On the Members of Christ

On angels

Question 4

On angels

Then there were questions concerning the members of Christ:

and first, concerning angels; (Q. 4.)

then, concerning men. (Qq. 5–8.)

Concerning angels there are five questions:

first, regarding their nature, whether they are composed out of matter and form;

second, regarding the knowledge of intellect, whether they can be simultaneously in actual morning and evening knowledge, that is, so that simultaneously they might know things in their proper nature and in the Word;

third, regarding the merit of will, namely, whether they could have merited enjoyment and enjoyed by the same act of charity;

fourth, regarding motion, whether they are moved in an instant;

fifth, regarding effect, whether they can impress upon or make something in those bodily things.

Article 1

Whether they are composed out of matter and form

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that an angel is composed out of matter and form.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says in the book On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture: the omnipotent God, before he fashioned out of unformed matter corporeal and incorporeal things, sensible and insensible things, intellectual things and things lacking intellect, first divided multiform species. (This is not Augustine of Hippo, but rather, Augustine of Ireland, On the Marvels of Sacred Scripture, ch. 1 (PL 35:2151).) Yet angels are intellectual and incorporeal. Therefore, they have matter from their composition. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 4.1 (PG 3:694–95); Aquinas, In II Sent. 3.1.1, s.c.)

Obj. 2: Boethius says in the book On Unity and the One: a certain thing is one by conjunction of simple things, as an angel and a soul, each of which is one by conjunction of matter and form; (Rather, Dominic Gundisalvi (Gundissalinus), The Treatise of Dominicus Gundisalvi De unitate Wrongly Attributed to Boethius, ed. Paul Correns, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 1,1 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1891), 9.) and thus, the same holds as before.

Obj. 3: Everything which is in a genus has genus and difference. Yet genus, according to Avicenna in his Metaphysics, is taken from the nature of matter, whereas differences from the nature of form. Therefore, everything which is in a genus is composed out of matter and form. (Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 5.5, p. 270.) Yet an angel is in the genus of substance, since it is a substance having a limited species. Therefore, an angel is composed out of matter and form.

Obj. 4: But you will say that the difference of an angel is not assumed out of form, but out of the formal, which is the very being of an angel.

On the contrary: the difference of any thing is from its essence and enters into its definition, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 1.7, pp. 54–55.) Therefore, the difference of an angel cannot be taken from its being.

Obj. 5: It is shown to be impossible for there to be many highest goods because they must be alike in something, since each is a highest good, and they must differ in something, otherwise they would not be many; (Cf. Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, ed. N. Wicki, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera philosophica mediae aetatis selecta 2 (Bern: Francke, 1985), 21.) and thus, they would be composed. But it is agreed that there are many angelic essences. Therefore, they must be alike in something and differ in something; and thus, they must be composed. But the parts of essence are matter and form. Therefore, angels are composed out of matter and form.

On the contrary: Boethius says in the book On the Two Natures and One Person of Christ: every nature of an incorporeal substance depends upon no foundation. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures: A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius, ch. 6 (PL 64:1350).) But angels are incorporeal. Therefore, there is no matter in them.

I answer that certain men posit that angels are composed out of matter and form.

But this seems repugnant to their nature, on account of two things which are found in them.

The first, indeed, is because they are intellectual. For if angels were to have matter from their composition, it would be necessary for everything in them to be there in a way befitting matter, since everything which is in another is in it in the way of the receiver, as is said in the Book of Causes. (Book of Causes, prop. 1–2, paras. 9, 19, 23; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 12, nn. 375–77.) Yet any form is in matter in that it has particular and material being. (Cf. SCG II.50–51.) Hence, if angels were to be composed out of matter, the forms by which they understand, whatever they are, must be in them according to material being. And thus, this impossible thing would follow: namely, that an angel never would know anything except a particular, because a form particularly received in something could not be a principle of universal knowledge, as is clear in sense.

Nor can this be avoided by positing that an angel is composed out of matter of another nature than this corporeal matter. (Avicebron, The Fountain of Life 4.8.) For whatever that matter would be, it is agreed that it would receive the substantial form of angel particularly. Otherwise, an angel would not be a particular thing, and thus that matter would be like this matter in this: that forms would be received in it through a particular mode. Hence it is impossible for an angel or any intellectual substance to be composed out of matter, since the reception by which the intellect receives forms is of one mode, and that by which prime matter receives is of another, as has been said and as the Commentator says on the third book of On the Soul. (Averroes, On the Soul 3, comm. 5; cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 2, a. 2, resp.) Hence the sentence of the philosophers is that intellectuality follows immunity from matter. (Aquinas attributes this doctrine to Avicenna: cf. Aquinas, On Being and Essence, ch. 5; In IV Sent. 50.1.1, s.c. 2.)

Second, it is repugnant to them because they are incorporeal. For whatever is composed out of matter must be like matter in the following way. Considered in itself, anything received out of matter, since it lacks form, does not have in itself any character of distinction. Yet the unity of matter being supposed, it is only possible for one matter to receive contrary and disparate forms in different parts. For the same matter according to the same thing cannot receive the form of angel and the form of rock. Yet difference of parts cannot be understood in matter that is not divided, nor division in that which does not have dimensions, because, with quantity taken away, substance remains indivisible, as is said in the first book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 204a9–11; 1.2, 185a32–b5; 185b16–17; 1.3, 186b12–13.) Hence it is necessary for everything composed out of matter to have dimensions; and for this reason, nothing incorporeal can be composed out of matter.

But because the substance of an angel is not its own being, since this applies only to God to whom being is due out from himself and not from another, we find in an angel both its substance, or quiddity, which subsists, and its being, by which it subsists, namely, by which it is said to be by the act of being, (Dominic Gundisalvi, Des Dominicus Gundissalines Schrift von dem Hervorgange der Welt (De Processione mundi), ed. Georg Bülow, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 24, 3 (Münster: Druck und Verlag der Achendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1925), 25.) just as we are said to run by the act of running. And thus, we (“We” refers here to teachers in sacred theology; cf. The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, ed. N. M. Haring (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966), 202.) say that an angel is composed out of that by which it is and that which it is, or, according to the word of Boethius, (Boethius, On the Trinity 2 (PL 64:1250); Hebdomads, rules 2, 7–8 (PL 64:1311).) out of being and that which it is. And because the very substance of an angel in itself is considered in potency unto being, since it has being from another, and this being itself is its act, for this reason, there is composition of act and potency in it. And thus, it could be conceded that there are matter and form in it, if it is that every act ought to be called form and every potency matter. But it does not apply in the case proposed, because being is not an act which is part of essence as form. Also, the very quiddity or substance of an angel is subsisting in itself, which does not apply to matter.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that Augustine, in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, says that the unformed matter which God first fashioned is signified through heaven and earth when it is said: in the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen 1:1). (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.1 para. 3 (CSEL 28:5; PL 34:247).) This is such that “earth” signifies the unformed matter of visible things, yet “heaven” signifies the angelic nature itself not yet formed through conversion unto the Word. Thus, the natural things of angels might be attributed to them as though matter, and the gifts of grace or glory might be attributed to them as though form. Hence the authority introduced is not relevant to the proposed question.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that that book is not Boethius’, and thus it need not be received authoritatively. Nevertheless, if we accept the book, it can be said that it speaks of form and matter broadly as act and potency, as has been said. (Above: response.)

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that the very substance of an angel relates in a certain way to its being as matter unto form, as has been said. (Above: response.) Yet matter, if its essence were to be defined, would have for a difference its own very order to form and for a genus its own very substance. And similarly, in angels genus is received out of the nature of their very substance, whereas specific difference is received out of the proportion of this substance to being. Hence angels differ according to this by species insofar as in the substance of one there is more or less of potency than in the substance of another. Yet the saying of Avicenna is understood concerning composite substances.

Reply Obj. 4: This we concede: for an angel’s difference is not received from being itself, but rather from the disposition of its substance to being.

Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that in the highest good there can be no diversity, since in it being and that which is are the same. Hence this suffices to remove its plurality. But the composition which is found in an angel suffices for its plurality, as is clear from what has been said.

Article 2

Whether angels can be simultaneously in actual morning and evening knowledge, that is, so that simultaneously they might know things in their proper nature and in the Word

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that an angel cannot know things simultaneously in the Word and in their proper nature.

Obj. 1: For in the same way a power cannot do the same act twice simultaneously, the intellect cannot think and think simultaneously. But that by which the intellect of an angel sees things in the Word is one act and that by which it sees things in their proper nature is another. Therefore, it is impossible for it to see simultaneously things in the Word and in their proper nature.

Obj. 2: But you will say that a thing is seen by the intellect of an angel simultaneously in the Word and in its proper nature in this way: just as our intellect simultaneously sees an eclipse and its cause.

On the contrary: when our intellect sees an eclipse and its cause simultaneously, it understands the cause as the reason for understanding the eclipse. Therefore, it understands the eclipse and its cause as one intelligible thing; and thus, there is only one act.

Obj. 3: Of one thing there can only be one ultimate term, just as one part of a line is only terminated at one point. But the ultimate term of a potency is activity. Therefore, one potency cannot have two activities simultaneously; and thus, the same holds as before.

Obj. 4: Just as potency relates to act, so act to object. But one act cannot be terminated at two objects. Therefore, neither can one potency have many acts simultaneously; and thus, the same holds as before.

On the contrary: The vision by which angels see things in the Word is blessed vision, which indeed is not cut through, but continuous. If, therefore, they cannot see things simultaneously in their proper nature and in the Word, they never see things in their proper nature. And this is seen especially in the soul of Christ, which from the beginning of its creation sees the Word and things in the Word.

I answer that an angel or soul can see things simultaneously in the Word and in their proper nature.

And this answer can be gathered expressly from Augustine in the fourth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, where he says that those days, and the evening and morning in them, are not ordained according to succession, but only by the order of nature. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.22–35 (CSEL 28:121–36; PL 34:311–20).) Hence there is simultaneously the first day with the second, and morning with evening, and thus simultaneously the vision of things in the Word and in their proper nature.

As to how this is possible, it must be seen thus. Notice that to act is not properly attributed to potency but to the subsisting thing which acts through potency. This is such that the potency itself of the intellect is not acting in understanding, but rather the principle of activity is. Yet just as intellective potency is made a principle of understanding for substance itself, so the intelligible species is made a principle of understanding for potency itself. Hence, just as one substance can have diverse acts simultaneously according to diverse potencies, for example, how the soul simultaneously wills and understands, so out of one intellective potency diverse acts can go forth simultaneously, if simultaneously it is perfectly united by diverse intelligible species. For Al-Ghazali assigns the cause as to why it is not possible to understand many things simultaneously to it not being possible for the intellect to be informed simultaneously by many species perfectly in act, just as neither is it possible for the same body to be configured simultaneously to diverse figures. (Algazel, Metaphysics, part 1, tr. 3, sent. 4, p. 68; cf. above: Quodlibet VII, q. 1, a. 2, resp.)

Yet the vision by which an angel sees things in their proper nature is made through con-created intelligible species or infused inhering species, while the vision of things in the Word is made through the very species or essence of the Word, which is not inhering, but the intellect is united to it as to an intelligible. Yet the inhering con-created species is not repugnant to the union of the angelic intellect with the Word, since it is not of one reason. And the species itself and whatever is of perfection in the angelic intellect is as though a material disposition unto that blessed union. Hence a double activity proceeds simultaneously out of the intellect of an angel: one by reason of union with the Word, namely, by which it sees things in the Word, another by reason of the intelligible species informing it, by which it sees things in their proper nature. Nor also in one of these activities is it debilitated through attention to the other, but rather strengthened, since one is the reason of the other, just as the imagination of a thing seen is strengthened when it is seen in act by the exterior eye: for the action of beatitude in the blessed is the reason of every other action found in them.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the first is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: This we concede because that example is not fitting.

Reply Obj. 3: The two acts do not serve as the end of the intellective potency of an angel by the same means, but by the different species by which it is ordered to act.

Reply Obj. 4: Between act and object nothing falls as a medium, just as species falls as a medium between intellect and its act. Hence it is not similar.

Article 3

Whether angels could have merited enjoyment and enjoyed by the same act of charity

To the third we proceed thus. It seems that an angel did not merit its own beatitude.

Obj. 1: For what is blessed is perfect, yet what merits is still imperfect. But the same thing cannot be simultaneously perfect and imperfect. Therefore, an angel cannot merit beatitude while it has it.

Obj. 2: A blessed angel is a possessor; yet no one merits unless a wayfarer. If, therefore, in the first instant when an angel was blessed it merited beatitude, it was simultaneously a wayfarer and a possessor, which is false, since this belongs to Christ alone.

Obj. 3: Beatitude, according to the Philosopher, consists in act, but in perfect act; (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 1.5, 1095b31–1096a2; 1.7, 1098a5–20; 1.8, 1098b31–1099a7; 10.6, 1176a33–1177a10.) and similarly, merit consists in act, but imperfect act. Yet it could not be that the act of an angel would be simultaneously perfect and imperfect. Therefore, it could not be that it simultaneously would be blessed and would merit beatitude.

On the contrary: Beatitude is had by no pure creature without merit, since it has the nature of reward. (Cf. ST I.62.4; Aristotle, Ethics 1.9, 1099b16–17.) But an angel could only merit it in the first instant when it was blessed, because before that it did not have grace, as certain men posit, and thus it could not merit. Therefore, in the first instant of its beatitude it merited it.

I answer that there is a threefold position concerning the condition of an angel.

For certain men have posited that an angel in the first instant of its creation would have been blessed. But this does not seem fitting, because by the same reason the others in the first instant would have been wretched, which certain men also say, but this is absurd and condemned. (Cf. Aquinas, On the First Decretal; ST I.63.5.)

Whereas others say that all had been fashioned in grace, and certain ones persevering in it merited beatitude, whereas the others acting against it were made wretched. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 2, ch. 1, 2:33; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 4, a. 1, q. 2, 2:132–34.) And this opinion has nothing of difficulty, hence it pleases me more than the others.

Whereas the third group says that the angels were created in pure natural conditions, and for some who converted unto the Word, there was conferred simultaneously grace and beatitude. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 2, ch. 1, 2:33; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 4, a. 1, q. 2, 2:132–34.)

And these are divided into three ways.

For certain men say that angels never merited beatitude. But to have the inheritance of divine enjoyment without merit only seems to apply to Christ alone, who is the natural Son.

Whereas others say that they merit it from works which they do among us. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 5, ch. 6, p. 354 (PL 192:662).) But it also does not seem fitting for merit to follow reward, since merit is rather a disposition to a reward.

The third group say that in the first instant the angels merited beatitude by being converted unto the Word. And among these three, this is the more probable.

To show this (Cf. ST I.62–63.) it must be known that merit relates to reward just as motion to a term and just as becoming to having been made. (Aristotle, Physics 6.6, 237b9–22.) Yet in these things which become successively, becoming is before having been made; whereas in these which become at once, becoming and having been made are simultaneous, just as air is simultaneously illuminated and has been illuminated, and just as a thing is created and has been created.

The reason for this is that the instant in which something has been made for the first time is the term of the preceding time in which it was not, and thus it retains something of the propriety of that time, inasmuch as it can be said that before this instant the thing was not. And, although becoming is attributed to the preceding time in these things which become through a successive mode, nevertheless in instantaneous makings, becoming can only be attributed to that first instant itself which divides between the being and non-being of the thing. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 1.3, 186a14–16.) Hence, although in all other instants it can be said that this has been made, nevertheless it can only be said in the first that it becomes and has been made.

Similarly, I say that in the first instant when the mind of an angel has converted unto the enjoyment of the Word, it both was blessed indeed by the perfect nature of enjoyment as though existing in having been made, and merited beatitude in this: that it converted to the Word, not with the perfection of beatitude preexisting, but as though existing in the very becoming of beatitude. But afterwards the mind of the angel is only blessed, and does not merit beatitude. It is similar concerning contrition because in the same instant there is the term of preparation for grace and the infusion of grace.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that it is not necessary to posit that the same thing is simultaneously perfect and imperfect, but that the same thing is simultaneously perfect and the term of imperfection, or is now for the first time perfect.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that an angel merits as a wayfarer not as though distant from the term, but as existing in the term of the way.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said just as to the first.

Article 4

Whether angels are moved in an instant

To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that an angel is moved in an instant.

Obj. 1: For just as it is said in the Book of Intelligences, in the motion of an angel, magnitude of space does not produce distance. (Adam of Puteorum Villa, Book on Intelligences, prop. 47.3; see Clemens Baeumker, Witelo, Beiträge zur Geschichte der philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster: Druck und Verlag der Achendorffschen Buchhandlung, 1900), 3.2:57.) But on account of the distance which magnitude of space makes, it happens that something arrives not equally quickly at something near and something far. Therefore, an angel arrives equally quickly at something far and something near. But every such thing is moved in an instant. Therefore, an angel is moved in an instant.

Obj. 2: Just as a divisible mobile relates to a divisible or successive motion, so an indivisible mobile relates to an indivisible and instantaneous motion. But a body, which is a divisible mobile, is moved successively in a divisible time. Therefore, an angel, which is an indivisible mobile, is moved at once in an instant from this: that it lacks quantity.

Obj. 3: The Philosopher, in the fourth book of the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 4.8, 215a24–216a11.) proves that if something were to be moved in a vacuum it would be moved in an instant because a medium would not resist. But, just as a vacuum does not resist a body in motion, so neither does some full space resist an angel. Therefore, an angel is moved in an instant.

On the contrary: Augustine says in the eighth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis that God moves a spiritual creature through times. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.20–26 (CSEL 28:258–65; PL 34:388–94).) Yet an angel is a spiritual creature. Therefore, it is moved through time and not in an instant.

I answer that in every motion it is necessary to understand succession and time through some mode, since the terms of all motions are opposed to one another and not touching, as is clear in the first book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 1.5, 188a30–b25.) Hence it is necessary that every mobile be understood as the first in one term of motion and afterwards in the other, and thus there follows succession.

But to cross from one term to the other in moving bodies happens in two ways.

One way is just as from an instant into an instant. Yet this can only be when there are such terms of motion between which a medium is received in some way, just as between two instants is a middle time, (Cf. above: Quodlibet VII, q. 4, a. 2, resp.; Aristotle, Physics 6.3, 234a7–8, 10.) as is clear in change of place and alteration, augmentation and diminution. And these motions are called continuous on account of the continuity of that over which the motion crosses, (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a10–14.) to which it pertains to receive continuously more and less.

In another way, it crosses from one term of motion into the other just as from time into an instant. And this happens in motions whose terms are privation and form, between which it is agreed that there is no medium, hence it cannot so be crossed from one extreme into the other that at some time it is in neither of the extremes, just as it is crossed from instant into instant such that it is in neither of the instants, but in a middle time. And motions of this sort are generation, corruption, illumination, and things of this sort, in which it is necessary to say that one term was in the whole preceding time and the other in the instant at which the time is terminated. For changes of this sort are terms of certain motions, just as the illumination of day is the term of the local motion of the sun. Hence in the whole preceding time when the sun was being moved unto the point directly of opposition, there was darkness, whereas in the very instant when the sun arrives unto the aforesaid point, there is light. And it is similar concerning generation and corruption, which are the terms of alteration. And because between time and instant there does not fall some medium, nor is there some instant to receive immediately preceding the last instant of time, thence it is that in changes of this sort it is crossed without a medium from one extreme into the other, nor does it pertain to this to receive a last instant in which it was in the term-from-which, but a last time, which is terminated unto the instant in which it is in the term-to-which. And for this reason, changes of this sort are called instantaneous. (Cf. above: Quodlibet VII, q. 4, a. 2, resp.)

Yet this cannot be said for the motion of an angel, since it has no order unto some continuous motion, so that it could be called its term. Hence it is necessary to posit that to cross from term of motion into term of motion should be understood just as it is crossed from instant into instant, and not just as it is crossed from time into instant, since time cannot be understood without motion. Hence, since the being of an angel in the term-from-which depends upon no motion, it cannot be said that it is there in time, but in a certain now, and similarly in the term-to-which in another now. But nows of this sort are not terms of this time which is the number of the motion of heaven, since the motion of an angel in no way depends upon the motion of heaven, such that it is measured by its number. Nor is it necessary for them to be continued through the medium of time: for continuity of time follows continuity of motion, and continuity of motion follows continuity of magnitude, over which motion crosses, as is said in the fourth book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a10–14.) But in these activities of an angel, by reason of which it is said to be moved through diverse places, there is not found any continuity. But they relate to one another consequently. Hence also the nows which measure the motion of an angel are instants relating consequently, and there is not something continuing between them, and that plurality of nows consequent upon one another is a certain time, in which we say that an angel is moved.

And this accords with the sayings of the Philosopher in the sixth book of the Physics, where he says that it is of the same reasoning that an indivisible thing is moved and that time is composed out of nows. (Aristotle, Physics 5.6–6.1, 231b18–232a22; 6.10, 240b31–241a6.)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that time is not discovered in the motion of an angel on account of distance of space, but on account of the terms’ not touching, (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 1.5, 188a30–b25.) namely, because it does not happen that an angel is in two places simultaneously.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that succession of motion not only follows the division of a mobile, but also of that over which a motion crosses, because according to before and after in magnitude there is before and after in motion, as is said in the fourth book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a16–17.) Therefore, granted that an angel is indivisible, nevertheless the places it moves are divided from one another, and for this reason, it is necessary for some division to be understood in its motion.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, although some full space does not impede an angel in its motion, nevertheless on account of the reasoning already said it is necessary for diverse nows to be understood in its motion. Yet the reasoning of the Philosopher leads more to the impossible than to a demonstration, as the Commentator says in the same place. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics 4, comm. 71–72; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 4, lect. 12, nn. 535–38.)

Article 5

Whether angels can impress upon or make something in those bodily things

To the fifth we proceed thus. It seems that angels cannot act upon these lower bodies.

Obj. 1: For action can only be between those things which fit somehow with one another. But an angel does not fit somehow with those bodies, since there is no one genus of corruptible and incorruptible things, as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b26–29.) Therefore, angels cannot act upon these bodies.

Obj. 2: If angels act upon these bodies, either they act through command or through influx. If through command, they can act equally upon something near and something far, which is against Damascene who says that where they work, they are. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.13 (PG 94:854).) Whereas if they act through influx, it is necessary for that which flows in to cross through a medium. Yet a bodily medium is not receptive of spiritual impression. Therefore, in no way can angels act either upon these lower bodies or upon our souls.

Obj. 3: Angels cannot be said to act or to influence in the way a font flows into a stream, such that something the same in number which was in an angel before is made afterwards in these lower things, for the angels would lose something in acting thus. Nor can the angels create what is said to be received through their influence in these lower things, because angels are not creators. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8.13 (CCSL 50:139; PL 42:875–76); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 7, ch. 8, p. 363 (PL 192:666).) Nor again can they draw it forth from potency to act, because nature suffices for this. Therefore, angels in no way act upon lower things.

On the contrary: Augustine says in the third book of On the Trinity that all things which are done in bodily things from above happen by the ministry of angels. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.4.10 (CCSL 50:136–37; PL 42:874).) Gregory also says in the fourth book of the Dialogues that all bodily things are administered through spiritual substances. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues 4.5 [4.6] (PL 77:329; SC 265:34, 38).)

I answer that concerning the action of angels upon these lower bodies there is a twofold opinion amongst the philosophers. For the Commentator says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics that spiritual substances can only impress upon these lower bodies with heavenly bodies mediating, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 11, comm. 32–35; cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 15.1.2, resp.) which are moved by incorporeal substances, according to the philosophers.

Whereas Avicenna says, in his Metaphysics and in the sixth book of On Natural Things, (Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 9.5, pp. 488–94; On Natural Things 6.4.) that they impress upon lower bodies in a twofold way. One way is through the motion of the spheres, and another way is immediately through command, because the forms of their intellect are productive, according to him, and sensible matter obeys their conceptions more than active and passive qualities. (Cf. Avicenna, On Natural Things 6.4.) And hence it is, according to him, that sometimes there are changes in those lower things from the conceptions of superior substances, beyond the whole order of natural causes.

But this second opinion is repugnant to the sayings of Augustine in the third book of On the Trinity, where he says that bodily matter does not serve angels at a nod. (Augustine, On the Trinity 3.8.13 (CCSL 50:139; PL 42:875); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 7, ch. 7, p. 363 (PL 192:666).) For it is repugnant to reason because, although that which is potency in matter is actually in spiritual substances much more nobly, nevertheless bodily matter is not a potency proportionate in respect to that act by which spiritual substances are in act. Yet it is necessary for the agent which leads out potency into act to be proportionate to matter. Hence it cannot be that the power of a created spiritual substance extends itself, changing matter immediately, but with some natural agent mediating.

For even though bodily matter may not obey it unto formal change immediately, nevertheless it obeys it naturally unto local motion, and through this power angels can gather and place certain natural agents to accomplish some effect. Whereas those unto which no natural power extends itself are made by divine power alone, which alone can change the natural order.

But because our minds are proportionate and near enough to receive the action of angels, for this reason, they can act in our minds in a twofold way. One way is by strengthening our intellect, just as in bodily things a less hot body is strengthened through a hotter one. Another way is through the natural agent of the intellect itself, just as also it acts upon bodies, and this is inasmuch as by angelic light phantasms are illumined for expressing some nobler conceptions than can be expressed by the light of the agent intellect.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that angels have a fittingness with those lower bodies, which is the fittingness of mover unto motion: for they can move bodies by local motion, and not only those heavenly ones immediately, but also these lower ones. Thus, our judgment concerning the action of angels upon bodies is a mean between the two aforesaid opinions of the philosophers.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that an angel acts upon these bodies by moving them locally through command, but this command is not without active power, which necessarily touches the moved body in some way, since it is necessary for mover and moved to exist simultaneously, as is proved in the seventh book of the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 7.2, 243a22–23.) Whereas it is not necessary for the action by which it is said to flow into our souls by strengthening them for understanding to cross through a bodily medium, because order amongst spiritual things does the same as position amongst bodily things, according to Augustine. (Cf. Augustine, Confessions 13.9, para. 10 (CCSL 27:246–47; PL 32:848–49); City of God 11.28 (CCSL 48:348; PL 41:342); Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, 2:154b; 1:181a.) Whereas our souls by the order of nature are, as it were, touched by these angels, just as also a lower angel by a superior. Hence it is not necessary for a bodily medium to intervene.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that angels create something neither in our soul nor in a natural body, but they only lead out from potency into act. And although a natural agent can lead out from potency into act, nevertheless they cannot do so as perfectly as an angel.

On men

Question 5

Regarding nature

Then there were questions concerning what pertains to men:

and first, regarding nature; (Q. 5.)

second, regarding grace; (Q. 6.)

third, regarding fault; (Q. 7.)

fourth, regarding glory. (Q. 8.)

Regarding nature, there were two questions:

first, whether the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul are a result of creation;

second, whether to command is an act of the will or of the reason.

Article 1

Whether the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul are a result of creation

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul are brought to exist through creation.

Obj. 1: For as Augustine says in the book On True Religion, a living substance is greater by the order of nature than a non-living substance. (Augustine, On True Religion 29.52 (CCSL 32:221; PL 34:145).) But the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul are living substances. Therefore, they are nobler than all non-living substances. Yet some non-living substances are created immediately by God, such as the elements of this world. (Cf. Galatians 4:3; Colossians 2:8, 20; Aquinas, Commentary on Galatians, ch. 4, lect. 1, n. 198; Commentary on Colossians, ch. 2, lect. 2, 4; Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 12, ch. 1, p. 384 (PL 192:675).) Therefore, the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul also are created immediately by God, since the nobility of the thing made demonstrates the nobility of the maker.

Obj. 2: Everything which is properly made in its own right is made either out of nothing or out of something. But to be made applies properly to the sensitive soul. Since, therefore, it is not made out of something, as it does not have matter as a part of it, it remains that it is made out of nothing, and thus it goes into being through creation.

Proof of the minor premise: everything which properly has being, if it did not always exist, properly is said to be made. But the sensitive soul properly and truly has being, since it is an acting substance (for it moves a body), yet nothing has a proper activity unless it has proper being. Therefore, since the sensitive soul of this animal did not always exist, to be made properly applies to it. And thus, it remains that it is created.

On the contrary (1): The Philosopher says in the second book of On the Soul that the first change of a sensitive thing is made by the one generating. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5, 417b16–17.) Yet the first change of a sensitive thing is that according to which it acquires its first act, which is the sensitive soul. Therefore, it is made through generation and not through creation.

Furthermore (2): Everything which precedes in the seed of man or animal is through generation and not through creation. But the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul precede in the seed of man because it is a living thing before it is animal, and animal before man, according to the Philosopher in the sixteenth book of On Animals. (Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.3, 736a35–b5.) Therefore, the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul are also in man through generation.

Furthermore (3): Since God works in an instant, whereas nature successively, everything which is brought to exist through successive action is from some natural agent. But the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul are produced by successive action because what is conceived is in a determinate space of time vivified and sensitized. Therefore, the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul are from a natural agent and not through creation.

I answer that there is a twofold opinion about this question: for certain men say that the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul are out of creation, whereas others that they are out of the parents.

And this diversity amongst the philosophers is found not only concerning those souls, but also concerning substantial forms: for certain men, as Plato and Avicenna, have posited that all forms are from something extrinsic. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 7, comm. 31; 11, comm. 18; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What is Sensed, tr. 1, ch. 9, n. 138; Plato, Timaeus 13, 41a.) They were convinced of this for two reasons especially: the first reason is that, since forms do not have matter as a part of them, they can only be made out of nothing. Hence it is necessary for them to be made by someone creating. The second reason is that in inferior things they did not see principles of action except active and passive qualities, which they judged insufficient for the production of substantial forms, since nothing acts beyond its species. (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What is Sensed, tr. 1, ch. 9, n. 138; Albert the Great, Summa de homine, q. 17, a. 3, obj. 15, ad 15, 35:150, 157; In II Sent., d. 1 A, a. 5, obj. 3, ad 3, 27:16a, 18a; d. 1 C, a. 12, obj. 12, 27:32b.)

But they seem to have been deceived in that they attributed to be made properly to these forms, although nevertheless to be made belongs to nothing except a composite, to which being also properly belongs. For forms are said to be not as subsisting things, but as those by which they are composed, hence also to be made is said not by proper making, but through the making of composites, which are made through transmutation of matter from potency into act. Hence, just as composites are made through natural agents, so also forms which are not subsisting. Yet active and passive qualities act unto substantial forms in virtue of the substantial forms, whose instruments they are, just as the heat of fire acts as an instrument of the nutritive soul, as is said in the second book of On the Soul. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a9–18; Aquinas, In II Sent. 18.2.3, ad 2.)

Yet the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul are not subsisting forms, otherwise they would remain after bodies. Hence it is necessary for them to be made by one generating through the making of composites, just as also the other material forms. Yet the intellective soul alone, which has subsisting being, since it remains after the body, is from without through creation. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.3, 736b27–29; Aquinas, In II Sent. 18.2.3, s.c.)

Yet if the vegetative and sensitive and intellective are rooted in man in diverse substances of the soul, then also the vegetative and the sensitive of man will be by one generating. But, because this opinion is repugnant both to the sayings of the philosophers, who in one animate thing posit only one soul to which all activities of the soul pertain, and also against the sayings of the saints disproving the duality of souls, as is clear in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, (Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas, ch. 15 (PL 42:1216; 58:984; CPG 5984); cf. Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 48 (PL 40:814).) for this reason, with it proved that in man there is only one substance of soul, whose powers are vegetative and sensitive and intellective, we say that the soul of man, which sustains all of these powers, is created by God, although it happens through the activity of a natural agent that a body furnished with organs is actually perfected through the powers which are the acts of the bodily parts.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the sensitive soul and the vegetative soul are not living substances, just as they are not subsisting things, but they are principles of living and of being. And again, it is not necessary, if that which is less noble is immediately created by God, for something nobler to be also. God, since he does not have limited power, nor does he act by necessity of nature, can do both nobler and less noble things according to his will, just as he produced the first individuals of brute animals immediately, even though men who now are generated out of seed are nobler.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that it does not befit a sensitive soul essentially either to be or to be made or to operate: (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 18.2.3, ad 1.) for there is no action of the sensitive soul in which the body does not communicate. For there is a double motive power of the sensitive soul: one which commands, namely, the appetitive, whose act it is agreed is not executed without the body; the other which is commanded, which affixed to muscles and nerves is the principle of mobility in them. (Cf. Avicenna, Book on the Soul 1.5, pp. 82–83; Aquinas, In I Sent. 14.1.3, resp.) But this distinction of bodily parts makes it that one part of an animal is moving and another is moved, and thus they can be moved out of themselves.

Reply Sed Contra 1–3: The other contrary objections we concede, except insofar as they pertain to man, in whose seed although the sensitive and vegetative soul precede imperfectly, nevertheless with those ceasing the rational soul is introduced through creation, which perfectly contains that which was in them imperfectly. For according to Avicenna, many generations and corruptions intervene in the generation of an animal out of seed. (Cf. Avicenna, Book on the Soul 5.7, p. 172; Aquinas, In II Sent. 12.1.4.)

Article 2

Whether to command is an act of the will or of the reason

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that to command is an act of the reason.

Obj. 1: For the Philosopher says in the first book of the Ethics: the reason entreats rightly and unto the best things, (Aristotle, Ethics 1.13, 1102b15–16.) and: it obeys that which is of the continent man. (Aristotle, Ethics 1.13, 1102b26–27.) Therefore, to command and to entreat and things of this sort seem to pertain to the reason.

On the contrary: To command pertains to a lord. But we are lords of our acts through the will. Therefore, to command is an act of the will.

I answer that in a command two things come together. One of these is of the reason and the other of the will. For the will commands and inclines us to do something: since it moves in the manner of an agent. The reason directs someone to execute that which is commanded, since it belongs to reason to direct. And, if the order of these two is considered, there is found, first, the inclination of the will to something through choice. Afterwards, in the beginning of execution, reason directs us to what has been chosen to be done. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 15.4.1, ad 1; Aristotle, Ethics 3.3, 1112b27–28.) And thus, command comes directly from an act of the reason, but from the will in the manner of a first mover.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Question 6

Regarding grace

Article 1

Whether charity is increased according to its essence

Then there is a question regarding grace, whether charity is increased according to its essence. And it seems that it is not.

Obj. 1: For since an increase is a certain change or variation, that which is increased according to essence is varied or changed according to essence. But that which is varied according to essence or changed is either generated or corrupted. Therefore, if charity is increased according to essence, it is corrupted; for it is not generated, since it was before.

Obj. 2: Charity does not have quantity except power. But the power of charity is its very essence. Therefore, the quantity of charity is its very essence. Therefore, it cannot be that the quantity of charity is varied without variation of its essence. And thus, if it is increased according to its essence, it is necessary that its essence is either corrupted or generated.

On the contrary: Essential reward responds to the very essence of charity. But certain men attain to a greater essential reward. Therefore, charity is increased in them according to its essence.

I answer that charity is increased according to its essence.

But it must be noted that this preposition “according to” amongst the various relations which it implies, (Peter of Spain, Tractatus (Summulae Logicales) 7.33, ed. L.M. De Rijk (Netherlands: Koninklijke Van Gorcum and Comp. B.V. Assen, 1972), 101; cf. ST I.43.3, obj. 2.) sometimes denotes a subject, such as when it is said, “he is white according to the foot,” because foot is the subject of whiteness; whereas sometimes it denotes a form, such as when it is said, “he is colored according to whiteness.” When, therefore, something is said to be moved according to this, either subject or form can be understood. For when it is said, “he is moved according to the hand,” the subject of motion is noted; whereas when it is said, “he is moved according to place,” that which formally specifies the motion is noted.

Thus, therefore, when we say that charity is increased according to essence, the subject of increase is denoted, so that the sense might be “the very essence of charity is increased,” just as when we say, “white is increased according to its essence.” Yet the form specifying the motion is not designated, so that the sense might be: “it is increased according to essence,” that is, its increase is a motion in being or in essence, but thus the increase is said to be according to quantity. And although the quantity of charity, which is power, is the same as the essence of charity, nevertheless it is not necessary for the essence of charity to be destroyed, because even in bodily increase the very essence of quantity is not destroyed, since indeterminate dimension remains always, but according to the diverse terminations which it receives, change is made from small into large, which is increase. So also the power itself of charity is not destroyed through its essence, but its termination is varied. For every form received in some subject receives termination according to the capacity of the receiver, (Cf. above: q. 4, a. 1, resp.) hence, as much as the subject of charity is more disposed unto charity through its conversion unto God, (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 17.1.3, qa. 4, ad 2.) in so much greater a charity does it participate. And thus, charity is said to increase according to its essence.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And through this the solution to the objections is clear.

Question 7

Regarding fault

Then there were two questions regarding fault:

first, whether Peter sinned mortally by denying Christ;

second, whether to have many prebends without a dispensation, but without the care of souls, is a mortal sin.

Article 1

Whether Peter sinned mortally by denying Christ

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that Peter did not sin mortally by denying Christ.

Obj. 1: For a certain gloss says that he sinned through something unexpected. (Glossa interlinearis, at Luke 22:57, in Glossa ordinaria 5.981; Ambrose of Milan, Exposition on the Gospel of Luke 10.72 (CCSL 14:367; PL 15:1822); Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 3.32.63 (CCSL 143:154; PL 75:630–31).) But sin through what is unexpected is venial and not mortal (hence the first motions, which come to be through what is unexpected, are venial sins). Therefore, he sinned venially and not mortally.

Obj. 2: Bernard says in the book On Loving God that in Peter charity was put to sleep, not extinguished. (Rather, William of Saint-Thierry, On the Nature and Dignity of Love (Liber beati Bernardi de amore) 6.14 (PL 184:390); cf. Alexander of Hales, Questiones antequam esset Frater, q. 23, 1:416.) But through mortal sin charity is extinguished. Therefore, Peter did not sin mortally.

On the contrary: Gregory says in the Morals on the Book of Job that Peter was snatched out from the very jaws of the devil. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 33.12.22 (CCSL 143:1692; PL 76:686); On the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 25.9 (PL 76:1195; CCSL 141).) But no one is in the jaws of the devil except through mortal sin. Therefore, Peter sinned mortally.

I answer that without a doubt Peter sinned mortally by denying Christ. This is clear from two things.

The first is because he denied the faith of Christ in the place where he was tried and his confession was required: for confession by the mouth is made unto salvation, as is said in Romans 10:10. It seems necessary for salvation for there to be a confession of faith in the aforesaid case. As well, a lie in matters of faith is especially most pernicious, according to Augustine in the book On Lying. (Augustine, On Lying 14.25 (CSEL 41:444; PL 40:505).)

The second is because to his defection of confession and lying he added perjury and blasphemy since, as is said in Matthew 26:74: he began to detest and to swear that he did not know the man, which it is agreed are grave sins. Hence the Gloss says in the same place: a third time he began to detest and to swear that he did not know the man, because to persevere in sin gives increase of crimes, and he who spurns the smallest things, falls into greater ones. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 26:72, 5.441 (PL 114:172); cf. Rabanus Maurus, On Matthew 8 (PL 107:1124 C; CCCM 174A:724).)

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that what is unexpected is understood in two ways: one way is insofar as it is opposed to deliberation, and thus the first motions are said to be from the unexpected. Yet Peter did not sin in this way from what was unexpected. Another way is insofar as it is opposed to choice, and in this way, Peter did sin from what was unexpected, because he did not sin out of choice, as though out of settled malice, (Cf. Aquinas, In II Sent. 7.1.2; Aristotle, Ethics 6.5, 1140b19–20; 3.5, 1114a32–b1; 7.7, 1150a21–22.) but out of the passion of fear. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 25.11.28 (CCSL 143B:1253–54; PL 76:339).) It being unexpected in this way, however, does not excuse one from mortal sin, as is clear in the incontinent man who fornicates when conquered by concupiscence, even though, nevertheless, he had the intention of containing himself. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 7.7, 1150a11–15.)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that Bernard is speaking improperly, and, so that it might be verified, his statement either must be understood concerning a certain love of familiarity which Peter had conceived for Christ, which remained in him even after the denial, or, if it is understood concerning gratuitous charity, it must be understood that it was not extinguished according to the divine predestination which was preparing his repentance, although in itself it was extinguished according to act.

Article 2

Whether to have many prebends without the care of souls, and without a dispensation, is a mortal sin

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that to have many prebends without the care of souls, and without a dispensation, is a mortal sin.

Obj. 1: For whoever acts against a statute of a council sins mortally. But he who has many prebends acts against a statute of a general council. Therefore, he sins mortally.

Proof of the minor premise: in Distinction 70 it is said in a certain decretal of Pope Urban, which begins “Of the holy canons”: let it not be permitted in any way for someone to be titled in two churches*, but let each man be in the one in which he is titled, in which alone he is considered a canon. For although by the dispensation of a bishop one can be over diverse churches, nevertheless he ought to be a cleric provided with a prebend only of the one church in which he is conscripted*. (Gratian, Decretum, Part 1, Distinction 70, canon 2, 1:257.)

Obj. 2: In the Decretum, a certain decretal of the seventh synod says: a cleric is not numbered in two churches at the same time. For this belongs to business and the advantage of filthy lucre, and is utterly alien to ecclesiastical custom (C. 21, q. 1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, c. 21, q. 1, c. 1, 1:852.) And thus, the same holds as before.

Obj. 3: Chrysostom says: that what blushed at darkness, blushes at light; (The citation has not been found; cf. John Chrysostom, Homilies 28.3, on 2 Corinthians 12:21.) what was not allowed for the figure, I consider illicit for reality. Yet it was not allowed for the figure that a Levite taking hold of an office in Bethlehem would take hold also in Jerusalem. Therefore, since we ought to be more perfect, let him who takes hold in Tyre not take hold in Damascus.

Obj. 4: Bernard says: he who is not one but many in benefices, will be not one but many in punishments. (The citation has not been found; cf. Bernard of Clairvaux, Letter 271 [341], “To Count Theobald” (PL 182:475).) But he who has many prebends is many in benefices. Therefore, he will be many in punishments. And thus, he sins most gravely.

Obj. 5: Whoever commits himself to the risk and danger of mortal sin sins mortally. But a man who receives two prebends commits himself to the risk and danger of mortal sin because by receiving many prebends he will swear to the statutes of each church in which he has a prebend, which at any time cannot be served simultaneously: for example, if at the same time he is called to an election in each church, or to carrying out some business of each church, and especially if there is a dispute between the two churches, since he is held to both. Therefore, it seems that he sins mortally. (Cf. above: Quodlibet VIII, q. 6, a. 2, obj. 1.)

On the contrary (1): That which inclines to common danger is not to be tolerated by the Church. Yet the Church commonly tolerates some men to have two prebends. Therefore, in this there is not the danger of mortal sin.

Furthermore (2): It is licit for someone having a patrimony to receive a prebend. But the compatibility between ecclesiastical benefices is greater than that between a patrimony and a prebend. Therefore, it is also licit for someone having one prebend to receive another.

I answer that every question about mortal sin, unless the truth is evident, is determined dangerously. This is because the error of not believing something to be mortal sin, but what is mortal sin, does not excuse the conscience from the whole sin, although perhaps it does so to an extent. And the error of believing something to be mortal which is not mortal still binds the conscience to sin. (Cf. above: Quodlibet VIII, q. 6, a. 3, resp.)

This is especially dangerous where the truth is ambiguous, which happens in this question. For since this question pertains both to theologians, inasmuch as it depends upon divine law or upon natural law, and to jurists, inasmuch as it depends upon positive law, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 5, lect. 12, nn. 1018, 1023.) there are found for this question theologians opining things contrary to theologians and jurists things contrary to jurists.

For in the divine law it is not expressly determined, since in Sacred Scripture no express mention is made concerning it, although arguments from some authorities of Scripture perhaps can be adduced unto it, which nevertheless do not show the truth lucidly. Whereas by considering it according to natural law, thus it seems at present that of human actions the difference is manifold. For there are certain things which have deformity inseparably annexed, such as fornication, adultery, and other things of this sort, which in no way can be done well. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 2.6, 1107a8–17.) And to have many prebends does not belong to such things, otherwise in no case could someone receive a dispensation, which no one says. Whereas there are certain actions which of themselves are indifferent unto good or evil, such as to lift a straw from the earth or something of this sort, (Cf. above: Quodlibet VIII, q. 6, a. 3, resp.) among which certain men reckon to have many prebends, saying that thus it is licit to have many prebends just as to have many apples. But this does not seem to be true, since to have many prebends contains very many disorders in itself, inasmuch as it is not possible for someone to serve in the many churches in which he has a prebend, since prebends seem to be ordained as certain stipends of those ministering to God in the same place. There follows also the diminution of divine cult when one is instituted instead of many. There follows also in some cases the defrauding of the wills of testators, who conferred some goods upon the churches so that there would be a settled number of men serving God there. There follows also both inequality, while one abounds in many benefices and another cannot have one, and many other things of this sort, which it is easy to consider. Hence it cannot be contained among the indifferent actions. And much less can it be contained among those which are good according to themselves, such as to give alms and things of this sort.

Whereas there are certain other actions which, absolutely considered, involve a certain deformity or disorder, which, nevertheless, are made good in some circumstances, just as to kill a man or to beat him in itself implies a certain deformity, but if there is added to kill a malefactor on account of justice or to beat a delinquent for the sake of discipline, there will not be sin, but a virtuous act. And to have many prebends seems to be among the number of these actions: for although it contains some disorders, nevertheless other circumstances can supervene adorning the act with honor such that the aforesaid disorders are completely evacuated, as for example if there is necessity in many churches for his services and he could serve the church more or just as much as another who is present, even though he be absent, and if there are other things of this sort in some way. And then with those conditions supervening with right intention, there will not be sin, even with no dispensation intervening, if it were considered only according to natural law, because dispensation does not pertain to natural law, but only to positive. Whereas if someone has many benefices with the intention of becoming richer, of living more elegantly, of being promoted to the episcopacy more easily after having been elected in some of the churches where he has a prebend, then the aforesaid deformities are not removed, but increased. For to have such an intention even for one benefice, which of itself implies no disorder, would be illicit. And it would have to be said likewise according to natural law, even with no positive law supervening.

Yet it is now established through ancient laws that this is prohibited. It is also clear that a custom is contrary to this prohibition, through which certain men say that those laws are abrogated, since human laws are abrogated through contrary custom. Whereas certain men say that through this custom the ancient laws are not derogated, since a certain decretal says: many things are endured through patience which, if they are drawn into judgment, with justice (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 3, tit. 5, c. 18, 2:471.) compelling, would be annulled. And this controversy must be left to the jurists. Although, it seems to be probable that, insofar as those ancient laws contain natural law, they cannot be abrogated through contrary custom, since this would be irrational. Insofar as they contain only something of positive law, they can be abrogated, especially if those dissimulating this contrary custom, in whose power it is to change the positive law, intend through such dissimulation to change the ancient laws. If, therefore, the ancient laws, which prohibit this, remain in their own strength, with a contrary custom opposing, it is certain that someone cannot have many prebends without a dispensation, even with those circumstances supervening which according to a consideration of natural law could have adorned the act with honor. Yet if the ancient laws are abrogated through custom, then with the aforesaid circumstances supervening, it is licit to have many prebends even without a dispensation, without which circumstances it is not licit, however much a dispensation intervenes, by this: that human dispensation does not remove the bond of natural law but only the bond of positive law, which is established through man, and through man can be dispensed.

Reply Obj. 1–5: And from these things the response to the objections is obvious.

Question 8

Regarding glory

Article 1

Whether all the saints who are canonized through the Church are in glory, or are some of them in hell

Then there is a question regarding glory, whether all the saints who are canonized through the Church are in glory, or are some of them in hell. And it seems that some men canonized by the Church can be in hell.

Obj. 1: For no one can be as sure of the state of someone else as he can be of his own self, because those things which are of a man no one knows unless the spirit of the man which is in him, as is said in 1 Corinthians 2:11. But a man cannot be sure of himself whether he is in the state of salvation. Ecclesiastes 9:1: no one knows whether he is worthy of hatred or of love. Therefore, much less does the pope know. Therefore, he can err in canonizing.

Obj. 2: Whoever in judging leans upon a fallible middle can err. But the Church in canonizing saints leans upon human testimony, since she inquires through witnesses concerning the life and miracles. Therefore, since the testimony of men is fallible, it seems that the Church in canonizing saints can err.

On the contrary (1): In the Church there cannot be a damnable error. But it would be a damnable error if one were venerated as a saint who was a sinner, because some men knowing his sins or heresy, if it happens thus, could be led into error. Therefore, the Church in such matters cannot err.

Furthermore (2): Augustine says in an epistle to Jerome that, if in canonical Scripture any lie should be admitted, our faith will give way, which faith depends upon canonical Scripture. (Augustine, Epistles 40.3, para. 5 (CSEL 34.2:75; PL 33:156); 28.3, para. 5 (CSEL 34.1:111; PL 33:113–14).) But, just as we are held to believe that which is in Sacred Scripture, so likewise that which commonly is determined through the Church, hence a heretic is judged who opines against the determination of councils. Therefore, the common judgment of the Church cannot be erroneous. And thus, the same holds as before.

I answer that something can be judged possible considered according to itself which is found impossible related to something extrinsic. Therefore, I say that for the judgment of those who are over the Church to err in any matters, if only their persons are regarded, is possible. Whereas if divine providence were to be considered which directs its Church by the Holy Spirit so that it might not err, just as he promised in John 16:13 that the Spirit coming would teach all truth, namely, concerning things necessary unto salvation, it is certain that it is impossible for the judgment of the Church universal to err in these things which pertain to faith. Hence the sentence of a pope, to which it pertains to determine concerning faith, which he proffers in judgment, must stand more than the opinion of any wise men in their writings, since Caiaphas, although wicked, is still read, because he was the pontiff, to have prophesied unknowingly, in John 11:51. Whereas in other sentences, which pertain to particular facts, as those concerning possessions or concerning crimes or concerning things of this sort, it is possible for the judgment of the Church to err on account of false witnesses.

The canonization of saints is a middle between these two. Since, nevertheless, the honor which we exhibit to the saints is a certain profession of faith, by which we believe in the glory of the saints, piously it must be believed that not even in these matters can a declaration of the Church err.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that a pontiff, to whom it belongs to canonize saints, can be made certain concerning the state of someone through inquisition of life and attestation of miracles, (Cf. Aquinas, An Apology for the Religious Orders, ch. 7; ST II-II.178.2, obj. 3.) and especially through the instinct of the Holy Spirit, who scrutinizes all things, even the profundities of God (1 Cor 2:10).

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that divine providence preserves the Church lest she be deceived in such matters through the fallible testimony of men.