On Christ

Question 1

Regarding the divine nature

There were questions concerning Christ the head; (Qq. 1–3.) then there were questions concerning his members. (Qq. 4–8.)

Concerning Christ there were three questions:

first, regarding the divine nature; (Q. 1.)

second, regarding the union of human with divine; (Q. 2.)

third, regarding the appearances under which he is contained in the sacrament of the altar. (Q. 3.)

Article 1

Whether God can make an actual infinity of things

About the first there is a question whether God can make an actual infinity of things. And it seems that he cannot.

Obj. 1: For God can make something greater than everything which he makes because the work does not equal his power, as Hugh of St. Victor says. (Hugh of Saint Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith 1.2.22 (PL 176:216); cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 43 C, a. 2, obj. 2, 26:379b.) But there cannot be something greater than an actual infinity. Therefore, God cannot make an actual infinity.

On the contrary: God can make more than man can say or think, according to Luke 1:37: no word will be impossible with God. But man can say that there is an actual infinity, and even think it, since certain philosophers have posited this, as is clear in the third book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 202b36–203b30.) Therefore, God can make an actual infinity.

I answer that, when it is said that God cannot make something, this is not on account of a defect of divine power, but on account of the incompatibility which is implied in the thing made. This happens in two ways. One way is because it is repugnant to the thing made insofar as it is made, just as we say that God cannot make some creature which conserves itself in being, because for something to be posited to have a maker, it is posited also to need a conserver, since the same is the cause of the being of a thing and that which conserves the thing in being. Another way is because it is repugnant to this thing made insofar as it is this thing made, just as if we say that God cannot make a horse to be rational. For to be rational, although it is not repugnant to a thing made insofar as it is made, since some things that are made are rational, nevertheless is repugnant to a horse insofar as it is a horse, which is by definition irrational.

Therefore, certain men say that God cannot make an actual infinity, (Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 3, epilogue, 1:773b; cf. Hugh of Saint Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith 1.2.22 (PL 176:216).) because to be infinite is repugnant to a thing made insofar as it is made. For it is against the nature of a creature for it to be equal to the Creator, which would be necessary to posit if there were some infinite creature, for infinite is not more than infinite. (Cf. Bonaventure, In I Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 3, epilogue, 1:771b; Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 1.73; Aquinas, In I Sent. 43.1.1, obj. 5.)

But that does not seem to be said rationally. For nothing prohibits that which is infinite in some way to be surpassed by something infinite in many ways, such as if there were some body infinite according to length but finite in width, it would be less than a body infinite both in width and in length. Yet given that God would make some body actually infinite, this body indeed would be infinite in dimensive quantity, but by necessity it would have a terminated nature of a species and limited being, from being a material thing. Hence it would not be equaled to God, whose being and essence is infinite in all modes. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 29, a. 3, resp.)

Whereas other men said that to be actually infinite in some way is repugnant neither to the thing made insofar as it is made, nor to this thing made insofar as it is this thing made, which is an actual being, whereas in some way it is repugnant to a being to be actually infinite. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 2, a. 10, resp.; Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 6.2, pp. 300–306; 8.1, pp. 376–81.) And this is the opinion of Al-Ghazali: for he distinguished a twofold infinite, namely, the essentially infinite and the incidentally infinite. (Algazel, Metaphysics, ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute Of Mediaeval Studies, 1933), part 1, tr. 1, div. 6, pp. 40–41.)

To understand this distinction, note that, since the infinite is principally found in quantity according to the Philosopher in the first book of the Physics, (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 1.2, 185b2–3.) if the quantity in which the infinite consists has such a multitude, every part of which depends upon another and has a fixed order, such that each part of that multitude is required essentially, then the infinite consisting in such a quantity will be called essentially infinite. This is clear in a staff that is moved by a hand, (Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 256a6–8.) a hand by muscles and nerves, which are moved by the soul, which if it proceeds to the infinite, namely, so that the soul is moved by another and thus thereafter to the infinite, or the staff moves something else and thus thereafter to the infinite, there will be an essentially infinite multitude of those movers and moved. Whereas if the quantity in which an infinite consists results from many things which serve the same order, and whose number is not required except incidentally, then there will be an incidental infinity. An example is if some craftsman makes a knife for the constitution of which there are needed many hammers out of this: (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 1.1.5, ad 5.) that one after another is broken, and one succeeds into the place of the other having the same order, if such a multitude grows out unto the infinite, it will be called incidentally infinite and not essentially. For an infinite multitude of hammers is accidental to the craftsman’s work, since through one hammer, if it had endured, it could have completed equally just as through infinite hammers.

Therefore, they say that the essentially infinite is repugnant to actual being since it is necessary in these things which have an essential order not to be completed finally except through the activity in a certain way of all those prior. Thus, to constitute one thing there is required the ordered influence of infinite things, and if there were to be something essentially infinite, thus it could never be completed, since it is not the case that infinite things come to pass. But the incidentally infinite, according to them, is not repugnant to actual being, since one part of the multitude does not depend upon another. Hence according to this, nothing prohibits being infinite in act. Thus, Al-Ghazali says in his Metaphysics that the rational souls of dead men are infinite in act, by this: that he posits there had been generation of men from eternity and that souls remain after the death of the bodies. (Algazel, Metaphysics, part 1, tr. 1, div. 6, pp. 40–41; cf. Aquinas, On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists, ch. 5, n. 121.)

And according to this opinion, God could make an actual infinity of things or an actual infinite thing, even if an actually infinite thing is not found in nature.

But from the contrary, the Commentator on the second book of the Metaphysics says that in act there cannot be either an essential infinity or an incidental infinity, whereas in potency there is found an incidental infinity, but not an essential infinity. And thus, according to him, to be infinite is altogether repugnant to this: that it is an actual being. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 2, comm. 6.)

And this seems to be truer. For there cannot be actually in the nature of things something not specified, relating itself indifferently to diverse species. For even if the intellect conceives of an animal not specified by rational or irrational difference, nevertheless there cannot actually be an animal which is not rational or irrational. Hence according to the Philosopher nothing is in a genus which is not in some species of it. (Aristotle, Topics 2.4, 111a33–b11.) Whereas each quantity is specified through a sure termination of quantity, just as the species of multitude are two and three and thus concerning the others, and of magnitude two-cubits-long and three-cubits-long or according to some determinate measure. Hence it is impossible for some quantity to be found actual which is not limited by proper boundaries. Yet since the infinite accords with quantity and is named through the removal of boundaries, (Aristotle, Physics 1.2, 185b2–3.) it will be impossible for an infinite to be actual. On account of this, the Philosopher says in the third book of the Physics that the infinite is like matter not yet specified, but existing under privation, and that it is more in the nature of a part and contained than of a whole and containing. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206b14–15; 207a21–22; 3.7, 207b35–208a1.)

And for this reason, just as God cannot make a horse to be rational, so he cannot make a being to be actually infinite.

Reply Obj. 1: Hence we concede the first, because it concludes something true, although it does not conclude it rightly, by this: that, if it is posited that God makes something infinite according to one mode, still he can make something infinite in another order. Thus, if he were able to make infinite men, still he would be able to make infinite lions. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 20, a. 4, ad 1; Disputed Questions On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 2, ad 9.) For there is not anything more than the infinite in that order by which it is infinite. But according to another order nothing prohibits something to be more than the infinite, just as even numbers are infinite, and nevertheless even and odd numbers taken together are more than even numbers.

Reply Sed Contra: Whereas the contrary objection it must be said that a word is understood not only which is brought forth by a word, but which is conceived by a mind. Yet what is repugnant to its own very self cannot be conceived by a mind, because no one can understand contradictories to be simultaneously true, as is proved in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.6, 1011b16–17.) Hence, since to be infinite is repugnant to being actual, this is not a word: “something infinite is actual.” Hence it does not follow that it is possible for God. Yet the philosophers who posited that an infinite is actual were ignorant of their own speech. (Cf. ST II-II.24.4, ad 3.)

Question 2

Regarding the union of human nature to the divine

Then there were questions concerning Christ as regards the union of human nature with the divine. And about this there were three questions:

first, whether in Christ there is one hypostasis only;

second, whether there is in him only one existence;

third, whether there is in him only one sonship.

Article 1

Whether in Christ there is one hypostasis only

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that in Christ there are many hypostases.

Obj. 1: For the union of soul to body is presupposed to assumption because Christ assumed humanity or human nature, which, since it is the form of the whole, (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.) names something composed out of soul and body. But soul and body united make a hypostasis of man. Therefore, a hypostasis in human nature is presupposed to assumption. But everything which is presupposed to assumption can be said to be assumed. Therefore, the hypostasis of the Word assumed a hypostasis of man. Yet assuming is not assumed, according to Boethius. (Rather, Alan of Lille; see Nikolaus M. Häring, “Magister Alanus de Insulis Regulae caelestis iuris,” in Middle Ages Doctrinal and Literary History Archives 48 (1981): rule 101, p. 206; Alan of Lille, Theologicae regulae (PL 210:675–76); cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 5 A, a. 1, 28:96b.) Therefore, in Christ the hypostasis of man is one thing and the hypostasis of the Word another. And thus, there are two hypostases there.

Obj. 2: Assuming a body presupposes that it can be assumed. But a body is not assumable unless united to a rational soul: for an inanimate body is not said to be assumable. Therefore, the union of soul and body is presupposed to the assumption of human nature; and thus, the same holds as before.

Obj. 3: Union presupposes a medium of union. But grace is the medium of the union of human nature to the divine person, hence it is called the grace of union. Therefore, it is presupposed to union. Yet grace can only be understood in a soul, nor is soul understood before it is united to a body, because by creating, it is infused, and by infusing it is created. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 18, ch. 7, p. 421 (PL 192:689); Pseudo-Augustine (Gennadius of Marseilles), Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas 18 (PL 58:985; CPG 5984).) Therefore, it is necessary to understand the union of soul with body before the union of human nature with divine; and thus, the same holds as before.

Obj. 4: Humanity is a certain substantial form. Yet every substantial form requires something which is informed through it. Yet it cannot be said that the hypostasis or eternal supposit is informed through some created form. Therefore, it is necessary to posit in Christ some created supposit or hypostasis which is informed by the humanity. And thus, there will be in Christ two hypostases, namely, the hypostasis of the Word and the hypostasis of man.

On the contrary (1): Those things which are disparate from one another are not predicated of one another, unless through this: that they come together in one supposit, just as we say that a white thing is a sweet thing on account of unity of subject. Now, the divine nature and the human are utterly disparate natures. Yet they are predicated of one another in the concrete: for we say, “God is man,” and “man is God.” Therefore, there is one supposit only and one hypostasis there.

Sed Contra (2): If it is said that they are predicated of one another on account of this: that they share in one person, yet not in one supposit or one hypostasis, then to the contrary: person does not add anything over hypostasis or supposit unless something accidental, namely, propriety pertaining to dignity. (Cf. Faustus of Reiz, On the Holy Spirit 2.4 (CSEL 21:139; PL 62:29).) Therefore, if in Christ there were one person and not one supposit and hypostasis, the divine nature and the human would be united in him only by accident, which is false.

I answer that, according to the second opinion which the Master posits in the sixth distinction of the third book of the Sentences, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 6, ch. 3, pp. 52–54 (PL 192:768–69).) which is the common opinion of modern men and much truer and more secure than others, in Christ there is one supposit only, and only one hypostasis, just as also one person.

For it is necessary according to the doctrine of the faith that we posit one thing subsisting in two natures, namely, the divine and the human. Otherwise, it could not be said that the Lord Jesus Christ is one, according to the sentence of the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 8:6. Hence also Nestorius was damned on account of this: that he presumed to divide Christ, introducing two persons.

Yet that which subsists in a nature is something undivided or singular. Hence the unity of Christ, in which two natures are united, must be attributed to some name through which singularity is designated. Yet of names which designate singularity, certain ones signify the singular in any genus of being, just as this name “singular” and “particular” and “individual,” because this whiteness is something singular and individual and particular: for universal and particular encircle every genus. Whereas certain ones signify singularity in the genus of substance, such as this name “hypostasis” which signifies individual substance, and this name “person,” which signifies an individual substance of a rational nature; (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures: A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius, ch. 3 (PL 64:1343–44).) and similarly, this name “supposit” or “thing of nature.” None of these can be predicated of this whiteness, even though this whiteness is singular, because each of those signifies something essentially subsisting, whereas accidents do not subsist. Whereas the parts of substances, even though they are from the nature of subsisting things, nevertheless do not subsist essentially, but they are in another. Hence also the aforesaid names are not said of the parts of substances: for we do not say that this hand is a hypostasis or a person or a supposit or a thing of nature, even though it can be said that it is a certain individual or particular or singular thing, which names also were said of accidents.

Yet it cannot be said that the human nature in Christ or some part of it subsists essentially: for this would be repugnant to union, unless we were to posit union in a qualified sense and not absolutely, just as stones in a heap are united, or two men through the affect of love or through some similitude of imitation, all of which we say in a qualified sense are one and not absolutely. For something absolutely one that subsists in itself contains nothing subsisting in itself actually, but perhaps in potency. Hence, to conserve the truth of the union of natures in Christ, it is necessary to posit, just as one person, so one hypostasis and one supposit and one thing of two natures. But nothing prohibits saying that the human nature itself in Christ is a certain individual or singular or particular. The same applies to parts of human nature, such as hands and feet and bones, whatever is a particular thing. For such a thing is not predicated of the whole because none of those is an individual subsisting in itself. But the individual subsisting in itself, or the singular or particular which is predicated of Christ, is one only. Hence we can say that there are many individuals or singulars or particulars in Christ, yet we cannot say that Christ is many individuals or singulars or particulars. But we cannot say that in Christ there are many hypostases or supposits.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that out of the union of soul and body both man and humanity are constituted. These two indeed differ in that humanity is signified in the manner of a part, since humanity is said as that by which man is man. Thus, it precisely signifies the essential principles of a species through which this individual is set in such a species, hence it is in the manner of a part, since besides principles of this sort there are found many others in nature. But man is signified in the manner of the whole: for man is said as having humanity or subsisting in humanity, without the cutting off of any other things supervening upon the essential principles of the species. For through this: that I say: “having humanity,” it is not cut off that it should have color and quantity and other things of this sort.

Therefore, according to the second aforesaid opinion, regarding the union of human nature to the divine there is presupposed the union of soul and body insofar as it constitutes humanity, not insofar as it constitutes man. For that which in Christ is constituted out of soul and body only, which is presupposed to union, is not a whole which subsists in itself. Rather, it is something of it, and for this reason, it cannot be signified as man, but as humanity. Hence it is necessary to say that in this very union of human nature to the divine, as though in the term of assumption, there must be understood for the first time in Christ the nature of man, because then for the first time it is understood as a complete thing existing in itself. And in this it differs from the two other opinions.

For the first opinion posits the assumption of human nature presupposes the union of soul to flesh, not only insofar as it constitutes humanity, but also insofar as it constitutes man: (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 6, ch. 2, pp. 50–52 (PL 192:768).) for it says that a man was assumed.

Whereas the third opinion posits that not even in the term of assumption is there understood a soul united to a body, neither unto constituting man nor unto constituting human nature; (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 6, cc. 4–6, pp. 55–59 (PL 192:769–70); cf. Peter Abelard, Theology ‘In the Schools’ 3.74–75 (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis [CCCM] 13:531–32; PL 178).) for it says that human nature is assumed materially, that is, for its parts, namely, soul and body, when we say that human nature was assumed by the Word. Hence it is clear that neither truly posits that Christ is man nor truly posits human nature in him, and for this reason, each is condemned as heretical. (By Pope Alexander III, according to William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 51, ch. 2, 3.1:43.)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that body united to soul is presupposed to the assumption of human nature, yet I say united by the union constituting humanity, yet not by the union constituting man.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that habitual grace is not understood as a medium of union which through the intellect precedes that union: for it is not a medium that causes union or the ability to be united. Rather, it is a medium which makes their union congruous, just as the splendors of clothing makes matrimonial joining congruous (and similarly knowledge and all other perfections of Christ would be able to be called a medium of union). Only as far as this can the habitual grace of Christ be called grace of union. Nevertheless, I think it truer for the grace of union to be called either the very gratuitous will of God which makes the union free, that is, with no preceding merits, or rather the gift itself freely given to human nature, which is to be in a divine person. If, nevertheless, soul united to body is presupposed to assumption, the objection must be solved as before. (Cf. ST III.2.10; 6.6.)

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that humanity is not the form of a part which is called a form because it informs some matter or subject, but it is called the form of the whole, (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 2, a. 2, resp.) in which the supposit of a nature subsists. Hence it is not necessary to posit that an uncreated hypostasis is informed by humanity, but that it subsists in it.

Article 2

Whether there is in him only one existence

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that in Christ there is not only one existence.

Obj. 1: For to live, according to the Philosopher in the second book of On the Soul, is existence for living things. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b13.) But in Christ there is not only one living, since there is in him both created life, by which the body lives through the soul, which is deprived by death, (Cf. SCG IV.82, “Adhuc”; Disputed Questions on the Soul, q. 14, obj. 8.) and uncreated life, by which the Word lives through itself. Therefore, neither in Christ is there one existence.

Obj. 2: Just as existence is of a supposit, so also is activity. But unity of supposit does not make it that in Christ there are not many activities. Therefore, neither will it make it that in Christ there is only one existence.

Obj. 3: Generation is change unto existence. (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 34.1.2, ad 5; Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, lect. 12, nn. 2396–98.) But in Christ there is a certain temporal generation, concerning which Matthew 1:18 says: yet the generation of Christ was thus, which cannot be terminated at the eternal existence. Therefore, it is terminated at some temporal and created existence. Therefore, in Christ there is a twofold existence, since in him there clearly is uncreated existence.

Obj. 4: Existence must be attributed to each thing about which it can be asked fittingly whether it exists. But concerning human nature it can be asked whether it exists. Therefore, human nature has a proper existence in Christ, and thus there is in him a twofold existence, since his divine nature also has existence.

On the contrary: Whatever things are distinct according to existence are distinct in supposit. But in Christ there is only one supposit. Therefore, there is also only one existence.

I answer that existence is spoken of in two ways, as is clear through the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.7, 1017a22–35.) and in a certain gloss of Origen on the beginning of John. (Glossa ordinaria, at John 1:1, 5.1016 (PL 114:356); the Gloss is not by Origen, but rather, John Scottus Eriugena, Homily on the Prologue of the Gospel according to John (PL 122:286).) One way is insofar as it is a verbal copula signifying the composition of any enunciation the soul makes. Hence this existence is not something in the nature of things, but only in an act of the soul composing and dividing. And thus, existence is attributed to each thing concerning which a proposition can be formed, whether it be a being or the privation of a being: for we say that blindness exists. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 2, lect. 7–8, nn. 275–93.) In another way, existence is spoken of as the act of a being inasmuch as it is a being, that is, by which some actual being is denominated in the nature of things. And thus, existence is only attributed to those very things which are contained in the ten categories, hence being said by such an existence is divided into the ten categories.

But this existence is attributed to something in two ways. One way is as to that which properly and truly has existence or exists; and thus, it is attributed only to substance essentially subsisting. Hence what truly is, is called substance in the first book of the Physics. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 1.3, 186b4–5.) Whereas for all things which do not subsist essentially but in another or with another, whether they are accidents or substantial forms or any parts, they do not have existence such that they themselves truly exist, but existence is attributed to them in another way, that is, as that by which something exists, just as whiteness is said to exist not because it itself may subsist in existence, but because by it something is white. Therefore, existence properly and truly is only attributed to a thing subsisting essentially.

Yet existence is attributed to this in a twofold way. That is, there is one existence which results from these things out of which its unity is integrated, which is the proper substantial existence of a supposit. Another existence is attributed to a supposit beyond those things which integrate it, which is superadded existence, namely, accidental existence. For example, to be white is attributed to Socrates when we say: Socrates is white.

Because, therefore, in Christ we posit only one subsisting thing, for the integrity of which there concurs also the humanity itself, since one supposit is of both natures, for this reason, it is necessary to say that substantial existence, which properly is attributed to the supposit, is in Christ one only, yet has unity out of the supposit itself and not out of the natures. If, nevertheless, the humanity is posited to be separated from the divinity, then the humanity will have its own existence other than from the divine existence. For nothing impeded it from having its own existence except this: that it was not subsisting essentially. This is just as if an ark were a certain individual natural thing, the whole itself only has one existence, nevertheless any of its parts separated from the ark will have its own existence.

And thus, it is clear that, according to the second opinion, it is necessary to say that in Christ there is one substantial existence, insofar as existence properly is of the supposit, although there be manifold accidental existence.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that to live refers to a certain existence specified through a special principle of existence, and for this reason, a diversity of life follows a diversity of principles of living. But existence looks more to the subsisting supposit.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the activity of a supposit is not of the integrity of its unity, but follows upon its unity. Hence of one supposit we find many activities according to the diverse principles of acting which are in the supposit, just as a man does something different by tongue and by hand. But existence is that upon which the unity of the supposit is founded, hence a manifold existence prejudices unity.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that temporal generation is terminated not at the existence of the eternal supposit so that existence might begin through it absolutely, but that it might begin to be the supposit that is the supposit of human nature.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that that objection proceeds from the existence which consists in an act of the soul, insofar as also those things which are only according to the soul are called existence, since “whether it exists” also can be asked concerning blindness.

Article 3

Whether there is in him only one sonship

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that in Christ there is not only one sonship.

Obj. 1: For with a cause multiplied, the effect is multiplied. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Memory and Recollection, tr. 2, ch. 3, n. 348.) But nativity is the cause of sonship. Since, therefore, in Christ there are two nativities, there shall be also two sonships.

Obj. 2: It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to remain and be corrupted. But, supposing that the Blessed Virgin had died before the death of Christ, the sonship by which he was called the Son of his mother would have been corrupted, yet there would remain his eternal sonship, by which he would be called the Son of his Father. Therefore, by one sonship Christ is called the Son of his Father and by another the Son of his mother.

Obj. 3: But you shall say that there is another relationship, but not another sonship.

On the contrary: a son is a relative according to reality and not only according to language. (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 6, 6a36–37; 7, 8a31–32, 8a39–b1; Boethius, On Categories 2 (PL 64:235D).) But relatives of this sort according to the Philosopher in the Categories are those for which to be is to be related to another. (Aristotle, Categories 7, 8a39–b1.) Therefore, the existence of sonship is the existence of the relationship by which one is related to another. And thus, if there are many relationships, there are many sonships.

Obj. 4: Nothing is found in a relation except a relationship and the cause or foundation of that relationship, just as the unity of quantity is the foundation of the relationship which is equality. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a10–12.) But the relationships by which Christ is related to his Father and mother are different; the foundations of these relationships or their causes also are different, namely, the nativities themselves, for sonship is the relation of origin. Therefore, there are many sonships in Christ.

On the contrary: Sonship is a personal relation. But in Christ there is only one person; therefore, there is only one sonship.

I answer that in Christ there is only one real sonship, (Cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 8 A, a. 2, 28:165–66.) even though there are many relative relationships in the mind.

To show this, it must be known that “to another” (That is, the category of relation. See Aristotle, Categories, cc. 4, 7.) differs from the other categories in this: that the other categories from their own proper nature are something. For example, quantity, from the fact it is a quantity, posits something, and so too for the other categories. But “to another” does not, from the proper nature of its own category, posit something, but “to something.” Hence there are found certain “to anothers” which are nothing in the nature of things, but are in the mind only, which does not happen in the other categories.

And, although “to another” does not posit something from the nature of its own category, nevertheless it is not from the very nature of its category that it posits nothing either, because thus relation would not be something in the nature of things, hence “to another” would not be one of the ten categories.

Yet relation is something real from this: that it causes relation. For since in something there is found something through which it depends upon and is compared to another, then we say that it really is compared or depends or is related, just as equality is posited as a real relation out of the unity of quantity, which causes equality.

Whereas because a thing has being and unity from the same thing, for this reason, a real unity of relation must be considered from the very foundation or cause of the relation. For instance, because there is one quantity through which I am equal to many things, in me there is only one real relation of equality relating me to many things. (Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a10–12.) Similarly, because by one nativity I am begotten out of father and mother, by one real sonship I am called the son of each, even though the relationships are multiplied. (Cf. ST I.28.1.)

But in Christ we cannot say that there is one cause of sonship whereby he is related to Father and mother, since there are two utterly disparate nativities. Hence, if there were something which could receive the temporal sonship as though as a subject, it would be necessary to posit in Christ many sonships. But sonship is such a relation that cannot have for its subject anything except the supposit itself. Yet in Christ there is only the eternal supposit, which indeed cannot be the subject of some temporal relation: for any temporal relations attributed to something eternal are relations of the mind and not of reality. Hence the sonship by which Christ is related to his mother is not a real relation but of the mind only, just as also other relations that are said concerning God to creatures. For it cannot be said that the subject of sonship is the eternal supposit by reason of human nature or of some part of it, just as the supposit is said of the death or the Passion, because thus the human nature itself or its part would be the first subject of sonship and would be denominated through itself, as happens with the other accidents which are attributed to Christ by reason of his human nature. Whereas sonship never denominates anything but the supposit itself, nor can it have something else for a subject. Nevertheless, nothing prohibits there being other real relations in Christ to the Virgin, just as when we say, “the body of Christ is originated out of the Virgin.” But that relation does not have the nature of sonship, unless we were to posit, according to the first opinion, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 6, ch. 2, pp. 50–52 (PL 192:768).) that there is a created supposit in Christ other from the uncreated.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that out of temporal nativity there is not born a real sonship but of the mind only, although Christ really is the Son of the Virgin, just as also God really is the Lord of creation, even though in him dominion is not a real relation. For he is called really Lord on account of his real power; and thus Christ is called really Son on account of his real nativity.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the relationship of relation depends on the thing to which something is related, and for this reason, when the thing is destroyed, the relationship is removed. But nevertheless, real sonship to the Father remains in Christ, even supposing the death of his mother.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, in that description of the Philosopher, “to be” is posited for the nature of a being, according as a definition is said as speech signifying what it is to be. (Aristotle, Topics 1.5, 101b39; 7.3, 153a15–16.) Hence it is not necessary for a relation to have existence from a relationship, but from the cause of a relationship; whereas it has the proper nature of genus or species from a relationship.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that, although there is both different relationships of sonship and different causes, still, nevertheless, the sonships cannot be two for the reason already said.

Question 3

Regarding the appearances under which Christ is contained in the sacrament of the altar

Article 1

Whether there are accidents there without a subject

Then there is a question concerning Christ as regards the appearances under which he is contained in the sacrament of the altar, namely, whether there are accidents there without a subject. And it seems that there are not.

Obj. 1: For God cannot make contradictories to be simultaneously true. Yet this would be the case if there were to be removed from something that which it is from its own definition. Since, therefore, to be in a subject is part of the definition of accident because the being of an accident is to be in, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 2, n. 15.) it seems that God cannot make an accident to be without a subject.

Obj. 2: Concerning anything there is predicated a definition, and a defined. (Aristotle, Topics 7.5, 154a32–b2.) But “being in itself*”* is the definition or description of substance. (See John Damascene, Dialectic, ch. 4 (PG 94:538).) If, therefore, in the sacrament of the altar there are accidents in themselves, not in a subject, it follows that they are substances, which is absurd.

Obj. 3: Substances cannot be generated out of accidents. (That is, accidents cannot be sufficient causes of substance; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 12.1.2, qa. 2, obj. 2.) But we see that worms and ashes are generated from those appearances, which it is agreed are not generated from the body of Christ. Therefore, accidents are not there without a subject.

Obj. 4: But you shall say that they are generated miraculously.

On the contrary: miracles are ordained for the edification of faith; but it does not edify the faith, but more so causes scandal, for worms to be generated thence. Therefore, it does not happen miraculously.

Obj. 5: In the sacrament of truth nothing ought to be disordered. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 13 E, a. 20, s.c. 2, 29:367a; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 12.1.1, qa. 2, obj. 2.) But it is against the order which God has imposed on things for an accident to be without a subject. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 12 E, a. 16, 29:324a.) Therefore, there are not accidents there without a subject.

On the contrary: Sense is not deceived in its proper sensation, according to the Philosopher in the second book of On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.3, 427b11–12; 428b18–19.) But sense judges that there is color and taste and other things of this sort there. Therefore, these accidents truly are there. Yet they are not in the body of Christ as in a subject, nor again in the air, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 12, ch. 3, p. 305 (PL 192:865).) since neither is born to be affected by such accidents. Therefore, the accidents are there without a subject.

I answer that beyond doubt the accidents in the sacrament of the altar are without a subject.

As to how this can be, consider that in all ordered causes, according to the Philosopher in the Book of Causes, (Cf. Book of Causes, prop. 1.) the first cause imprints more vehemently into that caused by the second cause than even the second cause. Hence it happens that the first cause withdraws its activity from the effect even later than the second cause will have retracted, as is said in a comment in the same place. (Cf. Book of Causes, prop. 1.) Yet the universal and first cause of all beings is God, not only of substances, but also of accidents: for he is the creator of substance and of accident. But beings go forth out of him by a certain order: for by the mediating principles of substance accidents are produced. Hence according to the order of nature accidents depend upon the principles of substance, so that without a subject they cannot be. Nevertheless, through this it is not excluded that God as first cause can conserve accidents in being with substances removed.

And in this way, accidents miraculously are in the sacrament of the altar without a subject, namely, by divine power holding them in being.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, when it is said: “the being of an accident is existing in,” or however a subject is put in the definition of accident, it is understood to be a definition through addition, as is said in the seventh book of the Metaphysics (it is called a definition through addition when in the definition there is put something which is outside the essence of the thing defined, just as nose is put in the definition of snub-nosed). (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.5, 1030b14–1031a14.) Yet this is on account of the natural dependence of accident upon subject. But with this not impeding, God can conserve accidents without a subject, nor, nevertheless, does it follow that contradictories are true simultaneously, because subject is not of the essence of accident.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, according to Avicenna in his Metaphysics, being cannot be put in the definition of some genus or species, because all particulars are united in the definition of genus and species, since genus or species is not according to one being in all. (Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 8.4, pp. 402–4.) And for this reason, this is not a true definition of substance: “substance is that which is in itself,” or of accident: “accident is that which is in another,” (Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 12, P. 1, a. 1, q. 1, ad 1, ad 4, 4:270.) but here there is a circumlocution of the true description, which is understood as such: “substance is a thing to whose nature it is due not to be in another;” “whereas accident is a thing to whose nature it is due to be in another.” Hence it is clear that, although an accident miraculously is not in another, nevertheless it does not reach unto the definition of substance: for it does not happen that to its nature it is due to be not in another; nor does it depart from the nature of accident, because still its nature remains such that it is due to it to be in another.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that concerning these things which are generated from the appearances, such as worms or ashes or any things of this sort, there are two more probable opinions.

One of these is that it is said that the substance of bread returns, from which there can again be generated things of this sort. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 12 E, a. 16, ad 5, 29:329b; Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 12, P. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1, 4:276a.) But this opinion seems to contain an impropriety, on account of two things, unless it be understood in the proper way. The first is because it cannot be that the substance of bread is again there: for either the substance of bread will be posited to be there a second time, with the appearances remaining, and thus, since the body of Christ is under the sacrament as long as the appearances remain, it will follow that at some time there will be there simultaneously the body of Christ and the substance of bread, which is not sustained. Or, this will be with the appearances destroyed, and this again is unfitting, namely, for the substance of bread to be without the proper accidents of bread.

Second, impropriety appears on account of the name “return.” For if something is converted into something else, it cannot be said to return unless it is reconverted into it. Yet the substance of bread is not annihilated, but transubstantiated into the Body of Christ. Hence it cannot be understood that the substance of bread returns, unless the body of Christ reverts to bread, which is absurd.

Hence, if that opinion ought to be sustained, there must be understood through the substance of bread the matter of bread, not that what was before returns, but that with the appearances destroyed some matter is provided there by God, either through creation or through another mode, from which bodies of this sort can be generated.

Whereas the other opinion is the more plain: where it is said that, when it is given to subsist in themselves by divine power, simultaneously it is given to those accidents to act, and that from them there is made whatever would be made out of the substance of bread or whatever it would do, if it were to remain. And by this power they nourish, and worms or ashes are generated thence.

Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that this miracle is ordained unto faith, namely, lest faith lose merit if the mystery of the sacrament is apprehended.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that nothing prohibits something to be ordained with the common order considered, the contrary of which also is ordained for some special cause. And in this way, even though an accident is in a subject according to the common order rightly ordained from heaven, nevertheless nothing prevents it being rightly ordained for an accident to be without a subject in the sacrament of the altar, namely, so that faith might have merit through the hiddenness of the sacrament.