On Things Pertaining to Nature

On things pertaining to uncreated nature

Question 1

On things pertaining to uncreated nature

Our inquiry concerns three things:

first, about what pertains to nature; (Qq. 1–3.)

second, about what pertains to fault and grace; (Qq. 4–6.)

third, about what pertains to punishment and glory. (Qq. 7–9.)

About the first it was asked:

first, concerning what pertains to uncreated nature; (Q. 1.)

second, concerning what pertains to created nature. (Qq. 2–3.)

About uncreated nature there were two questions:

first, whether the number six, according to which all creatures are said to be perfect, is creator or creature;

second, concerning the ideal notions which are in the divine mind, whether they apply what they exemplify, namely, creatures, first by reason of their own individuality or by reason of their specific nature.

Article 1

Whether the number six, according to which all creatures are said to be perfect, is creator or creature

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the aforesaid six is creator.

Obj. 1: If every creature were removed, perfection would only remain in the creator. But if every creature made during the works of the six days were removed, the perfection in the number six would remain. Hence Augustine says in the fourth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis: (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.7, para. 14 (CSEL 28:103; PL 34:301).) therefore, if those were not, namely, the works of the six days, that would be perfect, namely, six; yet unless that were perfect, those would not be made perfect according to it. Therefore, the number six is creator.

Obj. 2: But you will say that Augustine speaks about six in regard to the idea of six, which is in the divine mind.

On the contrary: just as, with all creatures removed, perfection remains in the idea of the number six, so also does this apply with the idea of a stone in the divine mind. Therefore, in this the number six would not have some preeminence over the stone, which nevertheless seems to be against Augustine’s intention.

Obj. 3: Whatever is more permanent than every creature is not created, but creator. Yet the number six is more permanent than heaven and earth, which, nevertheless, seem to be the most permanent creatures. Hence Augustine says in the fourth book of On Genesis: it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away, which were fashioned according to the number six, than for it to be that the number six is not the sum of its parts. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.7 (CSEL 28:103; PL 34:301).) Therefore, the number six is not creature, but creator.

On the contrary: The perfection of the creator does not consist of some parts, nor is there in him anything having parts. But, as Augustine says in the same book: we find that the number six is perfect because it is the sum of its parts. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.2, para. 2 (CSEL 28:94; PL 34:296).) Therefore, the number six is not creator, but creature.

I answer that, according to Avicenna in his Metaphysics, (Cf. Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 5.1, p. 236; Avicenna, Logic 1.1; Aquinas, On Being and Essence, ch. 3.) there is a threefold consideration of any nature. One is when considering the being which it has in singulars, such as the nature of a stone in this and that stone. Whereas another is when considering some nature according to its own intelligible being, such as the nature of a stone as it is in the intellect. Whereas the third is the absolute consideration of a nature, in abstraction from either being. Considered thus, the nature of a stone or anything else is considered only with regard to those things which belong essentially to such a nature.

Of these three considerations, two always uniformly preserve the same order. For the absolute consideration of a nature is prior to the consideration of it with regard to the being which it has in singulars. But the third consideration of a nature, which is that according to the being which it has in an intellect, does not always have the same order to the other considerations. For the consideration of a nature, according to the being which it has in an intellect that receives things, follows either of the other considerations: for by this knowable order it precedes knowledge and sensible sense, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1053a31–33.) just as a mover precedes something moved and a cause precedes something caused. But the consideration of a nature according to the being which it has in an intellect causing the thing precedes the other two considerations: for when the intellect of an artist invents some form of an artifact, the nature itself, or the form of the artifact considered in itself, is posterior to the intellect of the artist, and consequently also the sensible ark which has such a form or species. (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 1, para. 17 (CCSL 36:10; PL 35:1387); Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 2, a. 7, obj. 4, ad 4.)

Yet just as the intellect of an artist relates to artifacts, so the divine intellect relates to all creatures. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 38.1.1; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 1, a. 2; q. 2, a. 14.) Hence the first consideration of each created nature is with regard to how it is in the divine intellect; whereas the second consideration is of the nature itself absolutely; the third is with regard to how it is in things themselves or in an angelic mind; the fourth is with regard to the being which it has in the human intellect. And for this reason, Dionysius in the eleventh chapter of On the Divine Names assigns this order: (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 11, para. 6 (PG 3:954–55).) that first over all things is God, the very “substantificator” (“creator of the substance”) of things, whereas afterwards are the gifts themselves of God. These are presented to creatures, both universally and particularly considered, as beauty essentially, life essentially, which he says is a gift coming forth out of God, that is, the very nature of life. Then the participants themselves are considered universally and particularly, which are the things in which a nature has being.

In these, therefore, that which is prior is always the account of the posterior. If the posterior is removed, the prior remains, yet not conversely. And hence the fact that something belongs to a nature according to an absolute consideration is the reason why it belongs to some nature according to the being which it has in singulars, and not conversely. Hence, even if Socrates and Plato did not exist, still rationality would belong to human nature. Similarly, the divine intellect is the account of a nature considered absolutely or in singulars, and a nature itself considered absolutely and in singulars is the account of the human intellect and in a certain way its measure. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1053a31–33; 10.6, 1057a11–12; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 10, text. 5 and comm. 5; 10, text. 21.)

The words of Augustine, therefore, can be understood concerning the number six in two ways. One way is that through six the very nature of six is understood absolutely, to which perfection belongs first and essentially, which indeed is the account of the perfection of those things which participate in six. Hence, with all things which are perfected in six removed, perfection still belongs to the nature of six. And in this way, six names a created nature. In another way, six can be understood according to the being which it has in the divine intellect, and thus its perfection is the account of the perfection found in creatures, which have been fashioned according to six, and even if these were removed, perfection would remain in the aforesaid six. Yet thus six will not be a creature, but the account of a creature in the creator, which is the idea of six and is the same as the divine essence according to the thing, differing only by the type.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, with all creatures removed which were made in the six days, it is not said that perfection remains in the number six in the sense that the number six has some being in the nature of things with no creature existing, but rather that, with every created removed, there remains the absolute consideration of the nature of six abstracted from any being, and thus perfection will be attributed to it, just as, with all singular men removed, rationality still would remain attributable to human nature.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, just as in created things some are more common and some more contracted, so also the types of more common things in God extend themselves to more, whereas those of less common things to fewer. And because unity and multitude are common to all created things, for this reason also, the ideal account of number extends itself to all creatures. Hence Boethius says in the beginning of the Arithmetic: all things whatsoever which were constructed from the primeval nature of things, seem to be formed by the account of numbers. For this exemplar was principal in the mind of the fashioner. (Boethius, Arithmetic 1.2 (PL 63:1083).) Yet the idea of a stone does not extend itself to all creatures. For this reason, if six is understood as the idea of six, regarding this, six still will be more eminent than a stone, that is, than the idea of a stone, namely, in regard to how it extends itself to more things, and so too in regard to how perfection belongs to six according to the nature of six, yet not to a stone.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that it is not Augustine’s intention to say that, if heaven and earth and the rest of creatures pass away, six would remain according to some created being, but that, if all creatures fall from being, still the nature of six (as it is abstracted from any being) will remain of the sort to which perfection belongs, just as also human nature will remain such that rationality belongs to it.

Reply Sed Contra: It must be said that, although in God there cannot be something having parts, nevertheless there can be in him the account of a thing having parts, and thus there is in him the account of six constituted out of parts and the account of its parts.

Article 2

On the ideal notions which are in the divine mind

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the ideas in the divine mind first apply things in their singular nature before the nature of their species.

Obj. 1: Because, as Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions: ideas are certain forms or stable reasons of things which are contained by the divine intelligence; and although one neither comes to be nor perishes, nevertheless everything is said to be formed according to these which can come to be and perish, and everything which comes to be and perishes. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46, para. 2 (CCSL 44A:71; PL 40:30).) But a singular is that which comes to be and perishes, that is, which is generated and corrupted. Therefore, the ideas first apply the singular.

On the contrary (2): Since the ideas are exemplar forms, (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.9, 991a20–b1; 7.8, 1034a2–3; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 1, text. 32–33; 7, text. 28; Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 5 (PG 3:815–26).) the form of an idea requires its object to be similar to it. But the similar thing, that is, the created thing, is more similar to the divine exemplar in its form, the source of its species, than in its matter, which is the principle of its individuation. Therefore, the idea first applies the individual nature of the species rather than its singularity.

I answer that, although the exemplar forms of all creatures, which are called ideas, are in the divine mind just like the forms of artifacts are in the mind of an artist, nevertheless there is this difference between exemplar forms in the divine mind and those in the mind of a created artist: for the created artist works with presupposed matter. Hence the exemplar forms in his mind do not produce matter, which is the principle of individuation. They only produce form, from which comes the species of the artifact. For this reason, exemplar forms of this sort do not directly apply an artifact as individuals, but as species only. Yet the exemplar forms of the divine intellect produce the whole thing, both form and matter, and for this reason, they apply not only the nature of the creature’s species, but also its singularity. Nevertheless, they first apply the nature of the species.

The following makes this clear. For an exemplar is that which others things are made to imitate. Hence the exemplar’s nature requires the maker to intend the other thing to be like its exemplar, otherwise the imitation would happen by chance rather than by exemplarity. Thus, the intention of the agent is included in the exemplar’s nature, such that the exemplar first applies what the agent first intends in the work. Yet every agent especially intends in a work what is more perfect. Yet the nature of the species is the most perfect thing in each individual. For through this a double imperfection is perfected. The first is the imperfection of matter, which is the principle of singularity. Since it is in potency to the form of a species, it is perfected when it attains the nature of the species. The second is the imperfection of general form, which relates in potency to specific differences as matter to form. Hence the most specific species is first from the intention of nature, as is clear through Avicenna in principle of its sufficiency. For nature does not intend to generate Socrates principally, or else, with Socrates destroyed, the order and intention of nature would perish; rather, it intends in Socrates to generate man. Similarly, it does not intend principally to generate animal, otherwise its action would rest when it had produced the nature of animal (Cf. Avicenna, Physics of The Healing 1.1, para. 4, pp. 8–9.) (even though, nevertheless, the nature of animal is completed before the nature of man in an individual generated, as is clear in the sixteenth book of On Animals; (Aristotle, Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b1–5.) yet man is not completed before this man is generated).

Hence also an exemplar which is in the divine mind first applies the nature of the species in whatever creature.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that what is first in intention is last in execution. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 2.9, 200a15–24; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 2, text. 89; Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.7, 1032b–21; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 7, text. 23.) Hence, although nature first intends to generate man, nevertheless first there is generated this man: for man is not generated except through this man being generated. And on account of this it is also said in the definition of idea that according to those there comes to be everything which comes to be, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46, para. 2 (CCSL 44A:71; PL 40:30).) as regards the way of execution, in which singulars are first.

Reply Obj. 2: We concede the second argument to the contrary.

On things pertaining to created nature

Question 2

Regarding the human soul

Then there were questions about what pertains to created nature:

and first concerning what pertains to the human soul; (Q. 2.)

second, concerning what pertains to the body. (Q. 3.)

About the first, there were two questions:

first, whether the soul receives the species by which it knows from things outside the soul;

second, how charity or any other habit is known by someone who does not have it.

Article 1

Whether the soul receives the species by which it knows from things outside the soul

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul does not receive species from things outside the soul. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 10, a. 6.)

Obj. 1: For Augustine says, in the twelfth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis: not a body in the spirit, but the spirit itself makes an image of a body in its own self with wondrous quickness. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12.16 (CSEL 28:402; PL 34:467).) Yet it would not make this in its own self if it received it from exterior things. Therefore, the soul does not receive the species by which it knows from things.

Obj. 2: To abstract dimensions from a dimensioned thing belongs only to the one who gives dimensions to bodies, and this belongs only to the creator. But in order for the soul to receive species from things, it is necessary that the dimensions be separated from that species itself. For species have dimensional being in things outside the soul, (Cf. Aquinas, Questions on Spiritual Creatures, a. 3, ad 14.) yet not in the soul, especially as regards the intellect. Therefore, the soul cannot receive species from sensible things.

To the contrary: There seems to be the whole doctrine of the philosophers, which confesses that sense receives from sensible things, imagination from sense, understanding from phantasms. (Here, Aquinas means the whole doctrine of philosophers who are in his tradition. Examples include Aristotle himself and the Peripatetics, Augustine, Chrysippus, Plato, and the Platonists (in a loose sense). Aquinas argues against other particular philosophers who hold opposing views in his Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 10, a. 6; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, lect. 6, nn. 68–73.)

I answer that the human soul receives the likenesses of things, by which it knows, from things in the way a patient receives from an agent. This must not be understood as if an agent poured into a patient a species the same in number which it has in itself, but it generates a likeness of itself by leading out from potency unto act. And it is said that the species of color is transferred in this way from a colored body to vision.

But a distinction must be made between agents and patients. For there are some agents sufficient by themselves to induce their form into a patient, just as fire is sufficient by itself for heating. Whereas there are some agents not sufficient by themselves to induce their form into a patient unless another agent supervenes, just as the heat of fire does not suffice to complete the action of nutrition. Hence the power of the nutritive soul is the primary agent, whereas fiery heat is an instrumental one. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a9–18, 416b25–29.)

Similarly, there is diversity on the part of patients. For there are certain patients which in no way cooperate with an agent, such as a stone when it is thrown up or wood when a stool is made from it. Whereas there are certain patients which cooperate with an agent, such as a stone when it is thrown down and the body of a man when it is healed through art.

And according to this, things which are outside the soul relate to the diverse powers of the soul in three ways.

To the exterior senses they relate as sufficient agents, with which patients do not cooperate, but receive only. Yet that color by itself cannot move sight unless light supervenes, is not contrary to what has been said, because both color and light are counted among those things which are outside the soul. Yet the exterior senses only receive from things by experiencing, without working toward their own formation, although granted they have their proper activity once formed, which is judgment about their proper objects.

But things outside the soul relate to the imagination as sufficient agents: for the action of a sensible thing does not stop in sense, but from there extends even to the image or imagination. Nevertheless, the imagination is a patient which cooperates with an agent: for while the imagination itself forms for itself likenesses of some things which sense has never perceived, nevertheless it forms them out of these things which are perceived by sense, by combining and dividing them, just as we imagine golden mountains which we have never seen, from the gold and mountains we do see. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 28, n. 633.)

But exterior things relate to the potential intellect as insufficient agents: for the action of the sensible things themselves does not even stop in the imagination, but beyond this the phantasms move the potential intellect. Yet they do not suffice for this by themselves, since they are intelligible in potency. Yet the intellect is only moved by the intelligible in act. Hence it is necessary for the action of the agent intellect to supervene, by whose illumination phantasms are made intelligible in act, just as colors are made visible in act by the illumination of bodily light. And thus, it is clear that the agent intellect is the principal agent which effects the likenesses of things in the potential intellect, yet the phantasms received from exterior things are, as it were, instrumental agents. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a10–17; 3.7, 431a14–17, 431b2.) The potential intellect also is compared to things whose notion it receives as a patient which cooperates with an agent: for the intellect can form the quiddity of a thing which does not fall under sense much more than the imagination can.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, if the remark of Augustine refers to the intellect, it is plain that the things do not make a likeness of themselves in the potential intellect principally, but that the agent intellect does this. Yet if it refers to the imagination, the things indeed are makers, but they do not make alone, because the imagination itself also cooperates, as has been said. A body makes in the senses a likeness of itself sufficiently and alone, but Augustine is not speaking about this, because he distinguishes sense from spirit or bodily vision from spiritual. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 10, a. 6, ad 5; ST I.84.6, ad 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that argument proceeds as if that species, the same in number which is in things or in the imagination, is made afterwards in the intellect (for thus it would be necessary for the dimensions to be removed from it); and it is clear that this is false.

Article 2

How charity or any other habit is known by someone who does not have it

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that someone who does not have charity knows it through species.

Obj. 1: For everything which is known is known either through its essence or through a likeness of it. But someone without charity does not know it through its essence, because it is not essentially in him. Therefore, if it is known by someone without it, it is known through a likeness of it.

Obj. 2: Anyone who has charity knows himself to have it in some way, at least through conjectures or revelation. And similarly, after he has lost it, he can recall that he had had charity, which cannot be except through its species reserved in memory. Therefore, charity is known through a likeness of it by someone without it who had it before, and the same reason applies to anyone else not having it.

Obj. 3: Augustine says, in the tenth book of the Confessions, that memory relates to intelligence in this way: (Augustine, Confessions 10.14, paras. 21–22 (CCSL 27:166; PL 32:788).) just as the stomach of a ruminating animal to the mouth, because, just as that which is in the stomach of the ruminating animal is led back to the mouth, so that which is in the memory is led back to the intelligence. If, therefore, charity is preserved in memory through its likeness, it also will be grasped by the intelligence through its likeness.

On the contrary: Augustine says, in the twelfth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, and as is said in the Gloss on 2 Corinthians 12, that intellectual vision is of those things which do not have species like themselves which are not themselves, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12.6 (CSEL 28:386–87; PL 34:458–59); Glossa ordinaria, at 2 Corinthians 12, 6.447–48 (192:80–81; 114:568–69).) and among things of this sort he posits charity. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 12.24, para. 50 (CSEL 28:416; PL 34:474).) Therefore, charity cannot be known through a likeness of it, but only through its essence.

I answer that knowledge of charity is twofold: one is that by which it is known what charity is; the other is that by which charity is perceived, such as when someone knows himself to have charity, which pertains to knowing whether it exists. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.1, 89b24–25.)

The first knowledge of charity applies in the same way both to one having charity and to one not having it, namely, just as the human intellect was born to comprehend the quiddities of things, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430b27–29.) and proceeds to know them similar to how it knows complex conclusions.

For there are naturally in us certain first complex principles known by all, (Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.19, 99b17–100b17; Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3–5, 1005a20–1009a38.) from which reason proceeds to know in act conclusions which are known potentially in the aforesaid principles, whether through its own proper discovery or through another’s teaching or through divine revelation. (Hesiod, Work and Days, verses 291–95; cf. Aristotle, Ethics 1.4, 1095b10–13.) In all these modes of knowing man is helped by principles naturally known, either such that the principles themselves suffice to acquire knowledge, with sense and imagination supporting, (Aquinas, In II Sent. 3.3.4, ad 1; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 26, a. 2, ad 2.) such as when we acquire some knowledge through discovery or through teaching; or such that the aforesaid principles do not suffice to acquire knowledge. Still, nevertheless, in knowing of this sort, the principles direct inasmuch as they are found not to oppose the principles naturally known, which if it were the case, in no way would the intellect assent to them, just as it cannot dissent from the principles.

Similarly, in the intellect there are for us naturally certain conceptions known by all, as of being, of one, of the good, and of things of this sort, (Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 1.5, pp. 31–33; Aquinas, Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 3.) from which the intellect proceeds to knowing the quiddity of each thing in the same way through which it proceeds from principles known essentially to knowing conclusions.

And this happens either through those things which someone perceives by sense, just as when I conceive the quiddity of a thing through the sensible properties of that thing;

or, it happens through those things which someone hears from others, just as when a layman who does not know what music is, when he hears that it is some art through which one knows how to sing or to play the strings, he conceives the quiddity of music, since he himself knew beforehand what art is and what it is to sing; (Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 27–29; Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 3, lect. 10.)

or, it even happens through what is had from revelation, as is the case in matters of faith. For when we believe that something in us is given from heaven by which our affect is united to God, we conceive the quiddity of charity. We understand that charity is a gift of God (Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity 15.18.32 (CCSL 50 A:507–8; PL 42:1062–63); On Grace and Free Will 18.39 (PL 44:905).) by which the affect is united to God, (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 12, a. 5, resp.) but we still know beforehand what a gift is and what affect is and what union is, concerning which we cannot even know what they are unless by resolving them into something previously known. And thus, by this we might even arrive at the first conceptions of the human intellect, which are known naturally by all.

And because natural knowledge is a certain likeness of the divine truth impressed upon our mind, according to Psalm 4:6 [7]: the light of your face has been signed upon us, O Lord; for this reason, Augustine says, in the tenth book of On the Trinity, that habits of this sort are known in the first truth. (Augustine, On the Trinity 10.1.1 (CCSL 50:309; PL 42:971).)

Yet that conception of charity which the intellect forms in the aforesaid way is not only a likeness of charity, like the species of things in sense or in imagination. For sense and imagination never reach to knowing the nature of a thing, but only merely the accidents which surround the thing. And for this reason, the species which are in sense or imagination do not represent the nature of the thing, but only its accidents, just as a statue represents a man as to accidentals. But the intellect knows the very nature and substance of a thing, hence the intelligible species is a likeness of the very essence of the thing and is in a certain way the very quiddity and nature of the thing according to intelligible being, not according to natural being as it is in things. And for this reason, all things which do not fall under sense and imagination, but under intellect alone, are known through this: that their essences or quiddities are in some way in the intellect. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 2, lect. 13, nn. 533–35.)

And this is the way whereby charity is known by the knowledge “what it is,” both by someone who has charity and by someone who does not have it.

But according to another way of knowing charity, neither charity nor any habit or power is perceived by our intellect unless through this: that its acts are perceived, as is clear from the Philosopher in the second book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 2.3, 1104b3–5.) Yet the acts of charity or of any other habit are elicited by the essence of charity itself or of that other habit. And in this way, someone is said to know that he has charity or some other habit through the very essence of the habit according to the being which it has in the nature of things and not only in the intellect. Yet no one can know charity thus except one who has charity, because the acts of charity and of the other virtues especially consist in interior motions, which cannot be known except by one doing them, except insofar as they are manifested by exterior acts. And thus, through a certain conjecture someone not having charity can perceive that another has charity.

Yet I say this by supposing that someone can know that he has charity, which, nevertheless, I do not think is true, because in the very acts of charity we cannot perceive sufficiently that they are elicited by charity, on account of the likeness of natural love to gratuitous love.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that in one who does not have charity, the essence of charity is not there according to the being of nature, but according to intelligible being.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, after someone ceases to have charity according to the being of the nature of charity, charity still remains in him according to intelligible being, and thus he can know what charity is. There also remain in his memory the acts of charity which he has done, even in sensible memory on account of the sensible acts of charity, which certainly remain according to their likenesses, just as other sensible things, and from these someone remembers that he had had charity.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that that which is in memory returns to the understanding, not such that the species, the same in number which is in the memory, afterwards is made in the intellect, but in that manner of speaking by which phantasms are said to be made in the intellect, as has been said before. (Above: q. 2, a. 1, resp.)

Question 3

Regarding the human body

Article 1

Whether food is converted into true human nature

Then there was a question regarding the human body: whether food is converted into true human nature? (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What is Sensed, prologue, n. 2; cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, tract. 18, ch. 1, q. 3, 469–76.) And it seems that it is not.

Obj. 1: Because in the human body, true human nature is flesh or bone according to species. But food is not converted into that which is according to species, but into that which is according to matter, as the Philosopher seems to say in the first book of On Generation. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.15, 321b19–34.) Therefore, food is not converted into true human nature.

Obj. 2: That which is true human nature requires it to remain always in man, otherwise man would not remain the same in number. But that which is generated from food does not always remain, nay rather it flows in and flows out, as is clear from the first book of On Generation. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.15, 321b27.) Therefore, that which is generated from food is not true human nature.

Obj. 3: Augustine says that we were in Adam in two ways, namely, according to seed-like principle and according to fleshy substance, yet Christ was in him according to fleshy substance and not according to seed-like principle. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 10.20 (CSEL 28:323; PL 34:423–24). Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 30, a. 3, q. 1, obj. 2 and resp. Aquinas is citing the words of Bonaventure rather than of Augustine himself directly.) Yet that which is generated (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.15, 321b26.) from food for us was not in Adam. Therefore, the fleshy truth of our substances has not been generated from food.

Obj. 4: But you will say that our fleshy substance was in Adam originally and not essentially.

On the contrary: semen refers to the origin of a thing. If, therefore, we are said to have been in Adam according to fleshy substance only originally, then it is the same to be according to fleshy substance and according to seed-like principle, which is false. Therefore, the same holds as before.

On the contrary (1): As is said in the second book of the De Anima, food is such by potency as that which it nourishes. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416b5–7; 2.5, 417a20–21; On Generation and Corruption 1.17, 322a26–28; 1.16, 321b35–322a4.) But that which is somehow potentially something can be converted into that thing. Therefore, food can be converted into that which it nourishes. But that which it nourishes is that which is true human nature. Therefore, food is converted into that which is true human nature.

Furthermore (2): Semen from which generation comes especially seems to pertain to true human nature. But semen, according to the Philosopher in the fifteenth book of On Animals, comes from superfluous food. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 1.18, 724b21–726a28; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 9, nn. 333–34.) Therefore, food is converted into true human nature.

I answer that to address this question it is necessary first to see what true human nature is. Yet the truth of each thing, as Avicenna says in his Metaphysics, is nothing other than its property to be what has been established for it. (Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 8.6, p. 413.) For example, that which properly exists as gold, reaching the established ends of the nature of gold, is said truly to be gold. Yet each thing properly exists in some nature through standing under the completed form of that proper nature, by which it has being and the character of the species in that nature. Hence something pertains to the truth of each thing which is complete through the form of that thing, and which pertains directly and essentially to the completion of that thing. For in natural things as in artificial things there are found certain things wherein the character of the thing principally consists, yet others which are ordered to the conservation or melioration of these. For example, a trunk and fruits pertain essentially to the completing of a tree, hence they are its true nature. Yet leaves in some way are ordered to the conservation of the fruits, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b2–3.) and as regards this they do not seem to be of the true nature of a tree principally. Similarly, the character of a sword consists in iron and its sharpness, yet a sheath is for the conservation of a sword. Hence, if a sword were a natural thing, iron would be of the truth of its nature, yet not a sheath. Yet thus we say something is true human nature which essentially pertains to the perfection of human nature, completely participating the form of the species. Yet that which is ordered only to the conservation or melioration of these is not true human nature in man.

It must be said, therefore, that human nature can be considered in two ways: either according to the whole human species, or according to its existence in an individual. Accordingly, on the present question there are found three opinions.

For certain men (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 30, cc. 14–15, pp. 503–5 (PL 192:724).) say that food is not converted into true human nature either according to the species or according to the individual. For they say that all the matter which was born to be ever truly under the species of human nature was in the body of Adam, nor can any other matter truly become the subject of the human species. And from that matter out of which the body of the first man was composed, there was some part detached, which indeed through a certain multiplication, without addition of exterior matter, was augmented into so much as reached even to the complete quantity in the body of Seth; (Cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 3, a. 26, 28:64b.) from this body, something again was detached for the formation of the body of his son and multiplied in the aforesaid way. And thus, the whole human genus was multiplied from that matter in the body of the first man, without the addition of anything extrinsic. Yet that which is generated from food is necessary for us to conserve that humidity which is true human nature, namely, so that natural heat, having something else to consume, namely, the accidental humidity generated out of food, so to speak, will not consume the humidity which is true human nature. Likewise do artists apply lead to silver, namely, so that in the furnace the lead might be consumed and the silver might not be destroyed. (Cf. Malachi 3:2–3; Augustine, City of God 20.25 (CCSL 48:748; PL 41:699).) Hence in the resurrection, when the truth of human nature will be inconsumable, we will not require food, nor will there rise in us something which has been generated out of food, but only that which was in Adam.

But as far as pertains to the present question, a position of this sort seems unfitting for two reasons. The first reason is because it is the same thing for some form to lose nothing of its subject matter and to acquire nothing newly, for whose substance and nature nothing increases nor perishes. Yet it is agreed that some matter which was the substance of true human nature ceases to be the substance of human nature, as is clear in the death of each man. Hence, unless some matter would be newly added to human nature, it would follow that that which is true human nature in act would be less now than in the time of Adam. And thus, the nature of the species would not be saved perfectly through generation. The second reason is because that mutation which they call multiplication is in no way according to the essence of matter itself, but only according to quantity or the dimensions befalling it. For they do not say that something of matter through its essence is created newly or otherwise added, but that that same matter which was less before, afterwards becomes greater. Yet to be rarefied and condensed is nothing else than for the same matter to be changed from great dimensions into small ones and conversely. Hence it would follow according to the aforesaid position that that which is true human nature always would be rarefied through continuous generation and augmentation, and so much as nature cannot sustain: for that which is true human nature already would be innumerably more rare than fire, (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What is Sensed, tr. 1, ch. 3, nn. 55–57.) which is clearly false.

And for this reason, another opinion (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., preface, 2:2; d. 30, a. 3, qq. 1–2, 2:726–37; Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, 2:564–73; Questiones antequam esset Frater, 3:1284–1303.) says that food is converted into true human nature “first” and principally according to the species, yet not according to the individual, except secondarily. For they say that, in each individual of the human species, what is first and principally true human nature is that which he has derived from his parents, (Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 30, a. 3, q. 2, concl., 2:735.) and this is called by the Philosopher flesh and bone according to species, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.15–17, 321b10–322a33.) which always remain. But because that, since it is scant, would not suffice for the complete quantity due to human nature without addition, there is added that which is generated out of food. This is not only for it to conserve what was received from the first parents, as the first opinion said, but that a perfect quantity would be completed from an addition of this sort. And thus, that which is generated out of food is not true human nature in this individual principally, but only secondarily inasmuch as it is necessary for due quantity; and the Philosopher names this flesh and bone according to matter, which flows in and flows out. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.15, 321b27.) But nevertheless, out of this some part seminally crosses into the generation of offspring, and there is effected in it what is principally true human nature, with an admixture of this which was principally of the truth of human nature in the father, as certain men wish, or without its admixture, as others say, (Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, 2:566a; Aquinas, In II Sent. 30.2.2.) which is more consonant with the sayings of the Philosopher in the fifteenth book of On Animals, who says the sperm is totally from superfluous food. (Aristotle, On Generation of Animals 1.18, 724b21–726a28.) And thus, that which is generated from food cannot be that which is principally true human nature in him who is nourished, but it can be true human nature principally in another of the same species, namely, in his son. And according to this opinion, they say that that which is principally true human nature in each will rise whole in him, yet not the whole which is generated out of food, but only as much as suffices for the completion of quantity, (Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 30, a. 3, q. 2, concl., 2:735.) since on account of the completion of quantity only a certain amount pertains somehow to true human nature. And this opinion accords with the opinion of the commentator Alexander, who explained how the flesh according to species, which the Philosopher says always remains, is that which is derived from the parents, whereas flesh according to matter is that which is generated out of food, which flows in and flows out. (Cf. Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation 1.38, 39–51.)

But this opinion the commentator Averroes reproves in the treatise which he wrote on the book On Generation: (Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation 1.38, 49.) for since that which is generated out of food nourishes inasmuch as it is flesh in potency, the flesh increases by as much as there is potency, as is said in the second book of the De Anima. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416b5–7; 2.5, 417a20–21; cf. On Generation and Corruption 1.17, 322a26–28; 1.15–16, 321b35–322a4.) That which is generated out of food, after it has received the species of flesh, is made one with that which was in it before, because in the end that which has been converted is like it. Hence there does not seem to be any reason why natural heat should be able to consume something of that humidity of the flesh generated out of food and not something of the humidity which is derived from the parents, nor would it be able to be proved in some necessary way. (Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s On Generation 1.38.) And for this reason, that which is received from the parents, as that which is generated out of food, relates equally to this: that it remains or is consumed through natural heat, and to this: that it is restored through nourishment, which is to flow in and flow out. And thus, what is generated out of food and what is derived from the parents equally pertain to the truth of human nature.

And according to this there is a third opinion: that food is converted into that which is principally true of human nature both as far as the species and as far as the individual. For this opinion posits that each of these, namely, that which is generated out of food and that which is derived from the parents, is indifferently and equally perfected by the human form, and each indifferently remains or is consumed: indeed, it remains according to species, yet it is consumed and restored according to matter. For just as in some republic, men diverse in number pertain to the community, as certain men die and others succeed them in their place, and thus there does not remain one republic according to matter, because there are some men and then others, nevertheless it remains one in number as far as species or form on account of the unity of order in its distinct offices, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 44.1.2.) so also in the human body there remains flesh and bone and each of the parts (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.15, 321b19–20.) the same in number as far as species or form, which is considered in a determinate site and power and figure; yet it does not remain as far as matter, because that matter of the flesh in which such a form was before has been consumed and another has succeeded it in its place, just as is clear with fire, (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.16, 322a14–16.) which is continued according to the same form or mode through this: that, when certain logs are consumed, others are substituted which sustain the fire. And according to this opinion, both of the aforesaid, namely, that generated out of food and that derived from the parents, will rise without distinction in the amount necessary for the species and the due quantity of the human body.

And this opinion seems more probable than the others.

Reply Obj. 1: According to this, therefore, to the first it must be said that the distinction of the Philosopher, by which he distinguished flesh according to species and according to matter, is not to be understood such that the flesh which is called according to species, namely, that derived from the parents, and that which is according to matter, namely, that generated out of food, are different. Rather, one and the same signate flesh can be considered both according to the species which it has and according to matter. And that this is the understanding of the Philosopher is clear from this: that he says in the same place that flesh according to species and according to matter are distinguished in the same way as each one of those things having species in matter. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.15, 321b20–21.) Yet in other things having species in matter, just as stone and iron and things of this sort, the first distinction does not have a place, but the second does, as is clear through itself. And for this reason, it must be said that food is converted into the flesh which is according to species, that is, which has species, nevertheless not such that food becomes the species of flesh, but it becomes the matter of flesh, by the reason of which it can be said that it is converted into flesh as far as the matter and not as far as the species.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that true human nature, and anything else, derives from species. This is because that which is in man remains according to species even if it does not remain according to matter. Nonetheless, the truth of human nature is said to remain, nor does man cease to be the same in number on account of a permutation which is according to matter. For the whole matter is not drawn away from the form simultaneously so that another whole matter simultaneously receives the form (for this would be generation and corruption, just as if one whole fire were to be extinguished and another whole fire were to be lit). But some part of the matter is consumed and another is substituted into its place, which is made one matter with the preceding through this: that it is added to it to sustain the same form of the human body, just as, if one log of fire is consumed and another is set in its place, the fire will be the same in number. (Cf. Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.16, 322a14–16.)

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that for the conception of the human body two things concur, namely, the matter out of which the conceived is formed, and again the formative power which forms the conceived, which Augustine calls the first fleshy substance. The second is seed-like principle. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 10.20 (CSEL 28:323; PL 34:423–24).) Therefore, we are said according to both of those to have been in Adam originally, namely, inasmuch as the matter of the conceived was prepared through the generative power of the mother, yet the formative power is in the seed of the father, and both of these are led back to Adam as to a first origin from which they derived human nature and its consequent powers. Yet the body of Christ had been formed through the active power of the Holy Spirit, but the mother ministered the matter, because out of the most pure blood of the Virgin he was conceived, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.2 (PG 94:986).) And for this reason, he was not in Adam according to seed-like principle, but according to fleshy substance, nevertheless not such that a fleshy substance the same in number which is in us and was in Christ, was in Adam.

Reply Obj. 4: And from this also the response to what follows is clear.