterwards he contracts with another woman through words of the present, whether the second is his wife

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man who has known a woman carnally whom he betrothed through words of the future cannot have another woman as wife with whom afterwards he contracts through words of the present.

Obj. 1: For the judgment of the Church is compelled to stand with the first whom he knew carnally. (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 1, c. 30, 2:672.) But the Church can make persons illegitimate unto contracting. Therefore, it seems that such a man cannot contract matrimony with another woman. And thus, the woman with whom he contracted second through words of the present will not be his wife.

On the contrary: The error of a man does not prejudice the truth of matrimony. But from the error of someone presuming there was consent where there was carnal union, it happens that through the judgment of the Church a man is compelled to have that woman whom he knew carnally after a contract through words of the future. Therefore, this does not prejudice the truth of the second matrimony, which is contracted rightly through words of the present.

I answer that, just as Pope Nicholas says, the cause of matrimony is consent expressed through words of the present, without which, other words, even followed with intercourse, are frustrated. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 27, ch. 3, pp. 422–23 (PL 192:910–11); cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 27, q. 11, c. 2, 1:1063.)

Yet with the cause removed, the effect is removed. Hence, since in the first matrimony it is posited that there was not consent, it is clear that there was not matrimony. And because with a cause posited, the effect is posited, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 14, nn. 185–86.) the consequence is that the second was matrimony, in which there is posited to have been mutual consent expressed through words of the present between persons unbound by matrimony.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the Church conducts herself in three ways in these things pertaining to matrimony.

One way, indeed, is in the manner of one judging. And because men see those things which are apparent (1 Sam 16:7), it is necessary for an ecclesiastical judge to judge according to what is apparent to him through the confession of the parties, and through suitable witnesses, and through other legitimate proofs. (Cf. ST II-II.67.2.) With all of these presented, nevertheless, it happens that sometimes the truth is hidden, and especially in what pertains to the interior things of the heart, which cannot be proven by human testimony, even though through some exterior signs some conjecture can be made concerning these things. And for this reason, the judgment of the Church about those things which pertain to matrimony, if the truth is hidden, does not impede a subsequent contracting of matrimony, nor does it break off one already contracted.

In another way, the Church conducts herself in the manner of one prohibiting or punishing. And this indeed impedes the contracting of matrimony but does not break off one already contracted; for example, the Church imposes as a penalty of uxoricide that one should abstain from further matrimony. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 37.2.2; Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 33, q. 2, c. 5, 1:1152.) If, nevertheless, he will have contracted, the matrimony is not broken off.

In a third way the Church conducts herself in the manner of one establishing, which is done only by the authority of the supreme pontiff. And according to this any persons are rendered illegitimate unto contracting, such that even if they do contract, the matrimony is broken off, as is clear in certain grades of consanguinity and affinity, or even concerning adultery when someone has given faith to her that he will contract matrimony, or when he has plotted for the death of his wife. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 31, q. 1, cc. 3 and 7, 1:1109–10; Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de iure canonico, bk. 4, “Summa de matrimonio,” tit. 9, col. 949.)

Article 2

If a man accuses his wife of a secret adultery, whether the woman is held to confess her sin in judgment

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a woman accused of adultery is not held to confess her sin in judgment.

Obj. 1: For no one is held to publicize one’s secret sin. But the adultery of the woman is posited to be secret, yet if she were to confess it in judgment, it would come into the public. Therefore, the woman accused of adultery is not held to confess her sin in judgment.

On the contrary: She should fulfill an oath about telling the truth. But in no way should she swear an oath. Therefore, she should confess the truth about her sin.

I answer that, about this, a distinction must be made. For if the adultery is altogether secret, she should not confess her sin in judgment, nor should an oath be demanded from her concerning telling the truth, because secret judgment is reserved to the divine alone, (Cf. above: Quodlibet IV, q. 8, a. 1, obj. 1.) according to 1 Corinthians 4:5: do not judge before the time, until the Lord should come who shall illumine the hidden things of darkness. But when infamy concerning the adultery precedes or any evident signs are apparent which can make a vehement suspicion, or when it is halfway proven, then there should be demanded from her an oath concerning telling the truth, and she is held to confess the truth. (Cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 1, c. 21, 2:742.)

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

On things pertaining to the virtues

Question 9

On things pertaining to the virtues

Then there were two questions about the virtues:

first, about justice, namely, if someone falling in amongst thieves promises them money for his liberation, whether he is held to restore it if he receives it on loan from some friend of his;

second, about abstinence, whether someone can sin by fasting or by keeping vigil too much.

Article 1

About justice

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man who has received money on loan to redeem himself from thieves is not held to restore it.

Obj. 1: Because, as Augustine says, in time of necessity all things are common. (This adage is commonly cited by Aquinas but has not been found in Augustine. Cf. In III Sent. 30.1.2, ad 1.) But no one ought to demand as though proper that which is common, as Ambrose says, and is had in the Decretum (D. 47). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, d. 47, c. 8, 1:172; Gratian incorrectly attributes these words to Ambrose, but they are actually Basil’s (PG 31:1752, 276).) Since, therefore, that man who fell in amongst thieves was constituted in greatest necessity, namely, in danger of death, it seems that there is made common to him that which was another’s, and thus he is not held to restore to him who loaned, as if it were his property.

Obj. 2: No one is held to make recompense to someone for what that man was held to do. But that man who loaned money was held to liberate his neighbor from the danger of death, according to Proverbs 24:11: rescue those who are led unto death. Therefore, it seems that the man who was liberated is not held to restore to him the money loaned.

On the contrary: The Lord says in Matthew 7:12: all things which you will that men should do unto you, you also, do unto those. But that man who was liberated from the thieves would wish it to be restored to him if he had loaned anything. Therefore, he also ought to restore that which he received on loan.

I answer that the act of justice is to render to each that which is due to him. (Cf. ST II-II.58.11.) Hence, since by reason of the contract of good faith which was between the one loaning and the one receiving on loan, restitution is due out of a precept of justice, that man who received money on loan is held to return it to his creditor, and so much more as the creditor has helped him in greater necessity.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that then in necessity all things are made common when a man cannot help himself from his own property. For it would be ridiculous if anyone suffering hunger refuses to receive bread which he has in his chest and says that he is receiving another’s bread as though it were common. Yet those things which we can do through friends, we can do somehow through ourselves, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.3, 1112b27–28.) Yet that man who falls in amongst thieves can liberate himself through friends by receiving a loan, and for this reason, all things are not made common for him.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that each one is held to liberate his neighbor from death according to his condition and mode, and that man indeed fittingly fulfilled this who loaned money: for he was not held to donate it in a case where that man could have been liberated through a loan.

Article 2

About abstinence

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a man cannot sin by fasting or by keeping vigil too much.

Obj. 1: For God cannot be loved by man too much. But the proof of love is the presentation of work, as Gregory says in a certain homily. (Gregory the Great, On the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 30, para. 1, on John 14:23–31 (PL 76:1220).) Therefore, it seems that someone cannot sin by fasting or by keeping vigil too much on account of God.

On the contrary: Bernard confesses that he had sinned in debilitating his body by fasting and by keeping vigil too much. (William of Saint-Thierry, S. Bernardi vita prima 1.8, para. 41 (PL 185:251).)

I answer that, according to the Philosopher in the first book of the Politics, (Aristotle, Politics 1.8, 1257b25–28.) it must be judged one way concerning the end, and another way concerning what is for the end: for that which is sought as an end must be sought without measure, yet in what is for the end there must be applied a measure according to their proportion unto the end. For example, a medic makes health, which is his end, as however perfect as he can, yet he does not give the most powerful medicine as he can, but according as it accords unto making health.

Therefore, it must be considered that in the spiritual life the love of God is just as the end, yet fasting and vigils and other bodily exercises are not sought just as the end because, as is said in Romans 14:17: the kingdom of God is not food and drink, but they are applied as necessary unto the end, that is, unto mastering the concupiscences of the flesh, according to that saying of the Apostle: I castigate my body and drive it back unto servitude, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway (1 Cor 9:27). And for this reason, things of this sort must be applied with a certain measure of reason, namely, in order that concupiscence might be mastered and nature might not be extinguished, according to Romans 12:1: may you present your bodies as a living host, and afterwards he adds: your reasonable service.

Whereas if someone debilitated the virtue of nature to such an extent through fasting and vigils and other things of this sort that he was unable to pursue due works, for example a preacher to preach, a teacher to teach, a cantor to sing, and thus concerning others, without a doubt he sins, just as also a man would sin who would render himself impotent by too much abstinence unto rendering the debt to his wife. Hence Jerome says: from robbery he offers a holocaust who either by excessive lack of food or by immoderate scarcity of sleep afflicts the body; and again: a reasonable man loses dignity who prefers fasting to charity or vigils to integrity of sense. (Not found in Jerome, but attributed to Jerome’s Regula monachorum (PL 30) in: Gratian, Decretum, P. 3, “Concerning Consecration,” d. 5, c. 24, 1:1418; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 15.3.1, obj. 3, ad 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

On things pertaining to precepts

Question 10

On things pertaining to precepts

Then there were two questions about the precepts:

first, whether the precepts precede the counsels in the order of nature;

second, whether sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet are graver than sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet.

Article 1

Whether the precepts precede the counsels in the order of nature

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the precepts precede the counsels in the order of nature.

Obj. 1: For that to which nature first urges is prior in the order of nature. But the precepts concern the first instinct of nature because they concern a dictum of natural reason, yet not the counsels. Therefore, the precepts are prior in the order of nature to the counsels.

On the contrary: Something is called prior in nature in three ways. One way is just as the imperfect is prior to the perfect; and in this way, the precepts are not prior to the counsels because perfection consists especially in the precepts of charity. The second way is through the mode of the time of the cause preceding the effect; and thus also they are not prior, because it is not necessary that someone first should fulfill the precepts before the counsels. The third way is through the mode of origin, when the principle is simultaneous in time just as the light of the sun and a ray; but neither in this way are the precepts prior, because it is not necessary for whoever observes the precepts to observe the counsels. Therefore, in no way do the precepts precede the counsels in the order of nature.

I answer that about this it is necessary to consider two things: first, what it is to be prior in the order of nature; second, what is a precept and what is a counsel. With these made clear, that which is sought will be evidently apparent.

Concerning the first, therefore, it must be known that, according to the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, before and after are said in any order through comparison to the principle of that order, just as in place through comparison to the principle of place and in the disciplines through comparison to the principle of the discipline. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.11, 1018b9–12.) Thus, therefore, also in the order of nature something is said to be prior through comparison to the principles of nature. These, indeed, are the four causes, hence according to each genus of cause what is nearer to the cause is prior in the order of nature. Yet although the causes are four, nevertheless three of these, namely, efficient, formal, and final, concur unto the same. (Aristotle, Physics 2.7, 198a24–25.) Hence it remains that the order of nature is twofold: one, indeed, according to the character of material cause, according to which the imperfect is prior to the perfect and potency to act; yet the other order of nature is according to the character of the other three causes, according to which the perfect is prior to the imperfect and act to potency. Hence also the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the Metaphysics that some things are prior in power, others in perfection. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.11, 1019a6–7.) And because form is more nature than matter, as is proven in the second book of the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 193b6–7.) more fittingly is act said to be prior in nature which is prior in substance and species, as is said in the ninth book of the Metaphysics, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.8, 1049b4–1050a3.) to potency, which in one and the same thing is prior in generation and in time. Hence also the Philosopher says in the second book of On Interpretation that in these things which happen to be by act and potency, those which are in act are prior in nature, posterior in time. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 2.14, 23a24–26.)

Whereas about the second, that is, about the character of counsel and of precept, it must be considered that precept implies the character of something due. Yet something is due in two ways. One way is according to itself; and in this way, what is due is the end in each business; for a doctor on account of himself ought to seek health. Another way something is due is on account of another, namely, that without which it could not arrive at the end, just as a medic ought to indicate the treatment for the infirm without which he cannot be healed. Whereas, concerning that which is ordered unto the end, that someone might attain the end better or more easily, if without this the end could be had in some way, this does not have the character of something due.

Yet the end of the spiritual life, which is ordered by divine law, is twofold: one, indeed, is principal, namely, to adhere to God through charity. Hence it is said in 1 Timothy 1:5: the end of the precept is charity. Yet the other end is secondary as though dispositive, namely, purity and rectitude of heart, which consists in the interior acts of the other virtues, hence the Apostle says in Romans 6:22: you have your fruit in sanctification. Just as also in natural generation the end is both the substantial form itself and the ultimate disposition unto form.

Hence it is clear that the principal divine precepts indeed concern love of God and neighbor, as is clear in Matthew 22:37–40, whereas the secondary concern interior sanctification, according to 1 Thessalonians 4:3: this is the will of God, your sanctification. Whereas all other things of the spiritual life are ordered to the aforesaid things just as unto the end, but in two ways: for certain things are such without which the aforesaid ends cannot be, and these fall under precept, such as: thou shalt not have alien gods, thou shalt not steal, and so on. (Exodus 20:3, 15.) Yet there are certain others without which it can arrive at the aforesaid ends. Hence they do not fall under precept, but, because through things of this sort it arrives at the aforesaid ends more easily and better, counsels are given concerning them just as concerning poverty, virginity, and other things of this sort. And it is similar to how if someone were due by a precept to be in Rome on a fixed day: he would be held to go to Rome also by the debt of a precept, yet he would not be held by a precept to go as a horseman, because without this he could arrive at Rome. Nevertheless, this would fall under counsel inasmuch as by riding he would arrive at the end more easily and better. (Cf. above: Quodlibet IV, q. 12, a. 2, ad 2.)

Therefore, with these things having been seen, that which was sought is easily clear.

For if we compare the counsels to the final precepts, which concern love of God and neighbor and interior purity of heart, it is clear that the precepts are prior to the counsels naturally in the order of perfection, just as act naturally is prior to potency, and the end to these things which are under the end. But the counsels naturally were prior in the order of generation and of time, namely, inasmuch as through the counsels we arrive unto perfect purity of heart and perfect love of God and neighbor.

Yet if we compare the counsels to the other precepts which are ordered out of necessity unto the aforesaid ends, thus there will be a twofold consideration: for in the counsels it is necessary for the precepts to be included, for he who dismisses all things does not steal another’s things, and he who preserves virginity does not commit adultery. So too he who rides a horse goes, but the converse does not hold.

Therefore, there will be one comparison of counsels to precepts considered absolutely, and in this way, the precepts will be prior to the counsels in the order of nature, just as genus naturally is prior to species. Yet the counsels, conversely, will be naturally posterior to the precepts, just as species are naturally posterior to genera. This is clear from the Philosopher in the first book of the Physics: (Aristotle, Physics 1.1, 184a16–b14.) for genus is compared to species just as potency to act, yet the precepts taken absolutely relate like a genus to the observance of the precepts, with the counsels or without the counsels. This is how not committing adultery relates to not committing adultery as a virgin or as married, and to go, commonly speaking, relates to going on horseback and unto going on foot.

Whereas the other comparison is of counsels to precepts without the counsels observed, just as if we compare one going on horse to him who goes on foot: for it is similar to the comparison of a virgin or a continent man to one using matrimony, and of a pauper on account of Christ to him who is content with his own things in the world. And in this way, the counsels are prior to the precepts absolutely in the order of nature just as the perfect to the imperfect. Nor is it necessary for the precepts thus received naturally to precede the counsels in the order of generation and of time: for it is not necessary that that man who wills to preserve continence or virginity first should be joined in matrimony, nor also is it necessary that that man who wills to be a pauper on account of Christ should live first a secular life in which he is content with his own riches, just as also it is not necessary that that man who wills to go on horseback to Rome should go first on foot and afterwards on horseback, but it is better if from the beginning he goes on horseback.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 2

Whether sins which are done against the precepts of the second tablet are graver than sins which are done against the precepts of the first tablet

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet are graver than sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet.

Obj. 1: For, with the immutable good spurned, it is a sin against the precepts of the second tablet to adhere to a mutable good, just as is clear in theft and adultery and other things of this sort. But contempt of the immutable good is sin against the precepts of the first tablet, by which we are ordered to give reverence to God. Therefore, sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet include sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet, and which add something. Therefore, they are graver.

Obj. 2: Simony is the greatest sin; (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 25.3.1, qa. 2, ad 2.) but simony, since it is a species of avarice, is against the precepts of the second tablet. Therefore, the sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet are graver.

On the contrary: Infidelity, despair, and other things of this sort, which are the gravest sins, are sins against the precepts of the first tablet. Therefore, sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet are graver.

I answer that the formal character of mortal sin consists in aversion from God: (Cf. below: Quodlibet VI, q. 9, a. 2.) for if there were inordinate turning to a mutable good without aversion from God, it would not be mortal sin. Yet the precepts of the first tablet according to themselves order man directly unto God, hence they are said to pertain to love of God. And for this reason, sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet directly and through themselves involve aversion from God. Yet sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet through themselves disorder us principally about mutable goods (about which we are ordered through the precepts of the second tablet), yet consequently they disorder us from God. Yet in each genus that which is according to itself is foremost, hence sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet, according to their genus, are gravest in the genus of sins.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that contempt of God itself is intended in sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet. Yet this is not by necessity included in sins which are against the precepts of the second tablet: for a man who fornicates does not intend to do so in contempt of God, but he intends principally to be delighted, upon which it follows that he spurns God, transgressing his mandates beyond his principal intention.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that simony is not the greatest sin absolutely, but greatest amongst those which are committed about pecuniary contracts, and this because such a man conducts himself irreverently towards sacred things, in which he touches sins which are against the precepts of the first tablet.

Regarding things pertaining to certain states of men

Question 11

Regarding prelates

Then there were questions concerning what pertains especially to certain states of men:

and first, concerning what pertains to prelates; (Q. 11.)

second, concerning what pertains to teachers; (Q. 12.)

third, concerning what pertains to religious; (Q. 13.)

fourth, concerning what pertains to clerics. (Q. 14.)

About the first, there were three questions:

first, whether blessed Matthew was called at once from the customs post to the state of the apostolate and of perfection;

second, whether a man canonically elected to the episcopacy does better by consenting to his election or by refusing it;

third, whether a prelate who gives an ecclesiastical benefice to some relative of his, hoping through this that his family will be exalted and enriched, commits simony.

Article 1

Whether blessed Matthew was called at once from the customs post to the state of the apostolate and of perfection

To the first we proceed thus. It seems blessed Matthew was not called at once from the customs post to the state of the apostolate and of perfection.

Obj. 1: For Gregory says in his commentary on Ezekiel: no one is made highest at once. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 2, homily 3, para. 3 (CCSL 142:238; PL 76:959); cf. Morals on the Book of Job 22.19, para. 45 (CCSL 143A:1125; PL 76:240); John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” Archivum Franciscanum historicum 8 (1915): arg. 23, ad 23, 418, 437.) But the state of the apostolate and of evangelical perfection is the highest state of human life. Therefore, Matthew was not called at once to the state of perfection and of the apostolate.

On the contrary: Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew that from a publican immediately he was made an Apostle; (Jerome, On Matthew, bk. 1, on Matthew 9:9 (CCSL 77:55; PL 26:56); cf. Treatise on the Gospel of Mark, ch. 10, on Mark 14:3–6 (CCSL 78:498).) and Bede says in his commentary on Luke that from a publican to an apostle, from a customs official to an evangelist he was changed; (Bede, On the Gospel of Luke 2.5 (CCSL 120:122; PL 92:389).) and a certain gloss on Luke 5 says that straightaway, he reserved for himself no thought or respect of this life, (Glossa ordinaria, at Luke 5:27, 5.763 (PL 114:258); Bede, On the Gospel of Luke 2.5 (CCSL 120:122; PL 92:389).) which is of evangelical perfection. Therefore, at once he was called to the state of the apostolate and of perfection.

I answer that the question can be determined by the words of the Gospel.

For if we speak concerning the apostolate, it is clear according to the narrative of Matthew, Mark, and Luke (Matthew 9:9–10, 10:1–5; Mark 2:14–15, 3:13–19; Luke 5:27–29, 6:12–16.) that the Lord after the call of Matthew, with some space of time interjected, elected twelve Apostles out of his disciples, amongst whom one was Matthew. And thus, it is clear that at once from the beginning he was called to the discipleship of Christ, yet not to the apostolate: unless this is meant according to the predestination of Christ, who disposed him to assume the apostolate. And the words of Jerome and Bede must be understood in this way.

Yet if we speak concerning evangelical perfection, it is clear that at once from the beginning he was called to the state of perfection: for it is said in Luke 5:28 that rising, with all things forsaken, he followed him, which also pertained to the discipleship of Christ, according to what is said in Luke 14:33: unless anyone should have renounced all things which he possesses, he cannot be my disciple.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the highest in human life can be understood in two ways.

One way is according to the comparison of state to state, since in human life one state is greater than another, and another is highest. And thus, nothing prohibits someone from becoming highest immediately, that is, from reaching the highest state.

And this is apparent both in the spiritual life and in the secular. For certain men are found at once from boyhood to have flocked together to the state of religion, which is most perfect, either by their own proper will, just as blessed John the Baptist and blessed Benedict, or even by the devotion of their parents, just as those men who are handed over to monasteries by their parents: for in this way it is not necessary for anyone to be practiced in the secular life before he crosses over to religion, just as it is not necessary for someone to be practiced in a lay life before he becomes a cleric.

Similarly, some men immediately are assumed unto the kingship, either from boyhood itself, just as Solomon (Cf. above: Quodlibet IV, q. 12, a. 1, s.c. 2.) and Joash, (2 Kings 11:21.) the kings of Judah, or even out of the last state, just as Saul; (1 Samuel 9:21.) and in Ecclesiastes 4:14 it is said: because out of prison and chains sometimes someone comes forth unto the kingship.

In another way, the highest can be understood according to the comparison of grades by which the perfection of one man advances. And in this way, Gregory understands that no one immediately is made highest. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 2, homily 3, para. 3 (CCSL 142:238; PL 76:959); cf. Morals on the Book of Job 22.19, para. 45 (CCSL 143A:1125; PL 76:240).) For Augustine says in his commentary on the canonical epistles of John that charity is not perfect . . . as soon as it is born: for in order that it might be perfected, it is born; when it has been born, it is nourished; when it has been nourished, it is strengthened; when it has been strengthened, it is perfected. (Augustine, Homilies on the Epistle of St. John to the Parthians, tract. 5, ch. 3, para. 4 (PL 35:2014).) Nevertheless, it happens sometimes that one man immediately begins from a grade of sanctity that is higher than the highest advancement which another man reaches, as is clear concerning blessed Benedict, concerning whom Gregory says in the second book of the Dialogues that all men, present and to follow, recognize the boy Benedict had grasped the grace of living from such great perfection. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues [bk. 2 in Life of St. Benedict] 2.1 (SC 260:130; PL 66:128).)

Article 2

Whether a man elected canonically to the episcopacy does better by consenting to his election or by refusing it

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that one does better who consents to his canonical election than one who refuses it.

Obj. 1: For Gregory says in the twenty-second book of Morals on the Book of Job: power when it is secured not out of lust, must be loved. (Rather, the twenty-fourth book: Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 24.25, para. 55 (CCSL 143B:1229; PL 76:320).) But when someone through canonical election obtains the episcopal dignity, he does not secure it out of lust. Therefore, he should love it. Therefore, he should not refuse it.

On the contrary: Gregory says in the eighteenth book of Morals on the Book of Job that the prelacy through better intention (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 18.43, para. 70 (CCSL 143A:936; PL 76:79).) must be fled.

I answer that he who consents to his canonical election should especially consider what he intends. For if he intends something temporal, for example honor, riches, to shake himself off from the yoke of religion, or something of this sort, it is clear that it is a depraved intention; hence he would do better to not assent. Yet if he intends the advancement of the Church, thus it is plain that it is a good intention; hence Augustine says in the nineteenth book of On the City of God: in action honor or power must not be loved in this life . . . but the work itself . . . , if it is done rightly and usefully, that is, in order that it might prevail unto the salvation of one’s subjects, (Augustine, City of God 19.19 (CCSL 48:686; PL 41:647).) and he introduces that saying of the Apostle: if anyone should desire the episcopacy, he desires a good work (1 Tim 3:1).

But nevertheless, it must be known that for this work the greatest suitability is required, as Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: so much ought the action of a prelate to transcend the action of the people, as much as the life of a pastor is accustomed to be distant from the flock. (Gregory the Great, Book of Pastoral Rule 2.1 (CCSL 141; PL 77:25–26).) Human fragility, according to its own powers, is not sufficient for this, according to that saying of the Apostle: and unto these things is anyone so suitable? (2 Cor 2:16). But nevertheless, men are rendered suitable and sufficient by the aid of divine grace, just as he himself adds afterwards: he has made us suitable ministers of the New Testament (2 Cor 3:6).

Therefore, someone laudably, with consideration of his own defect, can refuse the office of the prelacy out of humility, just as Jeremiah says: I do not know how to speak, because I am a boy. (Jeremiah 1:6.) He also can consent laudably out of fraternal charity in order to procure the salvation of his neighbors, just as Isaiah who said: behold me, send me. (Isaiah 6:8.) But, just as Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: in both it must be considered subtly, because both he who has refused does not resist fully; and he who willed to be sent, before himself sees a purged coal of the altar; lest either not purged anyone should dare to go unto the sacred ministries, or he whom heavenly grace elects, under the appearance of humility should contradict a heavenly disposition*. (Cf. Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 24.25, para. 55 (CCSL 143B:1229; PL 76:320).) Because* therefore it is very difficult that whoever should be able to know himself purged, the office of the prelacy more safely is declined, nevertheless not pertinaciously, when the heavenly will is recognized unto receiving this. (Gregory the Great, Book of Pastoral Rule 1.7 (CCSL 141; PL 77:20).)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that word of Gregory should not be understood thus: power, when it is not secured out of lust, must be loved, but thus: power, when it is secured, must not be loved out of lust; for he adds: but out of longsuffering to be tolerated. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 24.25, para. 55 (CCSL 143B:1229; PL 76:320).)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the intention of those fleeing the prelacy is better according to their own desire, provided that necessity is not present on the part of the one imposing this burden. Hence Augustine says in the nineteenth book of On the City of God: the superior place, without which the people cannot be ruled, although let it be held thus . . . as is befitting, nevertheless is desired indecently; for the charity of truth seeks holy leisure, the necessity of charity receives just business. (Augustine, City of God 19.19 (CCSL 48:687; PL 41:647); cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 6, a. 1, resp.)

Article 3

Whether a prelate who gives an ecclesiastical benefice to some relative of his, hoping through this that his family will be exalted and enriched, commits simony

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that a prelate who gives an ecclesiastical benefice to some relative or friend of his, in order that other relatives of his might be exalted, commits simony.

Obj. 1: For simony is an intentional will of buying or selling something spiritual or annexed to the spiritual. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 49, ch. 1, 938.) But in the aforesaid case there seems to be the buying or selling of a spiritual thing because there can be buying and selling in these things in which there is liberality, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 25.3.3, resp.) yet here he hopes to be recompensed liberally. Therefore, there is simony here.

On the contrary: Commenting on Isaiah 33:15, blessed is he who shakes his hands off from every gift, Gregory says that a gift is threefold, from the hand, from the tongue, from service, (Gregory the Great, On the Gospels, bk. 1, homily 4.9 (PL 76:1091–92); cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 1, q. 1, c. 114, 1:402–3; Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 9.34, para. 53 (CCSL 143:494; PL 75:888–89).) none of which is in the proposed case. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 25.3.3, obj. 8.) Therefore, there is not simony there.

I answer that, since simony consists of buying and selling, a distinction seems to be needed because, if a prelate intends to obligate someone to whom he gives an ecclesiastical benefice with making some temporal recompense to himself or to his relatives, the intention is simoniacal: for he intends a certain tacit selling. Whereas if he does not intend to obligate him to this, but intends for that man to recompense himself or his own temporally by his own free will, there is a certain depraved and carnal intention, but not a simoniacal one.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that according to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the Ethics, liberality is not about any use of money, but about givings and takings. (Aristotle, Ethics 4.1, 1119b23–27.) Yet simony is about buying and selling.

Question 12

Regarding teachers

Then about teachers, there were two questions:

first, if a teacher always preached or taught principally out of vainglory, whether he should have a halo if he repents at death;

second, if by the teaching of some teacher, some men are called back from a better good, whether that teacher is held to revoke that teaching.

Article 1

If a teacher always preached or taught principally out of vainglory, whether he should have a halo if he repents at death

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man who always taught out of vainglory would regain a halo through penance.

Obj. 1: For the halo of doctrine is due to fruit, namely, to the conversion of the faithful, according to Philippians 4:1: my joy and my crown. But it could be that from the preaching of someone who preached principally from vainglory there followed the fruit of the conversion of the faithful. Therefore, if he repents, a halo is due to him.

Obj. 2: Just as a halo is due to virginity, so also to doctrine. But, if that woman who, although she is a virgin in the flesh, nevertheless is corrupt in mind, does penance, she regains her halo. Therefore, for the same reason this applies to a teacher who preached out of vainglory.

On the contrary: Dead works do not revive through repentance. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 14.2.3, qa. 1; 15.1.3, qa. 3–5.) But the works of that teacher were dead on account of vainglory, that is, since they were done in sin. Therefore, they do not revive through repentance so as to attain a reward.

I answer that, since a halo implies a certain singular excellence of reward, it is necessary that it presupposes gold just as the comparative presupposes the positive; (Aquinas, Commentary On the Heavens, bk. 3, lect. 3, n. 563.) and this is signified in Exodus 25, where it is said: you shall make . . . upon the golden crown, another . . . halo. (Exodus 25:23–25.) And for this reason, he who does not merit gold, that is, essential reward, does not merit a halo. Yet those who work out of vainglory do not merit essential reward because they have received their reward (Matt 6:2). Hence neither do they merit a halo. While repentance restores to man merits had before, it does not confer upon him those which he did not have, unless inasmuch as the movement itself of repentance is meritorious. Hence such a man does not merit a halo.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a halo is due to the conversion of the faithful, with the merit of essential reward presupposed in him who preached. Otherwise, it has the place which is said in Matthew 16:26: what does it profit a man, if he should gain the whole world, but suffer the detriment of his soul?

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the halo of virginity is due to the integrity of the flesh, which remains after repentance, and for this reason, a halo is due to the penitent virgin. But the halo of doctrine is due to the act of a teacher, which is passing, and for this reason, after repentance a halo is not due to the teacher unless the act is repeated.

Article 2

Whether, if by the teaching of some teacher some men are called back from a better good, that teacher is held to revoke that teaching

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that, if through someone’s teaching some men are drawn back from a better good, that man is held to revoke his teaching.

Obj. 1: For in his teaching such a teacher causes active scandal, because the teacher informs the intellect, and the intellect informs the affection and consequently the act. But everyone is held to remove active scandal. Therefore, such a teacher is held to revoke his teaching.

Obj. 2: Spiritual things are more powerful than temporal ones. But in temporal things, as Augustine says, sin is not dismissed unless what was taken is restored. (Cf. Augustine, Letter 153, 6.20 (CSEL 44:419; PL 33:662); Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 14, q. 6, c. 1, 1:742.) Therefore, much more for a teacher who causes spiritual loss, sin is not dismissed unless what was taken is restored, which is done through the revocation of that teaching.

On the contrary: Gregory says: truth is not to be dismissed on account of scandal. (Cf. John Peckham, Quodlibet I, ed. Girard J. Etzkorn, Bibliotheca Franciscana scholastica Medii Aevi 25 (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, Padri Editori di Quaracchi, 1989), q. 30, p. 62; Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 1, homily 7, para. 5 (CCSL 142:85; PL 76:842).)

I answer that it seems necessary to make a distinction.

For if a teacher teaches false teaching, he is held to revoke it in all ways, and most of all if spiritual loss follows from it. For example, if some men, by teaching some erroneous things, were to induce men unto some religion, as, for example, he were to say that whoever enters such a religion shall be at once of equal merit as blessed Peter. (John Peckham, Quodlibet I, q. 30, p. 62.) For to enter religion on account of an error is not good.

Whereas, if he teaches true teaching, from this spiritual detriment can follow in the hearers in two ways.

One way is out of a defect of this one who teaches. And this in two ways. One way is because he would propose a subtle and high teaching to the unlearned, who would not be capable of that teaching, and who from this would incur a detriment of salvation. This is against the example of the Apostle, who says: I gave you as little ones in Christ milk as drink, not food (1 Cor 3:1–2).

Another way is because he proposes confusedly and inordinately, not preferring greater things to lesser ones, against that which Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: thus the highest goods must be praised lest the ultimate things be despaired of; thus the last goods must be nourished lest, while they are believed to suffice, in no way do they tend to the highest. (Gregory the Great, Book of Pastoral Rule 3.36 (CCSL 141; PL 77:122).)

And in these cases, a teacher, from whose teaching there happens a spiritual loss, is held, against this loss, to posit a remedy inasmuch as he can, at least by expounding his teaching. And this is that which Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule: just as incautious speech draws into error, so indiscrete silence has abandoned in error those who could have been educated. (Gregory the Great, Book of Pastoral Rule 2.4 (CCSL 141; PL 77:30).)

In another way, it can happen from a defect of other things < . . . >. Hence such a teacher does not thus draw men back from a better good. And in this case, he is not held to cease from his teaching.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Question 13

Regarding religious

Then about religious there were two questions:

first, whether religious are held to tolerate patiently injuries done to them;

second, whether a man who swears he will not enter religion can enter religion licitly.

Article 1

Whether religious are held to tolerate patiently injuries done to them

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that religious should not tolerate their attackers.

Obj. 1: For in the attacking of perfect men God is attacked, hence the Lord said to Saul persecuting the disciples of Christ: Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? (Acts 9:4). But perfect men should not tolerate the attackers of God. Therefore, neither should they tolerate attacks upon themselves.

Obj. 2: Any perfect man should oppose what prejudices the state of perfection, hence the Apostle says: in order that our ministry might not be reproached (2 Cor 6:3). But through the perfect being attacked, harm is done to the state of perfection. Therefore, perfect men should not tolerate their attackers.

On the contrary: Gregory says: we are not perfect if we cannot bear the misconducts of others. (Cf. Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 5.17, para. 33 (CCSL 143:241; PL 75:697); 20.39, para. 75 (CCSL 143A:1058–59; PL 76:183).)

I answer that perfect men can be attacked in two ways. One way is with regard to their own persons, as when personal injuries are inflicted upon them; in another way, they can be attacked as regards their state, as for example when some men by words or deeds cause harm to the state of perfection. And these two are touched upon in James 2:6–7: do not the rich oppress you through power?, which pertains to personal injuries; do not those blaspheme the good name which is invoked over us?, which pertains to religion or state.

Therefore, in personal injuries it is befitting for perfect men to be most patient in order to be prepared to suffer even more, according to Matthew 5:39: if anyone should strike you on the right cheek, grant to him also the other. Whereas their state should not be suffered to be attacked, as much as they can resist: for this would incline to the injury of God. Hence against certain men it is said: you have not ascended out of the opposing side, nor have you set opposite a wall for the house of Israel (Ezek 13:5).

And for this reason, the Lord patiently tolerated injuries which were inflicted against his humanity, such as when the Jews said: behold a ravenous man and a drinker of wine (Matt 11:19); and such as when the devil said to him: send yourself down (Matt 4:6), which seems to pertain to his own injury. But the injuries of God he did not tolerate. Hence he refuted harshly the Pharisees (Matt 12:24–32) because they were saying he was casting out demons by Beelzebub, which pertained to the injuries of the Holy Spirit. And so too when the devil said to him: all these things I shall give to you, if falling down you should adore me (Matt 4:9), which pertained to the injury of God; for at once he repelled him, saying: go back, Satan (Matt 4:10). This is where Chrysostom says: let us learn by his example to endure our injuries . . . magnanimously, yet the injuries of God . . . not even to suffer unto hearing, because for anyone to be patient in our proper injuries is laudable, yet to ignore the injuries of God is exceedingly impious. (John Chrysostom, On Matthew, homily 5, on Matthew 4:10 (PG 56:668); cf. Aquinas, Catena Aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 4:10, ch. 4, lect. 4.)

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 2

Whether a man who swears an oath to not enter religion can enter religion licitly

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a man who has sworn to not enter religion cannot enter licitly.

Obj. 1: For every licit obligation must be fulfilled. But it was licit for that man not to enter religion. Therefore, since he has obligated himself to this by oath, it seems that he is held not to enter.

On the contrary: No impediment of spiritual advancement is from God. But an oath is from God. Therefore, the spiritual advancement of entering religion is not impeded through an oath.

I answer that the obligation of an oath can exist in three ways. For sometimes there is an illicit obligation that concerns an illicit thing, for example, when someone swears that he will fornicate, and such an oath a man is not held to fulfill, nor even is it licit to be fulfilled. Whereas sometimes there is a licit obligation that concerns a licit thing, for example, when someone swears that he will give alms, and it is not licit to neglect such an oath. Whereas sometimes there is an illicit obligation that concerns a licit thing, for example, when someone swears that he will not do something more good which, nevertheless, he is not held to do, for example, not to fast, or not to give some alms, or not to enter religion. For then what he obligates himself to by oath is licit, but, nevertheless, the obligation is illicit because through this a man, inasmuch as is in him, fixes himself against the grace of the Holy Spirit, which makes a man to dispose ascents in his heart. (Cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 6, a. 3, s.c.) Hence such an oath a man can licitly fulfill by abstaining from that good which he is not held to do. Nevertheless, he is not compelled by this oath to fulfilling that which he has sworn, because an oath, to be obligatory, ought to have three comrades: judgment, justice, and truth (Jer 4:2). (Jerome, On Jeremiah 1.4, on Jeremiah 4:2 (CCSL 74:40; PL 24:733); cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 22, q. 2, c. 2, 1:867.) Yet to this oath the judgment of discretion is lacking because it inclines to an inferior end (Bede, Homilies 2.23 [2.1], homily 20 (CCSL 122:352; PL 94:239); cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 22, q. 4, c. 6, 1:876.) by drawing back from a better good.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Question 14

Regarding clerics

Article 1

Whether it is licit for a cleric who is held unto the canonical hours to say Matins of the following day in the evening

Then about clerics there was asked one thing, namely, whether it is licit for a cleric who is held unto the canonical hours to say Matins of the following day in the evening. And it seems that it is not.

Obj. 1: For it is said in Sirach 20:7: the lascivious and imprudent man shall not observe the time. But that man in saying Matins does not observe the time: for since the day begins at midnight, it seems that he says Matins of the following day on the day preceding. Therefore, this seems to pertain to the lascivious and imprudent man and thus seems to be sin.

On the contrary: God is more clement than any man. But a man does not fault a debtor if he renders the debt to him before the time. Therefore, much less does God.

I answer that here the intention of him who anticipates the time in saying Matins, or in saying any canonical hours, must be considered. For if he does this on account of lasciviousness, namely, in order that more restfully he might be at leisure for slumber and pleasure, this is not without sin. Whereas if he does this on account of the necessity of licit and honest occupations, for example, if a cleric or teacher ought to do his readings at night, or on account of something else of this sort, he can say Matins licitly in the evening and anticipate the time in the other canonical hours, just as this is done also in solemn churches, because it is better to render both to God, namely, both the due praises and the other honest offices, than that through the one the other should be impeded.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, as regards contracts and other things of this sort, the day begins at midnight. (Cf. Justinian I, Digesta, ed. Theodor Mommsen and Paul Krueger, Corpus Juris Civilis (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1892), 2.12.8, 1:54b; Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 1, tit. 19, c. 24, 2:170.) But as regards the ecclesiastical office and celebrations of solemnities, the day begins at Vespers. Hence, if anyone says Matins after Vespers and Compline have been said, this already pertains to the following day.