On Things Pertaining to Grace and Fault

Question 4

Regarding prelates

Then there were questions concerning what pertains to fault and grace.

And first, there were questions concerning what pertains to grace; (Qq. 4–5.)

second, concerning what pertains to fault. (Q. 6.)

Regarding what pertains to grace, it was asked:

first, concerning what pertains to prelates only; (Q. 4.)

second, concerning what pertains to all commonly. (Q. 5.)

Regarding prelates, there were two questions:

first, concerning the election of prelates, namely, whether it is always necessary to elect the better man, or does it suffice to elect a good man;

second, concerning the honor which must be given to prelates, namely, whether bad prelates must be honored or not.

Article 1

Whether it is always necessary to elect the better man, or does it suffice to elect a good man

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is always necessary to elect the better man.

Obj. 1: For it is said in 2 Kings 10:3: elect the better man . . . and place him upon the throne of his father. Therefore, much more in spiritual offices must the better men be preferred.

Obj. 2: On 1 Timothy 3:2: it is necessary for a bishop to be irreprehensible, the Gloss says: let such a man be elected pontiff by comparison with whom the rest are called a flock. (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Timothy 3:2, 6.701 (PL 192:343; 114:628); Gregory the Great, Book of Pastoral Rule 2.1 [12] (CCSL 141; PL 77:25–26).) Therefore, it is always necessary in the episcopate to elect the better man.

Obj. 3: Pope Leo says: let him who is better among priests and deacons be elected (Leo the Great, Epistle 14, ch. 6 (PL 54:673); Gratian, Decretum, Part 1, Distinction 63, canon 19, 1:240.) as the bishop.

Obj. 4: He who is nearer ought to be preferred for possessing an inheritance. But to Christ, whose patrimony prelates and clerics possess, he who is better is nearer. Therefore, for the prelacy and ecclesiastical benefices the better men always must be preferred.

Obj. 5: If someone were commissioned by his lord to seek for the lord a faithful and suitable minister, he would not act faithfully towards his lord if, passing over a more suitable man, he received a less suitable one. Therefore, much more does he sin who is commissioned to elect someone as a minister of God if, passing over a better man, he elects someone less good.

On the contrary: A decretal says that it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it required that the better man be elected. (Innocent III, Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 1, tit. 6, c. 32, 2:77–79; cf. Glossa ordinaria on the Decretales (ed. Venice, 1591), bk. 1, tit. 27, c. 2, f. 231rb.)

I answer that any man can be called good or better than another in two ways: one way is absolutely, and thus he is better who is more perfect in charity; another way is according to a particular thing. And thus, someone is said to be better than another either for the military or for a magistracy or for a prelacy or for something of this sort, who is not better absolutely. For in each office, whether spiritual or bodily, some things are required besides moral goodness for someone to be suitable for discharging that office. (Cf. Plutarch, Life of Aristides, in Collection des Universités de France, publiée sous le patronage de 1’ Association Guillaume Budé (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1998), 24.7, bk. 5:50; Cicero 38.3, bk. 12:110; Aristotle, Politics 5.7, 1309a33–b6; Ethics 9.2, 1164b24–25.)

Therefore, it must be said that it is necessary to elect to the prelacy, or to any ecclesiastical office, someone who is good absolutely, for someone is rendered unworthy by mortal sin for discharging anything spiritual. Hence Dionysius says in the letter to the monk Demophilos, speaking about a priest who was not illuminated by grace: that man is not a priest, he is not, but an enemy, a deceitful one, a deceiver of his very self, and a wolf above the divine people clad with the skin of a sheep. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistles 8.2, “To Demophilus” (PG 3:1091–92).) Nevertheless, it is not necessary for that one always to be elected who is better absolutely: for it is possible that to him who is more perfect in charity there may be lacking many things which are required for him to be a suitable prelate, which are found in another man who is of lesser charity, such as knowledge, industry, power, and other things of this sort. Hence it is not always necessary to elect the better man absolutely, but him who is better for the office.

Yet if one elects someone whom he reckons less suitable for such an office, he sins. For it cannot be that of two one should be preferred to the other except on account of something considered in him. Yet the thing that is considered in the less suitable man so that he is preferred to the more suitable one is a condition that moves someone improperly, such as familiarity or consanguinity or something of this sort: for it cannot be a condition pertaining to the suitability of a prelate, from which the other is reckoned more suitable absolutely. And thus, it moves improperly, and so in such an election there is the receiving of persons, which cannot be without sin.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, when it is said: elect the better man (2 Kgs 10:3), this must be understood concerning the man better for the dignity to which he was elected.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the rest ought to be like a flock in comparison with the prelate, not considering only the sanctity of his customs, but his discretion and vivacity and other things of this sort which are exigent in a pastor for ruling a flock.

Reply Obj. 3: The reply is the same as to the first.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that he who is elected to the prelacy is not elected as though for possessing an inheritance, because the inheritance of Christians is not on earth, but in heaven, namely, God himself, according to Psalm 16 [15]:5: the Lord is the portion of my inheritance. Yet he is elected as if a steward in the family of some lord, according to 1 Corinthians 4:1: thus let man reckon us as ministers of Christ. Yet he who is nearer is not always elected as a steward, but he who is more suitable.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that it would happen similarly also in the procuring of some servant of a temporal lord, that it would not be necessary to seek the better man absolutely, but the better man for serving.

Reply Sed Contra: To the contrary objection it must be said that the decretal must be understood as far as this: that it is not always necessary to elect the better man absolutely, but it suffices to elect a good man.

Or it must be said that it does not speak as regards the forum of conscience, but as regards the contentious forum, in which an election is not rejected from someone else being found more suitable when he who is elected is suitable. Otherwise, every election would be open to calumny.

Article 2

Whether bad prelates must be honored or not

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that honor does not have to be given to bad prelates.

Obj. 1: For just as Boethius says in the book On Consolation: we cannot on account of honors judge that those must be revered whom we reckon unworthy of these honors. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 3.4, 5 (CCSL 94:43; PL 63:736).) But bad prelates are not worthy of honors. Therefore, they cannot be judged as having to be revered by their subjects.

Obj. 2: Honor is not due to bad prelates unless by the character of the prelacy. Since, therefore, they are unworthy of the prelacy, they are also consequently unworthy for honors and for all other things which are proper to the prelacy.

On the contrary: It is said in Exodus 20:12: honor your father; the Gloss: (Not found in the gloss on Exodus, but in: Glossa ordinaria, at Deuteronomy 5:16, 1.1493 (PL 113:458); at Ecclesiastes 3:9, 3.1767 (PL 113:1120–21).) that is, prelates. Since, therefore, it speaks indistinctly, it seems that all prelates both good and bad must be honored.

I answer that in a prelate we can consider two things, namely, his own person and his dignity, according to which there is a certain public person. If, therefore, the prelate is bad, his person must not be honored because, since honor is reverence exhibited to someone unto the testimony of virtue, (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 1, lect. 18, n. 214; bk. 4, lect. 8, n. 748; In III Sent. 9.2.3, obj. 1.) someone would proffer false testimony concerning him if he honored his own person, against that which is said in Exodus 20:16: you shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor. (Cf. Augustine, Questions on the Heptateuch, bk. 2, q. 71.6, on Exodus 20:1–17 (PL 34:622–23; CCSL 33:105).) But as far as he is a public person, thus he bears the type and place not of himself, but of another, namely, of Christ, in the Church, or of the whole republic, as in secular dignities. And thus, his value is not computed according to his own person, but according to him whose place he possesses, just as it is concerning a little stone which is placed in computations in place of one hundred marks, since in itself it prevails nothing, as is said in Proverbs 26:8: just as he who sends a stone into the heap of Mercury, so he who grants honor to a fool; for Mercury was called the god of accounting and trade. And thus, honor must be given to him not on account of himself, but on account of him whose place he obtains, just as the adoration of images is referred to the prototype, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 4.8 [or ch. 89] (PG 94:1115–17).) Hence also an evil prelate is compared to an idol in Zechariah 11:17: O pastor and idol forsaking the flock.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the intention of Boethius is to say that bad men are not judged as having to be revered in their own persons, although honors must be given to them on account of the offices in which they are constituted.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a bad prelate is unworthy both of the prelacy and of the honors which are due to a prelate. But he whose turn he bears is worthy of such honor being given to his vicar, just as the blessed Virgin is worthy of us venerating her image depicted on a wall, even though the image itself is not worthy of such reverence.

Question 5

Regarding all men

Then there were questions about what pertains to grace common to every state. And about this there were three questions:

first, concerning prayers, whether prayer made for another prevails as much as prayer made for oneself;

second, concerning suffrages, whether they benefit more a pauper who is more worthy than the rich man for whom they specially are made;

third, concerning vows, whether a simple vow breaks off a contracted marriage.

Article 1

On prayers

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that prayer made for oneself prevails more than prayer made for another.

Obj. 1: For thus it is said in a certain gloss, that special prayers prevail more. (Not found in the Gloss. Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 45, a. 11, 30:618b; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 45.2.3, qa. 1, ad 5.) But that is most special by which someone prays for himself. Therefore, prayer made for oneself prevails more than prayer made for another.

Obj. 2: As it is said in the book On Spirit and Soul, prayer is nothing other than devotion of the mind unto God. (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 50 (PL 40:816).) But someone prays more devoutly for himself than for another. Therefore, prayer made for oneself prevails more than prayer made for another.

On the contrary (3): Prayer prevails so much more as it is more devout. But sometimes someone prays more devoutly for another than for himself. Therefore, prayer made for another prevails more than prayer made for one’s own self.

I answer that the value of prayer is twofold: one which is proper to prayer, according to which prayer is said to prevail for obtaining what is asked for, just as the prayer of Peter prevailed to resurrect Tabitha (Acts 9:36–43). The other value is common to prayer and to other works of virtue, according to which prayer is said to prevail for meriting something for the one himself praying insofar as it is informed by charity, just as the prayer of Peter by which he obtained the resurrection of Tabitha was meritorious of eternal life for Peter, inasmuch as it was an act informed by charity.

Speaking, therefore, about the first value, prayer made for oneself, all else being equal, prevails more than prayer made for another because the efficacy of prayer in obtaining can lose its effect when it is made for another from some impediment which is found in him for whom it is prayed. Hence as one of the conditions of prayer which make it efficacious for obtaining, it is posited for someone to pray for himself. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 27, ch. 3, q. 1, 3:517; Alexander of Hales, Magistri Alexandri de Hales Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, 4 vols. (Quaracchi: College of St. Bonaventure, 1951–1957), d. 17 [L], 3:187.) Yet as regards the second value, a prayer prevails more which proceeds out of greater charity, whether it be made for oneself or for another.

Yet if we speak about interior charity, which ought to be judged through exterior works, then that comparison can be understood in two ways.

One way is such that someone prays for another in such a way that he prays also for himself. And then to pray for another and for one’s own self is of greater merit than to pray for oneself only: for it is of greater merit for a friend to be benevolent and beneficent to himself and to another than to himself only.

In another way, it can be understood such that someone prays for another and not for himself. And thus, he would be shown to be more benevolent towards another than towards himself, and thus he would sin in the order of charity, (Cf. Aquinas, In III Sent. 29.5; Disputed Questions on Charity, a. 9.) loving another more than himself. And understanding the comparison in this way, it is better to pray for oneself than for another.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that argument is not to the point, because special prayer is said in that gloss for any prayer done specially, whether for oneself or for another.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, although often a man prays for himself more devoutly, nevertheless sometimes he prays more devoutly for another. And accordingly, a universal indication as to which prayer prevails more cannot be made.

Reply Obj. 3: And the same is said about the third contrary objection.

Article 2

On suffrages

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the suffrages of a church specially made for some rich man avail equally for a pauper for whom they are not made, if he is of equal merit.

Obj. 1: For as Augustine says, suffrages of this sort only prevail for each man after death as much as he merited their benefit while living. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 45.2.4, qa. 1, obj. 2; Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 45, ch. 2, pp. 525–26 (PL 192:948–49); Augustine, Enchiridion 110, para. 29 (CCSL 46:108; PL 40:283); Sermon 172 (PL 38:937).) But the aforesaid two merited equally. Therefore, equally do the aforesaid suffrages benefit them.

Obj. 2: The Passion of Christ always more benefits him who is of greater merit. But in the Mass, which is the foremost of suffrages, there is the memorial of the dominical Passion. Therefore, they benefit equally those who are of equal merit.

On the contrary (1): God receives suffrages of this sort according to the intention of the one making them. But the one making them intends that they benefit more the rich man for whom he makes them. Therefore, they benefit him more.

Furthermore (2): It must not be said that the pious intention of those who make special suffrages for their dear ones is frustrated. Yet it would be frustrated if they would not benefit them more specially. Therefore, they benefit more those for whom they are made.

I answer that about this there is a twofold opinion.

For certain men say that the suffrages of a church specially made for someone prevail for all who are in purgatory, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 45.2.4, qa. 1, ad 1; 45.3.2, ad 2; Decretum, P. 3, D. 5, c. 24, 1:1418; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 45, a. 2, q. 3, 4:946b.) equally indeed for these who are of equal merit, whereas more for these who are of greater merit, less for these who are of lesser. So too a candle lit for some rich man in some house where there are many others equally benefits the others who are of equal sight, whereas more these who are of better sight, less these who are of worse, even though there is for the rich man more unto a certain honor. So too a reading which is read specially for some cleric, with many hearing it simultaneously, equally prevails for those who are of equal capacity, more for these who are of greater, less for these who are of lesser.

Whereas others say that suffrages prevail more for these for whom they specially are made. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 45, a. 2, q. 3, 4:946b.)

Yet each opinion is true according to something. To explain this, it must be known that the works of one do not prevail for another as regards essential reward, because everyone is judged by his own acts, but only as regards some accidental joy or as regards the remission of some temporal punishment. And thus, the suffrages of the living can benefit the dead. Yet a communication of works of this sort happens in two ways. One way is from a union of charity, by which all the faithful of Christ are made to be one body. And thus, the act of one redounds in a certain way to the aid of another, just as we also see in members of a natural body. And thus, someone is aided out of the act of another inasmuch as any man existing in charity rejoices concerning whatever good work. And as much as he is of greater charity, so much more does he rejoice, whether he is in purgatory or in paradise or even in the world. And as regards this, the first opinion is true. In another way, one’s act is made common to another through the intention of the one making it, because he makes it for that one or in that one’s place, which prevails especially in paying off debts, and thus the suffrages of a church prevail for the dead inasmuch as a living man has paid to God a satisfaction which the dead is held to pay. And thus, the value of the suffrage follows the intention of the one making it. And as regards this, the second opinion is true.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that merit concerning which Augustine speaks is conditioned merit: for someone while living merits suffrages to prevail for himself after death if they are made for him. This condition indeed exists in one and does not exist in the other, and for this reason, they do not benefit both equally.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the Passion of Christ has been given for all, yet the sacrifice of the Mass specially is offered for some, and for this reason, it is not alike.

Reply Sed Contra 1–2: We concede the other two.

Article 3

On vows

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that a simple vow of continence breaks off a contracted marriage.

Obj. 1: For if anyone gives to someone what he had previously given to another, the second giving is null. But he who utters a simple vow of continence gives his body to God. Therefore, since afterwards by contracting marriage he gives his body to a wife, that contract of marriage seems to prevail nothing. And thus, a simple vow breaks off a contracted marriage.

On the contrary: A decretal says that a simple vow impedes contracting marriage, but it does not break off one already contracted. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 6, cc. 4, 6, 2:685–86.)

I answer that a simple vow does not break off a contracted marriage. Only a solemn vow does.

The reason for this is clear if the difference between the two vows is inspected.

For in a simple vow there is only a promise, wherein someone promises to God that he will preserve continence. Yet dominion is not transferred by only a promise, (This doctrine is Roman law.) hence if someone promises something to someone and afterwards gives the same thing to another, a donation of this sort cannot be rescinded through the prior promise, although he does badly by giving. And thus, he who has uttered a simple vow of continence can afterwards hand over his body to a wife, and although he sins by doing this, nevertheless the marriage is not broken off on account of the preceding vow.

Yet in a solemn vow there is simultaneously a promise and bestowal. For there is a solemn vow when simultaneous with the vow someone is consecrated to God and placed in some state of sanctity either through the reception of an order or through the profession of a sure rule. (Cf. ST II-II.88.7; Henry of Segusio (Hostiensis), Summa aurea, bk. 4, “Qui clerici,” para. 4, 1313.) And thus, he cannot any longer hand over his body to a wife, and if he does hand it over, the contract is null. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 50, ch. 3, q. 3, 3.2:982; bk. 4, tract. 17, ch. 5, q. 5, 447; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 38, a. 2, q. 1, 4:820.)

Reply Obj. 1: And thus, marriage is broken off through a solemn vow, yet not through a simple vow.

Reply Sed Contra: Yet the argument brought to the contrary supposed something false, namely, that through a simple vow someone gives his body to God: for he does not give but promises.

On things pertaining to fault

Question 6

On things pertaining to fault

Then there were questions concerning what pertains to fault. And about this there were five questions:

first, whether he sins who goes to a church on account of the stipends, when otherwise he would not go, even though in the beginning he accepted the prebend so that he would serve God;

second, whether someone sins if, having a surplus, he does not give to a begging pauper;

third, whether, when there are diverse opinions concerning some fact, he who follows a less safe one sins, such as concerning a plurality of prebends;

fourth, whether a lie is always a sin;

fifth, whether as much as someone intends to sin, he sins.

Article 1

Whether he sins who goes to a church on account of the stipends, when otherwise he would not go, even though in the beginning he accepted the prebend so that he would serve God

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that he who goes to a church on account of the stipend, when otherwise he would not go, sins.

Obj. 1: For he seems to place divine submission, which is without price, under the price of a temporal thing. Therefore, he commits simony, and thus it seems that he sins mortally.

On the contrary: He who makes a vow by a good intention, if afterwards in the pursuit of the vow his will is changed so that reluctantly he does what willingly he promised, the merit of the vow is not evacuated, as Anselm is seen to say in the book On Likenesses. (Anselm of Canterbury, On Similitudes 81 (PL 159:652–53).) Therefore, for the same reason, he who receives a prebend to serve God does not sin even if afterwards his intention changes.

I answer that to answer this question it must be noted that an act is said to be spiritual in two ways. One way is on the part of the principle, namely, when the act applies to some person on account of something spiritual which is in him, such as to a bishop to consecrate basilicas and to a deacon to read the Gospel. And simony is committed in such acts if someone intends to sell his act. In another way, an act is spiritual not on the part of the principle, but on the part of the end only, such as to teach the liberal arts, to which belongs spiritual truth. But teaching of this sort does not apply to someone on account of some spiritual office, since it is permitted even to the Gentiles to teach arts of this sort. And in these acts simony is committed if the end, which is spiritual, is sold, namely, the truth itself, yet not if someone contracts for his works. Yet to celebrate the divine office in a church is a spiritual act in the first way: for it applies to someone by the fact he is a cleric. And for this reason, someone commits simony who intends to sell an act of this sort: for in any sale a price is received as an end.

And for this reason, in the aforesaid case a distinction must be made. For if he receives stipends of this sort as the end of his work principally intended, he commits simony, and thus he sins mortally. Yet if he has God as his principal end in such an act, yet secondarily regards stipends of this sort, not as an end, but just as for what is necessary for his sustenance, it is agreed that he does not sell a spiritual act, and thus he neither commits simony nor sins. For in that way the reception of stipends will not be the cause why he goes to a church, but it determines why he goes now and not at another turn.

Reply Obj. 1: And thus, the response to the first is clear, because he does not place that which is without price below price.

Reply Sed Contra: Whereas to the contrary objection, it must be said that in then vowing, the merit of the vow is not emptied when the intention of the one vowing is borne upon what is just, such as when someone wishes not to do what he has vowed provided he had not vowed it. Yet if it is borne directly upon what is illicit, then the merit of the vow is emptied, as when someone wishes absolutely not to do what he has vowed. Yet he who wishes to go to a church for money just as for a principal end has a will borne down upon what is illicit, and for this reason, he sins.

Article 2

Whether someone sins if, having a surplus, he does not give to a begging pauper

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that he who does not give to a begging pauper, if he has a surplus, sins.

Obj. 1: For to give alms from a surplus is in a precept. Luke 11:41: but nevertheless give what is superfluous as alms. Therefore, he sins if he does not grant this to one begging.

Obj. 2: Someone is held to inquire concerning what is necessary for salvation. But it is necessary for salvation for someone to come to help one living in extreme necessity. Therefore, every man is held to inquire whether the pauper is in extreme necessity, or to give to him at once.

On the contrary: Thus it would seem that all would be damned.

I answer that a distinction must be made about this. For supposing that someone has a surplus, both with respect to the individual and with respect to the person, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 15.2.1, qa. 4, ad 4.) which he is held to pay out to the poor, either he sees in the begging pauper evident signs of extreme necessity, or not. If he sees these signs, it is certain that he is held to give, and he sins by not giving. For in this case Ambrose speaks: feed the one dying of hunger . . . if you do not feed him, you have killed him. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 86, c. 21, 1:302; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 15.2.1, qa. 4, obj. 3; Pseudo-Ambrose, Sermon 64, 8th Sunday after Pentecost (PL 17:593–94).) Whereas if they do not appear, then he is not held to give to the begging pauper, because, although he is held to give what is superfluous to the poor, nevertheless he is not held to give to all, nor even to give to this one, but to distribute according to how it seems opportune to him. Nor is he held to inquire, because it would be too burdensome to inquire concerning all the poor, and especially since it belongs to the one suffering to make clear his necessity.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Article 3

Whether when there are diverse opinions concerning something, he who follows a less safe one sins, such as concerning a plurality of prebends

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that he who has many prebends sins by the very fact that the opinions of the masters are contrary to one another. (Above: q. 6, prologue.)

Obj. 1: For whoever commits himself to risk in something regarding salvation, sins. But that person commits himself to risk, as it seems, since he acts against the sentence of many experts. Therefore, it seems that he sins. (Cf. William of Auvergne, Tractatus de collatione beneficiorum 6.)

On the contrary: It can be that someone employs diligence in such a case, inquiring whether to have many prebends is licit, and does not find something which convinces him it is illicit. Therefore, it seems that he can have many prebends without sin.

I answer that someone commits sin in two ways: one way is by acting against the law, such as when someone fornicates; another way is by acting against his conscience, even if it is not against the law, such as if someone’s conscience tells him that to lift a straw from the earth is a mortal sin. (John of La Rochelle, Summa on Vices and Sins (Ms. Assisi Com. 587), f. 35rb10–12; cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 41, a. 1, q. 3, s.c. 2, concl., 2:942–43.) Yet out of conscience someone commits sin when he has sure faith concerning the contrary of that which he does, or even when he has an opinion with some doubt. Therefore, that which is done against the law is always evil, nor is it excused through this: that it is according to conscience. And similarly, that which is against conscience is evil, even though it is not against the law. Yet that which is neither against conscience nor against the law cannot be sin. (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 39.3.3; below: Quodlibet IX, q. 7, a. 2.)

Therefore, it must be said that when there are two contrary opinions concerning the same thing, it is necessary that one is true and the other is false. Therefore, either he who acts against the opinion of the masters, such as by having many prebends, acts contrary to the true opinion, and thus (since he acts against the law of God) he is not excused from sin, even though he does not act against his conscience: for thus he is acting against the law of God. Or that opinion which it follows is not true, but rather the contrary, such that truly it is licit to have many prebends. And thus, it must be distinguished, because either such a man has a conscience concerning the contrary, and thus again he sins by acting against conscience, although not against the law; or he does not have a certain conscience about the contrary, but, nevertheless, he is led into a certain doubt by the contrariety of the opinions. And thus, if with such a doubt remaining he has many prebends, he commits himself to danger, and thus beyond doubt he sins, as loving a temporal benefice more than his own salvation. Or, he is led by the contrary opinions into no doubt, and thus he neither commits himself to risk nor sins.

Reply Obj. 1: Hence the solution to the objections is clear.

Article 4

Whether a lie is always a sin

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that not every lie is a sin.

Obj. 1: For homicide is a greater sin than lying. But homicide can be done licitly, such as when a judge kills a thief. (Augustine, On Free Will 1.4, para. 9 (CCSL 29:216; PL 32:1226); cf. Albert the Great, Lecture on Ethics 2.7.) Therefore, lying also can be done licitly.

Obj. 2: In Sacred Scripture certain men are praised who nevertheless are understood to have lied, such as the midwives, (Exodus 1:15–21.) Jacob, (Genesis 27:19–24.) and Judith. (Judith 10:11–17.) Therefore, lying is not always a sin.

On the contrary: There is that which Augustine determines in the book On Lying. (Augustine, On Lying (CSEL 41:411–66; PL 40:487–518).)

I answer that whenever some act has some disorder inseparably annexed to it, it can never be done well, because this very disorder is something superfluous or diminished. And thus, in such an act a mean, in which virtue consists, cannot be reached, such as is also clear through the Philosopher in Ethics II. (Aristotle, Ethics 2.6, 1107a8–17.) Yet lying is an act of this sort: for unto this there are found words or voices: so that they might be signs of understandings, as is said in the beginning of On Interpretation, (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.1, 16a3–4.) and for this reason, when someone enunciates with their voice what they do not have in their mind, which is involved by the definition of lying, there is disorder there through abuse of the voice. And for this reason, we concede that lying is always a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that homicide also is always a sin (Aristotle, Ethics 2.6, 1107a8–17.) because it has disorder inseparably annexed to it: for homicide involves more than the killing of a man (for a composed term frequently implies more than the components): (Cf. Aquinas, In III Sent. 10.1.2, ad 3.) for homicide involves the undue killing of a man. (Cf. ST I-II.88.6, ad 3; Augustine, On Free Will 1.4, para. 9 (CCSL 29:216; PL 32:1226).) And for this reason, homicide is never licit, although to kill a man is sometimes licit.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as Augustine says in the book On Lying (and as is said in a Gloss on Psalm 5:7: you shall destroy all who speak a lie), (Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 5:7, 3.470 (PL 113:851); cf. PL 191:98.) someone is praised in Scripture in two ways: certain men on account of the perfect state of virtue, and their deeds are proposed for all as an example, and concerning such men it is not read that they lied. Or, if they said some things which seem to be lies, they are not lies according to the intention which they conceived in the Holy Spirit. Whereas certain men are praised on account of the innate disposition of virtue, and thus in some a lie is read to have been said, especially a dutiful lie, as is clear concerning the midwives: for they are not commended because they lied, but on account of their mercy whereby they fell into lying; and thus there appears in them a certain innate disposition, that is, progress, of virtue, yet not perfection. (Augustine, On Lying 5.7–8 (CSEL 41:421–22; PL 40:492–94); 17.34 (CSEL 41:454; PL 40:510–11); Augustine, Expositions on the Psalms 5.7 (CCSL 38:22; PL 36:85).)

Article 5

Whether as much as someone intends to sin, so much he sins

To the fifth we proceed thus. It seems that it is not necessary that, if someone intends to sin mortally, he sins mortally.

Obj. 1: For God is more prone to have mercy than to punish, (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 11.1.1, s. c.; Ambrose, Concerning Repentance 1.2, para. 9 (CSEL 73:123; PL 16:469); William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 19, ch. 1, 2.2:646.) as is said in a Gloss on the beginning of Jeremiah. (Glossa ordinaria, at Jeremiah, prologue, 4.579 (PL 114:9); cf. Rabanus Maurus, On Jeremiah (PL 111:795, 1224); Origen, Homily on Jeremiah (PL 25:585).) But, if someone intends to sin venially, it does not follow on account of that that he sins venially. Therefore, neither is it necessary that he who intends to sin mortally sins mortally.

On the contrary: Whoever intends to sin mortally acts against conscience. But every such man sins mortally. Therefore, if someone intends to sin mortally, he does sin mortally.

I answer that it is said improperly that someone intends to sin mortally or venially: for evil is beyond intention and will, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 22 (PG 3:731).) But someone intends to do something which he believes to be mortal sin, and from this it is said that he intends to sin mortally. Therefore, the aforesaid question seeks nothing except why someone believing what he does to be mortal sin, sins mortally. Yet it is not necessary that it be venial if he believes it to be venial, such as if he believes fornication to be a venial sin.

The response to this question is obvious because, since even an erroneous conscience has the power of binding, from the very fact that he acts against conscience, he sins mortally. (Cf. above: q. 6, a. 3, resp.) Yet error of conscience sometimes has the power of loosing or excusing, namely, when it proceeds from ignorance of that which someone cannot know or is not held to know. And in such a case, even though the deed is mortal concerning itself, nevertheless if he intends to sin venially, he sins venially. So too, if someone were to intend to come to his wife for the sake of delight and thus intends to sin venially, and if another woman were substituted for her, with him not knowing, nonetheless he would sin venially. Whereas sometimes the error of conscience does not have the power of loosing or of excusing, namely, when the error itself is a sin, such as when it proceeds out of ignorance of that which someone can know or is held to know, just as if he were to believe that simple fornication is a venial sin. And then, although he would believe himself to sin venially, nevertheless he would not sin venially, but mortally. (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 22.2.2; 41.2.1, ad 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.