On Things Pertaining to Punishment and Glory

Question 7

On the spiritual punishment of the damned

Then there were questions about what pertains to punishment and glory;

and first, concerning what pertains to punishment; (Qq. 7–8.)

second, concerning what pertains to glory. (Q. 9.)

Yet about punishment it was asked:

first, concerning the spiritual punishment; (Q. 7.)

second, concerning the bodily punishment of the damned. (Q. 8.)

About the first, there were two questions:

first, whether the damned see the glory of the saints, especially after the day of judgment;

second, whether the damned wish their neighbors to be damned.

Article 1

Whether the damned see the glory of the saints, especially after the day of judgment

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the damned after the day of judgment see the glory of the saints.

Obj. 1: For just as glory relates to misery, so misery to glory. But the perfection of the glory of the saints is for them to see the misery of the damned, as is said at the end of Isaiah (66:24): they shall go out and see the cadavers of the impious. Therefore, the perfection of the misery of the damned is also for them to see the glory of the saints, and thus after the day of judgment, when they will be in perfect misery, the damned will see the glory of the saints.

Obj. 2: After the day of judgment no affliction is subtracted from the damned. (Cf. above: Quodlibet VII, q. 5, a. 2, resp.) But the damned are afflicted now from seeing the glory of the saints, according to Isaiah 26:11: let the envious people see, and be confounded. Therefore, after the day of judgment they also will see the glory of the saints.

On the contrary: The matter of every delight will be subtracted from the damned after the day of judgment. But to see the glory of the saints is a certain matter of delight. Therefore, the damned will lack such a vision after the day of judgment.

I answer that to see the glory of the blessed happens in two ways. One way is such that one grasps what this glory is itself, both how and how much, and thus no one can see this glory except he who is in glory. For it surpasses both the desire and the understanding of those who do not experience it, since this is hidden manna and a new name written on a pebble, which no one knows except he who receives it, as is said in Revelation 2:17. In another way, to see the glory of the blessed happens such that the blessed themselves are seen in a certain indescribable and exceeding understanding, and thus the damned see the glory of the saints before the day of judgment, yet not after the day of judgment, for then they will be alienated utterly from the saints, as those who already have arrived at the greatest misery, and for this reason, they will not be held worthy even of the vision of the saints: for one seeing something has a share with that which he sees.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that to see the misery of the damned will belong altogether to the saints unto glory: for they will rejoice concerning the justice of God and concerning their own evasion, according to Psalm 57:11: the just man shall be made happy when he will see vengeance. But to see the glory of the saints involves something of perfection, of which after the day of judgment the damned will be deprived.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the damned existing in hell, after the day of judgment will be mindful of the glory of the saints, which before judgment and in judgment they had seen. Thus, they will recognize that they are in greatest glory, although they will not see the blessed themselves nor their glory, and thus they will be tortured by envy. And thus, the affliction which is now in them from such a vision will remain, even with the vision removed: concerning which also they will grieve the more, seeing themselves deemed unworthy even of the vision of the saints.

Reply Sed Contra: Whereas to the contrary objection, it must be said that to see the glory of the saints is not a matter of delight unless it is seen in the first way, which is not how it is seen by the damned even before judgment. Yet to see in the second way, and not to have, is the cause of more affliction on account of envy.

Article 2

Whether the damned wish their neighbors to be damned

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the damned would not wish their neighbors to be damned.

Obj. 1: For it is said in Luke 16:27–28 that the rich man damned in hell begged for Lazarus to be sent to his brothers so that he would testify to them lest they come into the place of torments. Yet petition is the designation of the will. (Cf. ST II-II.83.1, ad 1.) Therefore, the damned do not wish their neighbors to be damned.

On the contrary: On Isaiah 14:9: they have risen from their thrones, the Gloss says: it is a solace for the damned to have comrades of their misery. (Glossa ordinaria, at Isaiah 14:9, 4.162 (PL 113:1253); Jerome, On Isaiah 5 (CCSL 73:168).) Therefore, they would wish all to be damned.

I answer that spiritual vices are consummated in the damned, which is signified in Ezekiel 32:27, where it is said concerning the impious that with their arms they have descended to hell. And for this reason, perfect envy is in them, which involves grieving over the good of another which he himself does not have, and thus even to wish for everyone to suffer the evil which he himself suffers: for to be freed from a certain evil is a good. Indeed, in some this envy grows to such great strength even in this life that they envy their closest neighbors the goods which they themselves do not have.

Hence much more would the damned, with envy stimulating them, wish their neighbors to be damned with all others, and they will grieve if they know that some are saved. But nevertheless, if not all ought to be damned, but some to be saved, they would prefer for their neighbors rather than others to be saved from damnation, because in this also they will be tortured by envy if they see that others are saved and their own are damned. And in this way, the damned rich man did not wish for the damnation of his own.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Question 8

On the bodily punishment of the damned

Article 1

Whether there is only punishment of fire there, or also punishment of water

Then there were questions concerning the bodily punishment of the damned, namely, whether there is only punishment of fire, or also punishment of water?

Obj. 1: And it seems that there is, through that said in Job 24:19 concerning the impious: they shall pass from the waters of snows to the excessive heat. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 44, P. 2, a. 2, q. 2, fund. 3, 4:927b; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 50.2.3, qa. 1, s.c. 2.)

On the contrary: Every delight and refreshment is removed from the damned. But it cannot be without a certain refreshment for someone afflicted by heat to pass to the cold of water or conversely. Therefore, such an alternation of punishments will not be in the damned. (Cf. Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 44, P. 2, a. 2, q. 2, obj. 2, 4:927a.)

I answer that, just as Basil says expounding Psalm 28:7: the voice of the Lord cuts through the flame of fire, at the end of the world fire will be divided and the other elements, and whatever in them is beautiful and clear will remain higher for the glory of the elect, whereas that which in them is dreggy and punishing will descend into hell for the punishment of the damned. (Basil the Great, Homily on Psalm 28, para. 6 (PG 29:297–98); Homilies on the Six Days, homily 6.3; cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 47 E, a. 9, 30:651a.) And thus, the dregs of the whole creation will be collected into hell and will be for the damned as punishment. And they will not suffer the punishment of fire only, for it is of justice for those who have offended the Creator to be punished by every creature. Hence it is said in Wisdom 5:21 that the whole world shall fight against the senseless. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 50.2.3, ad 1; Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 6.12.14 (CCSL 143:293; PL 75:737).)

Reply Sed Contra: To the contrary objection, it must be said that there will be no refreshment in the damned from a variety of punishments of this sort. For fire and water and things of this sort do not act upon the bodies of the damned by the action of nature, such that they leave their qualities in the bodies of the damned according to the being of nature, just as fire leaves heat in wood which it makes to be hot. Otherwise, since contraries cannot be in the same thing simultaneously, (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.6, 1011b17–18; 5.11, 1018b22–23.) it would be necessary for the bodies of the damned to lose their qualities. And thus, with the natures of their organs being changed, the punishment would become less sensible.

But they act upon the bodies of the damned by spiritual action, namely, by impressing their qualities in the bodies of the damned according to spiritual being, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, lect. 12–13, nn. 191–95.) in the way the species of colors is in the air and the pupil, not such that the air and pupil become colored. Hence the bodies of the damned will sense the affliction of fire without being converted into the nature of fire.

And for this reason, the variety of punishments does not refresh them. For refreshment now coming forth from the alternation of punishments is caused by the transmutation of nature, inasmuch as through the cold of water an excess of heating is remitted and thus it is come unto a medium, which is delightful.

On things pertaining to glory

Question 9

On the glory of the saints

Then there were questions about the glory of the blessed. And about this two things were asked:

first, whether the beatitude of the saints first consists in intellect before it consists in affect, or conversely;

second, whether the blessed first see the humanity of Christ before his divinity.

Article 1

Whether the beatitude of the saints first consists in intellect before it consists in affect, or conversely

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the beatitude of the saints especially consists in intellect.

Obj. 1: For just as Augustine says, in the tenth book of the Confessions, beatitude is joy concerning truth. (Augustine, Confessions 10.23, para. 33 (CCSL 27:173; PL 32:793).) But truth pertains principally to the intellect. Therefore, so does beatitude.

Obj. 2: It is said in John 17:3: this is eternal life: that they may recognize you the true God and Christ Jesus whom you have sent. Yet recognition pertains to the intellect. Therefore, so does eternal life or beatitude.

Obj. 3: Augustine says in the first book of On the Trinity that vision is the whole reward. (It is actually: Augustine, Expositions on the Psalms 90.2, para. 13 (CCSL 39:1277; PL 36:1170); cf. Peter Lombard, Gloss on Psalms 90:16 (PL 191:854C); Augustine, On the Trinity 1.8, para. 17 (CCSL 50:51; PL 42:832).) Yet the reward is beatitude. Therefore, it pertains principally to the vision of the intellect.

On the contrary: A prize responds to merit. But merit especially consists in the will. Therefore, so does beatitude, which is the prize.

I answer that happiness or beatitude consists in activity and not in habit, as the Philosopher proves in the first book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 1.8, 1098b31–1099a7.) Hence the beatitude of man can be compared to some power of the soul in two ways. One way is as the object of a power, and thus beatitude especially is compared to the will: for beatitude names the last end of man and his highest good, yet end and good are the object of the will. Another way is as the act of a power, and thus beatitude originally and substantially consists in an act of the intellect. Yet in its form and completeness it consists in an act of the will, because it is impossible for the act itself of the will to be the last end of man. For the last end of man is that which is first desired, yet it cannot be for the first thing wanted to be an act of the will. For a power is first borne unto some object before it is borne upon its own act: for first the act of some power is understood before its reflex upon that act. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 430a2–9.) Yet an act is terminated at an object, and thus any power is borne first unto an object before it is borne unto its own act, just as sight first sees color before it sees that it sees color. And thus also the will first wants some good before it wants that it should want, and thus an act of the will cannot be the first willed, and consequently neither can the last end.

But whenever some more exterior good is desired as an end, that act of ours is for us as though an interior end by which first we attain to it perfectly, just as we say that consuming is the end and beatitude of him who places food as his end, and possession of him who places money as his end. Yet the end of our desire is God. Hence the act by which first we are conjoined to him is originally and substantially our beatitude. Yet we are first conjoined to God through an act of the intellect, and for this reason, the vision itself of God, which is an act of the intellect, is substantially and originally our beatitude.

But, because this is a most perfect activity and a most fitting object, for this reason, there follows the greatest delight, which indeed adorns the activity itself and perfects it just as beauty does with youth, as the Philosopher says in the tenth book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 10.4, 1174b31–33.) Hence that delight itself, which is of the will, is formally completing beatitude.

And thus, the origin of ultimate beatitude is in vision, yet its completion is in enjoyment. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 10.4, 1174b23–26, 1174b31–33.)

Reply Obj. 1–3: The first three arguments, therefore, must be conceded because they show that beatitude substantially consists in an act of the intellect.

Reply Sed Contra: Whereas to that objected to the contrary, it must be said that merit consists in acting, whereas reward in receiving. Yet action first pertains to the will by moving all the other powers, but reception first pertains to the intellect before the will. Hence reward is attributed first to the intellect, yet merit to the will.

Article 2

Whether the blessed first see the humanity of Christ before his divinity

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the blessed in glory first contemplate the divinity of Christ before his humanity.

Obj. 1: For the highest act principally and first applies to the highest state. But the blessed are in the highest state. Since, therefore, the act of the intellect, which is the highest power, and to which it pertains to be borne unto God, is the most noble act, it seems that for the blessed this act first applies to their contemplating God.

Obj. 2: This pertains to the imperfection of the way: that it is necessary that we should ascend from lower things to contemplating higher ones. But in the blessed there shall be perfection contrary to the imperfection of the way. Therefore, conversely they first shall contemplate higher things, and thus first the divinity of Christ before his humanity.

On the contrary: The extreme is only reached through a medium. But the medium between God and men is the humanity of Christ, as 1 Timothy 2:5 says: the mediator of God and men the man Christ Jesus. Therefore, the saints will not reach to the contemplation of the divinity of Christ except by first contemplating his humanity.

I answer that each one first considers the reason of a thing before that of which it is the reason, just as an artist first considers a rule of work before he works according to the rule. Yet the blessed are conjoined to God to such an extent that he is for them the reason of every knowing and activity: for otherwise the act of beatitude would be impeded through other acts of knowing and activities of the saints. And for this reason, that unto which the blessed first attend is God himself, and they have him as the medium of every knowing and as the rule of every work. And thus, they first contemplate the divinity of Christ before his humanity.

In contemplating both, nevertheless, they find delight. Hence it is said on John 10:9: they, namely, the blessed, shall go in to contemplate the divinity of Christ, and shall go out to contemplate his humanity, and in both they shall find pastures, that is, delight, as it is expounded in the book On the Spirit and the Soul. (Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 11 (PL 40:785).)

Reply Obj. 1–2: Therefore, we concede the first two arguments.

Reply Sed Contra: Whereas to the contrary objection, it must be said that that argument proceeds as regards the state of the way, in which we are not yet perfectly conjoined to God, but it is necessary for us to approach him through Christ. But when we will be conjoined to God already in beatitude, we will attend to the divinity of Christ before his humanity.